@1claw/sdk 0.61.12 → 0.61.14

package/README.md

@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ Key properties:
 
 ### TEE Enforcement (Pro+)
 
-Lock down agents so signing and execution requests **must** route through the hardware enclave (Shroud TEE). Direct Vault API calls are rejected with 403.
+Lock down agents so signing and execution **must** happen in the hardware enclave (Shroud TEE). The vault enforces it by forwarding to Shroud, not by rejecting you.
 
 ```typescript
 await client.agents.update(agentId, {
@@ -429,13 +429,12 @@ await client.agents.update(agentId, {
 ```
 
 When `intents_require_tee` is true:
-- Transaction submit/sign requests to `api.1claw.co` are rejected (403)
-- Agents must route through `shroud.1claw.co` where signing happens inside TEE memory
+- Transaction submit/sign requests are signed inside Shroud's TEE whichever host you call — the vault forwards a request that arrives at `api.1claw.co` to Shroud on the agent's behalf (vault ≥ 0.61.19), so the SDK needs no special `baseUrl`
+- Direct calls to `shroud.1claw.co` still work and are required for DPoP-bound tokens
 
 When `execution_require_tee` is true:
-- Execute requests to `api.1claw.co` are rejected (403)
+- Execute requests run on Shroud's TEE execution surface — forced by the vault, no client routing needed
 - All direct secret reads by the agent are blocked — forces use of Execution Intent bindings
-- Agents must route through `shroud.1claw.co`
 
 Both require `intents_api_enabled` / `execution_intents_enabled` to be on first.
 
@@ -636,6 +635,17 @@ const client = createClient({
 // Tokens refresh transparently — just make API calls
 ```
 
+The exchange response also says what the agent is entitled to (vault ≥ 0.61.17), so a tool host can shape its surface without a second call:
+
+```typescript
+const res = await client.auth.agentToken({ api_key: "ocv_..." });
+res.data?.entitlements;
+// { intents_api: true, execution_intents: false, execution_require_tee: false, intents_require_tee: false,
+//   cards: false, memory: true, shroud: false, discoverable: false, treasury_signer: false, has_delegations: false }
+```
+
+Changing a claim-bearing agent field (`scopes`, `vault_ids`, `is_active`, `intents_api_enabled`, `shroud_enabled`, `execution_intents_enabled`, `*_require_tee`, `environment`) via `client.agents.update()` revokes the agent's outstanding JWTs; the SDK's next request re-exchanges automatically.
+
 ## DPoP (Proof-of-Possession)
 
 Enable [DPoP (RFC 9449)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9449) to bind tokens to the client's ephemeral keypair. When enabled, the SDK generates a P-256 ECDSA keypair at startup and attaches a `DPoP` proof JWT to every request — stolen tokens are unusable without the matching private key.