@aastar/sdk 0.24.1 → 0.25.0

package/dist/kms.d.cts

@@ -334,7 +334,28 @@ interface RunCeremonyOptions {
     rpId?: string;
     origin?: string;
     signCount?: number;
+    /**
+     * The 32-byte payload digest being authorized (e.g. the SignHash hash). When set,
+     * the WebAuthn challenge is bound to it as `SHA-256(nonce ‖ payload)` instead of the
+     * raw nonce — this is the "what you see is what you sign" (WYSIWYS) commitment the
+     * TA verifies (AirAccount #68). REQUIRED once the KMS runs in strict mode
+     * (`--features strict-challenge`); in the default transition mode the raw nonce is
+     * still accepted. Omit only for non-signing ceremonies (none today). Accepts a
+     * Uint8Array or a `0x` hex string.
+     */
+    payload?: Uint8Array | `0x${string}`;
 }
+/**
+ * Compute the WYSIWYS-bound WebAuthn challenge for a signing ceremony:
+ * `base64url( SHA-256( decode(nonce) ‖ payload ) )`.
+ *
+ * `nonce` is the base64url challenge from BeginAuthentication; `payload` is the 32-byte
+ * digest about to be signed (the SignHash hash). The KMS/TA recomputes this exact value
+ * and rejects the signature if it doesn't match (AirAccount #68). Use this in a browser
+ * frontend that builds its own WebAuthn assertion for a device passkey, so the per-call
+ * `webAuthnAssertion` it sends commits to the operation hash.
+ */
+declare function commitChallenge(nonceBase64Url: string, payload: Uint8Array | `0x${string}`): string;
 /**
  * Run a full WebAuthn challenge-binding ceremony (AirAccount #49):
  *   1. fetch a one-time TA challenge from the `begin` endpoint,
@@ -769,37 +790,115 @@ declare class KmsManager {
      * challenge from {@link beginGrantSessionAuth} instead.)
      */
     beginWebAuthnAuth(keyId: string): Promise<KmsBeginAuthenticationResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Create a KMS signer that authorizes each signature with a LEGACY raw passkey
+     * assertion (reusable, no challenge consumption).
+     *
+     * @deprecated The KMS (v0.20.0+) rejects legacy raw passkey assertions for
+     * signing/mutating operations (`/SignHash` → 400, "no challenge binding —
+     * replayable"), unless `KMS_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSKEY=1` is set on the KMS (test
+     * only). Prefer {@link createKmsSignerWithCeremony}, which runs a one-time
+     * challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony per signature.
+     */
     createKmsSigner(keyId: string, address: string, assertionProvider: () => Promise<LegacyPasskeyAssertion>): KmsSigner;
+    /**
+     * Create a KMS signer that authorizes each signature with a one-time,
+     * challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony (production-safe; replay-protected).
+     *
+     * Every `signMessage` call runs a FRESH ceremony (BeginAuthentication →
+     * authenticator assertion → `/SignHash` with the `WebAuthn` field), because the
+     * KMS consumes the challenge atomically (one challenge ⇒ one signature). A
+     * Tier-2/3 BLS transfer that needs N owner signatures therefore triggers N
+     * ceremonies — see {@link BLSSignatureService} (which now skips the unused
+     * userOpHash owner-ECDSA for tiered signatures, so Tier-2 needs only one).
+     *
+     * @param ceremonySigner authenticator that signs the WebAuthn challenge
+     *   (a browser passkey on the client, or {@link P256PasskeySigner} server-side).
+     */
+    createKmsSignerWithCeremony(keyId: string, address: string, ceremonySigner: PasskeyCeremonySigner, ceremonyOptions?: Omit<RunCeremonyOptions, "signer">, commitPayload?: boolean): KmsSigner;
 }
+/** How a {@link KmsSigner} authorizes each `/SignHash` call. */
+type KmsSignerAuth = {
+    mode: "legacy";
+    assertionProvider: () => Promise<LegacyPasskeyAssertion>;
+} | {
+    mode: "ceremony";
+    ceremonySigner: PasskeyCeremonySigner;
+    ceremonyOptions?: Omit<RunCeremonyOptions, "signer">;
+    /**
+     * Bind each ceremony challenge to the payload via `SHA-256(nonce ‖ hash)`
+     * (WYSIWYS, AirAccount #68). DEFAULT `false` (raw nonce) because the LIVE KMS
+     * host (kms.aastar.io) still verifies the WebAuthn assertion against the raw
+     * nonce — sending the commitment is rejected with "Challenge mismatch". Enable
+     * only once the KMS host recomputes `expected = SHA-256(nonce ‖ payload)` for
+     * signing ops (tracked AirAccount-side). The commitment IS already correct vs
+     * the TA; the gap is the host verify.
+     */
+    commitPayload?: boolean;
+};
 /**
- * KMS-backed signer with Passkey assertion.
+ * KMS-backed signer (EIP-191 personal-sign over a digest).
  *
- * Each signing operation calls the `assertionProvider` to obtain a Legacy
- * Passkey assertion, which is then passed to KMS SignHash. The Legacy format
- * is reusable (no challenge consumption), enabling BLS dual-signing.
+ * Two authorization modes (see {@link KmsSignerAuth}):
+ *  - `ceremony` (preferred): each signature runs a fresh one-time WebAuthn
+ *    ceremony and calls KMS `SignHash` with the challenge-bound `WebAuthn` field
+ *    (replay-safe; what the KMS now requires).
+ *  - `legacy` (deprecated): each signature reuses a raw passkey assertion via
+ *    KMS `SignHash` `Passkey` field — rejected by KMS unless
+ *    `KMS_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSKEY=1` (test only).
  *
  * Narrowed during the ethers -> viem migration: only the EIP-191 personal-sign
- * and address-read behaviour is actually consumed by the SDK, so the former
- * ethers.AbstractSigner surface (signTransaction / signTypedData / connect /
- * provider) has been dropped.
+ * and address-read behaviour is consumed by the SDK.
  */
 declare class KmsSigner {
     private readonly keyId;
     private readonly _address;
     private readonly kmsManager;
-    private readonly assertionProvider;
-    constructor(keyId: string, _address: string, kmsManager: KmsManager, assertionProvider: () => Promise<LegacyPasskeyAssertion>);
+    private readonly auth;
+    constructor(keyId: string, _address: string, kmsManager: KmsManager, auth: KmsSignerAuth);
     getAddress(): Promise<string>;
-    signMessage(message: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string>;
+    /**
+     * EIP-191 personal-sign over a digest. A string is hashed as UTF-8 text, a byte
+     * array as raw bytes — byte-identical to ethers `hashMessage`.
+     *
+     * @param webAuthnAssertion OPTIONAL pre-built, one-time ceremony assertion. Use
+     *   this in server flows where the passkey lives on the USER's device: the
+     *   frontend runs the BeginAuthentication ceremony and the backend forwards the
+     *   resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }` here. When supplied it takes
+     *   precedence over the signer's baked-in auth mode. Each assertion is one-time
+     *   (the KMS consumes the challenge), so a caller that needs N signatures must
+     *   supply N distinct assertions.
+     *
+     *   WYSIWYS (AirAccount #68): the frontend MUST build the assertion over the
+     *   payload-committed challenge `commitChallenge(nonce, hashOf(message))`, not the
+     *   raw nonce — otherwise a compromised host could swap the signed payload. The
+     *   raw-nonce assertion only works while the KMS runs in transition mode. (The
+     *   signer's own ceremony mode does this automatically.)
+     */
+    signMessage(message: string | Uint8Array, webAuthnAssertion?: WebAuthnAssertion): Promise<string>;
 }
 
 /**
- * Context for passing Passkey assertion data through the signing chain.
- * Used by KMS-backed signers to authenticate signing operations.
+ * Context for passing a LEGACY raw passkey assertion through the signing chain.
+ *
+ * @deprecated KMS v0.20.0+ rejects legacy raw passkey assertions for signing
+ * (no challenge binding → replayable). Prefer {@link WebAuthnCeremonyContext}.
  */
 interface PasskeyAssertionContext {
     assertion: LegacyPasskeyAssertion;
 }
+/**
+ * Context carrying a one-time, challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony assertion
+ * (the replay-safe path the KMS now requires). In server transfer flows the
+ * passkey lives on the USER's device: the frontend runs the BeginAuthentication
+ * ceremony and the backend forwards the resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }`.
+ * Each assertion is one-time — a flow needing N signatures supplies N of them.
+ */
+interface WebAuthnCeremonyContext {
+    webAuthnAssertion: WebAuthnAssertion;
+}
+/** Either auth context accepted by a KMS-backed signer. */
+type SignerAuthContext = PasskeyAssertionContext | WebAuthnCeremonyContext;
 /**
  * Pluggable signer adapter — replaces NestJS AuthService wallet management.
  * Implement this to provide signing capabilities from your key management system.
@@ -817,9 +916,11 @@ interface ISignerAdapter {
      * `account.signMessage({ raw: bytes })`). A `Uint8Array` (or raw `0x` hex) is
      * signed as raw bytes — callers pass a 32-byte digest, NOT UTF-8 text.
      *
-     * @param ctx optional Passkey assertion context for KMS-backed signers.
+     * @param ctx optional auth context for KMS-backed signers — a one-time
+     *   {@link WebAuthnCeremonyContext} (preferred) or a legacy
+     *   {@link PasskeyAssertionContext}.
      */
-    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
     /**
      * Ensure a signer exists for the user (create on demand if needed).
      * Returns the signer's address.
@@ -1419,7 +1520,17 @@ declare class BLSSignatureService {
     /** Lazy-initialize BLSManager on first use. */
     private ensureInitialized;
     getActiveSignerNodes(): Promise<unknown[]>;
-    generateBLSSignature(userId: string, userOpHash: string, ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<BLSSignatureData>;
+    generateBLSSignature(userId: string, userOpHash: string, ctx?: SignerAuthContext, options?: {
+        /**
+         * Skip the owner ECDSA over `userOpHash` (`aaSignature`). The cumulative
+         * Tier-2 (algId 0x04) / Tier-3 (0x05) packings do NOT include it — they
+         * carry only `messagePointSignature` (owner intent comes from the P256
+         * passkey signature) — so computing it there is a wasted owner signature.
+         * Under the WebAuthn-ceremony KMS path that wasted signature is also a
+         * wasted user gesture, so tiered callers set this to `true`.
+         */
+        skipOwnerOpSignature?: boolean;
+    }): Promise<BLSSignatureData>;
     packSignature(blsData: BLSSignatureData): Promise<string>;
     /**
      * Generate a tiered signature based on the required tier level.
@@ -1441,7 +1552,7 @@ declare class BLSSignatureService {
         userOpHash: string;
         p256Signature?: string;
         guardianSigner?: GuardianSigner;
-        ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext;
+        ctx?: SignerAuthContext;
     }): Promise<string>;
 }
 
@@ -1561,7 +1672,20 @@ interface ExecuteTransferParams {
      *  the gas token address appended to paymasterData. Used when the paymaster
      *  contract does not expose a public token() getter for auto-detection. */
     paymasterTokenAddress?: string;
+    /**
+     * LEGACY raw passkey assertion for KMS signing.
+     * @deprecated KMS v0.20.0+ rejects it (replayable). Use {@link webAuthnAssertion}.
+     */
     passkeyAssertion?: LegacyPasskeyAssertion;
+    /**
+     * One-time, challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony assertion for KMS owner signing
+     * (replay-safe; what the KMS now requires). The frontend runs the
+     * BeginAuthentication ceremony with the user's device passkey and passes the
+     * resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }` here. The challenge is consumed once,
+     * so this authorizes exactly ONE owner signature — use the tiered path
+     * (`useAirAccountTiering: true`), which needs a single owner signature.
+     */
+    webAuthnAssertion?: WebAuthnAssertion;
     /** P256 passkey signature (64 bytes hex). Required for AirAccount Tier 2/3. */
     p256Signature?: string;
     /** Guardian signer instance. Required for AirAccount Tier 3. */
@@ -1639,7 +1763,7 @@ declare class WalletManager {
     private readonly signer;
     constructor(signer: ISignerAdapter);
     getAddress(userId: string): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
-    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
     ensureSigner(userId: string): Promise<{
         address: `0x${string}`;
     }>;
@@ -1670,6 +1794,26 @@ declare class WalletManager {
  *
  * const account = await client.accounts.createAccount('user-123');
  * ```
+ *
+ * @example KMS-backed signing (production) — inject {@link KmsSignerAdapter} as the
+ * `signer`. This is the wiring seam that carries a per-call WebAuthn ceremony
+ * assertion (challenge-bound, replay-safe) from `executeTransfer` through to the
+ * KMS `/SignHash`. The `userId → { keyId, address }` mapping is app-specific.
+ * ```ts
+ * import { AirAccountServerClient, KmsManager, KmsSignerAdapter } from '@aastar/airaccount/server';
+ *
+ * const kms = new KmsManager({ kmsEndpoint, kmsApiKey, kmsEnabled: true });
+ * const client = new AirAccountServerClient({
+ *   ...rest,
+ *   signer: new KmsSignerAdapter(kms, async (userId) => lookupUserKey(userId)),
+ * });
+ * // Transfer with a one-time WebAuthn assertion (frontend ceremony) on the tiered path:
+ * await client.transfers.executeTransfer(userId, {
+ *   ...params,
+ *   useAirAccountTiering: true,
+ *   webAuthnAssertion, // { ChallengeId, Credential } from BeginAuthentication
+ * });
+ * ```
  */
 declare class AirAccountServerClient {
     readonly ethereum: EthereumProvider;
@@ -3334,10 +3478,46 @@ declare class LocalWalletSigner implements ISignerAdapter {
     private readonly account;
     constructor(privateKey: string);
     getAddress(_userId: string): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
-    signMessage(_userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, _ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    signMessage(_userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, _ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
     ensureSigner(_userId: string): Promise<{
         address: `0x${string}`;
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACCOUNT_ABI, AGENT_SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ADDRESSES, AIRACCOUNT_FACTORY_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_COMPOSITE_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ADDRESS, ALG_ID, AccountManager, type AccountRecord, type ActiveRecovery, AgentRegistryService, type AgentReputationSummary, type AgentSessionConfig, type AgentSessionInfo, AirAccountServerClient, type AirAccountVersion, BLSSignatureData, BLSSignatureService, type BeginCeremonyResponse, type BindERC8004AgentWalletParams, type BlsConfigRecord, type BuildCredentialOptions, CALLDATA_PARSER_REGISTRY_ABI, ConsoleLogger, type CreateAgentAccountParams, type CreateP256SessionKeyRequest, type CreateP256SessionKeyResponse, DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_ID, DEFAULT_KMS_ENDPOINT, DEFAULT_ORIGIN, DEFAULT_RP_ID, type DelegateInitParams, DvtPendingConfirmationError, type EIP7702Authorization, EIP7702DelegateService, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V6, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V7_V8, ENTRYPOINT_ADDRESSES, ERC20_ABI, ERC8004Service, ERC8004_ADDRESSES, EXECUTE_BATCH_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_USER_OP_SELECTOR, type EntryPointConfig, EntryPointVersion, type EntryPointVersionConfig, type EstimateGasParams, EthereumProvider, type ExecuteTransferParams, FACTORY_ABI_V6, FACTORY_ABI_V7_V8, FORCE_EXIT_MODULE_ABI, ForceExitService, type FullConfigGuardianParams, GLOBAL_GUARD_ABI, type GrantP256SessionParams, type GrantSessionParams, GuardChecker, type GuardState, GuardStateReader, GuardStatus, type ILogger, type ISignerAdapter, type IStorageAdapter, type InstallModuleParams, KmsAgentService, type KmsAttestationManifestResponse, type KmsAttestationProofResponse, type KmsAttestationResponse, type KmsBeginAuthenticationRequest, type KmsBeginAuthenticationResponse, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthRequest, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthResponse, type KmsBeginRegistrationRequest, type KmsBeginRegistrationResponse, type KmsChangePasskeyResponse, type KmsCompleteRegistrationRequest, type KmsCompleteRegistrationResponse, type KmsCreateAgentKeyRequest, type KmsCreateAgentKeyResponse, type KmsCreateKeyRequest, type KmsCreateKeyResponse, type KmsDeleteKeyResponse, type KmsDeriveAddressResponse, type KmsDescribeKeyResponse, type KmsEip712Domain, type KmsEip712FieldValue, type KmsEip712TypeDef, type KmsEthereumTransaction, type KmsGetPublicKeyResponse, type KmsHealthResponse, KmsHttpClient, type KmsHttpClientOptions, type KmsKeyStatusResponse, type KmsListKeysResponse, KmsManager, KmsMonitorService, type KmsPaymentAuth, type KmsPaymentSignatureResponse, KmsPaymentSigner, type KmsPurgeKeyResponse, type KmsQueueStatusResponse, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRollbackCounterResponse, KmsSessionService, type KmsSignAgentRequest, type KmsSignAgentResponse, type KmsSignGTokenAuthorizationRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionResponse, type KmsSignHashResponse, type KmsSignMicropaymentVoucherRequest, type KmsSignP256GrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignRequest, type KmsSignResponse, type KmsSignTypedDataRequest, type KmsSignTypedDataResponse, type KmsSignX402PaymentRequest, KmsSigner, type KmsStatsResponse, type KmsVersionResponse, type L2Type, L2_TYPE, type LegacyPasskeyAssertion, LocalWalletSigner, MAX_GUARDIANS, MODULE_TYPE, MemoryStorage, type MintAgentIdentityParams, ModuleManager, type ModuleTypeId, type OapdConfig, type P256GuardianKey, P256PasskeySigner, PackedUserOperation, type PasskeyAssertionContext, type PasskeyCeremonySigner, PaymasterManager, PaymasterPriceStalenessError, type PaymasterRecord, type PendingExit, type PendingWeightChange, PreCheckResult, type QueryAgentReputationParams, RECOVERY_THRESHOLD, RECOVERY_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, RecoveryService, type RevokeP256SessionKeyRequest, type RevokeP256SessionKeyResponse, type RunCeremonyOptions, SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, type SerializedGuardianSpec, type ServerConfig, type SessionInfo, SessionKeyService, type SetAgentWalletParams, type SignP256UserOpRequest, type SignP256UserOpResponse, SilentLogger, type SubmitAgentReputationParams, TIER_GUARD_HOOK_ABI, TierConfig, TierLevel$1 as TierLevel, type TokenBalance, type TokenGuardState, type TokenInfo, TokenService, TransferManager, type TransferRecord, type TransferResult, type UninstallModuleParams, UserOperation, VALIDATOR_ABI, WEIGHT_CHANGE_EXPIRY_SECONDS, WEIGHT_CHANGE_THRESHOLD, WEIGHT_CHANGE_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, WalletManager, type WebAuthnAssertion, type WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential, type WeightConfig, WeightedSignatureService, YAAAServerClient, base64UrlDecode, base64UrlEncode, beginAuthenticationChallenge, beginGrantSessionChallenge, buildAuthenticationCredential, buildAuthenticatorData, buildClientDataJSON, buildFullInitConfig, buildInstallModuleHash, buildUninstallModuleHash, computeOapdSalt, erc8004AddressesForChain, getOapdAddress, getOapdAddressWithChainId, initConfigFromRecord, initConfigToTuple, isExecuteUserOpWrapped, isOapdDeployed, isPendingConfirmation, packP256SessionSignature, packSecp256k1SessionSignature, runAuthenticationCeremony, runGrantSessionCeremony, runWebAuthnCeremony, sepoliaV07Config, serializeGuardianSpecs, toGuardianSpecs, validateConfig, wrapExecuteUserOp };
+/** Resolves an app user id to its KMS key + EOA address. App-specific mapping. */
+type KmsKeyResolver = (userId: string) => Promise<{
+    keyId: string;
+    address: `0x${string}`;
+}>;
+/**
+ * KMS-backed {@link ISignerAdapter} — the bridge between the SDK signing chain
+ * (BLS / transfer pass a {@link SignerAuthContext}) and the KMS `/SignHash` API.
+ *
+ * This is the concrete adapter the BLS/transfer services expect: it unpacks the
+ * per-call auth context and forwards it to the right KMS endpoint.
+ *  - {@link WebAuthnCeremonyContext} (preferred) → `signHashWithWebAuthn`
+ *    (one-time, challenge-bound; replay-safe — what KMS v0.20.0+ requires).
+ *  - {@link PasskeyAssertionContext} (legacy, @deprecated) → `signHash`
+ *    (rejected by KMS unless `KMS_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSKEY=1`, test only).
+ *
+ * The frontend runs the BeginAuthentication ceremony with the user's device
+ * passkey and passes the resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }` down as
+ * `ctx.webAuthnAssertion`. Since each challenge is consumed once, a flow needing
+ * N signatures must pass N assertions — use the tiered transfer path, which needs
+ * only one owner signature.
+ *
+ * The `userId → { keyId, address }` mapping is app-specific; inject it via
+ * {@link KmsKeyResolver}.
+ */
+declare class KmsSignerAdapter implements ISignerAdapter {
+    private readonly kms;
+    private readonly resolveKey;
+    constructor(kms: KmsManager, resolveKey: KmsKeyResolver);
+    getAddress(userId: string): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    ensureSigner(userId: string): Promise<{
+        address: `0x${string}`;
+    }>;
+    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+}
+
+export { ACCOUNT_ABI, AGENT_SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ADDRESSES, AIRACCOUNT_FACTORY_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_COMPOSITE_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ADDRESS, ALG_ID, AccountManager, type AccountRecord, type ActiveRecovery, AgentRegistryService, type AgentReputationSummary, type AgentSessionConfig, type AgentSessionInfo, AirAccountServerClient, type AirAccountVersion, BLSSignatureData, BLSSignatureService, type BeginCeremonyResponse, type BindERC8004AgentWalletParams, type BlsConfigRecord, type BuildCredentialOptions, CALLDATA_PARSER_REGISTRY_ABI, ConsoleLogger, type CreateAgentAccountParams, type CreateP256SessionKeyRequest, type CreateP256SessionKeyResponse, DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_ID, DEFAULT_KMS_ENDPOINT, DEFAULT_ORIGIN, DEFAULT_RP_ID, type DelegateInitParams, DvtPendingConfirmationError, type EIP7702Authorization, EIP7702DelegateService, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V6, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V7_V8, ENTRYPOINT_ADDRESSES, ERC20_ABI, ERC8004Service, ERC8004_ADDRESSES, EXECUTE_BATCH_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_USER_OP_SELECTOR, type EntryPointConfig, EntryPointVersion, type EntryPointVersionConfig, type EstimateGasParams, EthereumProvider, type ExecuteTransferParams, FACTORY_ABI_V6, FACTORY_ABI_V7_V8, FORCE_EXIT_MODULE_ABI, ForceExitService, type FullConfigGuardianParams, GLOBAL_GUARD_ABI, type GrantP256SessionParams, type GrantSessionParams, GuardChecker, type GuardState, GuardStateReader, GuardStatus, type ILogger, type ISignerAdapter, type IStorageAdapter, type InstallModuleParams, KmsAgentService, type KmsAttestationManifestResponse, type KmsAttestationProofResponse, type KmsAttestationResponse, type KmsBeginAuthenticationRequest, type KmsBeginAuthenticationResponse, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthRequest, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthResponse, type KmsBeginRegistrationRequest, type KmsBeginRegistrationResponse, type KmsChangePasskeyResponse, type KmsCompleteRegistrationRequest, type KmsCompleteRegistrationResponse, type KmsCreateAgentKeyRequest, type KmsCreateAgentKeyResponse, type KmsCreateKeyRequest, type KmsCreateKeyResponse, type KmsDeleteKeyResponse, type KmsDeriveAddressResponse, type KmsDescribeKeyResponse, type KmsEip712Domain, type KmsEip712FieldValue, type KmsEip712TypeDef, type KmsEthereumTransaction, type KmsGetPublicKeyResponse, type KmsHealthResponse, KmsHttpClient, type KmsHttpClientOptions, type KmsKeyResolver, type KmsKeyStatusResponse, type KmsListKeysResponse, KmsManager, KmsMonitorService, type KmsPaymentAuth, type KmsPaymentSignatureResponse, KmsPaymentSigner, type KmsPurgeKeyResponse, type KmsQueueStatusResponse, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRollbackCounterResponse, KmsSessionService, type KmsSignAgentRequest, type KmsSignAgentResponse, type KmsSignGTokenAuthorizationRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionResponse, type KmsSignHashResponse, type KmsSignMicropaymentVoucherRequest, type KmsSignP256GrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignRequest, type KmsSignResponse, type KmsSignTypedDataRequest, type KmsSignTypedDataResponse, type KmsSignX402PaymentRequest, KmsSigner, KmsSignerAdapter, type KmsSignerAuth, type KmsStatsResponse, type KmsVersionResponse, type L2Type, L2_TYPE, type LegacyPasskeyAssertion, LocalWalletSigner, MAX_GUARDIANS, MODULE_TYPE, MemoryStorage, type MintAgentIdentityParams, ModuleManager, type ModuleTypeId, type OapdConfig, type P256GuardianKey, P256PasskeySigner, PackedUserOperation, type PasskeyAssertionContext, type PasskeyCeremonySigner, PaymasterManager, PaymasterPriceStalenessError, type PaymasterRecord, type PendingExit, type PendingWeightChange, PreCheckResult, type QueryAgentReputationParams, RECOVERY_THRESHOLD, RECOVERY_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, RecoveryService, type RevokeP256SessionKeyRequest, type RevokeP256SessionKeyResponse, type RunCeremonyOptions, SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, type SerializedGuardianSpec, type ServerConfig, type SessionInfo, SessionKeyService, type SetAgentWalletParams, type SignP256UserOpRequest, type SignP256UserOpResponse, type SignerAuthContext, SilentLogger, type SubmitAgentReputationParams, TIER_GUARD_HOOK_ABI, TierConfig, TierLevel$1 as TierLevel, type TokenBalance, type TokenGuardState, type TokenInfo, TokenService, TransferManager, type TransferRecord, type TransferResult, type UninstallModuleParams, UserOperation, VALIDATOR_ABI, WEIGHT_CHANGE_EXPIRY_SECONDS, WEIGHT_CHANGE_THRESHOLD, WEIGHT_CHANGE_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, WalletManager, type WebAuthnAssertion, type WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential, type WebAuthnCeremonyContext, type WeightConfig, WeightedSignatureService, YAAAServerClient, base64UrlDecode, base64UrlEncode, beginAuthenticationChallenge, beginGrantSessionChallenge, buildAuthenticationCredential, buildAuthenticatorData, buildClientDataJSON, buildFullInitConfig, buildInstallModuleHash, buildUninstallModuleHash, commitChallenge, computeOapdSalt, erc8004AddressesForChain, getOapdAddress, getOapdAddressWithChainId, initConfigFromRecord, initConfigToTuple, isExecuteUserOpWrapped, isOapdDeployed, isPendingConfirmation, packP256SessionSignature, packSecp256k1SessionSignature, runAuthenticationCeremony, runGrantSessionCeremony, runWebAuthnCeremony, sepoliaV07Config, serializeGuardianSpecs, toGuardianSpecs, validateConfig, wrapExecuteUserOp };

package/dist/kms.d.ts

@@ -334,7 +334,28 @@ interface RunCeremonyOptions {
     rpId?: string;
     origin?: string;
     signCount?: number;
+    /**
+     * The 32-byte payload digest being authorized (e.g. the SignHash hash). When set,
+     * the WebAuthn challenge is bound to it as `SHA-256(nonce ‖ payload)` instead of the
+     * raw nonce — this is the "what you see is what you sign" (WYSIWYS) commitment the
+     * TA verifies (AirAccount #68). REQUIRED once the KMS runs in strict mode
+     * (`--features strict-challenge`); in the default transition mode the raw nonce is
+     * still accepted. Omit only for non-signing ceremonies (none today). Accepts a
+     * Uint8Array or a `0x` hex string.
+     */
+    payload?: Uint8Array | `0x${string}`;
 }
+/**
+ * Compute the WYSIWYS-bound WebAuthn challenge for a signing ceremony:
+ * `base64url( SHA-256( decode(nonce) ‖ payload ) )`.
+ *
+ * `nonce` is the base64url challenge from BeginAuthentication; `payload` is the 32-byte
+ * digest about to be signed (the SignHash hash). The KMS/TA recomputes this exact value
+ * and rejects the signature if it doesn't match (AirAccount #68). Use this in a browser
+ * frontend that builds its own WebAuthn assertion for a device passkey, so the per-call
+ * `webAuthnAssertion` it sends commits to the operation hash.
+ */
+declare function commitChallenge(nonceBase64Url: string, payload: Uint8Array | `0x${string}`): string;
 /**
  * Run a full WebAuthn challenge-binding ceremony (AirAccount #49):
  *   1. fetch a one-time TA challenge from the `begin` endpoint,
@@ -769,37 +790,115 @@ declare class KmsManager {
      * challenge from {@link beginGrantSessionAuth} instead.)
      */
     beginWebAuthnAuth(keyId: string): Promise<KmsBeginAuthenticationResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Create a KMS signer that authorizes each signature with a LEGACY raw passkey
+     * assertion (reusable, no challenge consumption).
+     *
+     * @deprecated The KMS (v0.20.0+) rejects legacy raw passkey assertions for
+     * signing/mutating operations (`/SignHash` → 400, "no challenge binding —
+     * replayable"), unless `KMS_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSKEY=1` is set on the KMS (test
+     * only). Prefer {@link createKmsSignerWithCeremony}, which runs a one-time
+     * challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony per signature.
+     */
     createKmsSigner(keyId: string, address: string, assertionProvider: () => Promise<LegacyPasskeyAssertion>): KmsSigner;
+    /**
+     * Create a KMS signer that authorizes each signature with a one-time,
+     * challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony (production-safe; replay-protected).
+     *
+     * Every `signMessage` call runs a FRESH ceremony (BeginAuthentication →
+     * authenticator assertion → `/SignHash` with the `WebAuthn` field), because the
+     * KMS consumes the challenge atomically (one challenge ⇒ one signature). A
+     * Tier-2/3 BLS transfer that needs N owner signatures therefore triggers N
+     * ceremonies — see {@link BLSSignatureService} (which now skips the unused
+     * userOpHash owner-ECDSA for tiered signatures, so Tier-2 needs only one).
+     *
+     * @param ceremonySigner authenticator that signs the WebAuthn challenge
+     *   (a browser passkey on the client, or {@link P256PasskeySigner} server-side).
+     */
+    createKmsSignerWithCeremony(keyId: string, address: string, ceremonySigner: PasskeyCeremonySigner, ceremonyOptions?: Omit<RunCeremonyOptions, "signer">, commitPayload?: boolean): KmsSigner;
 }
+/** How a {@link KmsSigner} authorizes each `/SignHash` call. */
+type KmsSignerAuth = {
+    mode: "legacy";
+    assertionProvider: () => Promise<LegacyPasskeyAssertion>;
+} | {
+    mode: "ceremony";
+    ceremonySigner: PasskeyCeremonySigner;
+    ceremonyOptions?: Omit<RunCeremonyOptions, "signer">;
+    /**
+     * Bind each ceremony challenge to the payload via `SHA-256(nonce ‖ hash)`
+     * (WYSIWYS, AirAccount #68). DEFAULT `false` (raw nonce) because the LIVE KMS
+     * host (kms.aastar.io) still verifies the WebAuthn assertion against the raw
+     * nonce — sending the commitment is rejected with "Challenge mismatch". Enable
+     * only once the KMS host recomputes `expected = SHA-256(nonce ‖ payload)` for
+     * signing ops (tracked AirAccount-side). The commitment IS already correct vs
+     * the TA; the gap is the host verify.
+     */
+    commitPayload?: boolean;
+};
 /**
- * KMS-backed signer with Passkey assertion.
+ * KMS-backed signer (EIP-191 personal-sign over a digest).
  *
- * Each signing operation calls the `assertionProvider` to obtain a Legacy
- * Passkey assertion, which is then passed to KMS SignHash. The Legacy format
- * is reusable (no challenge consumption), enabling BLS dual-signing.
+ * Two authorization modes (see {@link KmsSignerAuth}):
+ *  - `ceremony` (preferred): each signature runs a fresh one-time WebAuthn
+ *    ceremony and calls KMS `SignHash` with the challenge-bound `WebAuthn` field
+ *    (replay-safe; what the KMS now requires).
+ *  - `legacy` (deprecated): each signature reuses a raw passkey assertion via
+ *    KMS `SignHash` `Passkey` field — rejected by KMS unless
+ *    `KMS_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSKEY=1` (test only).
  *
  * Narrowed during the ethers -> viem migration: only the EIP-191 personal-sign
- * and address-read behaviour is actually consumed by the SDK, so the former
- * ethers.AbstractSigner surface (signTransaction / signTypedData / connect /
- * provider) has been dropped.
+ * and address-read behaviour is consumed by the SDK.
  */
 declare class KmsSigner {
     private readonly keyId;
     private readonly _address;
     private readonly kmsManager;
-    private readonly assertionProvider;
-    constructor(keyId: string, _address: string, kmsManager: KmsManager, assertionProvider: () => Promise<LegacyPasskeyAssertion>);
+    private readonly auth;
+    constructor(keyId: string, _address: string, kmsManager: KmsManager, auth: KmsSignerAuth);
     getAddress(): Promise<string>;
-    signMessage(message: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string>;
+    /**
+     * EIP-191 personal-sign over a digest. A string is hashed as UTF-8 text, a byte
+     * array as raw bytes — byte-identical to ethers `hashMessage`.
+     *
+     * @param webAuthnAssertion OPTIONAL pre-built, one-time ceremony assertion. Use
+     *   this in server flows where the passkey lives on the USER's device: the
+     *   frontend runs the BeginAuthentication ceremony and the backend forwards the
+     *   resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }` here. When supplied it takes
+     *   precedence over the signer's baked-in auth mode. Each assertion is one-time
+     *   (the KMS consumes the challenge), so a caller that needs N signatures must
+     *   supply N distinct assertions.
+     *
+     *   WYSIWYS (AirAccount #68): the frontend MUST build the assertion over the
+     *   payload-committed challenge `commitChallenge(nonce, hashOf(message))`, not the
+     *   raw nonce — otherwise a compromised host could swap the signed payload. The
+     *   raw-nonce assertion only works while the KMS runs in transition mode. (The
+     *   signer's own ceremony mode does this automatically.)
+     */
+    signMessage(message: string | Uint8Array, webAuthnAssertion?: WebAuthnAssertion): Promise<string>;
 }
 
 /**
- * Context for passing Passkey assertion data through the signing chain.
- * Used by KMS-backed signers to authenticate signing operations.
+ * Context for passing a LEGACY raw passkey assertion through the signing chain.
+ *
+ * @deprecated KMS v0.20.0+ rejects legacy raw passkey assertions for signing
+ * (no challenge binding → replayable). Prefer {@link WebAuthnCeremonyContext}.
  */
 interface PasskeyAssertionContext {
     assertion: LegacyPasskeyAssertion;
 }
+/**
+ * Context carrying a one-time, challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony assertion
+ * (the replay-safe path the KMS now requires). In server transfer flows the
+ * passkey lives on the USER's device: the frontend runs the BeginAuthentication
+ * ceremony and the backend forwards the resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }`.
+ * Each assertion is one-time — a flow needing N signatures supplies N of them.
+ */
+interface WebAuthnCeremonyContext {
+    webAuthnAssertion: WebAuthnAssertion;
+}
+/** Either auth context accepted by a KMS-backed signer. */
+type SignerAuthContext = PasskeyAssertionContext | WebAuthnCeremonyContext;
 /**
  * Pluggable signer adapter — replaces NestJS AuthService wallet management.
  * Implement this to provide signing capabilities from your key management system.
@@ -817,9 +916,11 @@ interface ISignerAdapter {
      * `account.signMessage({ raw: bytes })`). A `Uint8Array` (or raw `0x` hex) is
      * signed as raw bytes — callers pass a 32-byte digest, NOT UTF-8 text.
      *
-     * @param ctx optional Passkey assertion context for KMS-backed signers.
+     * @param ctx optional auth context for KMS-backed signers — a one-time
+     *   {@link WebAuthnCeremonyContext} (preferred) or a legacy
+     *   {@link PasskeyAssertionContext}.
      */
-    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
     /**
      * Ensure a signer exists for the user (create on demand if needed).
      * Returns the signer's address.
@@ -1419,7 +1520,17 @@ declare class BLSSignatureService {
     /** Lazy-initialize BLSManager on first use. */
     private ensureInitialized;
     getActiveSignerNodes(): Promise<unknown[]>;
-    generateBLSSignature(userId: string, userOpHash: string, ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<BLSSignatureData>;
+    generateBLSSignature(userId: string, userOpHash: string, ctx?: SignerAuthContext, options?: {
+        /**
+         * Skip the owner ECDSA over `userOpHash` (`aaSignature`). The cumulative
+         * Tier-2 (algId 0x04) / Tier-3 (0x05) packings do NOT include it — they
+         * carry only `messagePointSignature` (owner intent comes from the P256
+         * passkey signature) — so computing it there is a wasted owner signature.
+         * Under the WebAuthn-ceremony KMS path that wasted signature is also a
+         * wasted user gesture, so tiered callers set this to `true`.
+         */
+        skipOwnerOpSignature?: boolean;
+    }): Promise<BLSSignatureData>;
     packSignature(blsData: BLSSignatureData): Promise<string>;
     /**
      * Generate a tiered signature based on the required tier level.
@@ -1441,7 +1552,7 @@ declare class BLSSignatureService {
         userOpHash: string;
         p256Signature?: string;
         guardianSigner?: GuardianSigner;
-        ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext;
+        ctx?: SignerAuthContext;
     }): Promise<string>;
 }
 
@@ -1561,7 +1672,20 @@ interface ExecuteTransferParams {
      *  the gas token address appended to paymasterData. Used when the paymaster
      *  contract does not expose a public token() getter for auto-detection. */
     paymasterTokenAddress?: string;
+    /**
+     * LEGACY raw passkey assertion for KMS signing.
+     * @deprecated KMS v0.20.0+ rejects it (replayable). Use {@link webAuthnAssertion}.
+     */
     passkeyAssertion?: LegacyPasskeyAssertion;
+    /**
+     * One-time, challenge-bound WebAuthn ceremony assertion for KMS owner signing
+     * (replay-safe; what the KMS now requires). The frontend runs the
+     * BeginAuthentication ceremony with the user's device passkey and passes the
+     * resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }` here. The challenge is consumed once,
+     * so this authorizes exactly ONE owner signature — use the tiered path
+     * (`useAirAccountTiering: true`), which needs a single owner signature.
+     */
+    webAuthnAssertion?: WebAuthnAssertion;
     /** P256 passkey signature (64 bytes hex). Required for AirAccount Tier 2/3. */
     p256Signature?: string;
     /** Guardian signer instance. Required for AirAccount Tier 3. */
@@ -1639,7 +1763,7 @@ declare class WalletManager {
     private readonly signer;
     constructor(signer: ISignerAdapter);
     getAddress(userId: string): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
-    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
     ensureSigner(userId: string): Promise<{
         address: `0x${string}`;
     }>;
@@ -1670,6 +1794,26 @@ declare class WalletManager {
  *
  * const account = await client.accounts.createAccount('user-123');
  * ```
+ *
+ * @example KMS-backed signing (production) — inject {@link KmsSignerAdapter} as the
+ * `signer`. This is the wiring seam that carries a per-call WebAuthn ceremony
+ * assertion (challenge-bound, replay-safe) from `executeTransfer` through to the
+ * KMS `/SignHash`. The `userId → { keyId, address }` mapping is app-specific.
+ * ```ts
+ * import { AirAccountServerClient, KmsManager, KmsSignerAdapter } from '@aastar/airaccount/server';
+ *
+ * const kms = new KmsManager({ kmsEndpoint, kmsApiKey, kmsEnabled: true });
+ * const client = new AirAccountServerClient({
+ *   ...rest,
+ *   signer: new KmsSignerAdapter(kms, async (userId) => lookupUserKey(userId)),
+ * });
+ * // Transfer with a one-time WebAuthn assertion (frontend ceremony) on the tiered path:
+ * await client.transfers.executeTransfer(userId, {
+ *   ...params,
+ *   useAirAccountTiering: true,
+ *   webAuthnAssertion, // { ChallengeId, Credential } from BeginAuthentication
+ * });
+ * ```
  */
 declare class AirAccountServerClient {
     readonly ethereum: EthereumProvider;
@@ -3334,10 +3478,46 @@ declare class LocalWalletSigner implements ISignerAdapter {
     private readonly account;
     constructor(privateKey: string);
     getAddress(_userId: string): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
-    signMessage(_userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, _ctx?: PasskeyAssertionContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    signMessage(_userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, _ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
     ensureSigner(_userId: string): Promise<{
         address: `0x${string}`;
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACCOUNT_ABI, AGENT_SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ADDRESSES, AIRACCOUNT_FACTORY_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_COMPOSITE_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ADDRESS, ALG_ID, AccountManager, type AccountRecord, type ActiveRecovery, AgentRegistryService, type AgentReputationSummary, type AgentSessionConfig, type AgentSessionInfo, AirAccountServerClient, type AirAccountVersion, BLSSignatureData, BLSSignatureService, type BeginCeremonyResponse, type BindERC8004AgentWalletParams, type BlsConfigRecord, type BuildCredentialOptions, CALLDATA_PARSER_REGISTRY_ABI, ConsoleLogger, type CreateAgentAccountParams, type CreateP256SessionKeyRequest, type CreateP256SessionKeyResponse, DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_ID, DEFAULT_KMS_ENDPOINT, DEFAULT_ORIGIN, DEFAULT_RP_ID, type DelegateInitParams, DvtPendingConfirmationError, type EIP7702Authorization, EIP7702DelegateService, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V6, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V7_V8, ENTRYPOINT_ADDRESSES, ERC20_ABI, ERC8004Service, ERC8004_ADDRESSES, EXECUTE_BATCH_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_USER_OP_SELECTOR, type EntryPointConfig, EntryPointVersion, type EntryPointVersionConfig, type EstimateGasParams, EthereumProvider, type ExecuteTransferParams, FACTORY_ABI_V6, FACTORY_ABI_V7_V8, FORCE_EXIT_MODULE_ABI, ForceExitService, type FullConfigGuardianParams, GLOBAL_GUARD_ABI, type GrantP256SessionParams, type GrantSessionParams, GuardChecker, type GuardState, GuardStateReader, GuardStatus, type ILogger, type ISignerAdapter, type IStorageAdapter, type InstallModuleParams, KmsAgentService, type KmsAttestationManifestResponse, type KmsAttestationProofResponse, type KmsAttestationResponse, type KmsBeginAuthenticationRequest, type KmsBeginAuthenticationResponse, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthRequest, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthResponse, type KmsBeginRegistrationRequest, type KmsBeginRegistrationResponse, type KmsChangePasskeyResponse, type KmsCompleteRegistrationRequest, type KmsCompleteRegistrationResponse, type KmsCreateAgentKeyRequest, type KmsCreateAgentKeyResponse, type KmsCreateKeyRequest, type KmsCreateKeyResponse, type KmsDeleteKeyResponse, type KmsDeriveAddressResponse, type KmsDescribeKeyResponse, type KmsEip712Domain, type KmsEip712FieldValue, type KmsEip712TypeDef, type KmsEthereumTransaction, type KmsGetPublicKeyResponse, type KmsHealthResponse, KmsHttpClient, type KmsHttpClientOptions, type KmsKeyStatusResponse, type KmsListKeysResponse, KmsManager, KmsMonitorService, type KmsPaymentAuth, type KmsPaymentSignatureResponse, KmsPaymentSigner, type KmsPurgeKeyResponse, type KmsQueueStatusResponse, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRollbackCounterResponse, KmsSessionService, type KmsSignAgentRequest, type KmsSignAgentResponse, type KmsSignGTokenAuthorizationRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionResponse, type KmsSignHashResponse, type KmsSignMicropaymentVoucherRequest, type KmsSignP256GrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignRequest, type KmsSignResponse, type KmsSignTypedDataRequest, type KmsSignTypedDataResponse, type KmsSignX402PaymentRequest, KmsSigner, type KmsStatsResponse, type KmsVersionResponse, type L2Type, L2_TYPE, type LegacyPasskeyAssertion, LocalWalletSigner, MAX_GUARDIANS, MODULE_TYPE, MemoryStorage, type MintAgentIdentityParams, ModuleManager, type ModuleTypeId, type OapdConfig, type P256GuardianKey, P256PasskeySigner, PackedUserOperation, type PasskeyAssertionContext, type PasskeyCeremonySigner, PaymasterManager, PaymasterPriceStalenessError, type PaymasterRecord, type PendingExit, type PendingWeightChange, PreCheckResult, type QueryAgentReputationParams, RECOVERY_THRESHOLD, RECOVERY_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, RecoveryService, type RevokeP256SessionKeyRequest, type RevokeP256SessionKeyResponse, type RunCeremonyOptions, SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, type SerializedGuardianSpec, type ServerConfig, type SessionInfo, SessionKeyService, type SetAgentWalletParams, type SignP256UserOpRequest, type SignP256UserOpResponse, SilentLogger, type SubmitAgentReputationParams, TIER_GUARD_HOOK_ABI, TierConfig, TierLevel$1 as TierLevel, type TokenBalance, type TokenGuardState, type TokenInfo, TokenService, TransferManager, type TransferRecord, type TransferResult, type UninstallModuleParams, UserOperation, VALIDATOR_ABI, WEIGHT_CHANGE_EXPIRY_SECONDS, WEIGHT_CHANGE_THRESHOLD, WEIGHT_CHANGE_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, WalletManager, type WebAuthnAssertion, type WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential, type WeightConfig, WeightedSignatureService, YAAAServerClient, base64UrlDecode, base64UrlEncode, beginAuthenticationChallenge, beginGrantSessionChallenge, buildAuthenticationCredential, buildAuthenticatorData, buildClientDataJSON, buildFullInitConfig, buildInstallModuleHash, buildUninstallModuleHash, computeOapdSalt, erc8004AddressesForChain, getOapdAddress, getOapdAddressWithChainId, initConfigFromRecord, initConfigToTuple, isExecuteUserOpWrapped, isOapdDeployed, isPendingConfirmation, packP256SessionSignature, packSecp256k1SessionSignature, runAuthenticationCeremony, runGrantSessionCeremony, runWebAuthnCeremony, sepoliaV07Config, serializeGuardianSpecs, toGuardianSpecs, validateConfig, wrapExecuteUserOp };
+/** Resolves an app user id to its KMS key + EOA address. App-specific mapping. */
+type KmsKeyResolver = (userId: string) => Promise<{
+    keyId: string;
+    address: `0x${string}`;
+}>;
+/**
+ * KMS-backed {@link ISignerAdapter} — the bridge between the SDK signing chain
+ * (BLS / transfer pass a {@link SignerAuthContext}) and the KMS `/SignHash` API.
+ *
+ * This is the concrete adapter the BLS/transfer services expect: it unpacks the
+ * per-call auth context and forwards it to the right KMS endpoint.
+ *  - {@link WebAuthnCeremonyContext} (preferred) → `signHashWithWebAuthn`
+ *    (one-time, challenge-bound; replay-safe — what KMS v0.20.0+ requires).
+ *  - {@link PasskeyAssertionContext} (legacy, @deprecated) → `signHash`
+ *    (rejected by KMS unless `KMS_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSKEY=1`, test only).
+ *
+ * The frontend runs the BeginAuthentication ceremony with the user's device
+ * passkey and passes the resulting `{ ChallengeId, Credential }` down as
+ * `ctx.webAuthnAssertion`. Since each challenge is consumed once, a flow needing
+ * N signatures must pass N assertions — use the tiered transfer path, which needs
+ * only one owner signature.
+ *
+ * The `userId → { keyId, address }` mapping is app-specific; inject it via
+ * {@link KmsKeyResolver}.
+ */
+declare class KmsSignerAdapter implements ISignerAdapter {
+    private readonly kms;
+    private readonly resolveKey;
+    constructor(kms: KmsManager, resolveKey: KmsKeyResolver);
+    getAddress(userId: string): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+    ensureSigner(userId: string): Promise<{
+        address: `0x${string}`;
+    }>;
+    signMessage(userId: string, message: `0x${string}` | Uint8Array, ctx?: SignerAuthContext): Promise<`0x${string}`>;
+}
+
+export { ACCOUNT_ABI, AGENT_SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ABI, AIRACCOUNT_ADDRESSES, AIRACCOUNT_FACTORY_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_COMPOSITE_VALIDATOR_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ABI, AIR_ACCOUNT_DELEGATE_ADDRESS, ALG_ID, AccountManager, type AccountRecord, type ActiveRecovery, AgentRegistryService, type AgentReputationSummary, type AgentSessionConfig, type AgentSessionInfo, AirAccountServerClient, type AirAccountVersion, BLSSignatureData, BLSSignatureService, type BeginCeremonyResponse, type BindERC8004AgentWalletParams, type BlsConfigRecord, type BuildCredentialOptions, CALLDATA_PARSER_REGISTRY_ABI, ConsoleLogger, type CreateAgentAccountParams, type CreateP256SessionKeyRequest, type CreateP256SessionKeyResponse, DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_ID, DEFAULT_KMS_ENDPOINT, DEFAULT_ORIGIN, DEFAULT_RP_ID, type DelegateInitParams, DvtPendingConfirmationError, type EIP7702Authorization, EIP7702DelegateService, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V6, ENTRYPOINT_ABI_V7_V8, ENTRYPOINT_ADDRESSES, ERC20_ABI, ERC8004Service, ERC8004_ADDRESSES, EXECUTE_BATCH_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_SELECTOR, EXECUTE_USER_OP_SELECTOR, type EntryPointConfig, EntryPointVersion, type EntryPointVersionConfig, type EstimateGasParams, EthereumProvider, type ExecuteTransferParams, FACTORY_ABI_V6, FACTORY_ABI_V7_V8, FORCE_EXIT_MODULE_ABI, ForceExitService, type FullConfigGuardianParams, GLOBAL_GUARD_ABI, type GrantP256SessionParams, type GrantSessionParams, GuardChecker, type GuardState, GuardStateReader, GuardStatus, type ILogger, type ISignerAdapter, type IStorageAdapter, type InstallModuleParams, KmsAgentService, type KmsAttestationManifestResponse, type KmsAttestationProofResponse, type KmsAttestationResponse, type KmsBeginAuthenticationRequest, type KmsBeginAuthenticationResponse, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthRequest, type KmsBeginGrantSessionAuthResponse, type KmsBeginRegistrationRequest, type KmsBeginRegistrationResponse, type KmsChangePasskeyResponse, type KmsCompleteRegistrationRequest, type KmsCompleteRegistrationResponse, type KmsCreateAgentKeyRequest, type KmsCreateAgentKeyResponse, type KmsCreateKeyRequest, type KmsCreateKeyResponse, type KmsDeleteKeyResponse, type KmsDeriveAddressResponse, type KmsDescribeKeyResponse, type KmsEip712Domain, type KmsEip712FieldValue, type KmsEip712TypeDef, type KmsEthereumTransaction, type KmsGetPublicKeyResponse, type KmsHealthResponse, KmsHttpClient, type KmsHttpClientOptions, type KmsKeyResolver, type KmsKeyStatusResponse, type KmsListKeysResponse, KmsManager, KmsMonitorService, type KmsPaymentAuth, type KmsPaymentSignatureResponse, KmsPaymentSigner, type KmsPurgeKeyResponse, type KmsQueueStatusResponse, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRefreshAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialRequest, type KmsRevokeAgentCredentialResponse, type KmsRollbackCounterResponse, KmsSessionService, type KmsSignAgentRequest, type KmsSignAgentResponse, type KmsSignGTokenAuthorizationRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignGrantSessionResponse, type KmsSignHashResponse, type KmsSignMicropaymentVoucherRequest, type KmsSignP256GrantSessionRequest, type KmsSignRequest, type KmsSignResponse, type KmsSignTypedDataRequest, type KmsSignTypedDataResponse, type KmsSignX402PaymentRequest, KmsSigner, KmsSignerAdapter, type KmsSignerAuth, type KmsStatsResponse, type KmsVersionResponse, type L2Type, L2_TYPE, type LegacyPasskeyAssertion, LocalWalletSigner, MAX_GUARDIANS, MODULE_TYPE, MemoryStorage, type MintAgentIdentityParams, ModuleManager, type ModuleTypeId, type OapdConfig, type P256GuardianKey, P256PasskeySigner, PackedUserOperation, type PasskeyAssertionContext, type PasskeyCeremonySigner, PaymasterManager, PaymasterPriceStalenessError, type PaymasterRecord, type PendingExit, type PendingWeightChange, PreCheckResult, type QueryAgentReputationParams, RECOVERY_THRESHOLD, RECOVERY_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, RecoveryService, type RevokeP256SessionKeyRequest, type RevokeP256SessionKeyResponse, type RunCeremonyOptions, SESSION_KEY_VALIDATOR_ABI, type SerializedGuardianSpec, type ServerConfig, type SessionInfo, SessionKeyService, type SetAgentWalletParams, type SignP256UserOpRequest, type SignP256UserOpResponse, type SignerAuthContext, SilentLogger, type SubmitAgentReputationParams, TIER_GUARD_HOOK_ABI, TierConfig, TierLevel$1 as TierLevel, type TokenBalance, type TokenGuardState, type TokenInfo, TokenService, TransferManager, type TransferRecord, type TransferResult, type UninstallModuleParams, UserOperation, VALIDATOR_ABI, WEIGHT_CHANGE_EXPIRY_SECONDS, WEIGHT_CHANGE_THRESHOLD, WEIGHT_CHANGE_TIMELOCK_SECONDS, WalletManager, type WebAuthnAssertion, type WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential, type WebAuthnCeremonyContext, type WeightConfig, WeightedSignatureService, YAAAServerClient, base64UrlDecode, base64UrlEncode, beginAuthenticationChallenge, beginGrantSessionChallenge, buildAuthenticationCredential, buildAuthenticatorData, buildClientDataJSON, buildFullInitConfig, buildInstallModuleHash, buildUninstallModuleHash, commitChallenge, computeOapdSalt, erc8004AddressesForChain, getOapdAddress, getOapdAddressWithChainId, initConfigFromRecord, initConfigToTuple, isExecuteUserOpWrapped, isOapdDeployed, isPendingConfirmation, packP256SessionSignature, packSecp256k1SessionSignature, runAuthenticationCeremony, runGrantSessionCeremony, runWebAuthnCeremony, sepoliaV07Config, serializeGuardianSpecs, toGuardianSpecs, validateConfig, wrapExecuteUserOp };