@1agh/maude 0.56.0 → 0.58.0

package/apps/studio/test/acp-branch-guard.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// feature-acp-write-path-scope Addendum, Task 9 — the branch-switch warning.
+//
+// `RepoBranchSwitcher.jsx` has THREE `window.location.reload()` call sites
+// (`switchDraft`, `createDraft`, and the local-merge fold in `foldDraft`). All
+// three move the worktree, so all three need the gate; covering one and missing
+// two is the easy mistake, which is why the source-shape assertion below exists
+// alongside the copy tests.
+//
+// Why the wording matters enough to test: this is a safety prompt, and Task 8
+// changed what is TRUE about it. Before, the reload killed the running turn, so
+// "this will stop it" was accurate. Now the bridge outlives its socket, so the
+// turn keeps going — into a worktree that has moved under it. "Will stop it"
+// would now be false in the reassuring direction.
+
+import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+
+import { chatGuardCopy } from '../client/panels/RepoBranchSwitcher.jsx';
+
+describe('chatGuardCopy', () => {
+  const one = chatGuardCopy({ count: 1, branch: 'draft-a', verb: 'switch to “main”' });
+
+  test('names the branch, the action, and the real consequence', () => {
+    expect(one.title).toBe('A chat is working right now');
+    expect(one.body).toContain('draft-a');
+    expect(one.body).toContain('switch to “main”');
+    expect(one.body).toContain('wrong branch');
+  });
+
+  test('does NOT claim the switch stops the chat (it no longer does — Task 8)', () => {
+    const all = `${one.title} ${one.body} ${one.meta}`.toLowerCase();
+    expect(all).not.toContain('will stop it');
+    // …and it does say the thing that IS true: the agent is actively editing.
+    expect(one.body).toContain('editing files on');
+  });
+
+  test('is honest that History cannot undo this', () => {
+    // The `_history/` snapshot stack is per-canvas-slug with NO branch
+    // awareness, so the "it's reversible" reassurance this whole feature leans
+    // on genuinely does not hold across a checkout. Promising rollback here
+    // would be the one lie that makes the confirm worse than no confirm.
+    expect(one.body).toContain("History can't undo");
+  });
+
+  test('pluralizes when several chats are running', () => {
+    expect(chatGuardCopy({ count: 3, branch: 'x', verb: 'y' }).title).toBe(
+      '3 chats are working right now'
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('the confirm is not the safe default', () => {
+    // "Wait" is the cancel; "Do it anyway" is the deliberate, phrased-as-a-risk
+    // confirm. A neutral "OK/Cancel" pair would read as routine.
+    expect(one.cancel).toBe('Wait');
+    expect(one.confirm).toBe('Do it anyway');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('all THREE reload call sites are gated', () => {
+  const src = readFileSync(
+    join(import.meta.dir, '..', 'client', 'panels', 'RepoBranchSwitcher.jsx'),
+    'utf8'
+  );
+
+  test('every reload lives in a `do*` action reached only through guardedByChat', () => {
+    // Source-shape guard rather than a render test: the failure mode is a
+    // FOURTH reload being added later without a gate, which no render test of
+    // the existing three would catch.
+    const guarded = src.match(/guardedByChat\(/g) ?? [];
+    // One definition + three call sites.
+    expect(guarded.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4);
+    for (const fn of ['doSwitchDraft', 'doCreateDraft', 'doFoldDraft']) {
+      expect(src).toContain(`function ${fn}`);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('the gate asks the SERVER, not local chat state', () => {
+    // A bridge can be running DETACHED (post-reload, pre-re-attach) with no
+    // client that knows about it — precisely the case the warning is for. Local
+    // busy state would answer "nothing is running" exactly when it matters.
+    expect(src).toContain('/_api/acp/running');
+  });
+
+  test('a failed probe never BLOCKS a switch', () => {
+    // A switch the user asked for must not be hostage to an unrelated fetch
+    // error. The catch returns 0 (⇒ proceed), not a thrown error.
+    expect(src).toMatch(/catch\s*{[\s\S]*?return 0;/);
+  });
+});
+
+// SECURITY (security-auditor A6) — cross-PROJECT loopback adjacency.
+//
+// Before the sidecar pool (Addendum Task 10) at most one dev-server ran at a
+// time, so "another Maude instance on another loopback port" was not a state the
+// product produced. The pool makes concurrency DESIGNED-IN: projects A and B now
+// routinely run side by side on different ports, and A's canvas iframe is
+// untrusted content (DDR-054). So the question "can A's canvas reach B's
+// privileged main origin?" went from hypothetical to worth an explicit test.
+//
+// The defence is `sameOriginWrite`'s host+port compare — different instance,
+// different port, different `host`, rejected. Asserting it here so the property
+// is pinned to the pool's introduction rather than left as an inference.
+describe('cross-project origin adjacency (A6)', () => {
+  test('a request from ANOTHER instance’s origin is not same-origin', async () => {
+    const { sameOriginWrite } = await import('../http.ts');
+    const projectB = new Request('http://localhost:4400/_api/acp/running', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      // Project A's canvas/main origin, aimed at project B's server.
+      headers: { origin: 'http://localhost:4399' },
+    });
+    expect(sameOriginWrite(projectB)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('a request from the SAME instance is allowed (the pool must not break normal use)', async () => {
+    const { sameOriginWrite } = await import('../http.ts');
+    const own = new Request('http://localhost:4400/_api/acp/running', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { origin: 'http://localhost:4400' },
+    });
+    expect(sameOriginWrite(own)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

package/apps/studio/test/acp-bridge-lifetime.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+// feature-acp-write-path-scope Addendum, Task 8 — the bridge outlives its socket.
+//
+// The bug this closes: `bridges` was keyed by `ws.data.id` and `onClose` called
+// `bridge.stop()` immediately, so ANY socket close killed the running agent.
+// `RepoBranchSwitcher.jsx` calls `window.location.reload()` unconditionally on a
+// branch switch / draft-create / local-merge fold, which meant switching drafts
+// mid-turn silently destroyed the work in flight. It merely LOOKED like a lost
+// place, because the transcript and the ACP sessionId are both persisted.
+//
+// What is asserted here, in the plan's own words:
+//   (a) the turn completes after the socket dies,
+//   (b) a re-attaching client receives each update EXACTLY ONCE, and
+//   (c) no orphaned bridge survives the TTL.
+// Plus the hazard the Addendum names explicitly: a permission request raised
+// while NOBODY is attached must fail closed, never read as consent.
+
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
+import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+
+import type { ServerWebSocket } from 'bun';
+
+import { AcpBridge } from '../acp/bridge.ts';
+import { createAcp, DETACHED_TTL_MS, MAX_DETACHED_BRIDGES } from '../acp/index.ts';
+import type { Context } from '../context.ts';
+import type { WsData } from '../ws.ts';
+
+const FIXTURE_SLOW = join(import.meta.dir, 'fixtures', 'mock-acp-agent-slow.mjs');
+const FIXTURE_PERM = join(import.meta.dir, 'fixtures', 'mock-acp-agent-permission.mjs');
+const TEST_ENV_KEYS = ['MAUDE_ACP_ADAPTER_ENTRY', 'MAUDE_ACP_RUNTIME', 'MAUDE_CLAUDE_BIN'];
+
+function useMockAgent(fixture: string) {
+  process.env.MAUDE_ACP_ADAPTER_ENTRY = fixture;
+  process.env.MAUDE_ACP_RUNTIME = process.execPath;
+  process.env.MAUDE_CLAUDE_BIN = process.execPath;
+}
+
+const dirs: string[] = [];
+function freshCtx(): Context {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'maude-acp-lifetime-'));
+  dirs.push(root);
+  mkdirSync(join(root, '.design', '_chat'), { recursive: true });
+  return {
+    paths: { repoRoot: root, designRoot: join(root, '.design'), designRel: '.design' },
+  } as unknown as Context;
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  for (const key of TEST_ENV_KEYS) delete process.env[key];
+  for (const d of dirs.splice(0)) rmSync(d, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+function fakeWs(id: string) {
+  const frames: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
+  const ws = {
+    data: { id } as WsData,
+    send: (raw: string) => {
+      frames.push(JSON.parse(raw));
+    },
+  } as unknown as ServerWebSocket<WsData>;
+  return { ws, frames };
+}
+
+async function until<T>(fn: () => T | undefined, timeoutMs = 15000): Promise<T> {
+  const start = performance.now();
+  for (;;) {
+    const v = fn();
+    if (v !== undefined) return v;
+    if (performance.now() - start > timeoutMs) throw new Error('timeout waiting for condition');
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
+  }
+}
+
+describe('bridge lifetime — a closed socket no longer kills the turn', () => {
+  test('the turn COMPLETES after the socket closes, and a re-attach gets every update exactly once', async () => {
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+
+    const a = fakeWs('life-a');
+    acp.onOpen(a.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'prompt', text: 'go', chat: 'c1' }));
+
+    // Wait until the turn is genuinely streaming, then yank the socket — the
+    // exact shape of a `window.location.reload()` landing mid-turn.
+    const firstSeq = await until(() => {
+      const f = a.frames.find((x) => x.t === 'update' && typeof x.seq === 'number');
+      return f ? (f.seq as number) : undefined;
+    });
+    // `seq` is the transcript LINE, not an agent-update counter — the bootstrap
+    // brief, the plugin-autoload audit record and the user's own turn all
+    // occupy lines before the first agent chunk. That is deliberate: the client
+    // compares it against the line count the HTTP hydration covered, which
+    // counts those lines too. An "nth agent update" counter would not line up.
+    expect(firstSeq).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    acp.onClose(a.ws);
+
+    // (a) The bridge SURVIVES the close. Under the old per-socket keying this
+    // was already 0 by now, and the agent was dead.
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(1);
+
+    // The chat's own transcript keeps growing while nobody is attached — the
+    // durable record the re-attach replays from.
+    await until(async () => {
+      const { chatTranscriptSeq } = await import('../acp/transcript.ts');
+      return chatTranscriptSeq(ctx.paths.designRoot, 'c1') > firstSeq ? true : undefined;
+    });
+
+    // (b) Re-attach from the seq the client had already hydrated. Everything
+    // after it replays; nothing at or before it does.
+    const b = fakeWs('life-b');
+    acp.onOpen(b.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(b.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'attach', chat: 'c1', seq: firstSeq }));
+    await until(() => b.frames.find((f) => f.t === 'attached'));
+
+    // Let the turn finish so the replay + live tail are both complete.
+    await until(() => b.frames.find((f) => f.t === 'turn-end'), 20000);
+
+    const seqs = b.frames.filter((f) => f.t === 'update').map((f) => f.seq as number);
+    // EXACTLY ONCE: no duplicates …
+    expect(new Set(seqs).size).toBe(seqs.length);
+    // … and nothing the client already had (that's the whole point of the seam;
+    // without it, the replay and the live stream overlap and the user sees the
+    // last few seconds twice).
+    expect(seqs.every((s) => s > firstSeq)).toBe(true);
+    // … and no HOLE either: the seqs are contiguous from firstSeq+1.
+    expect(seqs).toEqual(seqs.map((_, i) => firstSeq + 1 + i));
+
+    acp.onClose(b.ws);
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 40000);
+
+  test('a DETACHED, idle bridge is reaped — no orphaned subprocess', async () => {
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+    const a = fakeWs('reap-a');
+    acp.onOpen(a.ws);
+    // `warm` establishes a bridge without starting a turn — the "abandoned"
+    // shape, as opposed to the "still working" one above.
+    acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: 'c1' }));
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === 1 ? true : undefined));
+    acp.onClose(a.ws);
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(1); // detached, not yet reaped
+
+    // The real TTL is minutes — assert the CONSTANT is sane rather than sleeping
+    // through it. The reap PATH itself is covered by stopAll() below and by the
+    // ceiling test, which exercises the same `reap()`.
+    expect(DETACHED_TTL_MS).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(DETACHED_TTL_MS).toBeLessThanOrEqual(15 * 60_000);
+
+    acp.stopAll();
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(0);
+  }, 30000);
+
+  test('detached bridges are CAPPED — the least-recently-active is reaped', async () => {
+    // Detaching removed the natural reaper that socket-close used to be, so an
+    // unbounded set of detached bridges is a process leak (DDR-125 already books
+    // "N processes" as the cost of parallel chats). Idle ones are sacrificed
+    // first; a detached bridge with a live turn is what we are protecting.
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+    const sockets = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i <= MAX_DETACHED_BRIDGES; i++) {
+      const s = fakeWs(`cap-${i}`);
+      sockets.push(s);
+      acp.onOpen(s.ws);
+      acp.onMessage(s.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: `c${i}` }));
+    }
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === MAX_DETACHED_BRIDGES + 1 ? true : undefined));
+    for (const s of sockets) acp.onClose(s.ws);
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(MAX_DETACHED_BRIDGES);
+
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 30000);
+
+  test('re-attaching CANCELS the reaper (a reload is not an abandonment)', async () => {
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+    const a = fakeWs('rearm-a');
+    acp.onOpen(a.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: 'c1' }));
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === 1 ? true : undefined));
+    acp.onClose(a.ws);
+    const b = fakeWs('rearm-b');
+    acp.onOpen(b.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(b.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'attach', chat: 'c1', seq: 0 }));
+    const attached = await until(() => b.frames.find((f) => f.t === 'attached'));
+    expect(attached.chat).toBe('c1');
+    // Same bridge, not a fresh one — the whole point of keying by chat.
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(1);
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 30000);
+});
+
+describe('bridge lifetime — a detached bridge must never read as consent', () => {
+  test('a permission request raised with NO socket attached fails closed (deny)', async () => {
+    // The Addendum names this hazard explicitly: "A detached bridge is a live
+    // agent with no UI attached. Any requestPermission raised while nobody is
+    // watching must hit the existing timeout → fail-closed deny. 'No client
+    // attached' must never be a path to auto-approval — that would re-open,
+    // from a new direction, exactly what the write gate closes."
+    // Driven at the BRIDGE level with a short timeout override rather than
+    // through the manager: the real PERMISSION_TIMEOUT_MS is 120 s, and a test
+    // that actually sleeps through it would be a 2-minute test proving a
+    // constant. Detachment is modelled the way the manager models it — the
+    // request is raised and `broadcast` reaches nobody, i.e. no sink answers.
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_PERM);
+    const updates: Array<{ content?: { text?: string } }> = [];
+    const raised: string[] = [];
+    const bridge = new AcpBridge({
+      repoRoot: freshCtx().paths.repoRoot,
+      permissionTimeoutMs: 250,
+      onUpdate: (u) => updates.push(u as { content?: { text?: string } }),
+      // A DETACHED bridge still RAISES the request (the manager's `broadcast`
+      // is what silently drops it when `sinks` is empty) — it just never gets
+      // an answer. Nothing here calls resolvePermission.
+      onPermissionRequest: (id) => raised.push(id),
+    });
+    try {
+      await bridge.prompt('go', 'c1');
+      expect(raised).toHaveLength(1);
+      const text = updates.map((u) => u?.content?.text ?? '').join('');
+      expect(text).toContain('"outcome":"cancelled"');
+      expect(text).not.toContain('selected');
+    } finally {
+      await bridge.stop();
+    }
+  }, 30000);
+});
+
+describe('bridge lifetime — a socket may only address chats it is attached to', () => {
+  // SECURITY. Before bridges were re-keyed by chat, every control-frame lookup
+  // was `bridges.get(ws.data.id)` — a socket was STRUCTURALLY incapable of
+  // naming another socket's bridge. Re-keying moved the key into the FRAME, and
+  // the first cut resolved `chat` against the whole map, silently widening the
+  // surface so any socket could cancel another chat's turn or flip its config.
+  // The nonce ids make answering another chat's permission impractical to hit
+  // blind, but "you'd have to guess a UUID" is a weaker guarantee than "the
+  // frame cannot name that bridge at all" — and DDR-125 F1's posture is
+  // explicitly the latter. These tests pin the restored property.
+  test('a control frame naming ANOTHER chat is refused', async () => {
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+
+    const a = fakeWs('cross-a');
+    acp.onOpen(a.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: 'victim' }));
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === 1 ? true : undefined));
+
+    const b = fakeWs('cross-b');
+    acp.onOpen(b.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(b.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: 'attacker' }));
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === 2 ? true : undefined));
+
+    // Socket B names socket A's chat. Must be a no-op, not a cancel.
+    expect(() =>
+      acp.onMessage(b.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'cancel', chat: 'victim' }))
+    ).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() =>
+      acp.onMessage(
+        b.ws,
+        JSON.stringify({ t: 'permission-response', id: 'x', chat: 'victim', decision: 'allow' })
+      )
+    ).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() =>
+      acp.onMessage(
+        b.ws,
+        JSON.stringify({ t: 'set-mode', chat: 'victim', modeId: 'bypassPermissions' })
+      )
+    ).not.toThrow();
+
+    // Both bridges still alive — nothing was cancelled or torn down.
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(2);
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 30000);
+
+  test('a socket CAN address its own chat by name', async () => {
+    // The restriction must not break the normal path — the client echoes `chat`
+    // back on every response frame.
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+    const a = fakeWs('own-a');
+    acp.onOpen(a.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: 'mine' }));
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === 1 ? true : undefined));
+    expect(() => acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'cancel', chat: 'mine' }))).not.toThrow();
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(1);
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 30000);
+});
+
+describe('bridge lifetime — the attach seq is client-supplied and must be bounded', () => {
+  test('hostile seq values (negative, NaN, Infinity, fractional, huge) never throw or over-read', async () => {
+    // `frame.seq` flows into readChatLinesAfter. It is floored, clamped at 0,
+    // and the read is capped — but the values are attacker-chosen, so pin it.
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+    const a = fakeWs('seq-a');
+    acp.onOpen(a.ws);
+    for (const seq of [-1, -1e9, Number.NaN, Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY, 3.7, 1e15, '5', null]) {
+      expect(() =>
+        acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'attach', chat: 'c1', seq }))
+      ).not.toThrow();
+    }
+    // Every attach still answered — degraded to seq 0, never wedged.
+    expect(a.frames.filter((f) => f.t === 'attached').length).toBe(8);
+    // A chat with no transcript replays nothing regardless of the seq claimed.
+    expect(a.frames.filter((f) => f.t === 'update')).toHaveLength(0);
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 30000);
+
+  test('a traversal-shaped chat id cannot reach another file', async () => {
+    // chatId is sanitized to [a-z0-9_-] before it reaches the transcript path.
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+    const a = fakeWs('seq-b');
+    acp.onOpen(a.ws);
+    expect(() =>
+      acp.onMessage(a.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'attach', chat: '../../../etc/passwd', seq: 0 }))
+    ).not.toThrow();
+    const attached = a.frames.find((f) => f.t === 'attached');
+    expect(attached?.chat).not.toContain('/');
+    expect(attached?.chat).not.toContain('.');
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 30000);
+});
+
+describe('set-mode is attachment-scoped too (ethical-hacker A2)', () => {
+  test('a socket CANNOT flip another chat into bypassPermissions', async () => {
+    // A2 was the one control frame that escaped the attachment-scoping sweep,
+    // and the highest-value one to miss: `bypassPermissions` is an advertised
+    // mode and short-circuits ADAPTER-side, so `requestPermission` — and with it
+    // the entire write gate — never runs. A raw `bridges.get(chat)` let any
+    // main-origin socket switch the gate off for a chat it was never attached
+    // to, including a DETACHED one with a live turn and nobody watching.
+    useMockAgent(FIXTURE_SLOW);
+    const ctx = freshCtx();
+    const acp = createAcp(ctx);
+
+    const victim = fakeWs('mode-victim');
+    acp.onOpen(victim.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(victim.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: 'victim' }));
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === 1 ? true : undefined));
+
+    const attacker = fakeWs('mode-attacker');
+    acp.onOpen(attacker.ws);
+    acp.onMessage(attacker.ws, JSON.stringify({ t: 'warm', chat: 'attacker' }));
+    await until(() => (acp.size() === 2 ? true : undefined));
+
+    expect(() =>
+      acp.onMessage(
+        attacker.ws,
+        JSON.stringify({ t: 'set-mode', chat: 'victim', modeId: 'bypassPermissions' })
+      )
+    ).not.toThrow();
+    // Both bridges intact and the frame was a no-op — the mode change never
+    // reached a bridge this socket isn't attached to.
+    expect(acp.size()).toBe(2);
+    acp.stopAll();
+  }, 30000);
+});

package/apps/studio/test/acp-caps-bridge.test.ts

@@ -267,6 +267,11 @@ describe('Acp manager — set-mode/set-config frames validate against last-adver
       );
     } finally {
       acp.onClose(a.ws);
+      // Task 8 — `onClose` DETACHES now; it no longer stops the bridge (that is
+      // the point: a page reload must not kill a running turn). So a test that
+      // relied on socket-close for teardown leaks the adapter subprocess for the
+      // whole DETACHED_TTL_MS. Tear down explicitly.
+      acp.stopAll();
       await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
       await rm(designRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
     }

package/apps/studio/test/acp-commands.test.ts

@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ describe('Acp manager — warm frame broadcasts + open replays commands', () =>
       acp.onClose(b.ws);
     } finally {
       acp.onClose(a.ws);
+      // Task 8 — `onClose` DETACHES now; it no longer stops the bridge (that is
+      // the point: a page reload must not kill a running turn). So a test that
+      // relied on socket-close for teardown leaks the adapter subprocess for the
+      // whole DETACHED_TTL_MS. Tear down explicitly.
+      acp.stopAll();
       // give teardown a tick to kill the subprocess
       await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
       await rm(designRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });

package/apps/studio/test/acp-elicitation-bridge.test.ts

@@ -365,6 +365,11 @@ describe('Acp manager — elicitation-request/-response frames', () => {
       expect(settledFrame.id).toBe(reqFrame.id);
     } finally {
       acp.onClose(a.ws);
+      // Task 8 — `onClose` DETACHES now; it no longer stops the bridge (that is
+      // the point: a page reload must not kill a running turn). So a test that
+      // relied on socket-close for teardown leaks the adapter subprocess for the
+      // whole DETACHED_TTL_MS. Tear down explicitly.
+      acp.stopAll();
       await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
     }
   }, 20000);