@_mustachio/openauth 0.10.0 → 0.11.0

package/src/domain/logout.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/**
+ * `/end_session` endpoint logic — OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0.
+ *
+ * The OP validates the optional `id_token_hint`, validates the optional
+ * `post_logout_redirect_uri` against the client's registered list,
+ * revokes the subject's refresh tokens (when a subject is identified),
+ * and either redirects the user-agent back to the RP with `state` echoed
+ * or returns a generic "logged out" acknowledgement.
+ *
+ * Per §2:
+ *  - `id_token_hint` (RECOMMENDED): a previously-issued id_token. The
+ *    OP MUST verify the signature; expiry MAY be tolerated because
+ *    logout commonly follows token expiry. We accept expired hints but
+ *    enforce signature + issuer.
+ *  - `client_id` (OPTIONAL): when both this and `id_token_hint` are
+ *    present, the OP MUST verify the client_id matches the hint's `aud`.
+ *  - `post_logout_redirect_uri` (OPTIONAL): MUST be exact-match against
+ *    the resolved client's `postLogoutRedirectUris`. If the URI is not
+ *    registered, the OP MUST NOT redirect — surface a non-redirecting
+ *    error instead, otherwise the endpoint becomes an open redirector.
+ *  - `state` (OPTIONAL): echoed back in the redirect.
+ *
+ * Front-channel / back-channel logout (RP notification of OP-initiated
+ * logout) is out of scope for this minimal endpoint. Hosts that need it
+ * can layer their own notification fan-out on top of `session_logout`
+ * audit events.
+ */
+import type { AuditLog } from "../ports/audit-log"
+import type { ConfigStore } from "../ports/config-store"
+import type { KeyStore } from "../ports/key-store"
+import type { TokenStore } from "../ports/token-store"
+import { authError, type AuthError } from "../types/error"
+import type { Result } from "../types/result"
+import { err, isErr, ok } from "../types/result"
+import type { ClientConfig, TenantContext } from "../types/tenant"
+
+import { safeAudit } from "./audit"
+import { verifyIdToken } from "./jwt"
+import { revokeAllForSubject } from "./revoke"
+
+export type EndSessionRequest = {
+  idTokenHint?: string
+  clientId?: string
+  postLogoutRedirectUri?: string
+  state?: string
+}
+
+export type EndSessionDeps = {
+  configStore: ConfigStore
+  tokenStore: TokenStore
+  keyStore: KeyStore
+  auditLog?: AuditLog
+  issuerUrl: string
+  clock: () => number
+}
+
+export type EndSessionOutput =
+  /** Redirect the user-agent back to the RP. */
+  | { kind: "redirect"; url: string }
+  /**
+   * No `post_logout_redirect_uri` was supplied (or it wasn't registered).
+   * Caller should render a minimal "logged out" page or return 200.
+   */
+  | { kind: "ok"; subjectId?: string }
+
+/**
+ * Process an `/end_session` request and return an outcome the HTTP
+ * adapter can translate into a `Response`. Pure domain — no Hono types,
+ * no `Response` construction here.
+ */
+export async function endSession(
+  req: EndSessionRequest,
+  tenant: TenantContext,
+  deps: EndSessionDeps,
+): Promise<Result<EndSessionOutput, AuthError>> {
+  // 1. Verify the id_token_hint (if present). Tolerate expiry per §2.
+  let hintSubject: string | undefined
+  let hintAud: string | undefined
+  if (req.idTokenHint) {
+    const keysRes = await deps.keyStore.signingKeys()
+    if (isErr(keysRes)) return err(keysRes.error)
+    try {
+      const claims = await verifyIdToken(req.idTokenHint, keysRes.value, {
+        issuer: deps.issuerUrl,
+        acceptExpired: true,
+      })
+      hintSubject = claims.sub
+      hintAud = claims.aud
+    } catch (e) {
+      const reason = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)
+      return err(
+        authError.invalidRequest(
+          `id_token_hint failed signature/issuer verification: ${reason}`,
+          "id_token_hint",
+        ),
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 2. If both client_id and id_token_hint are present, they MUST agree
+  //    (§2). Disagreement is `invalid_request` — never a redirect.
+  if (req.clientId && hintAud && req.clientId !== hintAud) {
+    return err(
+      authError.invalidRequest(
+        "client_id does not match id_token_hint.aud",
+        "client_id",
+      ),
+    )
+  }
+
+  // 3. Resolve the client for redirect-URI validation. Prefer explicit
+  //    client_id, fall back to the hint's aud.
+  const resolvedClientId = req.clientId ?? hintAud
+  let client: ClientConfig | undefined
+  if (resolvedClientId) {
+    client = tenant.config.clients.find((c) => c.id === resolvedClientId)
+    if (!client) {
+      return err(
+        authError.invalidRequest(
+          `unknown client "${resolvedClientId}"`,
+          "client_id",
+        ),
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 4. Validate post_logout_redirect_uri. MUST be exact-match against
+  //    the client's registered list (§2). No client → no validatable URI.
+  if (req.postLogoutRedirectUri) {
+    if (!client) {
+      return err(
+        authError.invalidRequest(
+          "post_logout_redirect_uri requires identifying the client via client_id or id_token_hint",
+          "post_logout_redirect_uri",
+        ),
+      )
+    }
+    const registered = client.postLogoutRedirectUris ?? []
+    if (!registered.includes(req.postLogoutRedirectUri)) {
+      return err(
+        authError.invalidRequest(
+          "post_logout_redirect_uri is not registered for this client",
+          "post_logout_redirect_uri",
+        ),
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 5. Revoke the subject's tokens. Only possible when an id_token_hint
+  //    identified a subject. Without a hint, /end_session is essentially
+  //    a session-cookie clear (which the framework doesn't yet own); we
+  //    still return a successful redirect/ok so RPs can complete UX.
+  if (hintSubject) {
+    const revoked = await revokeAllForSubject(tenant.id, hintSubject, {
+      tokenStore: deps.tokenStore,
+      ...(deps.auditLog ? { auditLog: deps.auditLog } : {}),
+      clock: deps.clock,
+    })
+    if (isErr(revoked)) return err(revoked.error)
+  }
+
+  await safeAudit(deps, {
+    kind: "session_logout",
+    tenantId: tenant.id,
+    ...(resolvedClientId ? { clientId: resolvedClientId } : {}),
+    ...(hintSubject ? { subjectId: hintSubject } : {}),
+    timestamp: deps.clock(),
+  })
+
+  // 6. Build the redirect or signal "ok" for the caller to render.
+  if (req.postLogoutRedirectUri) {
+    const url = new URL(req.postLogoutRedirectUri)
+    if (req.state !== undefined) url.searchParams.set("state", req.state)
+    return ok({ kind: "redirect", url: url.toString() })
+  }
+  return ok({
+    kind: "ok",
+    ...(hintSubject ? { subjectId: hintSubject } : {}),
+  })
+}

package/src/domain/method-route.ts

@@ -166,6 +166,11 @@ async function translate(
           context: final.context ?? null,
           providerSubject: result.providerSubject,
           properties: result.properties,
+          ...(final.appNonce !== undefined ? { appNonce: final.appNonce } : {}),
+          ...(final.claimsRequest !== undefined
+            ? { claimsRequest: final.claimsRequest }
+            : {}),
+          authTime: Math.floor(now / 1000),
           expiresAt: now + AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS,
         },
         AUTH_CODE_TTL_MS,

package/src/domain/par.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/**
+ * Pushed Authorization Requests (RFC 9126).
+ *
+ * The RP submits the full `/authorize` parameter set to `POST /par` along
+ * with its client credentials. The OP authenticates the client, stores
+ * the payload under an opaque `request_uri`, and returns it with an
+ * `expires_in`. The RP then redirects the user-agent to
+ * `GET /authorize?client_id=...&request_uri=...` and the OP rehydrates
+ * the original parameter set.
+ *
+ * Per RFC 9126 §3:
+ *  - Response is HTTP 201 with `application/json` body
+ *    `{request_uri, expires_in}`.
+ *  - `request_uri` MUST be of the form
+ *    `urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:<opaque>` (§2.2).
+ *  - Default TTL is 60 seconds — same as auth-code TTL.
+ *
+ * Per RFC 9126 §4:
+ *  - At `/authorize`, `request_uri` is one-shot — consumed and discarded
+ *    on first use.
+ *  - Parameters in the PAR record take precedence; additional `/authorize`
+ *    parameters MAY be merged but MUST NOT contradict (we strictly use
+ *    the PAR'd set and ignore any additional ones except `client_id`).
+ *
+ * Client authentication (§2):
+ *  - Public clients: `client_id` only.
+ *  - Confidential clients: `client_id` + `client_secret` (Basic or form).
+ */
+import type { AuditLog } from "../ports/audit-log"
+import type { ConfigStore } from "../ports/config-store"
+import type { SessionStore } from "../ports/session-store"
+import { authError, type AuthError } from "../types/error"
+import type { Result } from "../types/result"
+import { err, isErr, ok } from "../types/result"
+import type { TenantContext } from "../types/tenant"
+
+import { verifyClientCredentials } from "./client-auth"
+import { randomToken } from "./crypto"
+
+export const PAR_URI_PREFIX = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:"
+export const DEFAULT_PAR_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000
+
+export type ParRequest = {
+  clientId: string
+  /** Confidential-client secret. */
+  clientSecret?: string
+  /** Raw `/authorize` parameter record, posted by the RP. */
+  params: Record<string, string>
+}
+
+export type ParResponse = {
+  request_uri: string
+  expires_in: number
+}
+
+export type ParDeps = {
+  configStore: ConfigStore
+  sessionStore: SessionStore
+  auditLog?: AuditLog
+  clock: () => number
+  /** Test override. */
+  newRequestUriSuffix?: () => string
+  ttlMs?: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Process a `POST /par` request. Authenticates the client, validates the
+ * `client_id` consistency, and persists the parameter set.
+ */
+export async function pushAuthorizationRequest(
+  req: ParRequest,
+  tenant: TenantContext,
+  deps: ParDeps,
+): Promise<Result<ParResponse, AuthError>> {
+  if (!deps.sessionStore.savePar || !deps.sessionStore.consumePar) {
+    return err(
+      authError.invalidRequest(
+        "session adapter does not implement PAR storage",
+      ),
+    )
+  }
+
+  // 1. Client authentication. The `client_id` in the body must match the
+  //    authenticating client.
+  const client = tenant.config.clients.find((c) => c.id === req.clientId)
+  if (!client) {
+    return err(authError.invalidClient(`unknown client "${req.clientId}"`))
+  }
+  if (client.type === "confidential") {
+    const authErr = await verifyClientCredentials(client, req.clientSecret)
+    if (authErr) return err(authErr)
+  } else if (req.clientSecret !== undefined) {
+    return err(
+      authError.invalidClient("public client must not present client_secret"),
+    )
+  }
+
+  // 2. Sanity-check the body: client_id in body must match — the RFC
+  //    requires it (§2). RP shouldn't be authenticating one client and
+  //    pushing params for a different one.
+  if (req.params.client_id && req.params.client_id !== req.clientId) {
+    return err(
+      authError.invalidRequest(
+        "client_id in body conflicts with authenticated client",
+        "client_id",
+      ),
+    )
+  }
+  // RFC 9126 §2.1: `request_uri` MUST NOT appear in a PAR request body.
+  if ("request_uri" in req.params) {
+    return err(
+      authError.invalidRequest(
+        "request_uri MUST NOT be present in a PAR request",
+        "request_uri",
+      ),
+    )
+  }
+
+  // 3. Mint request_uri + persist.
+  const suffix = (deps.newRequestUriSuffix ?? randomToken)()
+  const requestUri = PAR_URI_PREFIX + suffix
+  const ttl = deps.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_PAR_TTL_MS
+  const now = deps.clock()
+  const saved = await deps.sessionStore.savePar(
+    requestUri,
+    {
+      requestUri,
+      params: { ...req.params, client_id: req.clientId },
+      clientId: req.clientId,
+      issuedAt: now,
+      expiresAt: now + ttl,
+    },
+    ttl,
+  )
+  if (isErr(saved)) return err(saved.error)
+
+  return ok({
+    request_uri: requestUri,
+    expires_in: Math.floor(ttl / 1000),
+  })
+}

package/src/domain/refresh.ts

@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ export type RefreshGrantRequest = {
   /** Confidential clients authenticate at /token. */
   clientId?: string
   clientSecret?: string
+  /**
+   * RFC 9449 §6 — JWK thumbprint of the DPoP proof presented on this
+   * refresh request. MUST match `RefreshTokenPayload.dpopJkt` when the
+   * original grant was DPoP-bound; presence is REQUIRED for bound
+   * tokens, OPTIONAL otherwise.
+   */
+  dpopJkt?: string
 }
 
 export type RefreshTokensDeps = {
@@ -46,6 +53,8 @@ export type RefreshTokensDeps = {
   /** Reuse-detection window (ms). Default 60 s. */
   reuseWindowMs?: number
   newRefreshToken?: () => string
+  /** See `IdPOptions.customScopeClaims`. Forwarded to `mintTokens`. */
+  customScopeClaims?: Record<string, ReadonlyArray<string>>
 }
 
 export async function refreshTokens(
@@ -93,6 +102,27 @@ export async function refreshTokens(
     return err(authError.invalidGrant(INVALID_REFRESH_DESC))
   }
 
+  // RFC 9449 §5 — when the refresh token is DPoP-bound, verify the
+  // presented DPoP thumbprint matches BEFORE consuming. Consuming first
+  // would burn the token on a wrong-key probe AND trip reuse-detection
+  // on a subsequent legitimate retry with the right key.
+  if (peekedPayload.dpopJkt !== undefined) {
+    if (req.dpopJkt === undefined) {
+      return err(
+        authError.invalidDpopProof(
+          "refresh token is DPoP-bound; request is missing a DPoP proof",
+        ),
+      )
+    }
+    if (req.dpopJkt !== peekedPayload.dpopJkt) {
+      return err(
+        authError.invalidDpopProof(
+          "refresh token DPoP jkt does not match the original binding",
+        ),
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
   const consumed = await deps.tokenStore.consumeRefresh(req.refreshToken, {
     reuseWindowMs: deps.reuseWindowMs,
   })
@@ -150,6 +180,17 @@ export async function refreshTokens(
       methodKind: payload.methodKind,
       scopes: requestedScopes,
       audience: payload.audience,
+      // `auth_time` is stable across refresh rotations per OIDC Core §12;
+      // refresh does not re-authenticate the user. `nonce` is deliberately
+      // NOT carried forward — the nonce was bound to the original
+      // `/authorize` request and should not reappear on rotated id_tokens.
+      authTime: payload.authTime,
+      // Preserve DPoP binding across refresh rotation (§6.1).
+      ...(payload.dpopJkt !== undefined ? { dpopJkt: payload.dpopJkt } : {}),
+      // Preserve OIDC §5.5 claims-parameter intent across refresh (§12).
+      ...(payload.claimsRequest !== undefined
+        ? { claimsRequest: payload.claimsRequest }
+        : {}),
     },
     family: payload.family,
     deps,

package/src/domain/register.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/**
+ * Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591).
+ *
+ * The host owns persistence — this module validates the wire request,
+ * mints a fresh `client_id` (and `client_secret` for confidential
+ * clients), invokes the host's `registerClient` hook with a structured
+ * `ClientConfig`, and builds the §3.2.1 response.
+ *
+ * Per RFC 7591:
+ *  - §2: registration request body is JSON, fields include
+ *    `client_name`, `redirect_uris`, `grant_types`, `response_types`,
+ *    `token_endpoint_auth_method`, `scope`, etc.
+ *  - §3.2.1: response is JSON with `client_id`, optional
+ *    `client_secret`, `client_id_issued_at`, optional
+ *    `client_secret_expires_at`, and the registered metadata.
+ *  - §3.2.2: structural problems → `invalid_client_metadata` /
+ *    `invalid_redirect_uri`. We collapse to `invalid_request` for
+ *    consistency with the rest of the library's error mapping.
+ */
+import { authError, type AuthError } from "../types/error"
+import type {
+  RegisterClient,
+  RegisterClientRequest,
+  RegisterClientResponse,
+} from "../types/idp"
+import type { Result } from "../types/result"
+import { err, isErr, ok } from "../types/result"
+import type { TenantContext } from "../types/tenant"
+
+import { randomId, randomToken } from "./crypto"
+import { hashClientSecret } from "./token"
+
+export type RegisterDeps = {
+  registerClient?: RegisterClient
+  clock: () => number
+  /** Test override for deterministic client_id. */
+  newClientId?: () => string
+  /** Test override for deterministic client_secret. */
+  newClientSecret?: () => string
+}
+
+export async function registerNewClient(
+  request: RegisterClientRequest,
+  tenant: TenantContext,
+  deps: RegisterDeps,
+): Promise<Result<RegisterClientResponse, AuthError>> {
+  if (!deps.registerClient) {
+    return err(
+      authError.invalidRequest(
+        "dynamic client registration is not enabled on this deployment",
+      ),
+    )
+  }
+
+  // RFC 7591 §2 — redirect_uris is REQUIRED for any client that uses a
+  // redirect-based grant. We accept the field as required at the wire
+  // level (schema enforces) and validate non-empty here.
+  if (
+    !Array.isArray(request.redirect_uris) ||
+    request.redirect_uris.length === 0
+  ) {
+    return err(
+      authError.invalidRequest(
+        "redirect_uris must be a non-empty array",
+        "redirect_uris",
+      ),
+    )
+  }
+  for (const uri of request.redirect_uris) {
+    try {
+      // Reject relative / opaque URIs eagerly so the host gets a clean
+      // structural rejection instead of a runtime surprise at /authorize.
+      // RFC 7591 §2 leaves URI scheme to grant-type semantics; we follow
+      // the OAuth 2.1 BCP and require absolute URIs.
+      void new URL(uri)
+    } catch {
+      return err(
+        authError.invalidRequest(
+          `redirect_uri "${uri}" is not a valid absolute URI`,
+          "redirect_uris",
+        ),
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  const authMethod = request.token_endpoint_auth_method ?? "client_secret_basic"
+  const isPublic = authMethod === "none"
+  const clientId = (deps.newClientId ?? randomId)()
+  const grantTypes = request.grant_types ?? ["authorization_code"]
+  const responseTypes = request.response_types ?? ["code"]
+  const scopes = request.scope
+    ? request.scope.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean)
+    : ["openid"]
+
+  let secret: string | undefined
+  let secretHash: string | undefined
+  if (!isPublic) {
+    secret = (deps.newClientSecret ?? randomToken)()
+    secretHash = await hashClientSecret(secret)
+  }
+
+  const clientPartial = {
+    id: clientId,
+    name: request.client_name ?? clientId,
+    redirectUris: request.redirect_uris,
+    // Default scopes overlap with what the IdP advertises; hosts may
+    // override during the hook call before persisting.
+    scopes,
+    grantTypes: grantTypes.filter(
+      (g): g is "authorization_code" | "refresh_token" | "client_credentials" =>
+        g === "authorization_code" ||
+        g === "refresh_token" ||
+        g === "client_credentials",
+    ),
+    ...(request.post_logout_redirect_uris !== undefined
+      ? { postLogoutRedirectUris: request.post_logout_redirect_uris }
+      : {}),
+    ...(request.sector_identifier_uri !== undefined
+      ? { sectorIdentifier: request.sector_identifier_uri }
+      : {}),
+  }
+
+  const clientConfig = isPublic
+    ? {
+        ...clientPartial,
+        type: "public" as const,
+        pkceRequired: true as const,
+      }
+    : {
+        ...clientPartial,
+        type: "confidential" as const,
+        secretHash: secretHash!,
+        pkceRequired: true,
+      }
+
+  const hookResult = await deps.registerClient({
+    tenant,
+    request,
+  })
+  // The hook may either:
+  //  - persist `clientConfig` as-is (most common) and return it,
+  //  - synthesize its own (host-owned id generation, custom scopes) and
+  //    return that — in which case the secret we minted is moot.
+  // We trust the hook's returned client + secret as authoritative.
+  void clientConfig
+
+  if (isErr(hookResult)) return err(hookResult.error)
+  const persisted = hookResult.value.client
+  const persistedSecret = hookResult.value.secret
+
+  const issuedAt = Math.floor(deps.clock() / 1000)
+  return ok({
+    client_id: persisted.id,
+    ...(persistedSecret !== undefined
+      ? { client_secret: persistedSecret }
+      : {}),
+    client_id_issued_at: issuedAt,
+    // RFC 7591 §3.2.1: `0` = no expiry.
+    client_secret_expires_at: 0,
+    redirect_uris: persisted.redirectUris,
+    grant_types: persisted.grantTypes,
+    response_types: responseTypes,
+    token_endpoint_auth_method: authMethod,
+    ...(request.client_name !== undefined
+      ? { client_name: request.client_name }
+      : {}),
+  })
+}

package/src/domain/token-exchange.ts

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ export type ExchangeTokenDeps = {
   issuerUrl: string
   clock: () => number
   newRefreshFamily?: () => string
+  /** See `IdPOptions.customScopeClaims`. Forwarded to `mintTokens`. */
+  customScopeClaims?: Record<string, ReadonlyArray<string>>
 }
 
 export async function exchangeToken(
@@ -203,6 +205,15 @@ export async function exchangeToken(
       methodId: subjectClaims.mid ?? "token_exchange",
       methodKind: subjectClaims.mkind ?? "token_exchange",
       scopes: requestedScopes,
+      // Carry the original end-user auth_time across the audience swap.
+      // Per OIDC Core §12, switching audience is NOT a re-authentication
+      // — the user logged in once, and downstream id_token consumers rely
+      // on auth_time being stable to detect actual re-auth events. When
+      // absent (subject was a client_credentials / m2m token), mintTokens
+      // correctly skips id_token issuance.
+      ...(subjectClaims.auth_time !== undefined
+        ? { authTime: subjectClaims.auth_time }
+        : {}),
       ...(subjectClaims.aud !== undefined &&
       subjectClaims.aud !== callerClient.id
         ? { audience: subjectClaims.aud }