@0xmaxma/claude-gateway 1.8.7 → 1.8.8

package/dist/connectors/mcp-oauth.js

@@ -0,0 +1,522 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Generic OAuth 2.1 + PKCE (+ optional Dynamic Client Registration) support for
+ * "custom" MCP connectors whose only auth option is a real OAuth sign-in (no
+ * static API key) — e.g. Firecrawl's `https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp-oauth`.
+ *
+ * This module never touches Express or the pending-flow store — pure discovery
+ * + token functions, unit-testable with plain HTTP mocks. See
+ * `pending-oauth-store.ts` for the in-flight-flow state and
+ * `api/oauth-connectors-router.ts` for the HTTP endpoints that glue this
+ * together with `connectors/custom.ts`'s existing secret storage.
+ *
+ * Empirically verified against production Firecrawl (2026-09, this repo's own
+ * throwaway PoC — see git history / PR description, not reproduced here):
+ * DCR genuinely works with an arbitrary redirect_uri (no pre-registration
+ * needed), and the RFC 8707 `resource` parameter is REQUIRED on both the
+ * authorize request and the token exchange — omitting it yields a token that
+ * exchanges fine but is rejected by the MCP endpoint itself
+ * ("OAUTH_CONNECTION_INVALID"). Always pass `resource` through this module's
+ * functions; never make it optional.
+ */
+var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
+    return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.OAuthTokenError = void 0;
+exports.discoverOAuthMetadata = discoverOAuthMetadata;
+exports.discoverOAuthMetadataCached = discoverOAuthMetadataCached;
+exports.clearOAuthMetadataCache = clearOAuthMetadataCache;
+exports.registerClient = registerClient;
+exports.resolveClientId = resolveClientId;
+exports.resolveScope = resolveScope;
+exports.generatePkce = generatePkce;
+exports.generateState = generateState;
+exports.buildAuthorizeUrl = buildAuthorizeUrl;
+exports.exchangeCode = exchangeCode;
+exports.refreshAccessToken = refreshAccessToken;
+const crypto_1 = __importDefault(require("crypto"));
+/**
+ * Every request here goes to a third-party server the gateway does not control, on
+ * paths that run inside a 60s periodic sweep (see oauth-refresh-sweep.ts) and inside
+ * admin HTTP handlers. Node's fetch has no default timeout, so a provider that accepts
+ * the connection and then never responds would hang the caller indefinitely — the
+ * sweep's in-flight guard would then skip every subsequent tick, and refresh would
+ * stop happening at all. Bounded here so a hang surfaces as an ordinary failure.
+ */
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000;
+/**
+ * One request, timed out, with redirect-following DISABLED.
+ *
+ * Node's fetch defaults to `redirect: 'follow'`, and a followed redirect goes
+ * wherever the answering server names — without passing through
+ * `assertFetchableUrl`, which only ever sees the URL we ASK for. A single 302 to
+ * `http://169.254.169.254/` therefore lands past the guard the rest of this module
+ * is built around: the check has to run per hop, not once per call. Nothing here
+ * calls raw `fetch` any more; the two wrappers below are the only ways out.
+ */
+function fetchNoRedirect(url, init) {
+    return fetch(url, { ...init, redirect: 'manual', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS) });
+}
+/**
+ * Enough hops for the redirects a real deployment actually serves — a bare host to
+ * its canonical one, a trailing-slash normalisation — and few enough that a
+ * redirect loop costs three round trips instead of twenty.
+ */
+const MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS = 3;
+/**
+ * `fetchNoRedirect`, following up to `MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS` redirects and re-running
+ * `assertFetchableUrl` on every `Location` before going there.
+ *
+ * Used for the discovery walk and the DCR registration POST — requests that carry no
+ * credential, where refusing all redirects outright would break providers that
+ * legitimately serve their well-known documents off a canonical host. The token
+ * endpoint does NOT use this; see `tokenRequest`.
+ */
+async function fetchFollowingCheckedRedirects(url, what, init) {
+    let target = url;
+    let nextInit = init;
+    for (let hop = 0;; hop++) {
+        const resp = await fetchNoRedirect(target, nextInit);
+        if (resp.status < 300 || resp.status >= 400)
+            return resp;
+        const location = resp.headers.get('location');
+        // A 3xx with no Location is a malformed response, not a redirect — hand it back
+        // and let the caller's own status check produce the error.
+        if (!location)
+            return resp;
+        if (hop >= MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS) {
+            throw new Error(`Fetching the ${what} exceeded ${MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS} redirects — giving up at ${target}.`);
+        }
+        // A relative Location is legal (RFC 9110 §10.2.2) and resolves against the URL
+        // just requested, so resolve first and validate the absolute result.
+        target = assertFetchableUrl(new URL(location, target).toString(), `${what} redirect target`);
+        // RFC 9110 §15.4: only 307/308 preserve the method and body. 301/302/303 on a
+        // POST become a bodiless GET, which is what every other client does too.
+        nextInit =
+            resp.status === 307 || resp.status === 308
+                ? init
+                : { ...init, method: 'GET', body: undefined };
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Gate every URL discovery hands us before the gateway fetches it or POSTs a
+ * credential to it.
+ *
+ * The admin picks the MCP server URL. It does NOT pick what comes back from it: the
+ * `resource_metadata` URL arrives in that server's own WWW-Authenticate header, the
+ * `authorization_servers[0]` issuer arrives in the document that URL returns, and the
+ * authorize/token/registration endpoints arrive in the document after that. Three
+ * hops downstream, the remote server is choosing what this process connects to —
+ * which is a request-forgery primitive pointed at whatever the gateway's VM can
+ * reach but the internet cannot (a metadata service, an admin port on 127.0.0.1,
+ * a neighbour on the LAN).
+ *
+ * Requiring TLS is most of the fix on its own: cloud metadata services and internal
+ * admin ports overwhelmingly speak plain http, and a host that does terminate TLS
+ * proves nothing about the token — but a plain-http token endpoint would receive the
+ * refresh_token in cleartext, which is worth refusing on its own merits.
+ *
+ * This is a narrowing, not a boundary: an attacker-controlled https host on the LAN
+ * still passes. The trust boundary is still the admin key that added the connector.
+ */
+/**
+ * Loopback only — deliberately NOT config/public-url's `isLocalHostname`.
+ *
+ * That predicate answers a different question, for a value with a different
+ * provenance: whether the ADMIN's own `gateway.publicUrl` is a local address, so
+ * the UI can decide whether to show it as reachable. Widening it to `.internal`
+ * and `.local` is right there and wrong here — the hostname reaching this
+ * function was chosen three hops downstream by the remote MCP server, and
+ * `metadata.google.internal` (GCE), `metadata.internal`, and any mDNS `.local`
+ * name on the LAN are exactly the plain-http targets the https requirement above
+ * exists to refuse. Loopback is the only reason to relax it: a developer running
+ * an AS on 127.0.0.1 is talking to a socket no other host can reach.
+ */
+function isLoopbackHostname(hostname) {
+    const host = hostname.toLowerCase();
+    return host === 'localhost' || /^127\./.test(host) || host === '::1' || host === '[::1]';
+}
+function assertFetchableUrl(raw, what) {
+    let url;
+    try {
+        url = new URL(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new Error(`Discovery returned a ${what} that is not a valid URL: ${raw}`);
+    }
+    if (url.protocol === 'https:')
+        return url.toString();
+    if (url.protocol === 'http:' && isLoopbackHostname(url.hostname))
+        return url.toString();
+    throw new Error(`Discovery returned a ${what} the gateway will not call: ${url.protocol}//${url.host}` +
+        ` — OAuth endpoints must use https (plain http is allowed only for localhost).`);
+}
+/**
+ * A token endpoint that answered, and answered with a refusal.
+ *
+ * The distinction this class exists to draw is between "the grant is dead" and
+ * "we couldn't reach the provider just now". The refresh sweep gives up on a
+ * connector after a few consecutive failures and deletes its stored credentials,
+ * which is right for the first case and destructive for the second — a fifteen
+ * minute provider outage is an ordinary event and must not cost the user their
+ * sign-in. Only an explicit OAuth error response can be classified, so only this
+ * error type carries `isPermanent`; anything else the sweep sees (a DNS failure,
+ * a socket timeout, a 502, a discovery step that returned the wrong shape) is
+ * treated as retryable by default.
+ */
+class OAuthTokenError extends Error {
+    constructor(message, status, 
+    /** RFC 6749 §5.2 `error` code from the response body, when it had one. */
+    errorCode) {
+        super(message);
+        this.status = status;
+        this.errorCode = errorCode;
+        this.name = 'OAuthTokenError';
+    }
+    /**
+     * True when the authorization server has told us this grant will never work
+     * again. Deliberately a small allowlist rather than "any 4xx": a 400 with no
+     * recognisable `error` code, or a 429, says more about this request than about
+     * the grant, and retrying costs nothing but a backoff.
+     */
+    get isPermanent() {
+        return (this.status >= 400 &&
+            this.status < 500 &&
+            (this.errorCode === 'invalid_grant' ||
+                this.errorCode === 'invalid_client' ||
+                this.errorCode === 'unauthorized_client' ||
+                this.errorCode === 'invalid_scope'));
+    }
+}
+exports.OAuthTokenError = OAuthTokenError;
+/** Parse `resource_metadata="<url>"` out of a WWW-Authenticate header value. */
+function parseResourceMetadataUrl(header) {
+    if (!header)
+        return null;
+    const m = header.match(/resource_metadata="([^"]+)"/);
+    return m ? m[1] : null;
+}
+/**
+ * A metadata document's string list, or undefined when it has no such list at all.
+ *
+ * Filtered element by element, not merely checked for being an array: these
+ * documents come from a host we do not control, and `scopesSupported` is
+ * `join(' ')`ed straight into the `scope` query parameter of a URL the admin's own
+ * browser is then sent to. A `scopes_supported: ["read", 42, null, {"a":1}]` —
+ * malformed, but served with a 200 — produced `read 42 null [object Object]`, which
+ * the AS rejects as invalid_scope with nothing to say where the garbage came from.
+ * Dropping the non-strings asks for the scopes it did understand.
+ *
+ * The undefined/[] distinction is load-bearing at the one call site: a document
+ * that OMITS the list has said nothing and defers to the next document, while one
+ * that publishes an empty list has said "none", and that is an answer.
+ */
+function stringsOf(value) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(value))
+        return undefined;
+    return value.filter((s) => typeof s === 'string');
+}
+/**
+ * Discover OAuth metadata for an MCP server by probing it unauthenticated
+ * (expects a 401 advertising `resource_metadata`, per RFC 9728), then walking
+ * protected-resource metadata → authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414).
+ * Throws a descriptive error at whichever step fails — callers surface it
+ * to the admin as "can't set up OAuth for this URL", not a generic 500.
+ */
+async function discoverOAuthMetadata(mcpUrl) {
+    const probe = await fetchFollowingCheckedRedirects(mcpUrl, 'MCP server URL', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'initialize', params: {} }),
+    });
+    if (probe.status !== 401) {
+        throw new Error(`Expected a 401 challenge from ${mcpUrl} (got ${probe.status}) — this server may not require OAuth, or isn't an MCP server at all.`);
+    }
+    const resourceMetadataUrl = parseResourceMetadataUrl(probe.headers.get('www-authenticate'));
+    if (!resourceMetadataUrl) {
+        throw new Error(`${mcpUrl} returned 401 but no "resource_metadata" in its WWW-Authenticate header — can't discover its OAuth server.`);
+    }
+    const prm = await fetchFollowingCheckedRedirects(assertFetchableUrl(resourceMetadataUrl, 'resource_metadata URL'), 'protected-resource metadata').then((r) => {
+        if (!r.ok)
+            throw new Error(`Protected-resource metadata fetch failed: ${r.status}`);
+        return r.json();
+    });
+    const authServers = prm.authorization_servers;
+    if (!Array.isArray(authServers) || typeof authServers[0] !== 'string') {
+        throw new Error(`${resourceMetadataUrl} has no authorization_servers listed.`);
+    }
+    const issuer = new URL(assertFetchableUrl(authServers[0], 'authorization server issuer'));
+    // RFC 8414 §3.1: well-known path is inserted before the issuer's own path
+    // component (usually empty, as it is for Firecrawl).
+    const asMetaUrl = new URL(`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${issuer.pathname === '/' ? '' : issuer.pathname}`, issuer.origin);
+    const asMeta = await fetchFollowingCheckedRedirects(asMetaUrl.toString(), 'authorization-server metadata').then((r) => {
+        if (!r.ok)
+            throw new Error(`Authorization-server metadata fetch failed: ${r.status}`);
+        return r.json();
+    });
+    if (typeof asMeta.authorization_endpoint !== 'string' || typeof asMeta.token_endpoint !== 'string') {
+        throw new Error(`${asMetaUrl} is missing authorization_endpoint/token_endpoint.`);
+    }
+    return {
+        resource: mcpUrl,
+        // Validated here rather than at each use: the authorize endpoint becomes a
+        // redirect the admin's own browser follows, the token endpoint receives the
+        // refresh_token, and the registration endpoint receives a DCR POST. All three
+        // are values this last document chose.
+        authorizationEndpoint: assertFetchableUrl(asMeta.authorization_endpoint, 'authorization_endpoint'),
+        tokenEndpoint: assertFetchableUrl(asMeta.token_endpoint, 'token_endpoint'),
+        registrationEndpoint: typeof asMeta.registration_endpoint === 'string'
+            ? assertFetchableUrl(asMeta.registration_endpoint, 'registration_endpoint')
+            : undefined,
+        // The RESOURCE's list first, the authorization server's only as a fallback.
+        // These two documents answer different questions: RFC 9728 §2's
+        // `scopes_supported` is the scopes needed to reach THIS MCP server, while RFC
+        // 8414 §2's is every scope the AS issues for every resource behind it. Asking
+        // for the second is asking the admin to grant this gateway the union of an
+        // entire provider's privileges — and on an AS whose global list contains
+        // scopes this client may not have, it is also an `invalid_scope` refusal that
+        // fails the sign-in outright. The AS list stays as the fallback because a
+        // provider that publishes no per-resource scopes is a provider this gateway
+        // already signs into today.
+        scopesSupported: stringsOf(prm.scopes_supported) ?? stringsOf(asMeta.scopes_supported) ?? [],
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * How long a discovered OAuth metadata document is reused. Long enough that a
+ * connector refreshing on the hour never re-discovers, short enough that a
+ * provider that moves its endpoints is picked up the same day without a restart.
+ */
+const METADATA_CACHE_TTL_MS = 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * Hard ceiling on cached documents, enforced on top of the TTL.
+ *
+ * The TTL alone bounds how *stale* an entry can be, not how many there are: an
+ * expired entry for a URL nobody ever discovers again is never looked up, so its
+ * `expiresAt` check never runs and it sits in the Map for the process lifetime.
+ * Every connector edit that changes a URL, and every deleted connector, leaves one
+ * behind. Small leak, unbounded shape — so entries are pruned on write and the map
+ * is capped.
+ *
+ * The cap is generous relative to any plausible connector count; it exists so the
+ * map cannot grow without limit if `mcpUrl` ever becomes attacker-influenced, not
+ * to keep a real install under it.
+ */
+const MAX_METADATA_CACHE_ENTRIES = 256;
+const metadataCache = new Map();
+/**
+ * Drop expired entries, then oldest-first until the map is under the cap.
+ *
+ * Every entry gets the same TTL, so Map insertion order (which `keys()` preserves)
+ * is also expiry order — the first key is always the one closest to expiring, and
+ * evicting it costs at most one re-discovery.
+ */
+function pruneMetadataCache(now) {
+    for (const [url, entry] of metadataCache) {
+        if (entry.expiresAt <= now)
+            metadataCache.delete(url);
+    }
+    while (metadataCache.size > MAX_METADATA_CACHE_ENTRIES) {
+        const oldest = metadataCache.keys().next();
+        if (oldest.done)
+            break;
+        metadataCache.delete(oldest.value);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * `discoverOAuthMetadata` with a process-local cache, for the background refresh
+ * sweep.
+ *
+ * Discovery costs three round trips — an MCP probe that is *expected* to 401, then
+ * protected-resource metadata, then authorization-server metadata — to obtain a
+ * document that changes about never. Paying that on every refresh is not just waste:
+ * each of those three requests is another way for a refresh to fail, and a failed
+ * refresh is what eventually makes the sweep give up and delete the connector's
+ * credentials. Fewer moving parts on the periodic path means fewer spurious failures.
+ *
+ * Only the sweep uses this. An admin-initiated `oauth/start` still calls
+ * `discoverOAuthMetadata` directly: that is the moment a human is waiting to find out
+ * whether this URL works at all, so it should see today's truth, not a cached answer
+ * from before they fixed their provider's configuration.
+ */
+async function discoverOAuthMetadataCached(mcpUrl) {
+    const hit = metadataCache.get(mcpUrl);
+    if (hit && hit.expiresAt > Date.now())
+        return hit.metadata;
+    const metadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(mcpUrl);
+    // delete-then-set: re-`set`ting an existing key keeps its ORIGINAL position in a
+    // Map, which would leave a freshly-refreshed entry at the front of the eviction
+    // order. Re-inserting puts it back where its new expiry belongs.
+    metadataCache.delete(mcpUrl);
+    const now = Date.now();
+    metadataCache.set(mcpUrl, { metadata, expiresAt: now + METADATA_CACHE_TTL_MS });
+    pruneMetadataCache(now);
+    return metadata;
+}
+/** Drop every cached metadata document. For tests, and for a forced re-discovery. */
+function clearOAuthMetadataCache() {
+    metadataCache.clear();
+}
+/**
+ * Register a public (no client_secret) client via RFC 7591 DCR. Throws if the
+ * server rejects it — callers fall back to a per-connector static client_id
+ * (an env var an admin configured by hand) when this isn't available at all,
+ * see `resolveClientId` below.
+ */
+async function registerClient(registrationEndpoint, redirectUri, clientName) {
+    const resp = await fetchFollowingCheckedRedirects(registrationEndpoint, 'registration_endpoint', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+            redirect_uris: [redirectUri],
+            token_endpoint_auth_method: 'none',
+            grant_types: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
+            response_types: ['code'],
+            client_name: clientName,
+        }),
+    });
+    const body = (await resp.json().catch(() => ({})));
+    if (!resp.ok || typeof body.client_id !== 'string') {
+        throw new Error(`Dynamic client registration failed (${resp.status}): ${JSON.stringify(body)}`);
+    }
+    return body.client_id;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve a client_id for `metadata`: try DCR first, fall back to a static
+ * `MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID__<connectorId>` env var (an admin-configured client_id
+ * for a provider that advertises no registration_endpoint at all).
+ */
+async function resolveClientId(metadata, connectorId, redirectUri) {
+    if (metadata.registrationEndpoint) {
+        return registerClient(metadata.registrationEndpoint, redirectUri, `claude-gateway (${connectorId})`);
+    }
+    const envKey = `MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID__${connectorId.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]+/g, '_').toUpperCase()}`;
+    const staticClientId = process.env[envKey];
+    if (!staticClientId) {
+        throw new Error(`${metadata.authorizationEndpoint}'s server advertises no Dynamic Client Registration, and no ${envKey} env var is set as a fallback.`);
+    }
+    return staticClientId;
+}
+/**
+ * The `scope` to send with an authorization request for `metadata`.
+ *
+ * An admin-set `MCP_OAUTH_SCOPES__<connectorId>` (space-separated) wins, for the
+ * same reason `MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID__<connectorId>` exists above: discovery is the
+ * provider's story about itself, and when that story is wrong the sign-in fails at
+ * the provider with an `invalid_scope` the operator cannot otherwise do anything
+ * about. Some servers publish a scope the client is not entitled to; some grant a
+ * refresh_token only when `offline_access` is asked for and never advertise it.
+ * Both are one env var away from working, instead of a code change away.
+ *
+ * `offline_access` is the fallback when nothing is discovered or configured: the
+ * refresh sweep needs a refresh_token, and an authorization request carrying no
+ * scope at all gets whatever the provider's default happens to be.
+ */
+function resolveScope(metadata, connectorId) {
+    const envKey = `MCP_OAUTH_SCOPES__${connectorId.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]+/g, '_').toUpperCase()}`;
+    const override = process.env[envKey]?.trim();
+    if (override)
+        return override;
+    return metadata.scopesSupported.length > 0 ? metadata.scopesSupported.join(' ') : 'offline_access';
+}
+function base64url(buf) {
+    return buf.toString('base64').replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');
+}
+function generatePkce() {
+    const codeVerifier = base64url(crypto_1.default.randomBytes(32));
+    const codeChallenge = base64url(crypto_1.default.createHash('sha256').update(codeVerifier).digest());
+    return { codeVerifier, codeChallenge };
+}
+function generateState() {
+    return base64url(crypto_1.default.randomBytes(16));
+}
+function buildAuthorizeUrl(opts) {
+    const url = new URL(opts.metadata.authorizationEndpoint);
+    url.searchParams.set('response_type', 'code');
+    url.searchParams.set('client_id', opts.clientId);
+    url.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', opts.redirectUri);
+    url.searchParams.set('scope', opts.scope);
+    url.searchParams.set('code_challenge', opts.codeChallenge);
+    url.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', 'S256');
+    url.searchParams.set('state', opts.state);
+    // Required — see this file's module doc comment. Never omit.
+    url.searchParams.set('resource', opts.metadata.resource);
+    return url.toString();
+}
+/**
+ * Keys whose values are credentials, never diagnostics. A token endpoint's response
+ * body is reported verbatim in `tokenRequest`'s error message, and that message
+ * travels further than a stack trace: oauth-refresh-sweep.ts logs it on every failed
+ * refresh, and oauth-connectors-router.ts renders it into the callback page and the
+ * 502 body an admin sees in their browser.
+ *
+ * The reachable case is not an RFC 6749 §5.2 error body — those carry no tokens. It
+ * is the OTHER half of the throw condition: a 200 whose `access_token` is missing or
+ * not a string. A provider that returns `{"access_token": null, "refresh_token": "…"}`,
+ * or nests the token one level down, or 200s with a partial body on a bad day, hands
+ * us a live refresh_token and we print it. Redacting is cheap; a refresh_token in a
+ * log file is not revocable by us.
+ */
+const SECRET_RESPONSE_KEYS = new Set(['access_token', 'refresh_token', 'id_token']);
+/** The token endpoint's response, safe to put in an error message. Shape and error
+ *  fields are preserved — those are the diagnostic — and only the values that are
+ *  credentials are replaced. */
+function redactTokenResponse(parsed) {
+    const safe = {};
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(parsed)) {
+        safe[k] = SECRET_RESPONSE_KEYS.has(k) && v != null ? '[redacted]' : v;
+    }
+    return JSON.stringify(safe);
+}
+async function tokenRequest(tokenEndpoint, body) {
+    const resp = await fetchNoRedirect(tokenEndpoint, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
+        body,
+    });
+    // Alone among the requests in this file, a redirect here is refused rather than
+    // re-validated and followed. This body carries the authorization code plus its PKCE
+    // verifier, or the refresh_token: a 307 re-POSTs that verbatim to wherever the
+    // authorization server names, which is how a token endpoint that passed
+    // `assertFetchableUrl` at discovery time hands the gateway's live credential to a
+    // host of its choosing. Validating the target would not help — there is no
+    // destination for which forwarding this body is the right answer.
+    //
+    // Classified as transient (status < 400, so `isPermanent` is false): an AS that has
+    // started answering 302 here is misconfigured or mid-migration, and the sweep must
+    // back off rather than delete a grant that is probably still good.
+    if (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400) {
+        throw new OAuthTokenError(`Token request to ${tokenEndpoint} was answered with a ${resp.status} redirect` +
+            ` — the gateway does not forward credentials across redirects.`, resp.status);
+    }
+    const parsed = (await resp.json().catch(() => ({})));
+    if (!resp.ok || typeof parsed.access_token !== 'string') {
+        throw new OAuthTokenError(`Token request failed (${resp.status}): ${redactTokenResponse(parsed)}`, resp.status, typeof parsed.error === 'string' ? parsed.error : undefined);
+    }
+    return {
+        access_token: parsed.access_token,
+        token_type: typeof parsed.token_type === 'string' ? parsed.token_type : 'bearer',
+        expires_in: typeof parsed.expires_in === 'number' ? parsed.expires_in : undefined,
+        refresh_token: typeof parsed.refresh_token === 'string' ? parsed.refresh_token : undefined,
+        scope: typeof parsed.scope === 'string' ? parsed.scope : undefined,
+    };
+}
+function exchangeCode(opts) {
+    return tokenRequest(opts.metadata.tokenEndpoint, new URLSearchParams({
+        grant_type: 'authorization_code',
+        code: opts.code,
+        redirect_uri: opts.redirectUri,
+        client_id: opts.clientId,
+        code_verifier: opts.codeVerifier,
+        resource: opts.metadata.resource, // required — see module doc comment
+    }));
+}
+function refreshAccessToken(opts) {
+    return tokenRequest(opts.metadata.tokenEndpoint, new URLSearchParams({
+        grant_type: 'refresh_token',
+        refresh_token: opts.refreshToken,
+        client_id: opts.clientId,
+        resource: opts.metadata.resource, // required — see module doc comment
+    }));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=mcp-oauth.js.map

package/dist/connectors/mcp-oauth.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/connectors/oauth-refresh-sweep.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * Periodic refresh for connectors whose credential this gateway owns
+ * (CustomConnectorEntry.credentialOwner === 'gateway') — the gateway-side
+ * counterpart to whatever refresh loop an external control plane runs for the
+ * 'external' entries it pushes in. Runs on the same 60s
+ * interval as cliPairingStore.prune() (see gateway-router.ts) via
+ * refreshExpiringOAuthConnectors().
+ *
+ * Storage note: the refresh_token, its client_id, the access_token expiry and this
+ * sweep's failure bookkeeping all live in the same mcp-token.env as connector secrets,
+ * but under `internalSecretKey()`'s `CUSTOMINT__` prefix, which `customSecretKey()`
+ * cannot produce. `PLACEHOLDER_RE` accepts a leading underscore, so it is the prefix —
+ * not the `__` naming convention — that keeps a pasted `{__refresh_token}` from
+ * resolving to this sweep's slot. See custom.ts's `internalSecretKey`.
+ */
+import type { AgentRunner } from '../agent/runner';
+import type { CustomConnectorsStore } from './custom-connectors-store';
+/** Backoff for the nth consecutive transient failure, capped. */
+export declare function transientBackoffMs(consecutiveFailures: number): number;
+export declare function refreshTokenSecretKey(id: string): string;
+export declare function clientIdSecretKey(id: string): string;
+export declare function expiresAtSecretKey(id: string): string;
+export declare function refreshFailCountSecretKey(id: string): string;
+export declare function refreshBackoffUntilSecretKey(id: string): string;
+/** Consecutive *transient* failures — kept apart from `__refresh_fail_count` so an
+ *  outage can never accumulate toward deleting a live grant. Drives the exponential
+ *  backoff and status's `refresh` block; cleared on the first success. */
+export declare function refreshTransientCountSecretKey(id: string): string;
+/** Bumped on every access_token write — by the OAuth callback on a fresh sign-in
+ *  AND by this sweep on a successful refresh. Read back before this sweep commits,
+ *  so a manual reconnect landing mid-refresh wins instead of being clobbered by a
+ *  slower, now-stale refresh. */
+export declare function tokenGenerationSecretKey(id: string): string;
+/**
+ * DCR registration cache — deliberately NOT `clientIdSecretKey`.
+ *
+ * `oauth/start` registers a client before the user has done anything, and the flow can
+ * be abandoned. Writing that client_id into the key this sweep reads left the connector
+ * pairing refresh_token R1 (issued to the OLD client C1) with client_id C2; the next
+ * refresh POSTs that mismatched pair, the AS answers `invalid_client` — permanent, and
+ * correctly so for that pair — and three ticks later a working sign-in is deleted
+ * because an admin opened a Connect dialog and closed it again.
+ *
+ * `clientIdSecretKey` is written only by the callback, i.e. only once a token has
+ * actually been issued to that client. This key is just a cache so retried Connect
+ * clicks don't orphan a fresh registration at the provider every attempt. It lives
+ * beside the keys the sweep owns because the give-up path and DELETE /v1/connectors/:id
+ * both have to invalidate it (see `clearsDcrRegistration`).
+ */
+export declare function dcrClientIdSecretKey(id: string): string;
+/** The redirect_uri `dcrClientIdSecretKey`'s cached client was registered with. Reuse
+ *  that client_id only while this matches the current callback URL — otherwise the
+ *  provider would reject it, so re-registering is correct, not a skipped optimization. */
+export declare function clientRedirectUriSecretKey(id: string): string;
+/** Every key this sweep and the OAuth routers store for one connector, for the paths
+ *  that clear a connector out entirely. Enumerated once so a new key cannot be added to
+ *  the writers and forgotten by the deleters — the bug that left dead DCR registrations
+ *  behind forever. `includeDcrRegistration: false` keeps the cached DCR client (see
+ *  `clearsDcrRegistration`). */
+export declare function internalSecretKeysOf(id: string, opts?: {
+    includeDcrRegistration?: boolean;
+}): string[];
+/**
+ * Scan every gateway-owned connector; refresh any whose access_token is within
+ * REFRESH_SKEW_MS of its recorded expiry. Best-effort per connector — a failure is
+ * logged and skipped, never thrown, so one broken connector can't stop the rest.
+ * `agents` lets a successful refresh restart sessions already using the connector (a
+ * live MCP subprocess has the OLD token baked in and can't be hot-patched).
+ */
+export declare function refreshExpiringOAuthConnectors(store: CustomConnectorsStore, agents?: Map<string, AgentRunner>): Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-refresh-sweep.d.ts.map

package/dist/connectors/oauth-refresh-sweep.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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