@abloatai/ablo 0.34.0 → 0.35.0

package/dist/sync/credentialLifecycle.d.ts

@@ -1,175 +1,7 @@
 /**
- * Keeps the short-lived access credential fresh. It owns the re-mint hook, a
- * single-flight guard that stops concurrent triggers from minting more than
- * once, and a browser-only proactive refresh — a timer plus an OS-wake listener
- * — that renews the credential ahead of expiry. It reaches the rest of the
- * client only through the small {@link CredentialLifecycleContext} interface,
- * so the two can reference each other without an import cycle.
+ * Moved to the settlement core with the duplex transport (ADR 0016): keeping
+ * a long-lived socket's credential fresh is connection plumbing an agent needs
+ * as much as a browser does. This path re-exports it so existing importers
+ * stay unchanged.
  */
-import type { RecoveryClass } from '../errorCodes.js';
-/**
- * Tri-state outcome of a credential re-mint, mirroring the `getToken`
- * contract (see {@link CredentialLifecycle.refresh}).
- */
-export type CredentialRefreshOutcome = 'refreshed' | 'session_error' | 'network_error';
-/**
- * What an auth-rejected transport should do after recovery has run. `'retry'`
- * means a fresh credential is now in place — replay the request once. `'stop'`
- * means don't replay: either the session is gone for good, the rejection is one
- * a re-mint can't cure, or the mint failed transiently and the caller's own
- * retry path will recover later.
- */
-export type CredentialRecoveryOutcome = 'retry' | 'stop';
-/**
- * What a credential refresher may resolve with. The plain-string form returns
- * just the token. The object form also carries the mint response's `expiresAt`
- * (an ISO string, epoch milliseconds, or a `Date`), which lets the proactive
- * pre-roll schedule against the credential's real lifetime rather than assume
- * the server's default expiry.
- */
-export type CredentialRefreshResult = string | {
-    readonly token: string;
-    readonly expiresAt?: string | number | Date;
-} | null;
-/** A credential re-mint hook. `Promise<string | null>` resolvers remain
- *  assignable — the widened result type is a superset. */
-export type CredentialRefresher = () => Promise<CredentialRefreshResult>;
-/** The fallback pre-roll interval, and also its ceiling: 10 minutes, which sits
- *  comfortably inside the server's 15-minute default credential lifetime. Used
- *  as-is when the refresher reports no expiry. */
-export declare const DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS: number;
-/** Floor so a very short (or already-elapsed) TTL can't hot-loop the mint. */
-export declare const MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS: number;
-/**
- * Computes how long to wait before pre-rolling a credential that expires at
- * `expiresAtMs`: about two-thirds of the remaining lifetime (a 15-minute
- * credential yields 10 minutes), clamped to
- * [{@link MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS}, {@link DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS}]. An
- * unknown expiry (`null`) falls back to the 10-minute interval. Exported for
- * unit tests.
- */
-export declare function computePrerollDelayMs(expiresAtMs: number | null, nowMs: number): number;
-/**
- * The callbacks this lifecycle needs back from the surrounding client. It is
- * deliberately minimal — three callbacks, each resolved lazily at call time,
- * because the connection machinery behind two of them isn't constructed until
- * the sync connection is set up.
- */
-export interface CredentialLifecycleContext {
-    /** Push a freshly-minted access token into the shared credential source
-     *  (no-op when the deployment wired no credential source). */
-    setAuthToken(token: string): void;
-    /** Nudge the connection to re-probe using the credential now in place. */
-    nudgeReconnect(): void;
-    /** Report that the long-lived login is gone, so the connection can move to
-     *  its signed-out state. */
-    reportSessionExpired(): void;
-}
-export declare class CredentialLifecycle {
-    private readonly ctx;
-    /**
-     * The hook that mints a fresh short-lived access credential (the `ek_`/`rk_`
-     * key). An integrator wires it from their own token endpoint: this lifecycle
-     * decides when to refresh (a stale-credential probe or an external nudge),
-     * and the hook decides how to mint. It follows the same contract as a
-     * `getToken` function — it resolves a token string on success, `null` when
-     * the long-lived login is gone (a terminal state), and throws on a transient
-     * or offline failure. Used by {@link refresh}. When it is absent there is no
-     * silent re-mint, as with a static `apiKey` whose credential source is
-     * refreshed elsewhere.
-     */
-    private credentialRefresher;
-    /** Single-flight guard so a wake nudge + an in-flight request + a probe don't
-     *  all mint at once (the classic "token thrash → random logout" bug). */
-    private inFlightCredentialRefresh;
-    /** Tears down the proactive credential lifecycle (the refresh timer and the
-     *  OS-wake listener) installed by {@link start}; cleared when the client
-     *  disconnects. Null when no refresher is wired. */
-    private credentialLifecycleTeardown;
-    /** Epoch milliseconds at which the current credential expires, when the
-     *  refresher reports it (the object form of {@link CredentialRefreshResult}).
-     *  `null` for the string-form resolver, in which case the pre-roll uses its
-     *  fixed interval. */
-    private credentialExpiresAtMs;
-    /** Re-arms the proactive pre-roll timer (set by {@link start}). Called after
-     *  every successful mint, so a refresh triggered reactively (by a probe, an
-     *  OS wake, or the first mint) re-anchors the schedule to the fresh
-     *  credential's real expiry instead of a stale fixed delay. */
-    private prerollReschedule;
-    constructor(ctx: CredentialLifecycleContext);
-    /**
-     * Registers the re-mint hook for the access credential — a function that
-     * mints a fresh `ek_`/`rk_` key, typically the integrator's `getToken`. See
-     * {@link credentialRefresher}.
-     */
-    setRefresher(refresher: CredentialRefresher | null): void;
-    /**
-     * Re-mints the short-lived access credential, pushes it into the credential
-     * source, and reports a three-way outcome the connection layer acts on:
-     *   - a token string → `'refreshed'`     (the fresh key is in place; re-probe and reconnect)
-     *   - `null`         → `'session_error'` (the login itself is gone — terminal, sign out)
-     *   - a thrown error → `'network_error'` (the mint endpoint was unreachable — transient)
-     *
-     * The call is single-flight: concurrent triggers (an OS wake, an in-flight
-     * request, a probe) share one in-flight promise, so the credential is never
-     * minted twice at once. This avoids the failure where every rejected request
-     * mints a new token and the resulting thrash logs the user out.
-     *
-     * With no refresher wired, it resolves `'refreshed'` as a no-op re-probe: a
-     * static-`apiKey` client has no session to mint from and its credential
-     * source is refreshed elsewhere, so it simply re-probes with what it holds.
-     */
-    refresh(): Promise<CredentialRefreshOutcome>;
-    /**
-     * Interprets a refresh outcome and drives the connection accordingly. This is
-     * the single place the three-way outcome is acted on, shared by the proactive
-     * pre-roll, the OS-wake nudge, and the HTTP auth-recovery path, so every
-     * trigger converges on the same behavior.
-     */
-    private routeRefreshOutcome;
-    /**
-     * The shared recovery path for a request rejected on authentication, over any
-     * transport. The WebSocket probe already routes its own 401s; HTTP callers
-     * call this instead of inventing their own handling, so every path shares one
-     * single-flight mint, one outcome routing, and one taxonomy. It classifies
-     * the same recovery codes the connection probe does:
-     *   - `access_credential_expiry` — the routine case, an expired `ek_`/`rk_`:
-     *     silently re-mint through the single-flight {@link refresh} and tell the
-     *     caller to replay once on success. This never signs out on its own; the
-     *     only terminal path is the mint resolving `null`.
-     *   - `session_expiry` — the login is gone: report it (which drives sign-out)
-     *     and stop, since replaying is pointless.
-     *   - `auth_blocked`, `permission`, and everything else — re-minting would
-     *     produce the same rejected credential, so stop and leave the connection
-     *     alone.
-     */
-    recoverFromAuthRejection(recovery: RecoveryClass): Promise<CredentialRecoveryOutcome>;
-    /**
-     * Installs the credential lifecycle. It has two parts:
-     *   1. Reactive — registers `getToken` as the re-mint hook the connection
-     *      calls when a probe finds the key stale, or on a nudge.
-     *   2. Proactive — keeps the short-lived key fresh ahead of expiry with a
-     *      refresh timer inside the credential's lifetime, plus a re-mint on OS
-     *      wake. The whole proactive block is browser-gated on `typeof window`,
-     *      because a server render has no socket to keep warm and the resolver is
-     *      browser-oriented; arming it under Node would fire a relative-URL fetch
-     *      and throw. (Agents pass a static `apiKey` with no resolver, so this
-     *      method is never called for them.)
-     *
-     * Refreshing is automatic — a consumer never calls a refresh method. The call
-     * is idempotent: a second call replaces the first, and it is torn down when
-     * the client disconnects.
-     *
-     * `opts.proactiveInNode` arms the refresh timer on a windowless host as well.
-     * Set it for agent or system participants — long-lived server sockets whose
-     * `rk_`/`ek_` must renew before the server's keepalive check closes them.
-     * Node timers are `unref`ed, so a finishing script is never held alive by the
-     * pre-roll. The OS-wake listener stays browser-only regardless, since there
-     * is no `window` to listen on.
-     */
-    start(getToken: CredentialRefresher, opts?: {
-        proactiveInNode?: boolean;
-    }): void;
-    /** Tear down the proactive credential lifecycle (idempotent). */
-    stop(): void;
-}
+export { DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS, MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS, computePrerollDelayMs, CredentialLifecycle, type CredentialRefreshOutcome, type CredentialRecoveryOutcome, type CredentialRefreshResult, type CredentialRefresher, type CredentialLifecycleContext, } from '../transaction/transport/credentialLifecycle.js';

package/dist/sync/credentialLifecycle.js

@@ -1,322 +1,7 @@
 /**
- * Keeps the short-lived access credential fresh. It owns the re-mint hook, a
- * single-flight guard that stops concurrent triggers from minting more than
- * once, and a browser-only proactive refresh — a timer plus an OS-wake listener
- * — that renews the credential ahead of expiry. It reaches the rest of the
- * client only through the small {@link CredentialLifecycleContext} interface,
- * so the two can reference each other without an import cycle.
+ * Moved to the settlement core with the duplex transport (ADR 0016): keeping
+ * a long-lived socket's credential fresh is connection plumbing an agent needs
+ * as much as a browser does. This path re-exports it so existing importers
+ * stay unchanged.
  */
-import { getContext } from '../context.js';
-/** The fallback pre-roll interval, and also its ceiling: 10 minutes, which sits
- *  comfortably inside the server's 15-minute default credential lifetime. Used
- *  as-is when the refresher reports no expiry. */
-export const DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
-/** Floor so a very short (or already-elapsed) TTL can't hot-loop the mint. */
-export const MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS = 30 * 1000;
-/**
- * Computes how long to wait before pre-rolling a credential that expires at
- * `expiresAtMs`: about two-thirds of the remaining lifetime (a 15-minute
- * credential yields 10 minutes), clamped to
- * [{@link MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS}, {@link DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS}]. An
- * unknown expiry (`null`) falls back to the 10-minute interval. Exported for
- * unit tests.
- */
-export function computePrerollDelayMs(expiresAtMs, nowMs) {
-    if (expiresAtMs === null || !Number.isFinite(expiresAtMs)) {
-        return DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS;
-    }
-    const remaining = expiresAtMs - nowMs;
-    if (remaining <= 0)
-        return MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS;
-    const twoThirds = Math.floor((remaining * 2) / 3);
-    return Math.min(Math.max(twoThirds, MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS), DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS);
-}
-/** Narrow a refresher-supplied `expiresAt` to epoch ms, or `null` when
- *  absent/unparseable (→ fallback cadence, never a crash). */
-function normalizeExpiresAtMs(expiresAt) {
-    if (expiresAt === undefined)
-        return null;
-    const ms = expiresAt instanceof Date
-        ? expiresAt.getTime()
-        : typeof expiresAt === 'number'
-            ? expiresAt
-            : Date.parse(expiresAt);
-    return Number.isFinite(ms) ? ms : null;
-}
-export class CredentialLifecycle {
-    ctx;
-    /**
-     * The hook that mints a fresh short-lived access credential (the `ek_`/`rk_`
-     * key). An integrator wires it from their own token endpoint: this lifecycle
-     * decides when to refresh (a stale-credential probe or an external nudge),
-     * and the hook decides how to mint. It follows the same contract as a
-     * `getToken` function — it resolves a token string on success, `null` when
-     * the long-lived login is gone (a terminal state), and throws on a transient
-     * or offline failure. Used by {@link refresh}. When it is absent there is no
-     * silent re-mint, as with a static `apiKey` whose credential source is
-     * refreshed elsewhere.
-     */
-    credentialRefresher = null;
-    /** Single-flight guard so a wake nudge + an in-flight request + a probe don't
-     *  all mint at once (the classic "token thrash → random logout" bug). */
-    inFlightCredentialRefresh = null;
-    /** Tears down the proactive credential lifecycle (the refresh timer and the
-     *  OS-wake listener) installed by {@link start}; cleared when the client
-     *  disconnects. Null when no refresher is wired. */
-    credentialLifecycleTeardown = null;
-    /** Epoch milliseconds at which the current credential expires, when the
-     *  refresher reports it (the object form of {@link CredentialRefreshResult}).
-     *  `null` for the string-form resolver, in which case the pre-roll uses its
-     *  fixed interval. */
-    credentialExpiresAtMs = null;
-    /** Re-arms the proactive pre-roll timer (set by {@link start}). Called after
-     *  every successful mint, so a refresh triggered reactively (by a probe, an
-     *  OS wake, or the first mint) re-anchors the schedule to the fresh
-     *  credential's real expiry instead of a stale fixed delay. */
-    prerollReschedule = null;
-    constructor(ctx) {
-        this.ctx = ctx;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Registers the re-mint hook for the access credential — a function that
-     * mints a fresh `ek_`/`rk_` key, typically the integrator's `getToken`. See
-     * {@link credentialRefresher}.
-     */
-    setRefresher(refresher) {
-        this.credentialRefresher = refresher;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Re-mints the short-lived access credential, pushes it into the credential
-     * source, and reports a three-way outcome the connection layer acts on:
-     *   - a token string → `'refreshed'`     (the fresh key is in place; re-probe and reconnect)
-     *   - `null`         → `'session_error'` (the login itself is gone — terminal, sign out)
-     *   - a thrown error → `'network_error'` (the mint endpoint was unreachable — transient)
-     *
-     * The call is single-flight: concurrent triggers (an OS wake, an in-flight
-     * request, a probe) share one in-flight promise, so the credential is never
-     * minted twice at once. This avoids the failure where every rejected request
-     * mints a new token and the resulting thrash logs the user out.
-     *
-     * With no refresher wired, it resolves `'refreshed'` as a no-op re-probe: a
-     * static-`apiKey` client has no session to mint from and its credential
-     * source is refreshed elsewhere, so it simply re-probes with what it holds.
-     */
-    async refresh() {
-        const refresher = this.credentialRefresher;
-        if (!refresher)
-            return 'refreshed';
-        if (this.inFlightCredentialRefresh)
-            return this.inFlightCredentialRefresh;
-        const run = (async () => {
-            try {
-                const result = await refresher();
-                const token = typeof result === 'string' ? result : result?.token;
-                if (!token) {
-                    // null = the long-lived login is gone (the mint endpoint answered
-                    // 401/403). Terminal — this routes to sign-out.
-                    return 'session_error';
-                }
-                // Object-form resolvers carry the mint's actual expiry; remember it so
-                // the proactive pre-roll schedules off the real TTL (string-form
-                // resolvers leave it null → fixed fallback cadence).
-                this.credentialExpiresAtMs =
-                    typeof result === 'object' && result !== null
-                        ? normalizeExpiresAtMs(result.expiresAt)
-                        : null;
-                this.ctx.setAuthToken(token);
-                // Re-anchor the proactive pre-roll to the fresh credential's expiry.
-                this.prerollReschedule?.();
-                return 'refreshed';
-            }
-            catch (error) {
-                // A throw = transient (offline / mint endpoint unreachable / 5xx). The
-                // login may be perfectly valid; never sign out for this — back off and
-                // retry. Mirrors the `getToken` throw-vs-null contract end-to-end.
-                const message = error?.message ?? String(error);
-                // A relative-URL resolver invoked on the server (Node's fetch has no
-                // origin to resolve against) throws the opaque "Failed to parse URL" or
-                // "Only absolute URLs are supported". Translate it into something
-                // actionable rather than a mystery transient blip: the proactive
-                // refresh is browser-only, so reaching here means the resolver fired
-                // from a server render or a server route.
-                if (typeof window === 'undefined' && /parse URL|absolute URLs?/i.test(message)) {
-                    getContext().logger.warn('credential resolver ran on the server with a relative URL — Node fetch needs an absolute URL. ' +
-                        'Refresh the Ablo client in the browser, or build an absolute URL server-side ' +
-                        "(e.g. new URL('/api/ablo-session', process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL)).", { error: message });
-                }
-                else {
-                    getContext().logger.debug('access-credential re-mint failed (transient)', { error: message });
-                }
-                return 'network_error';
-            }
-        })();
-        this.inFlightCredentialRefresh = run;
-        try {
-            return await run;
-        }
-        finally {
-            this.inFlightCredentialRefresh = null;
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Interprets a refresh outcome and drives the connection accordingly. This is
-     * the single place the three-way outcome is acted on, shared by the proactive
-     * pre-roll, the OS-wake nudge, and the HTTP auth-recovery path, so every
-     * trigger converges on the same behavior.
-     */
-    routeRefreshOutcome(outcome) {
-        if (outcome === 'refreshed') {
-            // Fresh key already pushed into the credential source by `refresh`;
-            // nudge a parked connection to re-probe with it.
-            this.ctx.nudgeReconnect();
-            return 'retry';
-        }
-        if (outcome === 'session_error') {
-            // The long-lived login is gone (the mint answered 401/403). Report it;
-            // this is harmless in connection states that don't accept the event,
-            // which converge on sign-out anyway.
-            this.ctx.reportSessionExpired();
-            return 'stop';
-        }
-        // 'network_error' → transient (offline or a mint hiccup); the next proactive
-        // tick or the connection's own probe retries. Never sign out, never replay now.
-        return 'stop';
-    }
-    /**
-     * The shared recovery path for a request rejected on authentication, over any
-     * transport. The WebSocket probe already routes its own 401s; HTTP callers
-     * call this instead of inventing their own handling, so every path shares one
-     * single-flight mint, one outcome routing, and one taxonomy. It classifies
-     * the same recovery codes the connection probe does:
-     *   - `access_credential_expiry` — the routine case, an expired `ek_`/`rk_`:
-     *     silently re-mint through the single-flight {@link refresh} and tell the
-     *     caller to replay once on success. This never signs out on its own; the
-     *     only terminal path is the mint resolving `null`.
-     *   - `session_expiry` — the login is gone: report it (which drives sign-out)
-     *     and stop, since replaying is pointless.
-     *   - `auth_blocked`, `permission`, and everything else — re-minting would
-     *     produce the same rejected credential, so stop and leave the connection
-     *     alone.
-     */
-    async recoverFromAuthRejection(recovery) {
-        switch (recovery) {
-            case 'access_credential_expiry':
-                return this.routeRefreshOutcome(await this.refresh());
-            case 'session_expiry':
-                this.ctx.reportSessionExpired();
-                return 'stop';
-            default:
-                return 'stop';
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Installs the credential lifecycle. It has two parts:
-     *   1. Reactive — registers `getToken` as the re-mint hook the connection
-     *      calls when a probe finds the key stale, or on a nudge.
-     *   2. Proactive — keeps the short-lived key fresh ahead of expiry with a
-     *      refresh timer inside the credential's lifetime, plus a re-mint on OS
-     *      wake. The whole proactive block is browser-gated on `typeof window`,
-     *      because a server render has no socket to keep warm and the resolver is
-     *      browser-oriented; arming it under Node would fire a relative-URL fetch
-     *      and throw. (Agents pass a static `apiKey` with no resolver, so this
-     *      method is never called for them.)
-     *
-     * Refreshing is automatic — a consumer never calls a refresh method. The call
-     * is idempotent: a second call replaces the first, and it is torn down when
-     * the client disconnects.
-     *
-     * `opts.proactiveInNode` arms the refresh timer on a windowless host as well.
-     * Set it for agent or system participants — long-lived server sockets whose
-     * `rk_`/`ek_` must renew before the server's keepalive check closes them.
-     * Node timers are `unref`ed, so a finishing script is never held alive by the
-     * pre-roll. The OS-wake listener stays browser-only regardless, since there
-     * is no `window` to listen on.
-     */
-    start(getToken, opts) {
-        this.stop();
-        this.setRefresher(getToken);
-        // Re-mint through the same single-flight path the reactive probe uses
-        // (`refresh`) rather than calling `getToken()` directly. This gives two
-        // things: the mint stays single-flight, so an OS wake, an in-flight probe,
-        // and this proactive roll share one in-flight promise instead of thrashing;
-        // and the three-way outcome is honored, so a `null` result (the login is
-        // gone) actually drives expiry instead of being dropped, which would leave a
-        // zombie session that re-mints on every tab focus.
-        const refresh = async () => {
-            // Same outcome routing as every other trigger (see routeRefreshOutcome):
-            // refreshed → nudge, session_error → report, network_error → wait for
-            // the next tick / the FSM's own probe. Never sign out for a transient.
-            this.routeRefreshOutcome(await this.refresh());
-        };
-        const teardowns = [];
-        // The proactive pre-roll arms in the browser, or under Node when the host
-        // opts in (`proactiveInNode`, for agent or system participants). The
-        // default Node posture stays reactive-only, because a server render can
-        // construct user-kind clients whose resolver is browser-oriented (a
-        // relative-URL `fetch('/api/ablo-session')`); arming a timer there fires
-        // that resolver under Node, where fetch has no origin for a relative URL and
-        // throws "Failed to parse URL" on every tick. Long-lived server
-        // participants are the opposite case: their socket must outlive the
-        // credential's lifetime, so they get the timer. The reactive re-mint hook
-        // (`setRefresher` above) stays unconditional: it only fires on a real
-        // connection probe, which can't happen during a bare server-side module
-        // evaluation.
-        if (typeof window !== 'undefined' || opts?.proactiveInNode === true) {
-            // A missed tick (throttled in the background) is recovered by the next
-            // one, or by the reactive probe. This timer is the only proactive
-            // pre-roll — it keeps the key warm ahead of expiry even while the socket
-            // sits healthy and connected, a state the connection never probes. The
-            // delay comes from the minted credential's real `expiresAt` when the
-            // refresher reports one (about two-thirds of the remaining lifetime), with
-            // the 10-minute value as both ceiling and fallback, so a deployment that
-            // mints shorter-lived keys still pre-rolls in time rather than dropping to
-            // reactive-only recovery.
-            let timer = null;
-            const scheduleNext = () => {
-                if (timer !== null)
-                    clearTimeout(timer); // idempotent re-arm
-                const delay = computePrerollDelayMs(this.credentialExpiresAtMs, Date.now());
-                timer = setTimeout(() => {
-                    // `.finally` keeps the chain alive after a transient failure; a
-                    // successful mint has already re-armed via `prerollReschedule` (the
-                    // clearTimeout above makes the double-arm a no-op).
-                    void refresh().finally(scheduleNext);
-                }, delay);
-                // Node: never keep a finishing process alive just for the pre-roll
-                // (browser timers have no unref — optional call is a no-op there).
-                timer.unref?.();
-            };
-            scheduleNext();
-            this.prerollReschedule = scheduleNext;
-            teardowns.push(() => {
-                if (timer !== null)
-                    clearTimeout(timer);
-                timer = null;
-                this.prerollReschedule = null;
-            });
-            // OS-wake, on desktop only: the Electron shell bridges `powerMonitor`
-            // 'resume' to this DOM event. It is the one event trigger this lifecycle
-            // still owns, because `visibilitychange` does not fire on wake-from-sleep
-            // and the connection's own browser listeners don't cover wake. It is
-            // browser-gated separately from the timer, since a `proactiveInNode` host
-            // has no `window` to listen on and no OS sleep to wake from. Coming back
-            // online and regaining tab visibility are handled elsewhere — the
-            // connection already re-probes through this same credential path — so
-            // listening for them here too would only fire a second, redundant mint.
-            if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
-                const onWake = () => void refresh();
-                window.addEventListener('ablo:wake', onWake);
-                teardowns.push(() => { window.removeEventListener('ablo:wake', onWake); });
-            }
-        }
-        this.credentialLifecycleTeardown = () => {
-            for (const t of teardowns)
-                t();
-        };
-    }
-    /** Tear down the proactive credential lifecycle (idempotent). */
-    stop() {
-        this.credentialLifecycleTeardown?.();
-        this.credentialLifecycleTeardown = null;
-    }
-}
+export { DEFAULT_PREROLL_INTERVAL_MS, MIN_PREROLL_DELAY_MS, computePrerollDelayMs, CredentialLifecycle, } from '../transaction/transport/credentialLifecycle.js';

package/dist/sync/deltaPipeline.d.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 import { ModelScope } from '../InstanceCache.js';
 import type { Model } from '../Model.js';
-import type { ModelData } from '../types/modelData.js';
+import type { ModelData } from '../transaction/types/modelData.js';
 import type { SyncDelta } from './SyncWebSocket.js';
 /** One applied-delta result from the persistence layer's batch write, forwarded to the pool. */
 interface DeltaDbResult {

package/dist/sync/participants.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import type { SyncWebSocket } from './SyncWebSocket.js';
-import type { Schema } from '../schema/schema.js';
-import type { Claim, Activity, ClaimTarget, ClaimStream, Peer, PresenceStream, PresenceTarget } from '../types/streams.js';
+import type { Schema } from '../transaction/schema/schema.js';
+import type { Claim, Activity, ClaimTarget, ClaimStream, Peer, PresenceStream, PresenceTarget } from '../transaction/types/streams.js';
 import type { AttachableClaimStream } from './createClaimStream.js';
 /**
  * The scope a participant can be joined to. The usual form is an entity target
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export interface ScopedClaimOptions {
     /** Peer-visible description of the work. Defaults to `'editing'`. */
     readonly description?: string;
     /** How long the claim lives; the server expires it automatically after this. */
-    readonly ttl?: import('../types/streams.js').Duration;
+    readonly ttl?: import('../transaction/types/streams.js').Duration;
 }
 export interface ScopedClaims {
     readonly focus: ClaimTarget | null;
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ export interface ParticipantManager {
 }
 export interface ParticipantManagerConfig {
     readonly ready: () => Promise<void>;
-    readonly getTransport: () => SyncWebSocket | null;
+    /** The connection, host-built and stable for the client's lifetime. */
+    readonly transport: SyncWebSocket;
     readonly presence: PresenceStream;
     readonly claims: AttachableClaimStream;
     readonly schema?: Schema;

package/dist/sync/participants.js

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
-import { scopeKindOf } from '../schema/model.js';
-import { AbloConnectionError, AbloValidationError } from '../errors.js';
+import { scopeKindOf } from '../transaction/schema/model.js';
+import { AbloValidationError } from '../transaction/errors.js';
+import { subTarget, streamTarget, wireTarget, } from '../transaction/coordination/index.js';
 export function createParticipantManager(config) {
     return {
         async join(input, overrides) {
@@ -9,10 +10,9 @@ export function createParticipantManager(config) {
                 : null;
             const syncGroups = unique(resolveParticipantSyncGroups(options.scope ?? target ?? undefined, config.schema));
             await config.ready();
-            const transport = config.getTransport();
-            if (!transport) {
-                throw new AbloConnectionError('Ablo participant join failed: WebSocket is not connected', { code: 'ws_not_ready' });
-            }
+            // Not-connected joins surface through `sendClaim`'s diagnosed
+            // rejection below; a scopeless join needs no wire send at all.
+            const transport = config.transport;
             const claimId = createParticipantClaimId();
             if (syncGroups.length > 0) {
                 await transport.sendClaim(claimId, syncGroups, {
@@ -74,15 +74,30 @@ export function resolveParticipantSyncGroups(scope, schema) {
     }
     return out;
 }
+/**
+ * The group kind for a model, in the wire dialect every plane shares: a
+ * declared scope root wins; otherwise the lowercased typename — the same
+ * token the commit plane and claim targets use (`wireModel`). Never the
+ * camelCase schema key: the server validates inbound subscription groups
+ * against a lowercase-only grammar, so a key like `reportBlocks` would be
+ * rejected as malformed on subscribe — and even a lowercase key would put
+ * this client in a different group than a peer who resolved the same row
+ * through an entity ref, so the two would never see each other's claims.
+ */
+function groupKindForModel(def, key) {
+    return scopeKindOf(def, key) ?? (def.typename ?? key).toLowerCase();
+}
 export function syncGroupFromEntityRef(ref, schema) {
     const match = findModelForEntityRef(ref, schema);
-    const kind = match ? scopeKindOf(match.def, match.key) : undefined;
-    return `${kind ?? ref.type.toLowerCase()}:${ref.id}`;
+    const kind = match
+        ? groupKindForModel(match.def, match.key)
+        : ref.type.toLowerCase();
+    return `${kind}:${ref.id}`;
 }
 function syncGroupFromSchemaKey(schemaKey, id, schema) {
     const def = schema?.models?.[schemaKey];
-    const kind = def ? scopeKindOf(def, schemaKey) : undefined;
-    return `${kind ?? schemaKey}:${id}`;
+    const kind = def ? groupKindForModel(def, schemaKey) : schemaKey.toLowerCase();
+    return `${kind}:${id}`;
 }
 function findModelForEntityRef(ref, schema) {
     if (!schema?.models)
@@ -296,12 +311,8 @@ function createJoinedParticipant(args) {
 }
 function activityFromTarget(target) {
     return {
-        entityType: target.type,
-        entityId: target.id,
-        path: target.path,
-        range: target.range,
-        field: target.field,
-        meta: target.meta,
+        ...wireTarget(target),
+        ...subTarget(target),
     };
 }
 function presenceMatchesParticipant(entry, target, syncGroups) {
@@ -310,12 +321,8 @@ function presenceMatchesParticipant(entry, target, syncGroups) {
     if (!target)
         return true;
     return targetsOverlap({
-        type: entry.activity.entityType,
-        id: entry.activity.entityId,
-        path: entry.activity.path,
-        range: entry.activity.range,
-        field: entry.activity.field,
-        meta: entry.activity.meta,
+        ...streamTarget(entry.activity),
+        ...subTarget(entry.activity),
     }, target);
 }
 function targetsOverlap(a, b) {