@7h3/protocol 0.5.0 → 0.5.1

package/docs/SECURITY_REVIEW_2026-06-05.md

@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-# Internal Security Review — AIP v0.1.2
-
-**Date:** 2026-06-05  
-**Reviewer:** Claude Code (AI-assisted internal review)  
-**Scope:** `@7h3/protocol` v0.1.2 — TypeScript sources, Python SDK, Rust SDK  
-**Status:** ⚠️ NOT an independent third-party audit. This review was performed by the same AI assistant that co-developed parts of the codebase. It is published for transparency; it does not substitute for an independent cryptographic audit.
-
----
-
-## Summary
-
-The core cryptographic choices are sound: WebCrypto primitives for both HMAC-SHA256 and Ed25519, constant-time verification, algorithm-confusion guards, and fail-closed revocation. Two real bugs were found and fixed in this review pass. No signature-forgery or authentication-bypass paths were identified.
-
-| Finding | Severity | Status |
-|---|---|---|
-| Replay key collision via unescaped `\|` separator | Medium | **Fixed** — `encodeURIComponent` applied |
-| Empty nonce not rejected by `validateEnvelope` | Low | **Fixed** — error diagnostic added |
-| Rust cargo-fuzz targets uncompiled (README overclaim) | Low | **Corrected in README** |
-| `recipient: null` vs `undefined` — cross-language parity gap | Low | Documented accepted risk |
-| Revocation key space-separator (minor variant of #1) | Low | Documented accepted risk |
-
----
-
-## Finding 1 — Replay Key Collision (Medium, Fixed)
-
-**File:** `src/protocolReplay.ts` — `InMemoryReplayCache.makeKey` and `DistributedReplayCache.makeKey`
-
-**Before:**
-```ts
-return `${envelope.header.sender}|${envelope.header.messageId}|${envelope.header.nonce}`
-```
-
-**Problem:** The `|` separator is unescaped. A sender named `"a|b"` with messageId `"c"` produces the same composite key as sender `"a"` with messageId `"b|c"`. If an attacker controls their own agent ID and can observe or predict a target agent's messageId, they can send a message first that "claims" the target's replay key, causing the legitimate message to be rejected as a replay.
-
-**Security impact:** This is a **false-rejection DoS**, not a forgery or auth bypass. Signatures still cover the full, unencoded field values — an attacker cannot craft a message that validates under a victim's key. The worst they can achieve is having a legitimate message silently dropped.
-
-**Fix applied:**
-```ts
-return `${encodeURIComponent(envelope.header.sender)}|${encodeURIComponent(envelope.header.messageId)}|${encodeURIComponent(envelope.header.nonce)}`
-```
-
-`encodeURIComponent` maps `|` → `%7C`, making cross-boundary collisions impossible. For typical agent IDs containing only word characters and hyphens, the output is byte-identical to the old format — no Redis key migration required for standard deployments.
-
-**Note on deployed keys:** If your Redis instance already contains replay keys with agent IDs containing `|`, `%`, or other URI-reserved characters, those keys will have a different format after this fix. Existing entries will expire naturally via their TTL; no manual migration is needed.
-
----
-
-## Finding 2 — Empty Nonce Not Validated (Low, Fixed)
-
-**File:** `src/protocol.ts` — `validateEnvelope`
-
-**Problem:** `validateEnvelope` checked `messageId`, `sender`, `ttlMs`, `timestampMs`, and `content` but did not validate `nonce`. A missing or empty nonce produces a replay key of the form `sender||messageId`. While this doesn't defeat replay protection outright (the composite key still covers sender + messageId), it eliminates the entropy contribution of the nonce and allows any two messages with identical sender + messageId to collide in the replay cache, regardless of time.
-
-**Fix applied:** Added `if (!nonce.trim()) diagnostics.push({ level: 'error', message: 'Missing nonce — replay protection requires a unique nonce per message' })`.
-
----
-
-## Finding 3 — Rust cargo-fuzz Targets Uncompiled (Low, Corrected)
-
-**File:** `sdk/rust/fuzz/`, `README.md` status table
-
-**Problem:** `cargo-fuzz` is not installed in the development environment. The Rust fuzz targets (`fuzz_decode.rs`, `fuzz_canonicalize.rs`) were authored and reviewed but have never been compiled or run. The prior README entry claimed "✅ cargo-fuzz targets" without this qualification.
-
-**Correction:** The README status now reads: "TypeScript harnesses run clean (50k/20k rounds); Rust targets authored, not yet executed (`cargo-fuzz` not installed)."
-
-The targets themselves look structurally correct:
-- `fuzz_decode`: feeds arbitrary bytes through `decode_envelope` under a no-panic invariant — correct
-- `fuzz_canonicalize`: constructs `ProtocolEnvelope` from fuzz bytes, asserts `canonicalize_envelope` is idempotent — correct
-
-To run:
-```bash
-rustup toolchain install nightly
-cargo install cargo-fuzz
-cargo +nightly fuzz run fuzz_decode --manifest-path sdk/rust/fuzz/Cargo.toml
-cargo +nightly fuzz run fuzz_canonicalize --manifest-path sdk/rust/fuzz/Cargo.toml
-```
-
----
-
-## Finding 4 — `recipient: null` vs Absent (Low, Accepted Risk)
-
-**File:** `src/protocol.ts` — `serializeHeaderCanonical`
-
-```ts
-if (header.recipient !== undefined) {
-  parts.push(`"recipient":${JSON.stringify(header.recipient)}`)
-}
-```
-
-If a JSON message arrives with `"recipient": null`, JavaScript parses this as `null`, which passes the `!== undefined` check. `JSON.stringify(null)` produces `"null"`, so the canonical form includes `"recipient":null` — different from a message where `recipient` is absent entirely.
-
-In the TypeScript type system, `ProtocolHeader.recipient` is typed as `string | undefined`. A `null` value is a type violation but not rejected at runtime.
-
-**Cross-language risk:** The Rust SDK uses `Option<String>` for `recipient`, which serializes `None` as absent (the field is skipped). If a TS caller writes `recipient: null` and the Rust verifier receives it, the canonical forms diverge → signature mismatch.
-
-**Status:** Accepted risk. The correct mitigation is to normalise `null` → `undefined` in the wire decoder. This is tracked as a future improvement. In practice, `null` recipients do not appear in protocol-generated envelopes (`createEnvelope` leaves `recipient` undefined when not supplied).
-
----
-
-## Finding 5 — Revocation Key Space Separator (Low, Accepted Risk)
-
-**File:** `src/revocation.ts` — `InMemoryRevocationStore.makeKey` and `createRedisRevocationStore`
-
-The revocation key format `"${sender} ${keyId}"` uses a space as separator. If a sender ID contains a space (e.g., `"agent one"`) and a keyId starts with something that continues the pattern, a collision is theoretically possible. However:
-
-1. Key IDs in practice are short tokens like `"k1"`, `"prod-key-2026"` — not containing spaces
-2. Agent IDs with spaces are unusual enough to warrant operator documentation
-3. The collision would cause a revocation miss (treating a non-revoked key as revoked, or vice versa) — not an auth bypass
-
-**Status:** Accepted risk. Documented in this review. Consider changing to `${encodeURIComponent(sender)}:${encodeURIComponent(keyId)}` in a future patch.
-
----
-
-## Positive Findings
-
-### Constant-time HMAC verification
-
-`hmacVerify` delegates to `crypto.subtle.verify` (WebCrypto), which is specified to run in constant time. There is no string `===` comparison of signature bytes anywhere on the verify hot path.
-
-### Algorithm confusion rejected
-
-`verifyEnvelopeSignature` checks `signature.alg !== material.alg` before dispatching. An envelope signed with Ed25519 cannot be verified with HMAC material and vice versa — the check is at the dispatch level, before any cryptographic operation.
-
-`verifyEnvelopeHmac` checks `envelope.signature.alg !== 'HS256'` explicitly before calling `hmacVerify`. Same for `verifyEnvelopeEd25519` / `'ED25519'`. Downgrade attacks via algorithm confusion are blocked at two independent points.
-
-### Revocation fail-closed
-
-`createRedisRevocationStore` defaults to `errorBehavior: 'reject'`. A Redis outage causes the store to treat the key as revoked. Cached stale-revoked entries serve during brief outages without allowing a previously-revoked key through.
-
-### MCP wrapper — all four bindings present
-
-Code review confirms all four claimed bindings in `src/mcpWrapper.ts`:
-
-| Binding | Code location | Enforcement |
-|---|---|---|
-| Recipient | line 120: `envelope.header.recipient !== options.selfAgentId` | Returns 32600 error; handler does not run |
-| Sender | line 176: `received.envelope.header.sender !== options.peerAgentId` | Throws; response discarded |
-| Correlation | line 181: `body.correlationId !== decodeOptions.expectCorrelationId` | Throws; response discarded |
-| Replay | `InMemoryReplayCache` injected by default in `wrapMcpServer` | Replay → `consume()` returns `{ok: false}` |
-
-### Cross-language parity (within tested scope)
-
-The three conformance vectors in `conformance/aip_v0_1.json` produce byte-identical signatures in TypeScript, Python, and Rust. The canonicalization format is simple string concatenation with fixed key order; there is no runtime type ambiguity within the tested input set.
-
-**Caveat:** Three vectors are a narrow coverage set. Cross-language divergence on edge cases (very large integers, Unicode normalization, `NaN`/`Infinity` in numeric fields) is not covered by the current conformance suite.
-
----
-
-## Scope Not Covered
-
-| Area | Reason not covered |
-|---|---|
-| WebCrypto Ed25519 implementation | Browser/Node built-in; outside reviewable scope |
-| Binary wire format (protocolBinary.ts) | Not reviewed in this pass — fuzz coverage via `protocolFuzz.advanced.test.ts` exists |
-| Framework adapters (LangChain, LlamaIndex) | Translation adapters; lower security surface |
-| Policy enforcer | Logic review only; not cryptographic |
-| Python pure-Ed25519 implementation | Correctness verified against conformance vector; not audited for side channels |
-
----
-
-## Conclusion
-
-The cryptographic architecture is well-chosen: standard primitives, no custom crypto, constant-time comparison, fail-closed defaults. The two bugs fixed in this review (replay key collision, empty nonce) were low-to-medium severity and have been patched. No authentication bypass, signature forgery, or replay-protection bypass paths were found.
-
-**This review does not substitute for an independent third-party audit by a qualified cryptographer.** The parsing, canonicalization, and replay-cache logic remain unaudited by an external reviewer. Treat accordingly for high-stakes deployments.

package/docs/TELEMETRY.md

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-# Telemetry Events
-
-Transport-level telemetry can be attached to `receiveEnvelope` via `telemetry` callback.
-
-## Event phases
-
-- `decoded`
-- `rejected_clock_skew`
-- `rejected_validation`
-- `rejected_replay`
-- `rejected_missing_signature`
-- `rejected_missing_material`
-- `rejected_bad_signature`
-- `accepted`
-
-## Usage
-
-```ts
-import { receiveEnvelope } from './src/protocolTransport'
-
-await receiveEnvelope(rawEnvelope, {
-  nowMs: Date.now(),
-  replayCache,
-  secretResolver: async () => sharedSecret,
-  telemetry: async (event) => {
-    console.log(event.phase, event.sender, event.messageId, event.reason)
-  },
-})
-```
-
-## Gateway audit events
-
-`createAipMcpGatewayRuntime` supports `onAuditEvent` for request/policy traces.
-
-Phases:
-
-- `request_received`
-- `policy`
-- `verification_failed`
-- `request_success`
-- `request_error`

package/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-# 7h3 Protocol AIP Threat Model (v1.0 draft)
-
-## Scope
-
-This model covers `aip/0.1` envelope transport and verification paths in:
-
-- `src/protocol.ts`
-- `src/protocolTransport.ts`
-- `src/mcpGateway.ts`
-- `sdk/rust/src/lib.rs`
-
-## Assets
-
-- Message integrity and authenticity
-- Agent identity binding (`sender`, `keyId`, signature material)
-- Freshness (TTL + replay resistance)
-- Gateway policy decisions (allowlist/auth/rate-limit)
-
-## Assumptions
-
-- Clocks are roughly synchronized within deployment skew limits.
-- Secret/private-key material is provisioned securely outside protocol logic.
-- Transport channel can be observed/modified by adversaries; protocol must detect tamper.
-
-## Threats and controls
-
-## Tampering
-
-- Threat: attacker modifies envelope body/header in transit.
-- Controls:
-  - canonical payload signing (`HS256` / `ED25519`)
-  - signature verification before acceptance
-  - canonical key order fixed to prevent ambiguous signing forms
-
-## Replay
-
-- Threat: attacker replays previously valid signed envelopes.
-- Controls:
-  - TTL checks (`timestampMs + ttlMs`)
-  - replay cache consumption (`messageId` + `sender` + `nonce` semantics)
-
-## Sender impersonation
-
-- Threat: attacker signs as trusted sender with incorrect key material.
-- Controls:
-  - verifier resolves material by `(keyId, sender)` context
-  - `signatureResolver`/`secretResolver` mapping policy in transport layer
-
-## Algorithm confusion / downgrade
-
-- Threat: attacker swaps `alg` or relies on omitted compact alg fields.
-- Controls:
-  - explicit algorithm field in canonical signature object
-  - compact wire supports `sig.a`; default compatibility path only for legacy HS256
-  - verifier rejects material when resolved algorithm does not match envelope signature
-
-## Gateway abuse
-
-- Threat: unauthorized or abusive JSON-RPC method calls.
-- Controls:
-  - method allowlist
-  - authorization policy hook
-  - rate-limit policy hook with context-aware keys
-
-## Mitigated risks
-
-- **Distributed replay** — a Redis-backed `DistributedReplayStore` is shipped
-  (`createRedisReplayStore`, `src/replayStores.ts`). It uses atomic `SET NX PX`,
-  batches via pipeline (`reserveMany`), and degrades to a local store on a Redis
-  outage so a node never blindly accepts replays and never hard-stops. See
-  `DISTRIBUTED_REPLAY.md`.
-- **Fleet-wide key revocation** — a shared `RevocationStore`
-  (`createRedisRevocationStore`, `src/revocation.ts`) is consulted on the verify
-  path via `withRevocationCheck`. A key revoked on one node is rejected on all
-  nodes; reads are cached and fail **closed** by default. See `KEY_REVOCATION.md`.
-
-## Remaining risks (open)
-
-- No formal fuzz campaign yet for parser/canonicalization boundaries.
-- Revocation/replay stores rely on a correctly provisioned, available Redis (or
-  equivalent) control plane; operators own its HA and clock synchronization.
-- No third-party cryptographic audit yet.
-
-## Required production mitigations
-
-- Keep signature verification enabled by default in production paths.
-- Deploy a shared replay store (`createRedisReplayStore`) for horizontally scaled gateways.
-- Wire a shared revocation store (`createRedisRevocationStore` + `withRevocationCheck`)
-  and enforce key lifecycle policy (rotation, expiry, revocation) in the control plane.

package/docs/VERSIONING_POLICY.md

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# AIP Versioning Policy
-
-## Protocol versions
-
-- Protocol version is declared in `header.version` (for example `aip/0.1`).
-- New major protocol versions must not silently alter canonicalization or signature semantics.
-- Backward-incompatible wire or verification changes require a new minor/major protocol tag.
-
-## Compatibility rules
-
-- Patch releases: bug fixes only, no wire-format or canonicalization changes.
-- Minor releases: additive changes only (new optional fields/capabilities, no required-field breakage).
-- Major releases: allowed to remove or alter semantics with explicit migration documentation.
-
-## Signature profile policy
-
-- Supported profiles are explicitly declared by `signature.alg`.
-- Adding a new signature profile is a minor release only if existing profiles continue to verify unchanged.
-- Removing a profile requires a major release.
-
-## SDK versioning
-
-- TypeScript, Python, and Rust SDKs follow semver independently.
-- Conformance fixture changes require SDK conformance updates in the same release train.
-
-## Release evidence requirements
-
-- Conformance suites (TS/Python/Rust) pass.
-- Bench regression checks attached for performance-sensitive changes.
-- Migration guide updated for any behavior change that impacts consumers.

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-  <text x="1109" y="260" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="12" fill="#64748b" text-anchor="middle">transports</text>
-  <text x="1109" y="278" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="11" fill="#334155" text-anchor="middle">One wire format: 7h3/0.1</text>
-
-  <!-- Security features panel -->
-  <rect x="776" y="308" width="438" height="242" rx="12" fill="#0a0d1a" stroke="#1e293b" stroke-width="1"/>
-  <rect x="776" y="308" width="438" height="3"   rx="1.5" fill="url(#accentGrad)"/>
-  <text x="796" y="338" font-family="SF Mono,Consolas,monospace" font-size="10" fill="#475569" letter-spacing="4">SECURITY GUARANTEES</text>
-
-  <rect x="796" y="350" width="3" height="38" rx="1.5" fill="#4f7cff"/>
-  <text x="810" y="368" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="14" font-weight="600" fill="#e2e8f0">Verified sender identity</text>
-  <text x="810" y="384" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="11.5" fill="#475569">Ed25519 — cryptographically impossible to forge</text>
-
-  <rect x="796" y="398" width="3" height="38" rx="1.5" fill="#10b981"/>
-  <text x="810" y="416" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="14" font-weight="600" fill="#e2e8f0">Replay attack prevention</text>
-  <text x="810" y="432" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="11.5" fill="#475569">TTL + nonce — captured messages expire, can't be reused</text>
-
-  <rect x="796" y="446" width="3" height="38" rx="1.5" fill="#a855f7"/>
-  <text x="810" y="464" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="14" font-weight="600" fill="#e2e8f0">Tamper-evident audit log</text>
-  <text x="810" y="480" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="11.5" fill="#475569">Ed25519-signed entries — alter one byte, break the chain</text>
-
-  <rect x="796" y="494" width="3" height="38" rx="1.5" fill="#f59e0b"/>
-  <text x="810" y="512" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="14" font-weight="600" fill="#e2e8f0">Bidirectional trust</text>
-  <text x="810" y="528" font-family="Inter,sans-serif" font-size="11.5" fill="#475569">Servers sign responses — clients verify replies too</text>
-
-  <!-- Footer -->
-  <rect x="0" y="608" width="1280" height="32" fill="#04040c"/>
-  <rect x="0" y="608" width="1280" height="1"  fill="#1e293b"/>
-  <text x="62"   y="630" font-family="SF Mono,Consolas,monospace" font-size="12" fill="#334155">github.com/IceMasterT/7h3-protocol</text>
-  <text x="640"  y="630" font-family="SF Mono,Consolas,monospace" font-size="12" fill="#334155" text-anchor="middle">MIT License  ·  wire: 7h3/0.1  ·  Zero runtime deps</text>
-  <text x="1218" y="630" font-family="SF Mono,Consolas,monospace" font-size="12" fill="#334155" text-anchor="end">v0.4.0</text>
-</svg>

package/eslint.config.js

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-import js from '@eslint/js'
-import globals from 'globals'
-import tseslint from 'typescript-eslint'
-
-export default tseslint.config(
-  { ignores: ['dist', 'node_modules', 'sdk/rust/target'] },
-  {
-    extends: [js.configs.recommended, ...tseslint.configs.recommended],
-    files: ['**/*.ts'],
-    languageOptions: {
-      ecmaVersion: 2022,
-      globals: { ...globals.node, ...globals.browser },
-    },
-  },
-)

package/fuzz/ts/harness-decode.ts

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Fuzz harness: wire decoder resilience.
- *
- * Invariant: decodeEnvelope must NEVER throw on any input — arbitrary strings
- * and arbitrary bytes both. On garbage it must return {ok: false}.
- *
- * Strategy: start from the conformance corpus, apply mutations, run N rounds.
- */
-
-import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
-import { join, dirname } from 'node:path'
-import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
-import { decodeEnvelope } from '../../src/index.js'
-
-const __dir = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
-const VECTORS_PATH = join(__dir, '../../conformance/7h3_v0_1.json')
-const ROUNDS = parseInt(process.env.FUZZ_ROUNDS ?? '50000', 10)
-
-const { vectors, ed25519Vectors = [] } = JSON.parse(readFileSync(VECTORS_PATH, 'utf-8'))
-
-// --- corpus: valid JSON and compact encodings from conformance vectors ---
-const corpus: (string | Uint8Array)[] = []
-for (const v of [...vectors, ...ed25519Vectors]) {
-  const env = v.envelope
-  corpus.push(JSON.stringify(env))
-  // compact encoding
-  corpus.push(
-    JSON.stringify({
-      v: env.header?.version,
-      mid: env.header?.messageId,
-      ts: env.header?.timestampMs,
-      ttl: env.header?.ttlMs,
-      s: env.header?.sender,
-      n: env.header?.nonce,
-      i: env.body?.intent,
-      c: env.body?.content,
-    }),
-  )
-}
-// seed with known-bad corpus
-corpus.push('', '{}', '[]', 'null', '"string"', '{', '{"header":{}}', '{"header":{},"body":{}}')
-
-// --- mutators ---
-type Mutator = (input: string, rand: () => number) => string
-
-const mutators: Mutator[] = [
-  // bit flip a byte
-  (s, r) => {
-    const buf = Buffer.from(s, 'utf-8')
-    if (!buf.length) return s
-    buf[Math.floor(r() * buf.length)] ^= 1 << Math.floor(r() * 8)
-    return buf.toString('utf-8')
-  },
-  // insert random byte
-  (s, r) => {
-    const buf = Buffer.from(s, 'utf-8')
-    const idx = Math.floor(r() * (buf.length + 1))
-    const b = Math.floor(r() * 256)
-    return Buffer.concat([buf.subarray(0, idx), Buffer.from([b]), buf.subarray(idx)]).toString('utf-8')
-  },
-  // delete a byte
-  (s, r) => {
-    const buf = Buffer.from(s, 'utf-8')
-    if (!buf.length) return s
-    const idx = Math.floor(r() * buf.length)
-    return Buffer.concat([buf.subarray(0, idx), buf.subarray(idx + 1)]).toString('utf-8')
-  },
-  // truncate
-  (s, r) => {
-    const buf = Buffer.from(s, 'utf-8')
-    return buf.subarray(0, Math.floor(r() * buf.length)).toString('utf-8')
-  },
-  // mutate a JSON field
-  (s, r) => {
-    try {
-      const obj = JSON.parse(s) as Record<string, unknown>
-      const keys = Object.keys(obj)
-      if (!keys.length) return s
-      const key = keys[Math.floor(r() * keys.length)]
-      const replacement = [null, 0, 1, -1, '', [], {}, true, false][Math.floor(r() * 9)]
-      obj[key] = replacement
-      return JSON.stringify(obj)
-    } catch {
-      return s
-    }
-  },
-  // replace a known token with another
-  (s, r) => {
-    const tokens = ['7h3/0.1', 'TASK', 'PING', 'RESULT', 'HS256', 'ED25519', '"sender"', '"body"']
-    const replacements = ['aip/0.2', 'INVALID', '', '0', 'NONE', 'RSA', '"SENDER"', '"Body"']
-    const i = Math.floor(r() * tokens.length)
-    return s.split(tokens[i]).join(replacements[i])
-  },
-]
-
-// --- runner ---
-let crashes = 0
-let okFalse = 0
-let okTrue = 0
-
-function rand(): number {
-  return Math.random()
-}
-
-let current = corpus[0] as string
-
-for (let i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++) {
-  // pick a mutator and apply it
-  const mutator = mutators[Math.floor(rand() * mutators.length)]
-  current = mutator(current, rand)
-
-  // occasionally reset to a fresh corpus item
-  if (i % 500 === 0) {
-    current = corpus[Math.floor(rand() * corpus.length)] as string
-  }
-
-  try {
-    const result = decodeEnvelope(current)
-    if (result.ok) {
-      okTrue++
-    } else {
-      okFalse++
-    }
-  } catch (err) {
-    crashes++
-    console.error(`\nCRASH at round ${i}:`)
-    console.error('  Input (first 200 chars):', JSON.stringify(current.slice(0, 200)))
-    console.error('  Error:', err)
-  }
-}
-
-console.log(`[harness-decode] rounds=${ROUNDS} ok=${okTrue} ok:false=${okFalse} crashes=${crashes}`)
-if (crashes > 0) {
-  console.error(`FAIL: ${crashes} crash(es) detected`)
-  process.exit(1)
-}