@1presence/bridge 0.9.0 → 0.12.0

package/dist/auth.js

@@ -4,19 +4,17 @@ exports.AuthCancelledError = void 0;
 exports.isTokenValid = isTokenValid;
 exports.ensureFreshToken = ensureFreshToken;
 exports.getValidAuth = getValidAuth;
-exports.refreshAuth = refreshAuth;
-exports.clearAuth = clearAuth;
 const http_1 = require("http");
 const fs_1 = require("fs");
 const os_1 = require("os");
 const path_1 = require("path");
 const child_process_1 = require("child_process");
-// ─── Paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-const CONFIG_DIR = (0, path_1.join)((0, os_1.homedir)(), '.1presence');
-const AUTH_FILE = (0, path_1.join)(CONFIG_DIR, 'auth.json');
-function ensureConfigDir() {
-    (0, fs_1.mkdirSync)(CONFIG_DIR, { recursive: true });
-}
+const crypto_1 = require("crypto");
+// Auth lives only in process memory. Earlier versions persisted tokens to
+// ~/.1presence/auth.json; remove any leftover file on startup so a stale,
+// permission-bearing token can't survive a bridge restart.
+const LEGACY_AUTH_FILE = (0, path_1.join)((0, os_1.homedir)(), '.1presence', 'auth.json');
+(0, fs_1.rmSync)(LEGACY_AUTH_FILE, { force: true });
 // ─── JWT helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 function parseJwt(token) {
     try {
@@ -41,24 +39,6 @@ function uidFromToken(token) {
 function emailFromToken(token) {
     return parseJwt(token).email;
 }
-// ─── Cache read/write ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-function loadCachedAuth() {
-    try {
-        const raw = (0, fs_1.readFileSync)(AUTH_FILE, 'utf-8');
-        const data = JSON.parse(raw);
-        if (!data.token || !isTokenValid(data.token))
-            return null;
-        return { token: data.token, uid: data.uid, email: data.email, refreshToken: data.refreshToken };
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
-}
-function saveCachedAuth(auth) {
-    ensureConfigDir();
-    const data = { ...auth, savedAt: Date.now() };
-    (0, fs_1.writeFileSync)(AUTH_FILE, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), 'utf-8');
-}
 // ─── Browser auth flow ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 function openBrowser(url) {
     const platform = process.platform;
@@ -77,9 +57,35 @@ exports.AuthCancelledError = AuthCancelledError;
 function runBrowserAuthFlow(gatewayUrl, pwaUrl) {
     return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
         let resolved = false;
+        // Per-launch nonce. Embedded in the auth URL the bridge prints/opens and
+        // required on every request to this localhost server. Without it, a
+        // malicious page in the user's browser could scan ephemeral ports during
+        // the auth window and POST a forged token to hijack the bridge.
+        const nonce = (0, crypto_1.randomBytes)(32).toString('base64url');
+        const nonceBuf = Buffer.from(nonce, 'utf-8');
+        function checkNonce(provided) {
+            if (!provided)
+                return false;
+            const provBuf = Buffer.from(provided, 'utf-8');
+            if (provBuf.length !== nonceBuf.length)
+                return false;
+            return (0, crypto_1.timingSafeEqual)(provBuf, nonceBuf);
+        }
+        // CORS allowlist scoped to the legitimate PWA origin only.
+        const pwaOrigin = (() => {
+            try {
+                return new URL(pwaUrl).origin;
+            }
+            catch {
+                return null;
+            }
+        })();
         const server = (0, http_1.createServer)((req, res) => {
-            // CORS headers so the PWA (https) can POST to http://localhost
-            res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
+            const reqOrigin = req.headers['origin'] ?? '';
+            if (pwaOrigin && reqOrigin === pwaOrigin) {
+                res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', pwaOrigin);
+            }
+            res.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin');
             res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'POST, OPTIONS');
             res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type');
             if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {
@@ -92,12 +98,18 @@ function runBrowserAuthFlow(gatewayUrl, pwaUrl) {
                 res.end();
                 return;
             }
-            // Status beacon from the PWA — currently used so we exit early when
-            // the user closes the auth tab before signing in (sendBeacon path).
-            const path = (req.url ?? '/').split('?')[0];
+            const reqUrl = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://localhost');
+            const path = reqUrl.pathname;
+            // Every POST must carry the launch-specific nonce.
+            if (!checkNonce(reqUrl.searchParams.get('nonce'))) {
+                res.writeHead(403);
+                res.end();
+                return;
+            }
+            // Status beacon from the PWA — used so we exit early when the user closes
+            // the auth tab before signing in (sendBeacon path).
             if (path === '/status') {
-                const params = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://localhost').searchParams;
-                const event = params.get('event');
+                const event = reqUrl.searchParams.get('event');
                 res.writeHead(204);
                 res.end();
                 if (event === 'closed' && !resolved) {
@@ -138,7 +150,7 @@ function runBrowserAuthFlow(gatewayUrl, pwaUrl) {
         });
         server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
             const { port } = server.address();
-            const authUrl = `${pwaUrl.replace(/\/$/, '')}/cli-auth?port=${port}`;
+            const authUrl = `${pwaUrl.replace(/\/$/, '')}/cli-auth?port=${port}&nonce=${encodeURIComponent(nonce)}`;
             console.log('\nOpening browser for sign-in…');
             console.log(`If the browser doesn't open, visit:\n  ${authUrl}\n`);
             openBrowser(authUrl);
@@ -168,7 +180,7 @@ async function refreshIdToken(refreshToken) {
         throw new Error('Token refresh returned no id_token');
     return data.id_token;
 }
-/** Returns auth with a fresh ID token. Refreshes if <10 minutes remain. */
+/** Returns auth with a fresh ID token. Refreshes in-memory if <10 minutes remain. */
 async function ensureFreshToken(auth) {
     const { exp } = parseJwt(auth.token);
     const tenMinutes = 10 * 60;
@@ -177,26 +189,13 @@ async function ensureFreshToken(auth) {
     if (!auth.refreshToken)
         return auth; // no refresh token, use as-is
     const newToken = await refreshIdToken(auth.refreshToken);
-    const updated = { ...auth, token: newToken };
-    saveCachedAuth(updated);
-    return updated;
+    return { ...auth, token: newToken };
 }
 // ─── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// No cache — every bridge launch goes through the browser flow. This means
+// permission revocations take effect on the next restart, and the PWA's
+// CliAuthPage no-permission screen is what users see if access is denied.
 async function getValidAuth(gatewayUrl, pwaUrl) {
-    const cached = loadCachedAuth();
-    if (cached)
-        return cached;
     console.log('Sign-in required.');
-    const auth = await runBrowserAuthFlow(gatewayUrl, pwaUrl);
-    saveCachedAuth(auth);
-    return auth;
-}
-function refreshAuth(auth) {
-    saveCachedAuth(auth);
-}
-function clearAuth() {
-    try {
-        (0, fs_1.writeFileSync)(AUTH_FILE, '{}', 'utf-8');
-    }
-    catch { /* ignore */ }
+    return runBrowserAuthFlow(gatewayUrl, pwaUrl);
 }

package/dist/index.js

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ async function writeSetupFiles(auth) {
         ?? (await fetchVaultFile('AGENT.md', token))
         ?? (await fetchVaultFile('CLAUDE.md', token))
         ?? '';
-    (0, fs_1.writeFileSync)(tmpFile(`agent-${uid}.md`), systemPrompt, 'utf-8');
+    writeRestricted(tmpFile(`agent-${uid}.md`), systemPrompt);
     if (VERBOSE) {
         console.log('\n[bridge:verbose] ─── system prompt ───────────────────────');
         console.log(systemPrompt);
@@ -88,7 +88,14 @@ async function writeSetupFiles(auth) {
             },
         },
     };
-    (0, fs_1.writeFileSync)(tmpFile(`mcp-${uid}.json`), JSON.stringify(mcpConfig, null, 2), 'utf-8');
+    writeRestricted(tmpFile(`mcp-${uid}.json`), JSON.stringify(mcpConfig, null, 2));
+}
+// The MCP config embeds a Bearer JWT and the system prompt may contain vault
+// state. writeFileSync's mode only takes effect on file creation — chmodSync
+// covers the overwrite case so a legacy 0644 file gets tightened on next run.
+function writeRestricted(path, data) {
+    (0, fs_1.writeFileSync)(path, data, { mode: 0o600 });
+    (0, fs_1.chmodSync)(path, 0o600);
 }
 // ─── Handle a single incoming message (token refresh + spawn) ─────────────────
 async function handleMessage(conversationId, text, sessionId, auth, vaultFileOpen, clientCapabilities, syncedFolders) {
@@ -245,8 +252,7 @@ function connect(auth, retryDelay = 1000) {
     ws.on('close', (code) => {
         stopPing();
         if (code === 4001) {
-            console.error('Authentication failed — clearing cached credentials. Please restart the bridge.');
-            (0, auth_1.clearAuth)();
+            console.error('Authentication failed. Please restart the bridge to sign in again.');
             process.exit(1);
         }
         if (code === 4003) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@1presence/bridge",
-  "version": "0.9.0",
+  "version": "0.12.0",
   "description": "Run 1Presence on your Mac and use your Claude.ai Pro subscription from any device",
   "bin": {
     "1presence-bridge": "dist/index.js"