@7365admin1/core 3.47.1-staging.138 → 3.47.1-staging.140

package/.changeset/estate-structure-write-scope.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+"@7365admin1/core": minor
+---
+
+Scope the estate-structure writes to the site they act on.
+
+`POST/PATCH/PUT` on `/api/buildings`, `/api/building-levels` and
+`/api/building-units` all carried `requireAuth` and nothing more. The site came
+from the request body on the creates and the record id came from the URL on the
+edits and deletes, and neither was checked against the caller. So any signed-in
+account on the platform could add a block to another client's estate, rename its
+levels in bulk, or delete its units — the records residents, visitor passes,
+billing and access rights are all hung off.
+
+Ten routes now decide from the site:
+
+- `POST /api/buildings/`, `POST /api/building-levels/`,
+  `POST /api/building-units/` — from the site named in the body, which is where
+  the new record lands.
+- `PATCH /api/buildings/id/:id`, `PUT /api/buildings/:id`,
+  `PUT /api/building-levels/id/:id`, `PUT /api/building-levels/:id`,
+  `PATCH /api/building-units/id/:id`, `PUT /api/building-units/:id` — the stored
+  record is loaded first and its own site decides. The id in the URL selects the
+  record; it never authorises it.
+- `PATCH /api/building-levels/batch` — EVERY id in the batch is checked, not
+  just the first, and only the distinct sites are looked up so renaming twelve
+  levels of one block stays one check.
+
+The rule is `entitleSite`, the site-reach rule the camera, HID and people
+modules already use: a membership pinned to the site, an org-wide membership at
+the site's owning organisation, or an ACTIVE `customer.sites` engagement. The
+engagement branch is required, not incidental — the estate structure is
+maintained from the property-management and service-provider apps, whose users
+may hold no membership in the estate's own organisation.
+
+The shared four lines live in a new `src/utils/site-reach.util.ts` so the same
+check is not written out in three controllers. It introduces no second
+mechanism: it resolves the caller with `resolveInviteActor` and defers to
+`entitleSite`, exactly as `person.controller.ts` does.
+
+A site the caller cannot reach answers as a site that does not exist, so site
+ids cannot be enumerated by watching the difference. A record with no site at
+all is refused rather than waved through.
+
+The READS on these three routers are deliberately unchanged. Six of them share
+a controller function with a pre-login signup alias
+(`/buildings/list/site/resident/:siteId`, `/building-levels/list/site/resident/:siteId`,
+`/building-units/resident/site/:site/block/:block/level/:level` and the three
+`resident` variants), which the resident mobile app calls before an account
+exists. Guarding the handler would break registration on a shipped client, so
+those need the alias split first.

package/.changeset/site-org-scope.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+"@7365admin1/core": minor
+---
+
+Scope `/api/sites` to the organisation that owns the site.
+
+Every route on this router except the pre-login resident picker carried
+`requireAuth` and nothing more (`site.controller.ts`), and took the
+organisation from the query string or the site id from the URL. `requireAuth`
+proves a session exists and makes no organisation or site decision, so any
+signed-in account on the platform — a resident, a cleaner, an agency guard —
+could `DELETE /api/sites/:id` any site belonging to any client, rename it,
+re-block it, move its guard posts, rewrite its information page, create a site
+inside any organisation, and page through any client's estate list.
+
+The caller is now resolved from the session and the decision made before
+anything is read or written:
+
+- `POST /` uses `requireOrgAccess` on the body's `orgId` — that is where the new
+  site lands.
+- `GET /` uses `requireOrgAccess` on the `org` filter the caller sends.
+- `PUT /:id/block`, `PATCH /id/:id`, `PATCH /guard-post/id/:id`,
+  `PATCH /information/id/:id` and `DELETE /:id` use `entitleSite` — a
+  membership pinned to the site, an org-wide membership at the site's owning
+  organisation, or an ACTIVE `customer.sites` engagement. The engagement branch
+  is required, not incidental: Site Settings lives in the SERVICE-PROVIDER apps
+  (`web-app-security` and the five module apps, each
+  `pages/[org]/[site]/settings.vue` via `layer-common useSiteSettings.ts`), and
+  those users hold no membership in the estate's organisation at all.
+- `GET /:id` is deliberately one notch wider than the writes: it also passes
+  for any live membership in the site's OWNING organisation. Three shipped
+  mobile clients read this route, and the resident app reads
+  `org.defaultSite` — which in a multi-site organisation need not be the
+  resident's own site, and a resident's membership carries a `siteId`. The
+  wider read closes the cross-CLIENT read, which is the defect, and leaves
+  site-to-site partitioning inside one client where it is today.
+
+A site the caller cannot reach answers exactly as a site that does not exist,
+so site ids cannot be enumerated by watching the difference.
+
+`GET /site/resident` is unchanged and still pre-login: the resident mobile app
+needs a site picker before an account exists.
+
+No new authorization mechanism is introduced — `requireOrgAccess` and
+`entitleSite` are the helpers the member, role, people, camera and HID paths
+already use.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -10153,7 +10153,6 @@ declare function useHidAmicoService(): {
         location?: string | undefined;
         enabled?: boolean | undefined;
         username: string;
-        serial?: string | undefined;
         capabilities?: {
             card: boolean;
             facial: boolean;
@@ -10161,6 +10160,7 @@ declare function useHidAmicoService(): {
             pin: boolean;
             intercom: boolean;
         } | undefined;
+        serial?: string | undefined;
         baseUrl: string;
         deviceId?: string | undefined;
         firmwareVersion?: string | undefined;