0sec-cli 0.24.1 → 0.25.0

package/chunks/{chunk-GXXX7AGH.js → chunk-S3B6HFSM.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { createRequire as __0CreateRequire } from "node:module";
 const require = __0CreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   external_exports
-} from "./chunk-VIT5ALXF.js";
+} from "./chunk-5XOYTAOK.js";
 
 // packages/shared/dist/types.js
 function validateScanPlan(plan) {
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
 function loadVersion() {
   if (true) {
-    return "0.24.1";
+    return "0.25.0";
   }
   try {
     const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ var pocStepActionSchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [
     type: external_exports.literal("http"),
     method: external_exports.string(),
     url: external_exports.string(),
-    headers: external_exports.record(external_exports.string()).optional(),
+    headers: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.string()).optional(),
     body: external_exports.string().optional()
   }),
   external_exports.object({
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ var AgentActionTargetMetadataSchema = external_exports.object({
   target_version: external_exports.string().min(1),
   policy_version: external_exports.string().min(1),
   model_version: external_exports.string().min(1),
-  tool_versions: external_exports.record(external_exports.string().min(1)),
+  tool_versions: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.string().min(1)),
   configuration_sha256: Sha256Schema
 }).strict();
 var AgentActionToolCallSchema = external_exports.object({
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ var questionSchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [
 ]);
 var normalizedAnswerSchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [
   external_exports.object({ type: external_exports.literal("boolean"), probability }),
-  external_exports.object({ type: external_exports.literal("choice"), choice: external_exports.string(), probabilities: external_exports.record(probability) })
+  external_exports.object({ type: external_exports.literal("choice"), choice: external_exports.string(), probabilities: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), probability) })
 ]);
 var usageSchema = external_exports.object({
   inputTokens: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().max(MAX_INPUT_TOKENS),
@@ -1219,14 +1219,14 @@ function createJevEvaluator(config) {
           });
           if (!response.ok)
             throw new Error(`Jev provider returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
-          const body = external_exports.object({ model: external_exports.string().min(1), answers: external_exports.record(external_exports.unknown()), usage: usageSchema }).parse(await response.json());
+          const body = external_exports.object({ model: external_exports.string().min(1), answers: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.unknown()), usage: usageSchema }).parse(await response.json());
           model = body.model;
           rawUsage = body.usage;
           rawAnswers = body.answers;
         } else {
           const [{ experimental_evaluate: evaluate }, { createGateway }] = await Promise.all([
-            import("./dist-LNXGATR2.js"),
-            import("./dist-M2X367VW.js")
+            import("./dist-WNAOCQGA.js"),
+            import("./dist-JAZWL3SC.js")
           ]);
           signal.throwIfAborted();
           const gateway = createGateway({ apiKey: config.apiKey, fetch: fetchImpl });
@@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ var SecurityWorkflowBindingsSchema = external_exports.unknown().superRefine((bin
   }
   if (new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(bindings)).byteLength > 32768)
     context.addIssue({ code: external_exports.ZodIssueCode.custom, message: "Workflow inputs must be at most 32 KiB." });
-}).pipe(external_exports.record(external_exports.unknown()));
+}).pipe(external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.unknown()));
 var inputSchema = external_exports.object({ findingId: identifier.optional(), scanId: identifier.optional(), dbPath: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).max(4096).optional(), fromStep: identifier.optional(), artifactId: identifier.optional() }).strict();
 var nodeSchema = external_exports.object({ id: identifier, type: external_exports.enum(["trigger", "audit", "report", "verify", "fix", "research", "deep-review"]), label: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).max(160), enabled: external_exports.boolean(), plan: planSchema.optional(), execution: executionSchema.optional(), input: inputSchema.optional(), inputs: SecurityWorkflowBindingsSchema.superRefine((bindings, context) => {
   const pending = [bindings];
@@ -1751,7 +1751,7 @@ function operationTemplate(id, name, description, operation, compatibleTargetTyp
 }
 var FINDING_INPUT_REQUIREMENT = { names: ["finding", "findingPath", "findingId"], required: true, description: "Supply an existing finding, a finding JSON path, or a retained finding ID. Connected earlier finding evidence can also provide the input." };
 var SECURITY_WORKFLOW_TEMPLATES = [
-  template("repository-review", "Repository security review", "Review a local repository's trust boundaries, dependency exposure, and security-sensitive code.", "repository", [
+  template("repository-review", "Whitebox pentest", "Test a source repository for exploitable code paths, trust-boundary failures, dependency exposure, and unsafe configuration.", "repository", [
     phase("dependencies", "Dependency exposure", "known-vulnerabilities", "Inspect dependency manifests and lockfiles. Prioritize reachable vulnerable dependencies and supply-chain trust boundaries; distinguish confirmed exposure from version-only matches.", "quick"),
     phase("boundaries", "Trust boundaries", "unknown-vulnerabilities", "Trace authentication, authorization, tenant isolation, and privileged entry points in the authorized repository. Follow input-to-sink paths and report only supported security findings.", "deep"),
     phase("configuration", "Configuration and secrets", "misconfigurations", "Review repository configuration, credential handling, unsafe defaults, and sensitive debug surfaces. Do not expose secret values in reports.")
@@ -1839,6 +1839,7 @@ var BACKEND_CAPABILITIES = [
   "workspaces",
   "artifacts",
   "model-connections",
+  "provider-relay",
   "process-controls",
   "operator-services",
   "learning"
@@ -1935,6 +1936,8 @@ function backendCapabilitiesForApiPath(pathname) {
   };
   if (pathname === "/api/backend/handshake")
     return [];
+  if (pathname === "/api/console/provider-relays" || pathname.startsWith("/api/console/provider-relays/"))
+    return ["provider-relay"];
   if (pathname === "/api/workflow-engine/call")
     return ["workflow-engine"];
   if (parts[0] === "control" && parts.length === 2 && ["recover-stale-workers", "prune-stopped-workers", "reset-database", "start-daemon", "stop-daemon", "launch-run"].includes(parts[1]))
@@ -2148,6 +2151,107 @@ var successfulObservation = (value) => {
 };
 function accessMilestoneFromArtifact(eventType, value, scopeId, evidenceEventId) {
   const item = record(value);
+  if (eventType === "tool_artifact" && item && ["access_control_workflow", "access_control_cleanup"].includes(String(item.tool)) && item.state_access_proof !== void 0) {
+    const proof = record(item.state_access_proof);
+    const digest = (value2) => typeof value2 === "string" && /^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(value2);
+    const timestamp = (value2) => typeof value2 === "number" && Number.isFinite(value2) && value2 >= 0 && value2 <= 864e13;
+    if (!proof || proof.schema !== "0.state-access-proof/v1" || proof.authority !== "operator-fixture" || proof.access_class !== "unauthorized-write" || proof.status !== "confirmed" || proof.challenge_bound !== true || typeof proof.proof_id !== "string" || !/^[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{12}$/.test(proof.proof_id) || !digest(proof.fixture_digest) || !digest(proof.baseline_digest) || !digest(proof.observed_digest) || !timestamp(proof.verified_at) || !Number.isSafeInteger(proof.generation) || Number(proof.generation) < 1 || !Number.isSafeInteger(proof.cleanup_revision) || Number(proof.cleanup_revision) < 0 || !["required", "completed", "failed"].includes(String(proof.cleanup)) || proof.cleanup !== "required" && !timestamp(proof.cleanup_at) || typeof item.observation_url !== "string" || item.observation_url.length > 8192 || !scopeId || scopeId.length > 512)
+      return null;
+    if (item.tool === "access_control_workflow") {
+      const before2 = successfulObservation(item.observation_before), after2 = successfulObservation(item.observation_after);
+      const steps = item.steps;
+      if (item.verdict !== "confirmed" || !before2 || !after2 || before2.redacted !== false || after2.redacted !== false || before2.value_truncated === true || after2.value_truncated === true || before2.json_pointer_value === after2.json_pointer_value || after2.json_pointer_value !== item.expected_state || !Array.isArray(steps) || !steps.length || steps.length > 10 || !steps.some((value2) => {
+        const step = record(value2);
+        return step?.request_marker_sent === true && ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH"].includes(String(step.method));
+      }) || steps.some((value2) => {
+        const step = record(value2);
+        return !step || typeof step.status !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(step.status) || step.status < 100 || step.status > 599 || step.error !== void 0;
+      }))
+        return null;
+    }
+    if (item.tool === "access_control_cleanup") {
+      const observation = record(item.observation);
+      if (!observation || typeof observation.status !== "number" || observation.status < 200 || observation.status >= 300 || observation.truncated !== false || !digest(observation.value_digest) || observation.value_digest === proof.baseline_digest !== (proof.cleanup === "completed"))
+        return null;
+    }
+    let asset2;
+    try {
+      const url = new URL(item.observation_url);
+      if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol) || url.username || url.password)
+        return null;
+      asset2 = url.origin;
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const originalId = typeof proof.evidence_event_id === "string" && proof.evidence_event_id.length <= 512 ? proof.evidence_event_id : evidenceEventId;
+    return {
+      key: JSON.stringify([scopeId, "unauthorized-write", item.observation_url]),
+      asset: asset2,
+      status: "confirmed",
+      accessClass: "unauthorized-write",
+      headline: "Unauthorized state change confirmed",
+      summary: "A configured comparison identity changed the observed field of an operator-declared restricted disposable resource. Verification observed the new marker using the owner's request context.",
+      cleanup: proof.cleanup,
+      confidence: 1,
+      severity: "unassessed",
+      accessLevel: "Resource write",
+      prerequisites: ["Operator-declared restricted disposable resource", "Fresh private synthetic marker", "Distinct configured owner and comparison credentials"],
+      limitations: ["The proof covers only the configured resource and observed field. Cleanup checks that field only; other side effects, shell access and broader privileges are not established."],
+      verifiedAt: proof.verified_at,
+      proofId: proof.proof_id,
+      proofGeneration: proof.generation,
+      cleanupRevision: proof.cleanup_revision,
+      ...proof.cleanup_at !== void 0 ? { cleanupAt: proof.cleanup_at } : {},
+      ...originalId ? { evidenceEventId: originalId } : {},
+      ...proof.cleanup !== "required" && evidenceEventId ? { cleanupEvidenceEventId: evidenceEventId } : {}
+    };
+  }
+  if (eventType === "tool_artifact" && item?.tool === "access_control_probe") {
+    const proof = record(item.access_proof);
+    if (!proof || proof.schema !== "0.access-proof/v1" || proof.authority !== "operator-fixture" || proof.access_class !== "unauthorized-read" || !["confirmed", "blocked"].includes(String(proof.status)) || proof.owner_marker_observed !== true || proof.cleanup !== "not-required" || typeof proof.baseline_status !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(proof.baseline_status) || proof.baseline_status < 200 || proof.baseline_status >= 300 || proof.comparison_marker_observed !== (proof.status === "confirmed") || item.method !== "GET" || typeof item.url !== "string" || item.url.length > 8192 || !scopeId || scopeId.length > 512)
+      return null;
+    const baseline = record(proof.baseline_observation);
+    const observations = proof.comparison_observations;
+    const validObservation = (value2) => {
+      const observation = record(value2);
+      return observation && typeof observation.status === "number" && Number.isInteger(observation.status) && observation.truncated === false && typeof observation.marker_observed === "boolean" && typeof observation.response_digest === "string" && /^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(observation.response_digest);
+    };
+    if (!validObservation(baseline) || baseline.status !== proof.baseline_status || baseline.marker_observed !== true || !Array.isArray(observations) || !observations.length || observations.length > 16 || !observations.every(validObservation))
+      return null;
+    if (proof.status === "confirmed" ? !observations.some((value2) => {
+      const o = record(value2);
+      return Number(o.status) >= 200 && Number(o.status) < 300 && o.marker_observed === true;
+    }) : !observations.every((value2) => {
+      const o = record(value2);
+      return [401, 403].includes(Number(o.status)) && o.marker_observed === false;
+    }))
+      return null;
+    let asset2;
+    try {
+      const url = new URL(item.url);
+      if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol) || url.username || url.password)
+        return null;
+      asset2 = url.origin;
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const confirmed = proof.status === "confirmed";
+    return {
+      key: JSON.stringify([scopeId, "unauthorized-read", item.url]),
+      asset: asset2,
+      status: confirmed ? "confirmed" : "blocked",
+      accessClass: "unauthorized-read",
+      headline: confirmed ? "Unauthorized resource read confirmed" : "Unauthorized resource read blocked",
+      summary: confirmed ? "A comparison identity retrieved the private owner marker from an operator-declared restricted resource. This read-only proof required no cleanup. The result applies to the configured ownership contract." : "The configured comparison identities were denied access to the operator-declared restricted resource. This read-only test required no cleanup.",
+      cleanup: "not-required",
+      confidence: 1,
+      severity: confirmed ? "unassessed" : "info",
+      accessLevel: confirmed ? "Resource read" : "Access denied",
+      prerequisites: ["Operator-declared ownership contract"],
+      limitations: ["The result covers only the configured resource and tested identities."],
+      ...evidenceEventId && evidenceEventId.length <= 512 ? { evidenceEventId } : {}
+    };
+  }
   if (eventType !== "tool_artifact" || !item || item.tool !== "access_control_workflow" || item.workflow !== "access_control_workflow" || item.verdict !== "confirmed" || typeof item.owner_identity !== "string" || !item.owner_identity || typeof item.actor_identity !== "string" || !item.actor_identity || item.owner_identity === item.actor_identity || typeof item.expected_state !== "string" || item.expected_state.length > 500 || typeof item.observation_url !== "string" || item.observation_url.length > 8192 || !scopeId || scopeId.length > 512)
     return null;
   const before = successfulObservation(item.observation_before);
@@ -2176,13 +2280,38 @@ function accessMilestoneFromArtifact(eventType, value, scopeId, evidenceEventId)
     headline: "State change confirmed across request contexts",
     summary: "The observing context saw the declared marker after requests using different configured authentication headers. Authorization impact requires validation. Cleanup was not verified.",
     cleanup: "unknown",
+    confidence: 1,
+    severity: "info",
+    accessLevel: "Observed state transition",
+    prerequisites: ["Distinct configured authentication headers"],
+    limitations: ["Authorization impact and cleanup are unverified."],
     ...evidenceEventId && evidenceEventId.length <= 512 ? { evidenceEventId } : {}
   };
 }
 function appendAccessMilestone(current, next, limit = 80) {
-  if (current.some((item) => item.milestone.key === next.milestone.key))
-    return [...current];
-  return [...current, next].slice(-Math.max(1, Math.min(80, limit)));
+  const index = current.findIndex((item) => item.milestone.key === next.milestone.key);
+  if (index !== -1) {
+    const rank = { blocked: 0, conditional: 1, confirmed: 2 };
+    const previous = current[index].milestone;
+    const sameProof = next.milestone.proofId !== void 0 && next.milestone.proofId === previous.proofId;
+    const newerCleanup = sameProof && next.milestone.cleanup !== previous.cleanup && (next.milestone.cleanupRevision ?? -1) > (previous.cleanupRevision ?? -1);
+    const newerProof = next.milestone.proofId !== void 0 && next.milestone.proofId !== previous.proofId && (next.milestone.verifiedAt ?? -1) >= (previous.verifiedAt ?? -1) && ((next.milestone.proofGeneration ?? 0) > (previous.proofGeneration ?? 0) || (next.milestone.verifiedAt ?? -1) > (previous.verifiedAt ?? -1));
+    if (rank[next.milestone.status] <= rank[previous.status] && !newerCleanup && !newerProof)
+      return [...current];
+    const updated = [...current];
+    updated[index] = next;
+    return updated;
+  }
+  const appended = [...current, next];
+  const cap = Math.max(1, Math.min(80, Number.isFinite(limit) ? Math.floor(limit) : 80));
+  if (appended.length <= cap)
+    return appended;
+  const retained = new Set(visibleAccessMilestones(appended, cap));
+  return appended.filter((item) => retained.has(item));
+}
+function visibleAccessMilestones(items, limit = 3) {
+  const impact = (milestone) => milestone.status === "confirmed" ? milestone.accessClass === "unauthorized-write" ? 4 : 3 : milestone.status === "conditional" ? 1 : 0;
+  return items.map((item, index) => ({ item, index })).sort((a, b) => impact(b.item.milestone) - impact(a.item.milestone) || b.index - a.index).slice(0, Math.max(1, Math.min(80, Number.isFinite(limit) ? Math.floor(limit) : 3))).map((entry) => entry.item);
 }
 
 export {
@@ -2319,5 +2448,6 @@ export {
   getFindingPriority,
   compareFindingsByBusinessPriority,
   accessMilestoneFromArtifact,
-  appendAccessMilestone
+  appendAccessMilestone,
+  visibleAccessMilestones
 };

package/chunks/{chunk-WUPN3D37.js → chunk-S4DFH2FJ.js}

@@ -3017,8 +3017,33 @@ var {
   Help
 } = import_index.default;
 
+// packages/cli/src/presentation/event-bus.ts
+var PresentationEventBus = class {
+  listeners = [];
+  subscribe(listener) {
+    this.listeners.push(listener);
+    return () => {
+      const index = this.listeners.indexOf(listener);
+      if (index >= 0) this.listeners.splice(index, 1);
+    };
+  }
+  emit(event) {
+    for (const listener of [...this.listeners]) {
+      try {
+        listener.emit(event);
+      } catch {
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  get size() {
+    return this.listeners.length;
+  }
+};
+var presentationEventBus = new PresentationEventBus();
+
 export {
   InvalidArgumentError,
   Command,
-  Option
+  Option,
+  presentationEventBus
 };

package/chunks/{chunk-Q7JKIKKF.js → chunk-SEWZ76MN.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { createRequire as __0CreateRequire } from "node:module";
 const require = __0CreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   resolveOsecDbPath
-} from "./chunk-BMDG6T7D.js";
+} from "./chunk-YXTV2FRE.js";
 import {
   BACKEND_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
   BackendDescriptorSchema,
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ import {
   backendCapabilitiesForApiPath,
   homeStateDir,
   parseBackendHandshake
-} from "./chunk-GXXX7AGH.js";
+} from "./chunk-S3B6HFSM.js";
 import {
   external_exports
-} from "./chunk-VIT5ALXF.js";
+} from "./chunk-5XOYTAOK.js";
 
 // packages/cli/src/worker-deploy.ts
 import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
@@ -30,12 +30,8 @@ var REMOTE_DEPS = {
   "node-sqlite3-wasm": "^0.8.55",
   "pdfkit": "^0.15.2",
   "playwright": "1.60.0",
-  "react": "^19.2.4",
-  "react-dom": "^19.2.4",
   "tree-sitter": `file:${REMOTE_DIR}/vendor/tree-sitter-0.21.1-node24.tgz`,
-  "tree-sitter-c": "0.21.4",
-  "@opentui/core": "0.5.4",
-  "@opentui/react": "0.5.4"
+  "tree-sitter-c": "0.21.4"
 };
 var SSH_HOST_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9._@-]+$/;
 var LIMA_NAME_PATTERN = /^[\w.-]+$/;
@@ -64,10 +60,10 @@ function createRunner(options) {
     const configArgs = options.sshConfig ? ["-F", options.sshConfig] : [];
     return {
       label: host,
-      shell: (command, timeout = 3e5) => execFileSync("ssh", ["-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=15", ...configArgs, "--", host, "bash", "-s"], { input: command, encoding: "utf8", timeout }),
+      shell: (command, timeout = 3e5) => execFileSync("ssh", ["-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=15", ...configArgs, "--", host, "bash", "-s"], { input: command, encoding: "utf8", timeout }),
       copy: (local, remote) => execFileSync("scp", ["-q", "-o", "BatchMode=yes", ...configArgs, "--", local, `${host}:${remote}`], { stdio: "inherit", timeout: 6e5 }),
       tunnel: (port) => {
-        const child = spawn("ssh", ["-o", "BatchMode=yes", ...configArgs, "-N", "-L", `${port}:127.0.0.1:${port}`, "--", host], { stdio: "ignore", detached: true });
+        const child = spawn("ssh", ["-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=yes", "-o", "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes", ...configArgs, "-N", "-L", `${port}:127.0.0.1:${port}`, "--", host], { stdio: "ignore", detached: true });
         child.unref();
         return child.pid;
       }
@@ -168,7 +164,12 @@ async function deployWorker(options, runner = createRunner(options)) {
     writeFileSync(backendsConfig, JSON.stringify(registry, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 384 });
     writeFileSync(join(stateDir, `${backendId}.env`), `${tokenEnv}=${token}
 `, { mode: 384 });
-    writeFileSync(join(stateDir, `${backendId}.json`), JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, backendId, ssh: options.ssh, lima: options.ssh ? void 0 : options.lima ?? "zero-worker", sshConfig: options.sshConfig, port, tunnelPid, remoteDir: REMOTE_DIR }, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 384 });
+    let previousMetadata = {};
+    try {
+      previousMetadata = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(stateDir, `${backendId}.json`), "utf8"));
+    } catch {
+    }
+    writeFileSync(join(stateDir, `${backendId}.json`), JSON.stringify({ ...previousMetadata, schemaVersion: 1, backendId, autoReconnect: true, ssh: options.ssh, lima: options.ssh ? void 0 : options.lima ?? "zero-worker", sshConfig: options.sshConfig, port, tunnelPid, remoteDir: REMOTE_DIR }, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 384 });
     process.env[tokenEnv] = token;
     return { backendId, engine: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`, target: targetPath, backendsConfig, tokenEnv };
   } finally {
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ function loadManagedWorker(backendId) {
   } catch {
     throw new Error("This connection has no managed deployment metadata. Stop its engine directly on the host.");
   }
-  if (worker.schemaVersion !== 1 || worker.backendId !== backendId || worker.remoteDir !== REMOTE_DIR || !!worker.ssh === !!worker.lima) throw new Error("Invalid managed deployment metadata.");
+  if (worker.schemaVersion !== 1 || worker.backendId !== backendId || worker.remoteDir !== REMOTE_DIR || !!worker.ssh === !!worker.lima || worker.autoReconnect !== void 0 && typeof worker.autoReconnect !== "boolean") throw new Error("Invalid managed deployment metadata.");
   validateWorkerOptions({ ...worker, enginePort: worker.port });
   return worker;
 }
@@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ function stopManagedTunnel(worker) {
 }
 async function stopWorker(backendId, suppliedRunner) {
   const worker = loadManagedWorker(backendId);
+  writeFileSync(join(homeStateDir(), "workers", `${backendId}.json`), JSON.stringify({ ...worker, autoReconnect: false }, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 384 });
   const runner = suppliedRunner ?? createRunner(worker);
   runner.shell(`set -eu
 if test ! -f ${REMOTE_DIR}/engine.pid; then echo 'Managed engine PID is unavailable; engine was not stopped.' >&2; exit 1; fi
@@ -216,6 +218,64 @@ fi
 rm -f ${REMOTE_DIR}/engine.pid`, 3e4);
   return { stopped: true, tunnelStopped: stopManagedTunnel(worker), remoteFilesRemoved: false };
 }
+async function repairWorker(backendId, suppliedRunner, probe = (port) => {
+  try {
+    execFileSync("curl", ["-sf", "--connect-timeout", "2", "--max-time", "3", `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`], { stdio: "ignore" });
+    return true;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}) {
+  const worker = loadManagedWorker(backendId);
+  const credential = readFileSync(join(homeStateDir(), "workers", `${backendId}.env`), "utf8").trim();
+  const match = /^(ZERO_WORKER_[A-F0-9]+_TOKEN)=([a-f0-9]{64})$/.exec(credential);
+  if (!match) throw new Error("Managed worker credential is unavailable. Deploy this host again.");
+  writeFileSync(join(homeStateDir(), "workers", `${backendId}.json`), JSON.stringify({ ...worker, autoReconnect: true }, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 384 });
+  const runner = suppliedRunner ?? createRunner(worker);
+  const result = runner.shell(`set -eu
+cd ${REMOTE_DIR}
+test -f dist/0.js && test -d work || { echo 'Managed engine files are missing. Deploy this host again.' >&2; exit 1; }
+command -v node >/dev/null || { echo 'Node is unavailable on this host.' >&2; exit 1; }
+running=0
+if test -f engine.pid; then
+  pid=$(cat engine.pid)
+  case "$pid" in ''|*[!0-9]*) echo 'Invalid managed engine PID.' >&2; exit 1;; esac
+  if test "$pid" -gt 1 && kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; then
+    test "$(readlink /proc/$pid/cwd)" = "${REMOTE_DIR}" || { echo 'Managed engine PID belongs to another process.' >&2; exit 1; }
+    command=$(tr '\\000' ' ' < /proc/$pid/cmdline)
+    case "$command" in 'node dist/0.js dashboard '*|'node /tmp/zero-engine/dist/0.js dashboard '*) running=1;; *) echo 'Managed engine PID does not match Zero.' >&2; exit 1;; esac
+  fi
+fi
+if test "$running" = 0; then
+  if ss -ltn 2>/dev/null | grep -q ':${worker.port} '; then echo 'Engine port is occupied. No process was replaced.' >&2; exit 1; fi
+  ZERO_WORKER_TOKEN=${match[2]} setsid nohup node dist/0.js dashboard --host 127.0.0.1 --port ${worker.port} --no-open --ready-json --engine-token-env ZERO_WORKER_TOKEN --engine-workspace ${REMOTE_DIR}/work > engine.log 2>&1 < /dev/null &
+  echo $! > engine.pid
+  echo ENGINE_STARTED
+fi
+for i in $(seq 1 20); do
+  if curl -sf --max-time 1 http://127.0.0.1:${worker.port}/ >/dev/null; then echo ENGINE_READY; exit 0; fi
+  sleep 1
+done
+echo 'Managed engine did not become ready.' >&2; exit 1`, 3e4);
+  if (!result.includes("ENGINE_READY")) throw new Error("Managed engine did not become ready.");
+  process.env[match[1]] = match[2];
+  if (!probe(worker.port)) {
+    stopManagedTunnel(worker);
+    const tunnelPid = runner.tunnel(worker.port);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(tunnelPid) || tunnelPid <= 1) throw new Error("Could not start the SSH tunnel.");
+    writeFileSync(join(homeStateDir(), "workers", `${backendId}.json`), JSON.stringify({ ...loadManagedWorker(backendId), tunnelPid }, null, 2) + "\n", { mode: 384 });
+    let ready = false;
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 12; attempt++) {
+      if (probe(worker.port)) {
+        ready = true;
+        break;
+      }
+      await new Promise((resolve2) => setTimeout(resolve2, 250));
+    }
+    if (!ready) throw new Error("Remote engine is ready, but its SSH tunnel could not reconnect.");
+  }
+  return { backendId, reconnected: true, engineStarted: result.includes("ENGINE_STARTED") };
+}
 
 // packages/cli/src/web/backend-connections.ts
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
@@ -642,7 +702,7 @@ function json(res, status, value) {
   res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Cache-Control": "no-store" });
   res.end(JSON.stringify(value));
 }
-async function handleBackendConnectionRequest(req, res, url, registry) {
+async function handleBackendConnectionRequest(req, res, url, registry, onSessionClosed) {
   if (url.pathname === "/api/backends") {
     if (req.method !== "GET") throw new BackendConnectionError("Backend registry is read-only.", 405);
     registry.reload();
@@ -670,6 +730,7 @@ async function handleBackendConnectionRequest(req, res, url, registry) {
     return { handled: true };
   }
   const path = apiPath(`${url.pathname.slice(url.pathname.indexOf("/proxy/") + "/proxy".length)}${url.search}`);
+  if (new URL(path, "http://backend.invalid").pathname.startsWith("/api/console/provider-relays")) throw new BackendConnectionError("Provider relay grants are managed by the local engine.", 403);
   if (id === "local") return { handled: false, localPath: path };
   const abort = new AbortController();
   const disconnect = () => abort.abort();
@@ -679,6 +740,8 @@ async function handleBackendConnectionRequest(req, res, url, registry) {
     const body = ["GET", "HEAD"].includes(req.method ?? "GET") ? void 0 : await requestJson(req);
     const stream = req.headers.accept?.includes("text/event-stream") === true;
     const response = await registry.request(id, path, { method: req.method, body, stream, signal: abort.signal, lastEventId: typeof req.headers["last-event-id"] === "string" ? req.headers["last-event-id"] : void 0, requestId: typeof req.headers["x-0-request-id"] === "string" ? req.headers["x-0-request-id"] : void 0 });
+    const closedSession = /^\/api\/console\/sessions\/([^/]+)(\/delete)?$/.exec(new URL(path, "http://backend.invalid").pathname);
+    if (response.ok && closedSession && (req.method === "DELETE" && !closedSession[2] || req.method === "POST" && closedSession[2])) await onSessionClosed?.(id, decodeURIComponent(closedSession[1]));
     if (res.destroyed) return { handled: true };
     res.writeHead(response.status, { "Content-Type": response.headers.get("content-type") ?? "application/json", ...attachmentHeaders(response.headers), "Cache-Control": "no-store", "X-0-Request-ID": response.headers.get("x-0-request-id") ?? randomUUID(), ...response.headers.get("x-0-engine-id") ? { "X-0-Engine-ID": response.headers.get("x-0-engine-id") } : {}, "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff", ...stream ? { "X-Accel-Buffering": "no" } : {} });
     if (!response.body) {
@@ -727,6 +790,7 @@ export {
   deployWorker,
   loadManagedWorker,
   stopWorker,
+  repairWorker,
   BackendConnectionError,
   loadBackendConnectionConfig,
   createBackendHandshake,

package/chunks/{chunk-6XMFCVJS.js → chunk-TFKY6D7O.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { createRequire as __0CreateRequire } from "node:module";
 const require = __0CreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   LlmApiRuntime
-} from "./chunk-IJ6UPW3H.js";
+} from "./chunk-EIONVEFN.js";
 
 // packages/core/dist/stages/variant-candidates.js
 import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";