@7h3/protocol 0.6.1 → 0.6.3

package/auditLog.d.ts

@@ -10,10 +10,23 @@ export interface AuditEntry {
     failReason?: string;
     upstream?: string;
     responseStatus?: number;
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 of the preceding entry, or 64 zeros for the first.
+     *
+     * Without this, entries are signed independently, which detects modification
+     * but NOT deletion: an attacker who can write to the log removes the entries
+     * covering their activity and every remaining entry still verifies. Chaining
+     * makes the log tamper-evident as a whole — see verifyAuditChain.
+     */
+    prevHash: string;
     entrySignature: string;
 }
+/** Genesis value for `prevHash`, so entry 0 is chained like every other entry. */
+export declare const AUDIT_GENESIS_HASH: string;
+/** SHA-256 over a complete, signed entry — what the next entry chains to. */
+export declare function auditEntryHash(entry: AuditEntry): Promise<string>;
 export interface AuditLogger {
-    log(event: Omit<AuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestampMs' | 'entrySignature'>): Promise<void>;
+    log(event: Omit<AuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestampMs' | 'entrySignature' | 'prevHash'>): Promise<void>;
     query(opts?: {
         type?: AuditEventType;
         sender?: string;
@@ -24,10 +37,11 @@ export interface AuditLogger {
 }
 declare class InMemoryAuditLog implements AuditLogger {
     private entries;
+    private tip;
     private privateKey;
     private maxEntries;
     constructor(privateKey: string, maxEntries?: number);
-    log(event: Omit<AuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestampMs' | 'entrySignature'>): Promise<void>;
+    log(event: Omit<AuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestampMs' | 'entrySignature' | 'prevHash'>): Promise<void>;
     query(opts?: {
         type?: AuditEventType;
         sender?: string;
@@ -38,7 +52,7 @@ declare class InMemoryAuditLog implements AuditLogger {
     size(): number;
 }
 declare class NoopAuditLog implements AuditLogger {
-    log(_event: Omit<AuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestampMs' | 'entrySignature'>): Promise<void>;
+    log(_event: Omit<AuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestampMs' | 'entrySignature' | 'prevHash'>): Promise<void>;
     query(_opts?: {
         type?: AuditEventType;
         sender?: string;
@@ -48,6 +62,22 @@ declare class NoopAuditLog implements AuditLogger {
     verify(_entry: AuditEntry, _publicKey: string): Promise<boolean>;
     size(): number;
 }
+export interface AuditChainVerification {
+    ok: boolean;
+    length: number;
+    /** Index of the first entry that failed, or null when the chain verifies. */
+    brokenAt: number | null;
+    reason?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Verify an audit log end to end.
+ *
+ * Checks, for each entry in order, that `prevHash` matches the running hash of
+ * the previous entry and that the Ed25519 signature is valid. Verifying entries
+ * one at a time catches modification but not deletion — every surviving entry
+ * still verifies on its own — which is exactly what this closes.
+ */
+export declare function verifyAuditChain(entries: AuditEntry[], publicKey: string): Promise<AuditChainVerification>;
 export declare function createAuditLog(privateKey: string, opts?: {
     maxEntries?: number;
 }): InMemoryAuditLog;

package/index.js

@@ -2988,6 +2988,10 @@ var Cr = class {
 			reason: t
 		});
 	}
+	isEnvelopeRevoked(e) {
+		let t = e?.header?.sender, n = e?.signature?.keyId;
+		return t !== void 0 && this.isRevoked(t) || n !== void 0 && this.isRevoked(n);
+	}
 	isRevoked(e) {
 		return this.revoked.has(e);
 	}
@@ -3023,12 +3027,24 @@ var Cr = class {
 	}
 	consume(e, t, n = Date.now()) {
 		let r = n - t.windowMs, i = (this.windows.get(e) ?? []).filter((e) => e > r), a = i.length < t.requests;
-		if (a && i.push(n), i.length > 0) for (this.windows.delete(e), this.windows.set(e, i); this.windows.size > this.maxKeys;) {
-			let e = this.windows.keys().next().value;
-			if (e === void 0) break;
-			this.windows.delete(e);
-		}
-		else this.windows.delete(e);
+		if (a && i.push(n), i.length > 0) {
+			if (this.windows.delete(e), this.windows.set(e, i), this.windows.size > this.maxKeys) {
+				let r = n - t.windowMs;
+				for (let [t, n] of this.windows) {
+					if (this.windows.size <= this.maxKeys) break;
+					t !== e && (n.length === 0 || n[n.length - 1] <= r) && this.windows.delete(t);
+				}
+				for (let [n, r] of this.windows) {
+					if (this.windows.size <= this.maxKeys) break;
+					n !== e && r.length < t.requests && this.windows.delete(n);
+				}
+				for (; this.windows.size > this.maxKeys;) {
+					let e = this.windows.keys().next().value;
+					if (e === void 0) break;
+					this.windows.delete(e);
+				}
+			}
+		} else this.windows.delete(e);
 		return {
 			allowed: a,
 			remaining: Math.max(0, t.requests - i.length),
@@ -3642,16 +3658,25 @@ function ti(e) {
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region src/auditLog.ts
-function ni(e) {
+var ni = "0".repeat(64);
+async function ri(e) {
+	let t = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(e));
+	return [...new Uint8Array(t)].map((e) => e.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+}
+async function ii(e) {
+	return ri(Q(e) + e.entrySignature);
+}
+function Q(e) {
 	let t = [
 		`"id":${JSON.stringify(e.id)}`,
 		`"timestampMs":${e.timestampMs}`,
 		`"type":${JSON.stringify(e.type)}`
 	];
-	return e.sender !== void 0 && t.push(`"sender":${JSON.stringify(e.sender)}`), e.path !== void 0 && t.push(`"path":${JSON.stringify(e.path)}`), e.method !== void 0 && t.push(`"method":${JSON.stringify(e.method)}`), e.envelopeId !== void 0 && t.push(`"envelopeId":${JSON.stringify(e.envelopeId)}`), e.failReason !== void 0 && t.push(`"failReason":${JSON.stringify(e.failReason)}`), e.upstream !== void 0 && t.push(`"upstream":${JSON.stringify(e.upstream)}`), e.responseStatus !== void 0 && t.push(`"responseStatus":${e.responseStatus}`), `{${t.join(",")}}`;
+	return e.sender !== void 0 && t.push(`"sender":${JSON.stringify(e.sender)}`), e.path !== void 0 && t.push(`"path":${JSON.stringify(e.path)}`), e.method !== void 0 && t.push(`"method":${JSON.stringify(e.method)}`), e.envelopeId !== void 0 && t.push(`"envelopeId":${JSON.stringify(e.envelopeId)}`), e.failReason !== void 0 && t.push(`"failReason":${JSON.stringify(e.failReason)}`), e.upstream !== void 0 && t.push(`"upstream":${JSON.stringify(e.upstream)}`), e.responseStatus !== void 0 && t.push(`"responseStatus":${e.responseStatus}`), t.push(`"prevHash":${JSON.stringify(e.prevHash)}`), `{${t.join(",")}}`;
 }
-var ri = class {
+var ai = class {
 	entries = [];
+	tip = ni;
 	privateKey;
 	maxEntries;
 	constructor(e, t = 1e4) {
@@ -3661,19 +3686,20 @@ var ri = class {
 		let t = {
 			id: `audit-${Date.now()}-${y(5)}`,
 			timestampMs: Date.now(),
-			...e
-		}, n = await b(ni(t), this.privateKey), r = {
+			...e,
+			prevHash: this.tip
+		}, n = await b(Q(t), this.privateKey), r = {
 			...t,
 			entrySignature: n
 		};
-		this.entries.length >= this.maxEntries && this.entries.shift(), this.entries.push(r);
+		this.entries.length >= this.maxEntries && this.entries.shift(), this.entries.push(r), this.tip = await ii(r);
 	}
 	async query(e) {
 		let t = [...this.entries];
 		return e?.type !== void 0 && (t = t.filter((t) => t.type === e.type)), e?.sender !== void 0 && (t = t.filter((t) => t.sender === e.sender)), e?.since !== void 0 && (t = t.filter((t) => t.timestampMs >= e.since)), e?.limit !== void 0 && (t = t.slice(-e.limit)), t;
 	}
 	async verify(e, t) {
-		return x(ni({
+		return x(Q({
 			id: e.id,
 			timestampMs: e.timestampMs,
 			type: e.type,
@@ -3683,13 +3709,14 @@ var ri = class {
 			envelopeId: e.envelopeId,
 			failReason: e.failReason,
 			upstream: e.upstream,
+			prevHash: e.prevHash,
 			responseStatus: e.responseStatus
 		}), e.entrySignature, t);
 	}
 	size() {
 		return this.entries.length;
 	}
-}, ii = class {
+}, oi = class {
 	async log(e) {}
 	async query(e) {
 		return [];
@@ -3701,25 +3728,50 @@ var ri = class {
 		return 0;
 	}
 };
-function ai(e, t) {
-	return new ri(e, t?.maxEntries);
+async function si(e, t) {
+	let n = ni;
+	for (let r = 0; r < e.length; r++) {
+		let i = e[r];
+		if (i.prevHash !== n) return {
+			ok: !1,
+			length: e.length,
+			brokenAt: r,
+			reason: "prev-hash-mismatch"
+		};
+		let { entrySignature: a, ...o } = i;
+		if (!await x(Q(o), a, t)) return {
+			ok: !1,
+			length: e.length,
+			brokenAt: r,
+			reason: "bad-signature"
+		};
+		n = await ii(i);
+	}
+	return {
+		ok: !0,
+		length: e.length,
+		brokenAt: null
+	};
+}
+function ci(e, t) {
+	return new ai(e, t?.maxEntries);
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region src/otel.ts
-var oi = null;
-function si(e) {
-	oi = e;
+var li = null;
+function ui(e) {
+	li = e;
 }
-function ci() {
-	if (oi === null) return null;
+function di() {
+	if (li === null) return null;
 	try {
-		return oi.getTracer("7h3/protocol");
+		return li.getTracer("7h3/protocol");
 	} catch {
 		return null;
 	}
 }
-async function li(e, t) {
-	let n = ci();
+async function fi(e, t) {
+	let n = di();
 	if (n === null) return e(null);
 	let r = n.startSpan("7h3.verify", t);
 	try {
@@ -3730,8 +3782,8 @@ async function li(e, t) {
 		r.end();
 	}
 }
-async function ui(e) {
-	let t = ci();
+async function pi(e) {
+	let t = di();
 	if (t === null) return e(null);
 	let n = t.startSpan("7h3.audit.write");
 	try {
@@ -3744,63 +3796,63 @@ async function ui(e) {
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region src/encryption.ts
-function Q(e) {
+function mi(e) {
 	return Buffer.from(e).toString("base64url");
 }
 function $(e) {
 	return Buffer.from(e, "base64url");
 }
-var di = Buffer.from("302e020100300506032b656e04220420", "hex"), fi = Buffer.from("302a300506032b656e032100", "hex");
-function pi(e) {
+var hi = Buffer.from("302e020100300506032b656e04220420", "hex"), gi = Buffer.from("302a300506032b656e032100", "hex");
+function _i(e) {
 	let t = $(e);
 	return r({
-		key: Buffer.concat([di, t]),
+		key: Buffer.concat([hi, t]),
 		format: "der",
 		type: "pkcs8"
 	});
 }
-function mi(e) {
+function vi(e) {
 	let t = $(e);
 	return i({
-		key: Buffer.concat([fi, t]),
+		key: Buffer.concat([gi, t]),
 		format: "der",
 		type: "spki"
 	});
 }
-function hi() {
+function yi() {
 	let { privateKey: e, publicKey: t } = o("x25519"), n = e.export({ format: "jwk" });
 	return {
 		publicKey: t.export({ format: "jwk" }).x,
 		privateKey: n.d
 	};
 }
-function gi(e, t, n) {
+function bi(e, t, n) {
 	let r = s("sha256", a({
-		privateKey: pi(e),
-		publicKey: mi(t)
+		privateKey: _i(e),
+		publicKey: vi(t)
 	}), $(n), Buffer.from("7h3-enc/1", "utf8"), 32);
 	return Buffer.from(r);
 }
-function _i(e, n) {
-	let r = hi(), i = c(12), a = Q(i), o = gi(r.privateKey, n, a), s = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(e), "utf8"), l = t("chacha20-poly1305", o, i, { authTagLength: 16 }), u = Buffer.concat([l.update(s), l.final()]), d = l.getAuthTag(), f = {
+function xi(e, n) {
+	let r = yi(), i = c(12), a = mi(i), o = bi(r.privateKey, n, a), s = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(e), "utf8"), l = t("chacha20-poly1305", o, i, { authTagLength: 16 }), u = Buffer.concat([l.update(s), l.final()]), d = l.getAuthTag(), f = {
 		ephemeralPublic: r.publicKey,
 		nonce: a,
-		ciphertext: Q(u),
-		tag: Q(d)
+		ciphertext: mi(u),
+		tag: mi(d)
 	};
 	return {
-		encryptedContent: Q(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(f), "utf8")),
+		encryptedContent: mi(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(f), "utf8")),
 		ephemeralPublic: r.publicKey
 	};
 }
-function vi(e, t) {
-	let r = $(e).toString("utf8"), { ephemeralPublic: i, nonce: a, ciphertext: o, tag: s } = JSON.parse(r), c = gi(t, i, a), l = $(a), u = $(o), d = $(s), f = n("chacha20-poly1305", c, l, { authTagLength: 16 });
+function Si(e, t) {
+	let r = $(e).toString("utf8"), { ephemeralPublic: i, nonce: a, ciphertext: o, tag: s } = JSON.parse(r), c = bi(t, i, a), l = $(a), u = $(o), d = $(s), f = n("chacha20-poly1305", c, l, { authTagLength: 16 });
 	f.setAuthTag(d);
 	let p = Buffer.concat([f.update(u), f.final()]);
 	return JSON.parse(p.toString("utf8"));
 }
-async function yi(e, t) {
-	let { encryptedContent: n } = _i(e.body, t.recipientX25519PublicKey);
+async function Ci(e, t) {
+	let { encryptedContent: n } = xi(e.body, t.recipientX25519PublicKey);
 	return w({
 		header: e.header,
 		body: {
@@ -3811,12 +3863,12 @@ async function yi(e, t) {
 		}
 	}, t.senderEd25519PrivateKey);
 }
-async function bi(e, t) {
+async function wi(e, t) {
 	if (!await T(e, t.senderEd25519PublicKey)) throw Error("7h3/encryption: Ed25519 signature verification failed");
 	return {
 		envelope: e,
-		body: vi(e.body.content, t.recipientX25519PrivateKey)
+		body: Si(e.body.content, t.recipientX25519PrivateKey)
 	};
 }
 //#endregion
-export { at as AgentSession, ot as AipAgentAdapter, zr as CAP_HEADER, Tn as CBOR_CONTENT_TYPE, Sn as CborDecoder, bn as CborEncoder, Rt as ClusterRedisReplayStore, An as DEFAULT_HEADER, xe as DEFAULT_MAX_BINARY_ENVELOPE_BYTES, Re as DistributedReplayCache, hr as GRPC_METADATA_KEY, ri as InMemoryAuditLog, It as InMemoryRedisLikeClient, A as InMemoryReplayCache, Ut as InMemoryRevocationStore, ze as InMemoryVerificationMaterialCache, Rn as InMemoryWebhookReplayCache, Cr as KeyRotationManager, xn as MAX_CBOR_DEPTH, _e as MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS, ge as MAX_TTL_MS, ii as NoopAuditLog, $r as Protocol7h3Gateway, Ir as Protocol7h3Metrics, Ar as RESPONSE_HEADER, Lt as RedisReplayStore, wr as RevocationRegistry, rt as RollingKeyring, Mt as RuntimePolicyManager, qn as STREAM_HEADER, Ye as SessionTransport, ar as SignedStreamReader, ir as SignedStreamWriter, Y as SimpleCounter, Fr as SimpleHistogram, Tr as SlidingWindowRateLimiter, Ln as WEBHOOK_DEFAULT_TTL_MS, R as WEBHOOK_SIG_HEADER, z as WEBHOOK_TS_HEADER, N as bootstrapRuntimePolicyEnforcer, Z as canonicalizeCapabilityToken, _ as canonicalizeEnvelope, Un as consumeWebhook, st as createAipAgentAdapter, $e as createAipCapabilities, At as createAipMcpGatewayRuntime, jt as createAipMcpGatewayRuntimeWithPolicy, ai as createAuditLog, an as createCachingKeyRegistry, Vt as createClusterReplayStore, rn as createCompositeKeyRegistry, D as createEnvelope, ei as createGateway, Sr as createHttpKeyRegistry, tn as createHttpMcpClient, en as createHttpMcpHandler, Pn as createHttpMiddleware, it as createKeyringSignatureResolver, Yt as createMcpClientCodec, Rr as createMetricsMiddleware, Ct as createPolicyEnforcer, ti as createProductionGateway, pt as createRawTaskFromJsonRpc, ct as createRawTaskFromLangChain, ut as createRawTaskFromLlamaIndex, zt as createRedisReplayStore, Wt as createRedisRevocationStore, In as createSignedFetchRequest, Xe as createSignedMessage, or as createSignedStream, pr as createSignedWebSocketStream, nn as createStaticKeyRegistry, $t as createStdioMcpClient, sr as createStreamVerifier, wn as decodeCbor, Ge as decodeEnvelope, qe as decodeEnvelopeBatch, Ie as decodeEnvelopeBinary, kn as decodeEnvelopeCbor, dr as decodeStreamChunk, vi as decryptBody, Kr as delegateCapabilityToken, gi as deriveEncryptionKey, et as encodeAipCapabilities, Cn as encodeCbor, j as encodeEnvelope, Ke as encodeEnvelopeBatch, Fe as encodeEnvelopeBinary, En as encodeEnvelopeCbor, ur as encodeStreamChunk, _i as encryptBody, xr as fetchWellKnownKeys, pe as generateEd25519KeypairBase64Url, hi as generateX25519KeyPair, ci as getOtelTracer, Pt as getRuntimeTuningPreset, Er as globalRateLimiter, kr as isAllowedSender, wt as isRuntimeMode, Vr as issueCapabilityToken, bt as loadRuntimePolicy, Dr as matchGlob, Or as matchPolicy, X as metrics, nt as negotiateAipCapabilities, Qr as normalizeGatewayPath, bi as openEnvelope, tt as parseAipCapabilities, Zr as parseCapabilityChain, vt as parseRuntimePolicyJson, br as parseWellKnownKeys, y as randomHex, M as receiveEnvelope, Je as receiveEnvelopeBatch, mr as receiveSignedWebSocketStream, Ft as recommendPolicyAdjustments, Lr as renderPrometheusText, yi as sealEnvelope, Xr as serializeCapabilityChain, Qt as serveMcpOverStdio, yr as serveWellKnownKeys, si as setOtelProvider, b as signCanonicalPayloadEd25519, de as signCanonicalPayloadHmac, w as signEnvelopeEd25519, S as signEnvelopeHmac, Fn as signFetchRequest, gr as signGrpcCall, Mn as signHttpRequest, Nn as signHttpRequestHmac, Wn as signQueueMessage, jr as signResponse, cr as signStream, zn as signWebhook, Bn as signWebhookHmac, mt as toJsonRpcResponse, lt as toLangChainMessage, dt as toLlamaIndexMessage, Yr as tokenMatchesScope, E as validateEnvelope, _t as validateRuntimePolicy, x as verifyCanonicalPayloadEd25519, fe as verifyCanonicalPayloadHmac, he as verifyCanonicalPayloadSignature, Jr as verifyCapabilityChain, qr as verifyCapabilityToken, T as verifyEnvelopeEd25519, C as verifyEnvelopeHmac, me as verifyEnvelopeSignature, _r as verifyGrpcCall, jn as verifyHttpEnvelope, Kn as verifyQueueBatch, Gn as verifyQueueMessage, Mr as verifyResponse, lr as verifyStream, Vn as verifyWebhook, Hn as verifyWebhookHmac, ui as withAuditSpan, vr as withGrpcVerification, Gt as withRevocationCheck, li as withVerificationSpan, Xt as wrapMcpClient, Jt as wrapMcpServer, fr as wrapWebSocket };
+export { ni as AUDIT_GENESIS_HASH, at as AgentSession, ot as AipAgentAdapter, zr as CAP_HEADER, Tn as CBOR_CONTENT_TYPE, Sn as CborDecoder, bn as CborEncoder, Rt as ClusterRedisReplayStore, An as DEFAULT_HEADER, xe as DEFAULT_MAX_BINARY_ENVELOPE_BYTES, Re as DistributedReplayCache, hr as GRPC_METADATA_KEY, ai as InMemoryAuditLog, It as InMemoryRedisLikeClient, A as InMemoryReplayCache, Ut as InMemoryRevocationStore, ze as InMemoryVerificationMaterialCache, Rn as InMemoryWebhookReplayCache, Cr as KeyRotationManager, xn as MAX_CBOR_DEPTH, _e as MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS, ge as MAX_TTL_MS, oi as NoopAuditLog, $r as Protocol7h3Gateway, Ir as Protocol7h3Metrics, Ar as RESPONSE_HEADER, Lt as RedisReplayStore, wr as RevocationRegistry, rt as RollingKeyring, Mt as RuntimePolicyManager, qn as STREAM_HEADER, Ye as SessionTransport, ar as SignedStreamReader, ir as SignedStreamWriter, Y as SimpleCounter, Fr as SimpleHistogram, Tr as SlidingWindowRateLimiter, Ln as WEBHOOK_DEFAULT_TTL_MS, R as WEBHOOK_SIG_HEADER, z as WEBHOOK_TS_HEADER, ii as auditEntryHash, N as bootstrapRuntimePolicyEnforcer, Z as canonicalizeCapabilityToken, _ as canonicalizeEnvelope, Un as consumeWebhook, st as createAipAgentAdapter, $e as createAipCapabilities, At as createAipMcpGatewayRuntime, jt as createAipMcpGatewayRuntimeWithPolicy, ci as createAuditLog, an as createCachingKeyRegistry, Vt as createClusterReplayStore, rn as createCompositeKeyRegistry, D as createEnvelope, ei as createGateway, Sr as createHttpKeyRegistry, tn as createHttpMcpClient, en as createHttpMcpHandler, Pn as createHttpMiddleware, it as createKeyringSignatureResolver, Yt as createMcpClientCodec, Rr as createMetricsMiddleware, Ct as createPolicyEnforcer, ti as createProductionGateway, pt as createRawTaskFromJsonRpc, ct as createRawTaskFromLangChain, ut as createRawTaskFromLlamaIndex, zt as createRedisReplayStore, Wt as createRedisRevocationStore, In as createSignedFetchRequest, Xe as createSignedMessage, or as createSignedStream, pr as createSignedWebSocketStream, nn as createStaticKeyRegistry, $t as createStdioMcpClient, sr as createStreamVerifier, wn as decodeCbor, Ge as decodeEnvelope, qe as decodeEnvelopeBatch, Ie as decodeEnvelopeBinary, kn as decodeEnvelopeCbor, dr as decodeStreamChunk, Si as decryptBody, Kr as delegateCapabilityToken, bi as deriveEncryptionKey, et as encodeAipCapabilities, Cn as encodeCbor, j as encodeEnvelope, Ke as encodeEnvelopeBatch, Fe as encodeEnvelopeBinary, En as encodeEnvelopeCbor, ur as encodeStreamChunk, xi as encryptBody, xr as fetchWellKnownKeys, pe as generateEd25519KeypairBase64Url, yi as generateX25519KeyPair, di as getOtelTracer, Pt as getRuntimeTuningPreset, Er as globalRateLimiter, kr as isAllowedSender, wt as isRuntimeMode, Vr as issueCapabilityToken, bt as loadRuntimePolicy, Dr as matchGlob, Or as matchPolicy, X as metrics, nt as negotiateAipCapabilities, Qr as normalizeGatewayPath, wi as openEnvelope, tt as parseAipCapabilities, Zr as parseCapabilityChain, vt as parseRuntimePolicyJson, br as parseWellKnownKeys, y as randomHex, M as receiveEnvelope, Je as receiveEnvelopeBatch, mr as receiveSignedWebSocketStream, Ft as recommendPolicyAdjustments, Lr as renderPrometheusText, Ci as sealEnvelope, Xr as serializeCapabilityChain, Qt as serveMcpOverStdio, yr as serveWellKnownKeys, ui as setOtelProvider, b as signCanonicalPayloadEd25519, de as signCanonicalPayloadHmac, w as signEnvelopeEd25519, S as signEnvelopeHmac, Fn as signFetchRequest, gr as signGrpcCall, Mn as signHttpRequest, Nn as signHttpRequestHmac, Wn as signQueueMessage, jr as signResponse, cr as signStream, zn as signWebhook, Bn as signWebhookHmac, mt as toJsonRpcResponse, lt as toLangChainMessage, dt as toLlamaIndexMessage, Yr as tokenMatchesScope, E as validateEnvelope, _t as validateRuntimePolicy, si as verifyAuditChain, x as verifyCanonicalPayloadEd25519, fe as verifyCanonicalPayloadHmac, he as verifyCanonicalPayloadSignature, Jr as verifyCapabilityChain, qr as verifyCapabilityToken, T as verifyEnvelopeEd25519, C as verifyEnvelopeHmac, me as verifyEnvelopeSignature, _r as verifyGrpcCall, jn as verifyHttpEnvelope, Kn as verifyQueueBatch, Gn as verifyQueueMessage, Mr as verifyResponse, lr as verifyStream, Vn as verifyWebhook, Hn as verifyWebhookHmac, pi as withAuditSpan, vr as withGrpcVerification, Gt as withRevocationCheck, fi as withVerificationSpan, Xt as wrapMcpClient, Jt as wrapMcpServer, fr as wrapWebSocket };

package/keyInfra.d.ts

@@ -56,7 +56,37 @@ export interface RevocationList {
 }
 export declare class RevocationRegistry {
     private revoked;
-    revoke(keyId: string, reason?: string): void;
+    /**
+     * Revoke an identifier — either a sender identity or a keyId.
+     *
+     * Which one you pass matters, and the difference used to be silent. A
+     * registry lookup is keyed by *sender*, so `wrapRegistry().getPublicKey()`
+     * can only ever compare against a sender id. Revoking a bare keyId therefore
+     * blocked the HMAC path (which receives both identifiers) while leaving the
+     * Ed25519 path fully open — a revoked, compromised key kept authenticating.
+     *
+     * Use {@link isEnvelopeRevoked} on the verification path to enforce a keyId
+     * revocation for Ed25519, or revoke the sender identity as well. For
+     * fleet-wide `(sender, keyId)` revocation, use `RevocationStore` from
+     * `./revocation` instead.
+     */
+    revoke(senderOrKeyId: string, reason?: string): void;
+    /**
+     * True if either the envelope's sender or the keyId it was signed under has
+     * been revoked.
+     *
+     * This is the check that actually enforces a keyId revocation for Ed25519,
+     * because unlike a registry lookup it can see `signature.keyId`. Call it on
+     * the verification path alongside signature checking.
+     */
+    isEnvelopeRevoked(envelope: {
+        header?: {
+            sender?: string;
+        };
+        signature?: {
+            keyId?: string;
+        };
+    }): boolean;
     isRevoked(keyId: string): boolean;
     getList(): RevocationList;
     importList(list: RevocationList): void;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@7h3/protocol",
-  "version": "0.6.1",
+  "version": "0.6.3",
   "description": "7h3 Protocol: deterministic, signed, replay-safe AI-to-AI message envelopes (wire 7h3/0.1).",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./index.js",