@1e0zj/dsh-plugin-mall 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@1e0zj/dsh-plugin-mall",
-  "version": "0.3.0",
+  "version": "0.3.1",
   "description": "dsh 插件市场：搜索 GitHub dsh-plugin 话题下的插件仓库，一键安装到本地 dsh profile（agent 工具 + 设置页插件市场 tab）",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "src/index.js",

package/src/client.js

@@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ window.__ModuleLoader__.load({
       // carryFromId：把上一阶段（预检）的日志接过来并撤掉它的条目。一次点击
       // 只应该在面板里留下一个任务，日志连续——而不是 market-1 预检、
       // market-2 安装两条并排，让人以为自己点了两次。
+      // 重试同理：同一 spec 上一轮失败/完成的终态条目一并撤掉——用户没点
+      // 「清空」就重试时，面板照样只留新一轮一条。旧失败日志不拼进新任务
+      // （两轮 pnpm 输出混在一起没法读）；running 的不动，那是真并发任务。
       var track = useCallback(function (id, spec, carryFromId) {
         var next = Object.assign({}, jobsRef.current);
         var carried = "";
@@ -189,6 +192,11 @@ window.__ModuleLoader__.load({
           carried = next[carryFromId].output || "";
           delete next[carryFromId];
         }
+        for (var key in next) {
+          if (key !== id && next[key] && next[key].spec === spec && next[key].status !== "running") {
+            delete next[key];
+          }
+        }
         next[id] = { status: "running", spec: spec, output: carried };
         jobsRef.current = next;
         setJobs(Object.assign({}, next));

package/src/guard.js

@@ -583,9 +583,9 @@ export function inspectRemoteCandidate({ profileDir, manifest, patchText, spec }
 }
 
 /** Locate a binary on PATH by explicit extension (no shell, no PATHEXT guessing). */
-function findOnPath(binary, extensions) {
-  const separator = process.platform === "win32" ? ";" : ":";
-  for (const dir of String(process.env.PATH ?? "").split(separator)) {
+function findOnPath(binary, { platform, pathEnv, extensions }) {
+  const separator = platform === "win32" ? ";" : ":";
+  for (const dir of String(pathEnv ?? "").split(separator)) {
     if (dir.length === 0) continue;
     for (const ext of extensions) {
       const candidate = join(dir, `${binary}${ext}`);
@@ -596,16 +596,32 @@ function findOnPath(binary, extensions) {
 }
 
 /**
- * pnpm spawn plan, mirroring installer.js pnpmSpawnPlan: a real .exe spawns
- * without a shell; only the .cmd shim forces a cmd wrapper on Windows
- * (shell:true, and Node's DEP0190 warning with it).
+ * How to spawn pnpm on this platform. installer.js consumes this too, so the
+ * plan lives here exactly once instead of as two drifting copies (the mirror
+ * copies had already diverged once; that is how the quoting bug below stayed
+ * invisible on both sides).
+ * @returns {{ command: string, shell: boolean, treeKill: boolean }}
+ *   treeKill marks the shell-wrapped case: cancel must taskkill /T the tree.
  */
-function pnpmSpawnPlan() {
-  if (process.platform !== "win32") return { command: "pnpm", shell: false };
-  const exe = findOnPath("pnpm", [".exe"]);
-  if (exe !== undefined) return { command: exe, shell: false };
-  const cmd = findOnPath("pnpm", [".cmd"]);
-  return { command: cmd ?? "pnpm", shell: true };
+export function pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform = process.platform, pathEnv = process.env.PATH } = {}) {
+  if (platform !== "win32") return { command: "pnpm", shell: false, treeKill: false };
+  // A real .exe spawns without a shell — cancel then kills pnpm itself.
+  const exe = findOnPath("pnpm", { platform, pathEnv, extensions: [".exe"] });
+  if (exe !== undefined) return { command: exe, shell: false, treeKill: false };
+  // Only the .cmd shim: Node refuses batch files with shell:false (EINVAL
+  // since the batch-file argument-injection fix), so a cmd wrapper is
+  // unavoidable — flag it so cancel kills the whole tree, not the wrapper.
+  const cmd = findOnPath("pnpm", { platform, pathEnv, extensions: [".cmd"] });
+  if (cmd === undefined) return { command: "pnpm", shell: true, treeKill: true };
+  // The shim usually sits in a directory with a space (`D:\Program Files\nodejs`
+  // is Node's default install layout). Under shell:true Node joins command and
+  // args with spaces WITHOUT quoting per argument — the same fact the
+  // UNSAFE_SPEC_RE comment below argues from — so an unquoted path is cut at
+  // the first space and cmd answers `'D:\Program' is not recognized`, killing
+  // every preflight and install on such machines. Quote the command ourselves;
+  // the args joined after it are fixed flags plus an assertSafeSpec-validated
+  // spec, none of which carry spaces.
+  return { command: `"${cmd}"`, shell: true, treeKill: true };
 }
 
 function spawnCapture(command, args, options, onOutput) {
@@ -641,7 +657,9 @@ function spawnCapture(command, args, options, onOutput) {
 // not only by the agent/browser callers that happen to check first: anything
 // carrying shell metacharacters, or a Windows `file:`/`link:` path with spaces,
 // is refused before a single byte of filesystem work and before pnpm is spawned.
-const UNSAFE_SPEC_RE = /[;&|`$()<>^"!*\n\r]/;
+// `%` is on the list like everywhere else: cmd performs `%VAR%` expansion, and
+// the expanded value (often full of spaces and semicolons) reshapes the argv.
+const UNSAFE_SPEC_RE = /[;&|`$()<>^%!"*\n\r]/;
 
 function assertSafeSpec(spec) {
   const value = String(spec ?? "");
@@ -1888,6 +1906,12 @@ async function selfTest() {
       if (rep.verdict !== "blocked" || !rep.issues.some((entry) => entry.code === "unsafe-spec")) {
         throw new Error("preflightInstall should reject a spec with shell metacharacters before spawning");
       }
+      // `%` 单独成案：它不是 POSIX 元字符，但 cmd 会做 %VAR% 展开，展开值
+      // 里的分号/空格足以重塑 argv——黑名单曾漏掉它，与 cli.js 漂移过。
+      const repPct = await preflightInstall({ profileDir: p, spec: "evil-pkg%PATH%" });
+      if (repPct.verdict !== "blocked" || !repPct.issues.some((entry) => entry.code === "unsafe-spec")) {
+        throw new Error("preflightInstall should reject a spec carrying cmd %VAR% expansion");
+      }
       if (process.platform === "win32") {
         const repWin = await preflightInstall({ profileDir: p, spec: "file:C:\\some dir\\pkg" });
         if (repWin.verdict !== "blocked" || !repWin.issues.some((entry) => entry.code === "unsafe-spec")) {
@@ -1906,6 +1930,36 @@ async function selfTest() {
       if (!args.includes("--ignore-scripts")) throw new Error("probe args must keep install scripts disabled");
     }
 
+    // pnpmSpawnPlan (pure, plus a real spawn on Windows): the .cmd shim path
+    // must carry its own quotes. Node's shell:true joins command and args
+    // without per-argument quoting, so `D:\Program Files\nodejs\pnpm.CMD`
+    // would be cut at the first space and cmd would answer
+    // `'D:\Program' is not recognized` — that exact failure blocked every
+    // preflight on a real machine (Node's default install layout has a space).
+    {
+      const shimRoot = join(root, "path with space");
+      mkdirSync(shimRoot, { recursive: true });
+      writeFileSync(join(shimRoot, "pnpm.cmd"), "@echo probe-ok\r\n");
+      const plan = pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform: "win32", pathEnv: shimRoot });
+      if (plan.shell !== true || plan.treeKill !== true || plan.command !== `"${join(shimRoot, "pnpm.cmd")}"`) {
+        throw new Error(`quoted .cmd plan expected, got ${JSON.stringify(plan)}`);
+      }
+      if (pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform: "linux", pathEnv: shimRoot }).command !== "pnpm") {
+        throw new Error("posix plan should spawn pnpm directly");
+      }
+      const noShim = pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform: "win32", pathEnv: join(root, "no-shim-here") });
+      if (noShim.command !== "pnpm" || noShim.shell !== true || noShim.treeKill !== true) {
+        throw new Error(`missing-shim fallback expected, got ${JSON.stringify(noShim)}`);
+      }
+      // 引用不是摆设：Windows 真机端到端 spawn 一轮（CI 是 Linux，只跑静态断言）。
+      if (process.platform === "win32") {
+        const probe = spawnSync(plan.command, ["--version"], { shell: plan.shell, encoding: "utf8", timeout: 15000 });
+        if (probe.status !== 0 || !/probe-ok/.test(probe.stdout ?? "")) {
+          throw new Error(`quoted shim must actually run: status=${probe.status} stdout=${JSON.stringify(probe.stdout)} stderr=${JSON.stringify(probe.stderr)}`);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
     // Rollback reconcile args/env (pure): scripts off, the restored lockfile
     // authoritative, peer auto-install off, strictly offline — there is no
     // online retry path or args at all, and nothing user-controlled anywhere

package/src/installer.js

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 import { dump, load } from "js-yaml";
 import { DEFAULT_PROFILE_BUNDLES, PROFILE_TEMPLATES, initProfile, resolveProfileDir } from "@deepseek-ai/dsh-app-boot";
 import { describeBuildScripts, npmNameOf } from "./github.js";
-import { commitPendingSnapshot, createProfileSnapshot, markPendingSnapshot, pnpmGuardEnv, rollbackPendingSnapshot } from "./guard.js";
+import { commitPendingSnapshot, createProfileSnapshot, markPendingSnapshot, pnpmGuardEnv, pnpmSpawnPlan, rollbackPendingSnapshot } from "./guard.js";
 
 // ── spec normalization ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -1132,8 +1132,10 @@ export function createJobTracker() {
 
 // Windows spawn 走 shell，spec 会被拼进 cmd 行；agent 传入的参数不可信。
 // 合法的 npm 名 / github:owner\/repo / git·file·link·URL spec 都不含这些
-// shell 元字符——出现即拒绝，宁可误杀不放开命令注入面。
-const UNSAFE_SPEC_RE = /[;&|`$()<>^"!*\n\r]/;
+// shell 元字符——出现即拒绝，宁可误杀不放开命令注入面。`%` 在列：cmd 会
+// 做 `%VAR%` 环境变量展开，展开结果常含分号/空格，足以改变参数切分。
+// （cli.js 的同款黑名单一直含 %，此前三处已经漂移。）
+const UNSAFE_SPEC_RE = /[;&|`$()<>^%!"*\n\r]/;
 
 /** Reject install/remove specs carrying shell metacharacters. */
 export function assertSafeSpec(spec) {
@@ -1258,36 +1260,11 @@ function serializedProducer(lockKey, start) {
 // (a .cmd shim cannot be spawned with shell:false on modern Node), cancel
 // terminates the whole process tree and the done chain waits for the
 // wrapper's 'close' before any rollback runs.
-
-/** First `binary<ext>` found on PATH, or undefined. */
-function findOnPath(binary, { platform, pathEnv, extensions }) {
-  const separator = platform === "win32" ? ";" : ":";
-  for (const dir of String(pathEnv ?? "").split(separator)) {
-    if (dir.length === 0) continue;
-    for (const ext of extensions) {
-      const candidate = join(dir, `${binary}${ext}`);
-      if (existsSync(candidate)) return candidate;
-    }
-  }
-  return undefined;
-}
-
-/**
- * How to spawn pnpm on this platform.
- * @returns {{ command: string, shell: boolean, treeKill: boolean }}
- *   treeKill marks the shell-wrapped case: cancel must taskkill /T the tree.
- */
-function pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform = process.platform, pathEnv = process.env.PATH } = {}) {
-  if (platform !== "win32") return { command: "pnpm", shell: false, treeKill: false };
-  // A real .exe spawns without a shell — cancel then kills pnpm itself.
-  const exe = findOnPath("pnpm", { platform, pathEnv, extensions: [".exe"] });
-  if (exe !== undefined) return { command: exe, shell: false, treeKill: false };
-  // Only the .cmd shim: Node refuses batch files with shell:false (EINVAL
-  // since the batch-file argument-injection fix), so a cmd wrapper is
-  // unavoidable — flag it so cancel kills the whole tree, not the wrapper.
-  const cmd = findOnPath("pnpm", { platform, pathEnv, extensions: [".cmd"] });
-  return { command: cmd ?? "pnpm", shell: true, treeKill: true };
-}
+//
+// The plan itself is pnpmSpawnPlan in guard.js (imported above) — one
+// implementation, not a local mirror. It quotes the .cmd path: Node's
+// shell:true joins without per-argument quoting, and `D:\Program Files\…`
+// would be cut at the first space (`'D:\Program' is not recognized`).
 
 /**
  * Terminate a shell-wrapped process tree (Windows): taskkill /T /F kills the
@@ -2051,6 +2028,17 @@ async function runTransactionFixtures() {
   const tick = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 1));
   const flush = async (rounds = 5) => { for (let index = 0; index < rounds; index++) await tick(); };
 
+  // 纯函数前置：spec 黑名单。`%` 必须在内——cmd 的 %VAR% 展开元字符，
+  // 展开值里的分号/空格足以重塑 argv；三处黑名单曾漂移（cli.js 一直有，
+  // installer/guard 漏过）。
+  {
+    const rejects = (value) => {
+      try { assertSafeSpec(value); return false; } catch { return true; }
+    };
+    check("assertSafeSpec：cmd 的 %VAR% 展开元字符被拒绝", rejects("evil-pkg%PATH%"));
+    check("assertSafeSpec：正常 spec 不受影响", !rejects("some-plugin@1.0.0") && !rejects("github:owner/repo"));
+  }
+
   // 0. hashPackageTree 确定性与符号链接越界防御
   {
     const tempDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "dsh-mall-selftest-hash-"));
@@ -2567,7 +2555,9 @@ async function runTransactionFixtures() {
   }
 
   // 4a. spawn 计划（纯函数）：非 Windows 无 shell；Windows 有 .exe 则
-  // shell:false，仅 .cmd 则 shell:true + treeKill，全找不到回退 "pnpm"。
+  // shell:false，仅 .cmd 则 shell:true + treeKill 且 command 自带引号
+  // （.cmd 常在 `D:\Program Files\nodejs` 这类带空格的目录里，shell:true 下
+  // Node 只拼空格不逐参数引用，不引用就从空格截断），全找不到回退 "pnpm"。
   {
     const shimDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "dsh-mall-selftest-path-"));
     try {
@@ -2577,15 +2567,36 @@ async function runTransactionFixtures() {
       const missingOk = planMissing.command === "pnpm" && planMissing.shell === true && planMissing.treeKill === true;
       writeFileSync(join(shimDir, "pnpm.cmd"), "@echo off\r\n");
       const planCmd = pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform: "win32", pathEnv: shimDir });
-      const cmdOk = planCmd.command === join(shimDir, "pnpm.cmd") && planCmd.shell === true && planCmd.treeKill === true;
+      const cmdOk = planCmd.command === `"${join(shimDir, "pnpm.cmd")}"` && planCmd.shell === true && planCmd.treeKill === true;
       writeFileSync(join(shimDir, "pnpm.exe"), "MZ");
       const planExe = pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform: "win32", pathEnv: shimDir });
       const exeOk = planExe.command === join(shimDir, "pnpm.exe") && planExe.shell === false && planExe.treeKill === false;
       check(
-        "pnpmSpawnPlan：posix 直起 / win32 优先 .exe 无 shell / 仅 .cmd 则 treeKill",
+        "pnpmSpawnPlan：posix 直起 / win32 优先 .exe 无 shell / 仅 .cmd 则带引号 + treeKill",
         posixOk && missingOk && cmdOk && exeOk,
         JSON.stringify({ planPosix, planMissing, planCmd, planExe }),
       );
+      // 空格目录不是假想敌：Node 默认装进 Program Files，真实机器上命令从
+      // 空格截断曾让「'D:\Program' 不是内部或外部命令」拦下所有预检。
+      const spaceDir = join(shimDir, "dir with space");
+      mkdirSync(spaceDir, { recursive: true });
+      writeFileSync(join(spaceDir, "pnpm.cmd"), "@echo probe-ok\r\n");
+      const planSpace = pnpmSpawnPlan({ platform: "win32", pathEnv: spaceDir });
+      check(
+        "pnpmSpawnPlan：带空格的 .cmd 路径 → command 自带引号",
+        planSpace.shell === true && planSpace.command === `"${join(spaceDir, "pnpm.cmd")}"`,
+        JSON.stringify(planSpace),
+      );
+      // 引用必须真的可跑：Windows 真机端到端 spawn 一轮假 shim（CI 是 Linux，
+      // 只跑静态断言；Windows 上这一条覆盖完整链路）。
+      if (process.platform === "win32") {
+        const probe = spawnSync(planSpace.command, ["--version"], { shell: planSpace.shell, encoding: "utf8", timeout: 15000 });
+        check(
+          "pnpmSpawnPlan：带引号 command 真实 spawn 不再被空格截断",
+          probe.status === 0 && /probe-ok/.test(probe.stdout ?? ""),
+          `status=${probe.status} stdout=${JSON.stringify((probe.stdout ?? "").slice(0, 80))} stderr=${JSON.stringify((probe.stderr ?? "").slice(0, 80))}`,
+        );
+      }
     } finally {
       rmSync(shimDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
     }