0sec-cli 0.24.1 → 0.26.0

package/chunks/{chunk-GXXX7AGH.js → chunk-GYEYTNHK.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { createRequire as __0CreateRequire } from "node:module";
 const require = __0CreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   external_exports
-} from "./chunk-VIT5ALXF.js";
+} from "./chunk-5XOYTAOK.js";
 
 // packages/shared/dist/types.js
 function validateScanPlan(plan) {
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
 function loadVersion() {
   if (true) {
-    return "0.24.1";
+    return "0.26.0";
   }
   try {
     const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ var pocStepActionSchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [
     type: external_exports.literal("http"),
     method: external_exports.string(),
     url: external_exports.string(),
-    headers: external_exports.record(external_exports.string()).optional(),
+    headers: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.string()).optional(),
     body: external_exports.string().optional()
   }),
   external_exports.object({
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ var AgentActionTargetMetadataSchema = external_exports.object({
   target_version: external_exports.string().min(1),
   policy_version: external_exports.string().min(1),
   model_version: external_exports.string().min(1),
-  tool_versions: external_exports.record(external_exports.string().min(1)),
+  tool_versions: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.string().min(1)),
   configuration_sha256: Sha256Schema
 }).strict();
 var AgentActionToolCallSchema = external_exports.object({
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ var questionSchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [
 ]);
 var normalizedAnswerSchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [
   external_exports.object({ type: external_exports.literal("boolean"), probability }),
-  external_exports.object({ type: external_exports.literal("choice"), choice: external_exports.string(), probabilities: external_exports.record(probability) })
+  external_exports.object({ type: external_exports.literal("choice"), choice: external_exports.string(), probabilities: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), probability) })
 ]);
 var usageSchema = external_exports.object({
   inputTokens: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().max(MAX_INPUT_TOKENS),
@@ -1219,14 +1219,14 @@ function createJevEvaluator(config) {
           });
           if (!response.ok)
             throw new Error(`Jev provider returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
-          const body = external_exports.object({ model: external_exports.string().min(1), answers: external_exports.record(external_exports.unknown()), usage: usageSchema }).parse(await response.json());
+          const body = external_exports.object({ model: external_exports.string().min(1), answers: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.unknown()), usage: usageSchema }).parse(await response.json());
           model = body.model;
           rawUsage = body.usage;
           rawAnswers = body.answers;
         } else {
           const [{ experimental_evaluate: evaluate }, { createGateway }] = await Promise.all([
-            import("./dist-LNXGATR2.js"),
-            import("./dist-M2X367VW.js")
+            import("./dist-WNAOCQGA.js"),
+            import("./dist-JAZWL3SC.js")
           ]);
           signal.throwIfAborted();
           const gateway = createGateway({ apiKey: config.apiKey, fetch: fetchImpl });
@@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ var SecurityWorkflowBindingsSchema = external_exports.unknown().superRefine((bin
   }
   if (new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(bindings)).byteLength > 32768)
     context.addIssue({ code: external_exports.ZodIssueCode.custom, message: "Workflow inputs must be at most 32 KiB." });
-}).pipe(external_exports.record(external_exports.unknown()));
+}).pipe(external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.unknown()));
 var inputSchema = external_exports.object({ findingId: identifier.optional(), scanId: identifier.optional(), dbPath: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).max(4096).optional(), fromStep: identifier.optional(), artifactId: identifier.optional() }).strict();
 var nodeSchema = external_exports.object({ id: identifier, type: external_exports.enum(["trigger", "audit", "report", "verify", "fix", "research", "deep-review"]), label: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).max(160), enabled: external_exports.boolean(), plan: planSchema.optional(), execution: executionSchema.optional(), input: inputSchema.optional(), inputs: SecurityWorkflowBindingsSchema.superRefine((bindings, context) => {
   const pending = [bindings];
@@ -1751,7 +1751,7 @@ function operationTemplate(id, name, description, operation, compatibleTargetTyp
 }
 var FINDING_INPUT_REQUIREMENT = { names: ["finding", "findingPath", "findingId"], required: true, description: "Supply an existing finding, a finding JSON path, or a retained finding ID. Connected earlier finding evidence can also provide the input." };
 var SECURITY_WORKFLOW_TEMPLATES = [
-  template("repository-review", "Repository security review", "Review a local repository's trust boundaries, dependency exposure, and security-sensitive code.", "repository", [
+  template("repository-review", "Whitebox pentest", "Test a source repository for exploitable code paths, trust-boundary failures, dependency exposure, and unsafe configuration.", "repository", [
     phase("dependencies", "Dependency exposure", "known-vulnerabilities", "Inspect dependency manifests and lockfiles. Prioritize reachable vulnerable dependencies and supply-chain trust boundaries; distinguish confirmed exposure from version-only matches.", "quick"),
     phase("boundaries", "Trust boundaries", "unknown-vulnerabilities", "Trace authentication, authorization, tenant isolation, and privileged entry points in the authorized repository. Follow input-to-sink paths and report only supported security findings.", "deep"),
     phase("configuration", "Configuration and secrets", "misconfigurations", "Review repository configuration, credential handling, unsafe defaults, and sensitive debug surfaces. Do not expose secret values in reports.")
@@ -1839,6 +1839,7 @@ var BACKEND_CAPABILITIES = [
   "workspaces",
   "artifacts",
   "model-connections",
+  "provider-relay",
   "process-controls",
   "operator-services",
   "learning"
@@ -1935,6 +1936,8 @@ function backendCapabilitiesForApiPath(pathname) {
   };
   if (pathname === "/api/backend/handshake")
     return [];
+  if (pathname === "/api/console/provider-relays" || pathname.startsWith("/api/console/provider-relays/"))
+    return ["provider-relay"];
   if (pathname === "/api/workflow-engine/call")
     return ["workflow-engine"];
   if (parts[0] === "control" && parts.length === 2 && ["recover-stale-workers", "prune-stopped-workers", "reset-database", "start-daemon", "stop-daemon", "launch-run"].includes(parts[1]))
@@ -2148,6 +2151,107 @@ var successfulObservation = (value) => {
 };
 function accessMilestoneFromArtifact(eventType, value, scopeId, evidenceEventId) {
   const item = record(value);
+  if (eventType === "tool_artifact" && item && ["access_control_workflow", "access_control_cleanup"].includes(String(item.tool)) && item.state_access_proof !== void 0) {
+    const proof = record(item.state_access_proof);
+    const digest = (value2) => typeof value2 === "string" && /^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(value2);
+    const timestamp = (value2) => typeof value2 === "number" && Number.isFinite(value2) && value2 >= 0 && value2 <= 864e13;
+    if (!proof || proof.schema !== "0.state-access-proof/v1" || proof.authority !== "operator-fixture" || proof.access_class !== "unauthorized-write" || proof.status !== "confirmed" || proof.challenge_bound !== true || typeof proof.proof_id !== "string" || !/^[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{12}$/.test(proof.proof_id) || !digest(proof.fixture_digest) || !digest(proof.baseline_digest) || !digest(proof.observed_digest) || !timestamp(proof.verified_at) || !Number.isSafeInteger(proof.generation) || Number(proof.generation) < 1 || !Number.isSafeInteger(proof.cleanup_revision) || Number(proof.cleanup_revision) < 0 || !["required", "completed", "failed"].includes(String(proof.cleanup)) || proof.cleanup !== "required" && !timestamp(proof.cleanup_at) || typeof item.observation_url !== "string" || item.observation_url.length > 8192 || !scopeId || scopeId.length > 512)
+      return null;
+    if (item.tool === "access_control_workflow") {
+      const before2 = successfulObservation(item.observation_before), after2 = successfulObservation(item.observation_after);
+      const steps = item.steps;
+      if (item.verdict !== "confirmed" || !before2 || !after2 || before2.redacted !== false || after2.redacted !== false || before2.value_truncated === true || after2.value_truncated === true || before2.json_pointer_value === after2.json_pointer_value || after2.json_pointer_value !== item.expected_state || !Array.isArray(steps) || !steps.length || steps.length > 10 || !steps.some((value2) => {
+        const step = record(value2);
+        return step?.request_marker_sent === true && ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH"].includes(String(step.method));
+      }) || steps.some((value2) => {
+        const step = record(value2);
+        return !step || typeof step.status !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(step.status) || step.status < 100 || step.status > 599 || step.error !== void 0;
+      }))
+        return null;
+    }
+    if (item.tool === "access_control_cleanup") {
+      const observation = record(item.observation);
+      if (!observation || typeof observation.status !== "number" || observation.status < 200 || observation.status >= 300 || observation.truncated !== false || !digest(observation.value_digest) || observation.value_digest === proof.baseline_digest !== (proof.cleanup === "completed"))
+        return null;
+    }
+    let asset2;
+    try {
+      const url = new URL(item.observation_url);
+      if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol) || url.username || url.password)
+        return null;
+      asset2 = url.origin;
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const originalId = typeof proof.evidence_event_id === "string" && proof.evidence_event_id.length <= 512 ? proof.evidence_event_id : evidenceEventId;
+    return {
+      key: JSON.stringify([scopeId, "unauthorized-write", item.observation_url]),
+      asset: asset2,
+      status: "confirmed",
+      accessClass: "unauthorized-write",
+      headline: "Unauthorized state change confirmed",
+      summary: "A configured comparison identity changed the observed field of an operator-declared restricted disposable resource. Verification observed the new marker using the owner's request context.",
+      cleanup: proof.cleanup,
+      confidence: 1,
+      severity: "unassessed",
+      accessLevel: "Resource write",
+      prerequisites: ["Operator-declared restricted disposable resource", "Fresh private synthetic marker", "Distinct configured owner and comparison credentials"],
+      limitations: ["The proof covers only the configured resource and observed field. Cleanup checks that field only; other side effects, shell access and broader privileges are not established."],
+      verifiedAt: proof.verified_at,
+      proofId: proof.proof_id,
+      proofGeneration: proof.generation,
+      cleanupRevision: proof.cleanup_revision,
+      ...proof.cleanup_at !== void 0 ? { cleanupAt: proof.cleanup_at } : {},
+      ...originalId ? { evidenceEventId: originalId } : {},
+      ...proof.cleanup !== "required" && evidenceEventId ? { cleanupEvidenceEventId: evidenceEventId } : {}
+    };
+  }
+  if (eventType === "tool_artifact" && item?.tool === "access_control_probe") {
+    const proof = record(item.access_proof);
+    if (!proof || proof.schema !== "0.access-proof/v1" || proof.authority !== "operator-fixture" || proof.access_class !== "unauthorized-read" || !["confirmed", "blocked"].includes(String(proof.status)) || proof.owner_marker_observed !== true || proof.cleanup !== "not-required" || typeof proof.baseline_status !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(proof.baseline_status) || proof.baseline_status < 200 || proof.baseline_status >= 300 || proof.comparison_marker_observed !== (proof.status === "confirmed") || item.method !== "GET" || typeof item.url !== "string" || item.url.length > 8192 || !scopeId || scopeId.length > 512)
+      return null;
+    const baseline = record(proof.baseline_observation);
+    const observations = proof.comparison_observations;
+    const validObservation = (value2) => {
+      const observation = record(value2);
+      return observation && typeof observation.status === "number" && Number.isInteger(observation.status) && observation.truncated === false && typeof observation.marker_observed === "boolean" && typeof observation.response_digest === "string" && /^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(observation.response_digest);
+    };
+    if (!validObservation(baseline) || baseline.status !== proof.baseline_status || baseline.marker_observed !== true || !Array.isArray(observations) || !observations.length || observations.length > 16 || !observations.every(validObservation))
+      return null;
+    if (proof.status === "confirmed" ? !observations.some((value2) => {
+      const o = record(value2);
+      return Number(o.status) >= 200 && Number(o.status) < 300 && o.marker_observed === true;
+    }) : !observations.every((value2) => {
+      const o = record(value2);
+      return [401, 403].includes(Number(o.status)) && o.marker_observed === false;
+    }))
+      return null;
+    let asset2;
+    try {
+      const url = new URL(item.url);
+      if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol) || url.username || url.password)
+        return null;
+      asset2 = url.origin;
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const confirmed = proof.status === "confirmed";
+    return {
+      key: JSON.stringify([scopeId, "unauthorized-read", item.url]),
+      asset: asset2,
+      status: confirmed ? "confirmed" : "blocked",
+      accessClass: "unauthorized-read",
+      headline: confirmed ? "Unauthorized resource read confirmed" : "Unauthorized resource read blocked",
+      summary: confirmed ? "A comparison identity retrieved the private owner marker from an operator-declared restricted resource. This read-only proof required no cleanup. The result applies to the configured ownership contract." : "The configured comparison identities were denied access to the operator-declared restricted resource. This read-only test required no cleanup.",
+      cleanup: "not-required",
+      confidence: 1,
+      severity: confirmed ? "unassessed" : "info",
+      accessLevel: confirmed ? "Resource read" : "Access denied",
+      prerequisites: ["Operator-declared ownership contract"],
+      limitations: ["The result covers only the configured resource and tested identities."],
+      ...evidenceEventId && evidenceEventId.length <= 512 ? { evidenceEventId } : {}
+    };
+  }
   if (eventType !== "tool_artifact" || !item || item.tool !== "access_control_workflow" || item.workflow !== "access_control_workflow" || item.verdict !== "confirmed" || typeof item.owner_identity !== "string" || !item.owner_identity || typeof item.actor_identity !== "string" || !item.actor_identity || item.owner_identity === item.actor_identity || typeof item.expected_state !== "string" || item.expected_state.length > 500 || typeof item.observation_url !== "string" || item.observation_url.length > 8192 || !scopeId || scopeId.length > 512)
     return null;
   const before = successfulObservation(item.observation_before);
@@ -2176,13 +2280,38 @@ function accessMilestoneFromArtifact(eventType, value, scopeId, evidenceEventId)
     headline: "State change confirmed across request contexts",
     summary: "The observing context saw the declared marker after requests using different configured authentication headers. Authorization impact requires validation. Cleanup was not verified.",
     cleanup: "unknown",
+    confidence: 1,
+    severity: "info",
+    accessLevel: "Observed state transition",
+    prerequisites: ["Distinct configured authentication headers"],
+    limitations: ["Authorization impact and cleanup are unverified."],
     ...evidenceEventId && evidenceEventId.length <= 512 ? { evidenceEventId } : {}
   };
 }
 function appendAccessMilestone(current, next, limit = 80) {
-  if (current.some((item) => item.milestone.key === next.milestone.key))
-    return [...current];
-  return [...current, next].slice(-Math.max(1, Math.min(80, limit)));
+  const index = current.findIndex((item) => item.milestone.key === next.milestone.key);
+  if (index !== -1) {
+    const rank = { blocked: 0, conditional: 1, confirmed: 2 };
+    const previous = current[index].milestone;
+    const sameProof = next.milestone.proofId !== void 0 && next.milestone.proofId === previous.proofId;
+    const newerCleanup = sameProof && next.milestone.cleanup !== previous.cleanup && (next.milestone.cleanupRevision ?? -1) > (previous.cleanupRevision ?? -1);
+    const newerProof = next.milestone.proofId !== void 0 && next.milestone.proofId !== previous.proofId && (next.milestone.verifiedAt ?? -1) >= (previous.verifiedAt ?? -1) && ((next.milestone.proofGeneration ?? 0) > (previous.proofGeneration ?? 0) || (next.milestone.verifiedAt ?? -1) > (previous.verifiedAt ?? -1));
+    if (rank[next.milestone.status] <= rank[previous.status] && !newerCleanup && !newerProof)
+      return [...current];
+    const updated = [...current];
+    updated[index] = next;
+    return updated;
+  }
+  const appended = [...current, next];
+  const cap = Math.max(1, Math.min(80, Number.isFinite(limit) ? Math.floor(limit) : 80));
+  if (appended.length <= cap)
+    return appended;
+  const retained = new Set(visibleAccessMilestones(appended, cap));
+  return appended.filter((item) => retained.has(item));
+}
+function visibleAccessMilestones(items, limit = 3) {
+  const impact = (milestone) => milestone.status === "confirmed" ? milestone.accessClass === "unauthorized-write" ? 4 : 3 : milestone.status === "conditional" ? 1 : 0;
+  return items.map((item, index) => ({ item, index })).sort((a, b) => impact(b.item.milestone) - impact(a.item.milestone) || b.index - a.index).slice(0, Math.max(1, Math.min(80, Number.isFinite(limit) ? Math.floor(limit) : 3))).map((entry) => entry.item);
 }
 
 export {
@@ -2319,5 +2448,6 @@ export {
   getFindingPriority,
   compareFindingsByBusinessPriority,
   accessMilestoneFromArtifact,
-  appendAccessMilestone
+  appendAccessMilestone,
+  visibleAccessMilestones
 };