@7365admin1/core 3.48.1-staging.162 → 3.48.1-staging.163

package/.changeset/nfc-patrol-log-site-scope.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+"@7365admin1/core": minor
+---
+
+Scope the NFC patrol log routes to the estate the round was walked at, and take
+the author from the session.
+
+An NFC patrol log is the proof that a round was actually walked: the route, the
+day, each checkpoint the guard tapped a tag against, the ones that were skipped
+and why, and the signature that closes the round off. It is the document a
+client is shown when they ask whether their estate was patrolled.
+
+Every route on `/api/nfc-patrol-log` carried `requireAuth` and nothing more, and
+`nfc-patrol-log.controller.ts` held no authorization identifier of any kind.
+`requireAuth` proves a session exists; it makes no organisation or site
+decision. So being signed in anywhere on the platform was enough to read another
+client's patrol history, **mark a checkpoint on another estate's round as
+completed**, or **sign that round off as done** — falsifying the patrol proof,
+not merely reading it.
+
+All five handlers now decide before any work is done. The route count was
+verified at the registration site — `nfc-patrol-log.route.ts` mounts **five**
+routes, not the four the earlier inventory recorded.
+
+- `POST /` and `GET /` already REQUIRE a site (`schemaCreateNfcPatrolLog` and
+  the query schema both have `site` required), so the guard checks a site the
+  request already names and no caller's contract changes. The repository does
+  genuinely apply that `site` — it is the first term of the aggregation match,
+  not a parameter it accepts and ignores.
+- `PATCH /:id/checkpoint`, `GET /:id` and `PATCH /:id/sign` name only a record,
+  so the site is read off the STORED log through `requireNfcPatrolLogReach`.
+  `getById` on this repository is NOT cached, so no separate raw reader was
+  needed here, unlike the occurrence mounts.
+- `POST /`'s `createdBy` came from the request body and was never compared to
+  the session. It comes from `callerId(req)` now. The field is still accepted,
+  so no caller starts to 400; it is simply ignored.
+
+None of the three record routes can MOVE a log: `updateCheckpoint` sets only the
+checkpoint fields and `sign` sets only the signature fields, so there is no
+destination to check.
+
+The rule is the existing one, `requireSiteReach` -> `entitleSite`. The
+`customer.sites` branch is load-bearing here more than on any other mount: the
+people who walk these rounds are the contracted security agency's guards and
+hold no membership in the estate's own organisation.
+
+`GET /:id` previously answered **200 with `null`** for an id matching nothing,
+because the handler passed the repository's `null` straight to `res.json`. It
+now refuses — a log that does not exist has no site, and `requireSiteReach`
+refuses a missing site.
+
+Sibling mounts on the same family — `/nfc-patrol-tag`, `/nfc-patrol-settings`,
+`/nfc-patrol-route` and `/patrol-routes` — are NOT touched here. The first three
+carry `/public` routes behind `requireSessionOrLegacyToken`, which is inert
+while `ENFORCE_NFC_PUBLIC_AUTH` is off, so guarding their shared handlers would
+refuse a live legacy screen. That needs the SEC-028 decision first.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -7916,6 +7916,40 @@ declare function useNfcPatrolLogService(): {
     sign: (id: string, value: TSignNfcPatrolLog) => Promise<string>;
 };
 
+/**
+ * Who may see, or change, one estate's guard-patrol record.
+ *
+ * An NFC patrol log is the proof that a round was actually walked: the route,
+ * the day, each checkpoint the guard tapped a tag against, the ones that were
+ * skipped and why, and the signature that closes the round off. It is the
+ * document a client is shown when they ask whether their estate was patrolled.
+ *
+ * Every route on `/api/nfc-patrol-log` carried `requireAuth` and nothing more,
+ * and this controller held no authorization identifier of any kind.
+ * `requireAuth` proves a session exists; it makes no organisation or site
+ * decision. So being signed in anywhere on the platform was enough to read
+ * another client's patrol record, mark a checkpoint on it as completed or
+ * skipped, or sign a round off as done - which is falsifying the estate's
+ * patrol proof, not merely reading it.
+ *
+ * The estate is the scope, and the rule is the existing `requireSiteReach` ->
+ * `entitleSite` that `/api/occurrence-books`, `/api/occurrence-entries`,
+ * `/api/occurrence-subjects`, `/api/work-orders`, `/api/feedbacks` and the rest
+ * already use. The `customer.sites` branch is load-bearing here more than
+ * anywhere: the people who walk these rounds are the contracted security
+ * agency's guards and hold no membership in the estate's own organisation.
+ *
+ *  - `POST /` and `GET /` already REQUIRE a site (`schemaCreateNfcPatrolLog`
+ *    and the query schema both have `site` required), so the guard checks a
+ *    site the request already names and no caller's contract changes.
+ *  - `PATCH /:id/checkpoint`, `GET /:id` and `PATCH /:id/sign` name only a
+ *    record, so the site is read off the STORED log via
+ *    `requireNfcPatrolLogReach`.
+ *
+ * None of the three record routes can MOVE a log: `updateCheckpoint` sets only
+ * the checkpoint fields and `sign` sets only the signature fields, so there is
+ * no destination to check.
+ */
 declare function useNfcPatrolLogController(): {
     add: (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => Promise<void>;
     getAllBySite: (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => Promise<void | Response<any, Record<string, any>>>;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -72788,6 +72788,10 @@ var import_joi119 = __toESM(require("joi"));
 function useNfcPatrolLogController() {
   const { add: _add, completeCheckpoint: _completeCheckpoint, sign: _sign } = useNfcPatrolLogService();
   const { getAllBySite: _getAllBySite, getById: _getById } = useNfcPatrolLogRepo();
+  async function requireNfcPatrolLogReach(req, id) {
+    const log = await _getById(id);
+    await requireSiteReach(req, log?.site);
+  }
   async function add(req, res, next) {
     try {
       const payload = req.body;
@@ -72795,7 +72799,8 @@ function useNfcPatrolLogController() {
       if (error) {
         return next(new import_node_server_utils227.BadRequestError(error.message));
       }
-      const data = await _add(value);
+      await requireSiteReach(req, value.site);
+      const data = await _add({ ...value, createdBy: callerId(req) });
       res.status(201).json(data);
       return;
     } catch (error) {
@@ -72844,6 +72849,7 @@ function useNfcPatrolLogController() {
       );
     }
     try {
+      await requireSiteReach(req, value.site);
       const data = await _getAllBySite({
         page: value.page,
         limit: value.limit,
@@ -72866,6 +72872,7 @@ function useNfcPatrolLogController() {
       skippedRemarks: req.body.skippedRemarks
     };
     try {
+      await requireNfcPatrolLogReach(req, id);
       const data = await _completeCheckpoint(id, payload);
       res.status(200).json(data);
       return;
@@ -72876,6 +72883,7 @@ function useNfcPatrolLogController() {
   }
   async function getLog(req, res, next) {
     try {
+      await requireNfcPatrolLogReach(req, req.params.id);
       const log = await _getById(req.params.id);
       res.json(log);
     } catch (error) {
@@ -72885,6 +72893,7 @@ function useNfcPatrolLogController() {
   async function sign(req, res, next) {
     try {
       const value = await schemaSignNfcPatrolLog.validateAsync(req.body);
+      await requireNfcPatrolLogReach(req, req.params.id);
       const result = await _sign(
         req.params.id,
         value