@1delta/margin-fetcher 5.0.66 → 5.0.68

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { PublicClient, Address, Hex } from 'viem';
 import { Lender } from '@1delta/lender-registry';
 export { hasCrossMarginRisk, isAaveType, isAaveV2Type, isAaveV32Type, isAaveV3Type, isCompoundV3, isCompoundV3Type, isInit, isMorphoType, isMultiMarket, isYLDR } from '@1delta/lender-registry';
-import { DebitData, LenderDebitData, LstAcceptedInput } from '@1delta/calldata-sdk';
+import { DebitData, LenderDebitData, LendingMode as LendingMode$1, LstAcceptedInput } from '@1delta/calldata-sdk';
 import { RelayProxyConfig } from '@1delta/proxy-fetch';
 import { TermMarketConfig, LiquityBranchConfig, LiquityConfigChain, RiverMarketConfig, RiverConfigChain, RiverChainData, InverseMarketConfig, InverseConfigChain, InverseChainData, FraxlendConfigChain, ResupplyConfigChain, CoolerConfigChain, LlamaLendMarketConfig, LlamaLendConfigChain, LlamaLendChainData, UsddMarketConfig, UsddConfigChain, UsddChainData, FrankencoinMarketConfig, FrankencoinConfigChain, FrankencoinChainData, TellerPoolConfig, MorphoTypeVaultEntry } from '@1delta/data-sdk';
 export { MorphoLensAbi } from '@1delta/abis';
@@ -1632,6 +1632,17 @@ declare function needsLenderApproval(params: {
     aaveV4Spoke?: string;
     /** Silo: check the protected share token instead of collateral */
     isProtected?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * This is a BORROW delegation check — resolve against the entry the borrow
+     * grant actually lives on (Silo: debt share token; Aave: variable/stable
+     * debt token's `borrowAllowance`; Venus: the comptroller's `updateDelegate`
+     * boolean) instead of the withdraw-side key. Without it a borrow check
+     * reads a withdraw allowance that is 0 for a borrow-only grant and the
+     * permission is re-emitted forever.
+     */
+    isBorrow?: boolean;
+    /** Aave borrow checks: which debt token to resolve (default VARIABLE). */
+    mode?: LendingMode$1;
 }): boolean;
 /**
  * Checks whether an ERC20 or Permit2 token approval is needed for
@@ -7972,6 +7983,22 @@ interface LiquidationTerms {
      * Aave-style escalation: the close factor rises to 1 once health falls below
      * this. Without it, `closeFactor: 0.5` understates the worst case.
      */
+    /**
+     * The health factor BELOW WHICH the position becomes liquidatable, when the
+     * protocol's trigger is not the usual `HF < 1`.
+     *
+     * Added for Flying Tulip, whose `marginHfTargetBps = 12500` makes a position
+     * liquidatable at **HF < 1.25** — `liquidateFlash` reverts above it. Every
+     * consumer in this repo otherwise assumes `HF < 1 ⇒ liquidatable`, which
+     * understates the danger zone by a quarter of a point of health on the side
+     * that costs the borrower money.
+     *
+     * ABSENT means the ordinary `HF < 1`. Do not default it to 1 at the call
+     * site — an explicit 1 and an absent field should read the same, and a
+     * lender that has no health factor at all (Frankencoin's challenge game,
+     * Teller's time-based default) must not acquire one by omission.
+     */
+    liquidationHealthFactor?: number;
     fullCloseBelowHealthFactor?: number;
     /**
      * `repay-to-target-hf` only: the health factor at or below which the