@7365admin1/layer-common 4.82.1-staging.472 → 4.82.1-staging.474

package/components/BulletinBoardView.vue

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
               <v-col class="font-weight-bold">{{ label }}:</v-col>
 
               <v-col cols="9" class="px-10">
-                <span v-if="key === 'content'" v-html="getFieldValue(key)" />
+                <span v-if="key === 'content'" v-html="sanitizeHtml(getFieldValue(key))" />
                 <span v-else-if="key === 'noExpiration'">
                   <BulletinExpirationChip
                     :value="getFieldValue(key) as boolean"

package/components/HidUserEnrollment.vue

@@ -2331,11 +2331,59 @@ function applyFacialResult(
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * THE IDENTITY ROW BEHIND A ROSTER ROW.
+ *
+ * This list is read from the READER (`getReaderUsers`), and `listReaderUsers`
+ * builds each row out of the device's own `users` columns - it carries no
+ * identity `_id` at all, so `toHidUser` leaves `_id` undefined for every row on
+ * screen. A delete that only acted when `_id` was present therefore never
+ * touched the database: the device user was destroyed and the identity stayed
+ * `active`, with no error, because the guard was an `if` rather than a failure.
+ *
+ * That left the row orphaned, and an orphan is not inert. `findIdentityBySubject`
+ * excludes only `status: "deleted"`, so it still answers "this person is already
+ * enrolled on this reader" and REFUSES to enrol somebody the operator can no
+ * longer see. The reconcile reads it too: `findProfileIdentity` finds the active
+ * row and reuses its stored `hidUserId`, so the device user is rebuilt with the
+ * same UID the operator just deleted, from an access grant that was never
+ * removed because `deleteIdentity` never ran.
+ *
+ * Resolved the same way `saveUser` already resolves it, by the reader's own keys.
+ */
+async function findIdentityIdForUser(readerId: string, user: HidUser) {
+  if (user._id) return user._id;
+  if (!readerId) return "";
+  try {
+    const identity = await findExistingIdentityOnReader(readerId, {
+      hidUserId: String(user.hidUserId ?? ""),
+      registration: String(user.registration ?? ""),
+      cardNo: String(user.cardNo ?? ""),
+      metadata: {},
+    });
+    return identity?._id ?? "";
+  } catch (error: unknown) {
+    // A lookup failure must not stop the device delete the operator asked for.
+    // The row stays behind and the next delete can clear it.
+    console.error(
+      "Unable to resolve the stored identity for this HID user:",
+      error
+    );
+    return "";
+  }
+}
+
 async function deleteUser() {
   if (!selectedUser.value) return;
 
   deleting.value = true;
   try {
+    // Resolved BEFORE the device user is destroyed: this reads our own records,
+    // and doing it first means a failure here costs nothing.
+    const identityId = await findIdentityIdForUser(
+      selectedReaderId.value,
+      selectedUser.value
+    );
     await syncHidUserRole(
       selectedReaderId.value,
       toHidNumericId(selectedUser.value.hidUserId),
@@ -2346,8 +2394,10 @@ async function deleteUser() {
       toHidNumericId(selectedUser.value.hidUserId)
     );
     await deleteHidUserFromReader(selectedReaderId.value, selectedUser.value);
-    if (selectedUser.value._id) {
-      await deleteIdentity(selectedUser.value._id);
+    if (identityId) {
+      // Soft-deletes the row AND removes the access grant that let this person
+      // through, which is what stops the next reconcile rebuilding them.
+      await deleteIdentity(identityId);
     }
     deleteDialog.value = false;
     await loadUsers();

package/nuxt.config.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,23 @@
 // https://nuxt.com/docs/api/configuration/nuxt-config
 import vuetify, { transformAssetUrls } from "vite-plugin-vuetify";
+import { SECURITY_HEADERS } from "./utils/security-headers";
 export default defineNuxtConfig({
   ssr: false,
   devtools: { enabled: false },
+
+  // Security headers for every app that extends this layer: the HTML shell gets
+  // them from Nitro, the static files from the `_headers` file the Cloudflare
+  // preset writes from these same rules. See utils/security-headers.ts.
+  routeRules: {
+    "/**": { headers: SECURITY_HEADERS },
+    // Stored files read with the signed-in session (API-core
+    // GET /api/files/object/<key>) instead of the public CDN. Unused until an
+    // app's API_DO_STORAGE_ENDPOINT points at /api/storage/<folder>; that switch
+    // goes with SPACES_PRIVATE_PREFIXES - see the storage runbook.
+    ...(process.env.API_CORE
+      ? { "/api/storage/**": { proxy: `${process.env.API_CORE}/api/files/object/**` } }
+      : {}),
+  },
   build: {
     transpile: ["vuetify"],
   },
@@ -48,6 +63,9 @@ export default defineNuxtConfig({
       cookieConfig: {
         domain: (process.env.DOMAIN as string) ?? "localhost",
         secure: true,
+        // Explicit, not the browser default: the API also reads `sid` from the
+        // cookie, so a cross-site form post must never carry it (CSRF).
+        sameSite: "lax",
         maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
       },
       APP: (process.env.APP as string) ?? "App",

package/package.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "name": "@7365admin1/layer-common",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",
-  "version": "4.82.1-staging.472",
+  "version": "4.82.1-staging.474",
   "author": "7365admin1",
   "main": "./nuxt.config.ts",
   "//files": "What a consumer extending this layer actually loads. Without this npm ships the whole working tree - the changesets, the CI workflows, the render harness in tools/ and any scratch directory that happened to exist at publish time. Nuxt resolves a layer by directory, so every runtime directory below has to stay listed; adding a new top-level runtime directory means adding it here too.",
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
     "pages",
     "plugins",
     "public",
+    "server",
     "services",
     "types",
     "utils",
@@ -57,8 +58,9 @@
     "@mdi/font": "^7.4.47",
     "@types/qrcode": "^1.5.6",
     "ckeditor5": "47.4.0",
+    "dompurify": "^3.3.1",
     "hls.js": "^1.6.13",
-    "html2pdf.js": "^0.10.2",
+    "html2pdf.js": "^0.14.0",
     "html5-qrcode": "^2.3.8",
     "moment-timezone": "^0.6.0",
     "nuxt-signature-pad": "^1.8.0",

package/server/plugins/no-powered-by.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+// Nuxt's renderer stamps `x-powered-by: Nuxt` on the HTML shell. It tells a
+// scanner the framework for free and helps nobody, so drop it.
+export default defineNitroPlugin((nitroApp) => {
+  nitroApp.hooks.hook("render:response", (response) => {
+    if (response?.headers) delete response.headers["x-powered-by"];
+  });
+});

package/utils/sanitize-html.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import DOMPurify from "dompurify";
+
+/**
+ * The one way rich text typed by a user (announcements, facility descriptions,
+ * policies) reaches `v-html`. Keeps formatting, drops scripts, event handlers,
+ * `javascript:` links and embedded frames/forms. Browser-only (the apps are
+ * `ssr: false`); without a DOM it returns "" rather than unsanitised HTML.
+ */
+export function sanitizeHtml(html: unknown): string {
+  if (html === null || html === undefined || html === "") return "";
+  if (typeof window === "undefined" || !DOMPurify.isSupported) return "";
+  return DOMPurify.sanitize(String(html), {
+    USE_PROFILES: { html: true },
+    FORBID_TAGS: ["style", "form", "input", "button", "iframe", "object", "embed"],
+  });
+}

package/utils/security-headers.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * Response headers every web app sends, on the HTML shell (Nitro route rules)
+ * and on the static files (nitro writes the same rules into Cloudflare's
+ * `_headers`). One list, so the eleven apps cannot drift apart.
+ *
+ * The ENFORCED Content-Security-Policy only carries the directives that cannot
+ * break a screen: who may frame us (clickjacking), no plugins, no <base> swap.
+ * The full policy ships as Report-Only first: the apps load Google Fonts,
+ * camera players and documents in iframes, sockets and the Spaces CDN, and a
+ * wrong guess there blanks a page. Violations show in the browser console;
+ * once a release runs clean, move it to the enforced header.
+ *
+ * HSTS deliberately has no `preload`: preload is decided for the whole
+ * iservice365.org domain at the apex and is hard to undo (owner/leads action).
+ */
+export const CSP_ENFORCED = [
+  "frame-ancestors 'self'",
+  "object-src 'none'",
+  "base-uri 'self'",
+].join("; ");
+
+export const CSP_REPORT_ONLY = [
+  "default-src 'self'",
+  "script-src 'self'",
+  "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com",
+  "font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com",
+  "img-src 'self' data: blob: https:",
+  "media-src 'self' blob: https:",
+  "connect-src 'self' https: wss:",
+  "frame-src 'self' https:",
+  "worker-src 'self' blob:",
+  "object-src 'none'",
+  "base-uri 'self'",
+  "frame-ancestors 'self'",
+  "form-action 'self' https:",
+  "upgrade-insecure-requests",
+].join("; ");
+
+export const SECURITY_HEADERS: Record<string, string> = {
+  "strict-transport-security": "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
+  "x-content-type-options": "nosniff",
+  "x-frame-options": "SAMEORIGIN",
+  "referrer-policy": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
+  // camera/mic: QR scan, photo capture; geolocation: attendance;
+  // usb/serial/hid: card readers (useWebUsb). Everything else is off.
+  "permissions-policy":
+    "camera=(self), microphone=(self), geolocation=(self), usb=(self), serial=(self), hid=(self), payment=(self), display-capture=(self), bluetooth=(), midi=(), magnetometer=(), gyroscope=(), accelerometer=()",
+  // allow-popups: payment and document windows we open keep working.
+  "cross-origin-opener-policy": "same-origin-allow-popups",
+  "content-security-policy": CSP_ENFORCED,
+  "content-security-policy-report-only": CSP_REPORT_ONLY,
+};