zig_example 0.2.0 → 0.3.1

data/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1074 @@
+/*
+ * 'OpenSSL for Ruby' project
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2002  Michal Rokos <m.rokos@sh.cvut.cz>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ */
+/*
+ * This program is licensed under the same licence as Ruby.
+ * (See the file 'LICENCE'.)
+ */
+#include "ossl.h"
+
+#define NewCipher(klass) \
+    TypedData_Wrap_Struct((klass), &ossl_cipher_type, 0)
+#define AllocCipher(obj, ctx) do { \
+    (ctx) = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); \
+    if (!(ctx)) \
+	ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, NULL); \
+    RTYPEDDATA_DATA(obj) = (ctx); \
+} while (0)
+#define GetCipherInit(obj, ctx) do { \
+    TypedData_Get_Struct((obj), EVP_CIPHER_CTX, &ossl_cipher_type, (ctx)); \
+} while (0)
+#define GetCipher(obj, ctx) do { \
+    GetCipherInit((obj), (ctx)); \
+    if (!(ctx)) { \
+	ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "Cipher not initialized!"); \
+    } \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Classes
+ */
+VALUE cCipher;
+VALUE eCipherError;
+static ID id_auth_tag_len, id_key_set;
+
+static VALUE ossl_cipher_alloc(VALUE klass);
+static void ossl_cipher_free(void *ptr);
+
+static const rb_data_type_t ossl_cipher_type = {
+    "OpenSSL/Cipher",
+    {
+	0, ossl_cipher_free,
+    },
+    0, 0, RUBY_TYPED_FREE_IMMEDIATELY,
+};
+
+/*
+ * PUBLIC
+ */
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+ossl_evp_get_cipherbyname(VALUE obj)
+{
+    if (rb_obj_is_kind_of(obj, cCipher)) {
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+	GetCipher(obj, ctx);
+
+	return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
+    }
+    else {
+	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+	StringValueCStr(obj);
+	cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(RSTRING_PTR(obj));
+	if (!cipher)
+	    ossl_raise(rb_eArgError,
+		       "unsupported cipher algorithm: %"PRIsVALUE, obj);
+
+	return cipher;
+    }
+}
+
+VALUE
+ossl_cipher_new(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    VALUE ret;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    ret = ossl_cipher_alloc(cCipher);
+    AllocCipher(ret, ctx);
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PRIVATE
+ */
+static void
+ossl_cipher_free(void *ptr)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ptr);
+}
+
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_alloc(VALUE klass)
+{
+    return NewCipher(klass);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     Cipher.new(string) -> cipher
+ *
+ *  The string must contain a valid cipher name like "aes-256-cbc".
+ *
+ *  A list of cipher names is available by calling OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_initialize(VALUE self, VALUE str)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+    char *name;
+
+    name = StringValueCStr(str);
+    GetCipherInit(self, ctx);
+    if (ctx) {
+	ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "Cipher already initialized!");
+    }
+    AllocCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (!(cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name))) {
+	ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "unsupported cipher algorithm (%"PRIsVALUE")", str);
+    }
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    return self;
+}
+
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_copy(VALUE self, VALUE other)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx1, *ctx2;
+
+    rb_check_frozen(self);
+    if (self == other) return self;
+
+    GetCipherInit(self, ctx1);
+    if (!ctx1) {
+	AllocCipher(self, ctx1);
+    }
+    GetCipher(other, ctx2);
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(ctx1, ctx2) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    return self;
+}
+
+static void
+add_cipher_name_to_ary(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *arg)
+{
+    VALUE ary = (VALUE)arg;
+    rb_ary_push(ary, rb_str_new2(name->name));
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers -> array[string...]
+ *
+ *  Returns the names of all available ciphers in an array.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_s_ciphers(VALUE self)
+{
+    VALUE ary;
+
+    ary = rb_ary_new();
+    OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
+                    add_cipher_name_to_ary,
+                    (void*)ary);
+
+    return ary;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.reset -> self
+ *
+ *  Fully resets the internal state of the Cipher. By using this, the same
+ *  Cipher instance may be used several times for encryption or decryption tasks.
+ *
+ *  Internally calls EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1).
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_reset(VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    return self;
+}
+
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_init(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self, int mode)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], *p_key = NULL;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *p_iv = NULL;
+    VALUE pass, init_v;
+
+    if(rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "02", &pass, &init_v) > 0){
+	/*
+	 * oops. this code mistakes salt for IV.
+	 * We deprecated the arguments for this method, but we decided
+	 * keeping this behaviour for backward compatibility.
+	 */
+	VALUE cname  = rb_class_path(rb_obj_class(self));
+	rb_warn("arguments for %"PRIsVALUE"#encrypt and %"PRIsVALUE"#decrypt were deprecated; "
+                "use %"PRIsVALUE"#pkcs5_keyivgen to derive key and IV",
+                cname, cname, cname);
+	StringValue(pass);
+	GetCipher(self, ctx);
+	if (NIL_P(init_v)) memcpy(iv, "OpenSSL for Ruby rulez!", sizeof(iv));
+	else{
+	    StringValue(init_v);
+	    if (EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH > RSTRING_LEN(init_v)) {
+		memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+		memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), RSTRING_LEN(init_v));
+	    }
+	    else memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), sizeof(iv));
+	}
+	EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), EVP_md5(), iv,
+		       (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(pass), RSTRING_LENINT(pass), 1, key, NULL);
+	p_key = key;
+	p_iv = iv;
+    }
+    else {
+	GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    }
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, p_key, p_iv, mode) != 1) {
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+    }
+
+    rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, p_key ? Qtrue : Qfalse);
+
+    return self;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.encrypt -> self
+ *
+ *  Initializes the Cipher for encryption.
+ *
+ *  Make sure to call Cipher#encrypt or Cipher#decrypt before using any of the
+ *  following methods:
+ *  * [#key=, #iv=, #random_key, #random_iv, #pkcs5_keyivgen]
+ *
+ *  Internally calls EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1).
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_encrypt(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+{
+    return ossl_cipher_init(argc, argv, self, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.decrypt -> self
+ *
+ *  Initializes the Cipher for decryption.
+ *
+ *  Make sure to call Cipher#encrypt or Cipher#decrypt before using any of the
+ *  following methods:
+ *  * [#key=, #iv=, #random_key, #random_iv, #pkcs5_keyivgen]
+ *
+ *  Internally calls EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0).
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_decrypt(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+{
+    return ossl_cipher_init(argc, argv, self, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.pkcs5_keyivgen(pass, salt = nil, iterations = 2048, digest = "MD5") -> nil
+ *
+ *  Generates and sets the key/IV based on a password.
+ *
+ *  *WARNING*: This method is only PKCS5 v1.5 compliant when using RC2, RC4-40,
+ *  or DES with MD5 or SHA1. Using anything else (like AES) will generate the
+ *  key/iv using an OpenSSL specific method. This method is deprecated and
+ *  should no longer be used. Use a PKCS5 v2 key generation method from
+ *  OpenSSL::PKCS5 instead.
+ *
+ *  === Parameters
+ *  * _salt_ must be an 8 byte string if provided.
+ *  * _iterations_ is an integer with a default of 2048.
+ *  * _digest_ is a Digest object that defaults to 'MD5'
+ *
+ *  A minimum of 1000 iterations is recommended.
+ *
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_pkcs5_keyivgen(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    const EVP_MD *digest;
+    VALUE vpass, vsalt, viter, vdigest;
+    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *salt = NULL;
+    int iter;
+
+    rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "13", &vpass, &vsalt, &viter, &vdigest);
+    StringValue(vpass);
+    if(!NIL_P(vsalt)){
+	StringValue(vsalt);
+	if(RSTRING_LEN(vsalt) != PKCS5_SALT_LEN)
+	    ossl_raise(eCipherError, "salt must be an 8-octet string");
+	salt = (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(vsalt);
+    }
+    iter = NIL_P(viter) ? 2048 : NUM2INT(viter);
+    if (iter <= 0)
+	rb_raise(rb_eArgError, "iterations must be a positive integer");
+    digest = NIL_P(vdigest) ? EVP_md5() : ossl_evp_get_digestbyname(vdigest);
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), digest, salt,
+		   (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(vpass), RSTRING_LENINT(vpass), iter, key, iv);
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, -1) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof key);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof iv);
+
+    rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
+
+    return Qnil;
+}
+
+static int
+ossl_cipher_update_long(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, long *out_len_ptr,
+			const unsigned char *in, long in_len)
+{
+    int out_part_len;
+    int limit = INT_MAX / 2 + 1;
+    long out_len = 0;
+
+    do {
+	int in_part_len = in_len > limit ? limit : (int)in_len;
+
+	if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, out ? (out + out_len) : 0,
+			      &out_part_len, in, in_part_len))
+	    return 0;
+
+	out_len += out_part_len;
+	in += in_part_len;
+    } while ((in_len -= limit) > 0);
+
+    if (out_len_ptr)
+	*out_len_ptr = out_len;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.update(data [, buffer]) -> string or buffer
+ *
+ *  Encrypts data in a streaming fashion. Hand consecutive blocks of data
+ *  to the #update method in order to encrypt it. Returns the encrypted
+ *  data chunk. When done, the output of Cipher#final should be additionally
+ *  added to the result.
+ *
+ *  If _buffer_ is given, the encryption/decryption result will be written to
+ *  it. _buffer_ will be resized automatically.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_update(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char *in;
+    long in_len, out_len;
+    VALUE data, str;
+
+    rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "11", &data, &str);
+
+    if (!RTEST(rb_attr_get(self, id_key_set)))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "key not set");
+
+    StringValue(data);
+    in = (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(data);
+    in_len = RSTRING_LEN(data);
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    out_len = in_len+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+    if (out_len <= 0) {
+	ossl_raise(rb_eRangeError,
+		   "data too big to make output buffer: %ld bytes", in_len);
+    }
+
+    if (NIL_P(str)) {
+        str = rb_str_new(0, out_len);
+    } else {
+        StringValue(str);
+        rb_str_resize(str, out_len);
+    }
+
+    if (!ossl_cipher_update_long(ctx, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str), &out_len, in, in_len))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+    assert(out_len < RSTRING_LEN(str));
+    rb_str_set_len(str, out_len);
+
+    return str;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.final -> string
+ *
+ *  Returns the remaining data held in the cipher object. Further calls to
+ *  Cipher#update or Cipher#final will return garbage. This call should always
+ *  be made as the last call of an encryption or decryption operation, after
+ *  having fed the entire plaintext or ciphertext to the Cipher instance.
+ *
+ *  If an authenticated cipher was used, a CipherError is raised if the tag
+ *  could not be authenticated successfully. Only call this method after
+ *  setting the authentication tag and passing the entire contents of the
+ *  ciphertext into the cipher.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_final(VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int out_len;
+    VALUE str;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    str = rb_str_new(0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
+    if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str), &out_len))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+    assert(out_len <= RSTRING_LEN(str));
+    rb_str_set_len(str, out_len);
+
+    return str;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.name -> string
+ *
+ *  Returns the name of the cipher which may differ slightly from the original
+ *  name provided.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_name(VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+    return rb_str_new2(EVP_CIPHER_name(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)));
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.key = string -> string
+ *
+ *  Sets the cipher key. To generate a key, you should either use a secure
+ *  random byte string or, if the key is to be derived from a password, you
+ *  should rely on PBKDF2 functionality provided by OpenSSL::PKCS5. To
+ *  generate a secure random-based key, Cipher#random_key may be used.
+ *
+ *  Only call this method after calling Cipher#encrypt or Cipher#decrypt.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_key(VALUE self, VALUE key)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int key_len;
+
+    StringValue(key);
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+    key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+    if (RSTRING_LEN(key) != key_len)
+	ossl_raise(rb_eArgError, "key must be %d bytes", key_len);
+
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(key), NULL, -1) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
+
+    return key;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.iv = string -> string
+ *
+ *  Sets the cipher IV. Please note that since you should never be using ECB
+ *  mode, an IV is always explicitly required and should be set prior to
+ *  encryption. The IV itself can be safely transmitted in public, but it
+ *  should be unpredictable to prevent certain kinds of attacks. You may use
+ *  Cipher#random_iv to create a secure random IV.
+ *
+ *  Only call this method after calling Cipher#encrypt or Cipher#decrypt.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_iv(VALUE self, VALUE iv)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int iv_len = 0;
+
+    StringValue(iv);
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+	iv_len = (int)(VALUE)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+    if (!iv_len)
+	iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+    if (RSTRING_LEN(iv) != iv_len)
+	ossl_raise(rb_eArgError, "iv must be %d bytes", iv_len);
+
+    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(iv), -1) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    return iv;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.authenticated? -> true | false
+ *
+ *  Indicated whether this Cipher instance uses an Authenticated Encryption
+ *  mode.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_is_authenticated(VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+    return (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) ? Qtrue : Qfalse;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.auth_data = string -> string
+ *
+ *  Sets the cipher's additional authenticated data. This field must be
+ *  set when using AEAD cipher modes such as GCM or CCM. If no associated
+ *  data shall be used, this method must *still* be called with a value of "".
+ *  The contents of this field should be non-sensitive data which will be
+ *  added to the ciphertext to generate the authentication tag which validates
+ *  the contents of the ciphertext.
+ *
+ *  The AAD must be set prior to encryption or decryption. In encryption mode,
+ *  it must be set after calling Cipher#encrypt and setting Cipher#key= and
+ *  Cipher#iv=. When decrypting, the authenticated data must be set after key,
+ *  iv and especially *after* the authentication tag has been set. I.e. set it
+ *  only after calling Cipher#decrypt, Cipher#key=, Cipher#iv= and
+ *  Cipher#auth_tag= first.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_auth_data(VALUE self, VALUE data)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char *in;
+    long in_len, out_len;
+
+    StringValue(data);
+
+    in = (unsigned char *) RSTRING_PTR(data);
+    in_len = RSTRING_LEN(data);
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "AEAD not supported by this cipher");
+
+    if (!ossl_cipher_update_long(ctx, NULL, &out_len, in, in_len))
+        ossl_raise(eCipherError, "couldn't set additional authenticated data");
+
+    return data;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.auth_tag(tag_len = 16) -> String
+ *
+ *  Gets the authentication tag generated by Authenticated Encryption Cipher
+ *  modes (GCM for example). This tag may be stored along with the ciphertext,
+ *  then set on the decryption cipher to authenticate the contents of the
+ *  ciphertext against changes. If the optional integer parameter _tag_len_ is
+ *  given, the returned tag will be _tag_len_ bytes long. If the parameter is
+ *  omitted, the default length of 16 bytes or the length previously set by
+ *  #auth_tag_len= will be used. For maximum security, the longest possible
+ *  should be chosen.
+ *
+ *  The tag may only be retrieved after calling Cipher#final.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_get_auth_tag(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+{
+    VALUE vtag_len, ret;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int tag_len = 16;
+
+    rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "01", &vtag_len);
+    if (NIL_P(vtag_len))
+	vtag_len = rb_attr_get(self, id_auth_tag_len);
+    if (!NIL_P(vtag_len))
+	tag_len = NUM2INT(vtag_len);
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "authentication tag not supported by this cipher");
+
+    ret = rb_str_new(NULL, tag_len);
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, tag_len, RSTRING_PTR(ret)))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "retrieving the authentication tag failed");
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.auth_tag = string -> string
+ *
+ *  Sets the authentication tag to verify the integrity of the ciphertext.
+ *  This can be called only when the cipher supports AE. The tag must be set
+ *  after calling Cipher#decrypt, Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv=, but before
+ *  calling Cipher#final. After all decryption is performed, the tag is
+ *  verified automatically in the call to Cipher#final.
+ *
+ *  For OCB mode, the tag length must be supplied with #auth_tag_len=
+ *  beforehand.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag(VALUE self, VALUE vtag)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    unsigned char *tag;
+    int tag_len;
+
+    StringValue(vtag);
+    tag = (unsigned char *) RSTRING_PTR(vtag);
+    tag_len = RSTRING_LENINT(vtag);
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "authentication tag not supported by this cipher");
+
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag_len, tag))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unable to set AEAD tag");
+
+    return vtag;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.auth_tag_len = Integer -> Integer
+ *
+ *  Sets the length of the authentication tag to be generated or to be given for
+ *  AEAD ciphers that requires it as in input parameter. Note that not all AEAD
+ *  ciphers support this method.
+ *
+ *  In OCB mode, the length must be supplied both when encrypting and when
+ *  decrypting, and must be before specifying an IV.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag_len(VALUE self, VALUE vlen)
+{
+    int tag_len = NUM2INT(vlen);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "AEAD not supported by this cipher");
+
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag_len, NULL))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unable to set authentication tag length");
+
+    /* for #auth_tag */
+    rb_ivar_set(self, id_auth_tag_len, INT2NUM(tag_len));
+
+    return vlen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ *   cipher.iv_len = integer -> integer
+ *
+ * Sets the IV/nonce length of the Cipher. Normally block ciphers don't allow
+ * changing the IV length, but some make use of IV for 'nonce'. You may need
+ * this for interoperability with other applications.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_iv_length(VALUE self, VALUE iv_length)
+{
+    int len = NUM2INT(iv_length);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "cipher does not support AEAD");
+
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, len, NULL))
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unable to set IV length");
+
+    /*
+     * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() returns the default length. So we need to save
+     * the length somewhere. Luckily currently we aren't using app_data.
+     */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, (void *)(VALUE)len);
+
+    return iv_length;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.key_len = integer -> integer
+ *
+ *  Sets the key length of the cipher.  If the cipher is a fixed length cipher
+ *  then attempting to set the key length to any value other than the fixed
+ *  value is an error.
+ *
+ *  Under normal circumstances you do not need to call this method (and probably shouldn't).
+ *
+ *  See EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length for further information.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_key_length(VALUE self, VALUE key_length)
+{
+    int len = NUM2INT(key_length);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, len) != 1)
+        ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    return key_length;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.padding = integer -> integer
+ *
+ *  Enables or disables padding. By default encryption operations are padded using standard block padding and the
+ *  padding is checked and removed when decrypting. If the pad parameter is zero then no padding is performed, the
+ *  total amount of data encrypted or decrypted must then be a multiple of the block size or an error will occur.
+ *
+ *  See EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding for further information.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_padding(VALUE self, VALUE padding)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int pad = NUM2INT(padding);
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, pad) != 1)
+	ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+    return padding;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.key_len -> integer
+ *
+ *  Returns the key length in bytes of the Cipher.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_key_length(VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+    return INT2NUM(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.iv_len -> integer
+ *
+ *  Returns the expected length in bytes for an IV for this Cipher.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_iv_length(VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    int len = 0;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+	len = (int)(VALUE)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+    if (!len)
+	len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+    return INT2NUM(len);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.block_size -> integer
+ *
+ *  Returns the size in bytes of the blocks on which this Cipher operates on.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_block_size(VALUE self)
+{
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+    return INT2NUM(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ *  call-seq:
+ *     cipher.ccm_data_len = integer -> integer
+ *
+ *  Sets the length of the plaintext / ciphertext message that will be
+ *  processed in CCM mode. Make sure to call this method after #key= and
+ *  #iv= have been set, and before #auth_data=.
+ *
+ *  Only call this method after calling Cipher#encrypt or Cipher#decrypt.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_ccm_data_len(VALUE self, VALUE data_len)
+{
+    int in_len, out_len;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+    in_len = NUM2INT(data_len);
+
+    GetCipher(self, ctx);
+    if (EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &out_len, NULL, in_len) != 1)
+        ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+    return data_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * INIT
+ */
+void
+Init_ossl_cipher(void)
+{
+#if 0
+    mOSSL = rb_define_module("OpenSSL");
+    eOSSLError = rb_define_class_under(mOSSL, "OpenSSLError", rb_eStandardError);
+#endif
+
+    /* Document-class: OpenSSL::Cipher
+     *
+     * Provides symmetric algorithms for encryption and decryption. The
+     * algorithms that are available depend on the particular version
+     * of OpenSSL that is installed.
+     *
+     * === Listing all supported algorithms
+     *
+     * A list of supported algorithms can be obtained by
+     *
+     *   puts OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers
+     *
+     * === Instantiating a Cipher
+     *
+     * There are several ways to create a Cipher instance. Generally, a
+     * Cipher algorithm is categorized by its name, the key length in bits
+     * and the cipher mode to be used. The most generic way to create a
+     * Cipher is the following
+     *
+     *   cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('<name>-<key length>-<mode>')
+     *
+     * That is, a string consisting of the hyphenated concatenation of the
+     * individual components name, key length and mode. Either all uppercase
+     * or all lowercase strings may be used, for example:
+     *
+     *  cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc')
+     *
+     * === Choosing either encryption or decryption mode
+     *
+     * Encryption and decryption are often very similar operations for
+     * symmetric algorithms, this is reflected by not having to choose
+     * different classes for either operation, both can be done using the
+     * same class. Still, after obtaining a Cipher instance, we need to
+     * tell the instance what it is that we intend to do with it, so we
+     * need to call either
+     *
+     *   cipher.encrypt
+     *
+     * or
+     *
+     *   cipher.decrypt
+     *
+     * on the Cipher instance. This should be the first call after creating
+     * the instance, otherwise configuration that has already been set could
+     * get lost in the process.
+     *
+     * === Choosing a key
+     *
+     * Symmetric encryption requires a key that is the same for the encrypting
+     * and for the decrypting party and after initial key establishment should
+     * be kept as private information. There are a lot of ways to create
+     * insecure keys, the most notable is to simply take a password as the key
+     * without processing the password further. A simple and secure way to
+     * create a key for a particular Cipher is
+     *
+     *  cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-256-cfb')
+     *  cipher.encrypt
+     *  key = cipher.random_key # also sets the generated key on the Cipher
+     *
+     * If you absolutely need to use passwords as encryption keys, you
+     * should use Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) by
+     * generating the key with the help of the functionality provided by
+     * OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac_sha1 or OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac.
+     *
+     * Although there is Cipher#pkcs5_keyivgen, its use is deprecated and
+     * it should only be used in legacy applications because it does not use
+     * the newer PKCS#5 v2 algorithms.
+     *
+     * === Choosing an IV
+     *
+     * The cipher modes CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR all need an "initialization
+     * vector", or short, IV. ECB mode is the only mode that does not require
+     * an IV, but there is almost no legitimate use case for this mode
+     * because of the fact that it does not sufficiently hide plaintext
+     * patterns. Therefore
+     *
+     * <b>You should never use ECB mode unless you are absolutely sure that
+     * you absolutely need it</b>
+     *
+     * Because of this, you will end up with a mode that explicitly requires
+     * an IV in any case. Although the IV can be seen as public information,
+     * i.e. it may be transmitted in public once generated, it should still
+     * stay unpredictable to prevent certain kinds of attacks. Therefore,
+     * ideally
+     *
+     * <b>Always create a secure random IV for every encryption of your
+     * Cipher</b>
+     *
+     * A new, random IV should be created for every encryption of data. Think
+     * of the IV as a nonce (number used once) - it's public but random and
+     * unpredictable. A secure random IV can be created as follows
+     *
+     *   cipher = ...
+     *   cipher.encrypt
+     *   key = cipher.random_key
+     *   iv = cipher.random_iv # also sets the generated IV on the Cipher
+     *
+     * Although the key is generally a random value, too, it is a bad choice
+     * as an IV. There are elaborate ways how an attacker can take advantage
+     * of such an IV. As a general rule of thumb, exposing the key directly
+     * or indirectly should be avoided at all cost and exceptions only be
+     * made with good reason.
+     *
+     * === Calling Cipher#final
+     *
+     * ECB (which should not be used) and CBC are both block-based modes.
+     * This means that unlike for the other streaming-based modes, they
+     * operate on fixed-size blocks of data, and therefore they require a
+     * "finalization" step to produce or correctly decrypt the last block of
+     * data by appropriately handling some form of padding. Therefore it is
+     * essential to add the output of OpenSSL::Cipher#final to your
+     * encryption/decryption buffer or you will end up with decryption errors
+     * or truncated data.
+     *
+     * Although this is not really necessary for streaming-mode ciphers, it is
+     * still recommended to apply the same pattern of adding the output of
+     * Cipher#final there as well - it also enables you to switch between
+     * modes more easily in the future.
+     *
+     * === Encrypting and decrypting some data
+     *
+     *   data = "Very, very confidential data"
+     *
+     *   cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc')
+     *   cipher.encrypt
+     *   key = cipher.random_key
+     *   iv = cipher.random_iv
+     *
+     *   encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final
+     *   ...
+     *   decipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc')
+     *   decipher.decrypt
+     *   decipher.key = key
+     *   decipher.iv = iv
+     *
+     *   plain = decipher.update(encrypted) + decipher.final
+     *
+     *   puts data == plain #=> true
+     *
+     * === Authenticated Encryption and Associated Data (AEAD)
+     *
+     * If the OpenSSL version used supports it, an Authenticated Encryption
+     * mode (such as GCM or CCM) should always be preferred over any
+     * unauthenticated mode. Currently, OpenSSL supports AE only in combination
+     * with Associated Data (AEAD) where additional associated data is included
+     * in the encryption process to compute a tag at the end of the encryption.
+     * This tag will also be used in the decryption process and by verifying
+     * its validity, the authenticity of a given ciphertext is established.
+     *
+     * This is superior to unauthenticated modes in that it allows to detect
+     * if somebody effectively changed the ciphertext after it had been
+     * encrypted. This prevents malicious modifications of the ciphertext that
+     * could otherwise be exploited to modify ciphertexts in ways beneficial to
+     * potential attackers.
+     *
+     * An associated data is used where there is additional information, such as
+     * headers or some metadata, that must be also authenticated but not
+     * necessarily need to be encrypted. If no associated data is needed for
+     * encryption and later decryption, the OpenSSL library still requires a
+     * value to be set - "" may be used in case none is available.
+     *
+     * An example using the GCM (Galois/Counter Mode). You have 16 bytes _key_,
+     * 12 bytes (96 bits) _nonce_ and the associated data _auth_data_. Be sure
+     * not to reuse the _key_ and _nonce_ pair. Reusing an nonce ruins the
+     * security guarantees of GCM mode.
+     *
+     *   cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-gcm').encrypt
+     *   cipher.key = key
+     *   cipher.iv = nonce
+     *   cipher.auth_data = auth_data
+     *
+     *   encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final
+     *   tag = cipher.auth_tag # produces 16 bytes tag by default
+     *
+     * Now you are the receiver. You know the _key_ and have received _nonce_,
+     * _auth_data_, _encrypted_ and _tag_ through an untrusted network. Note
+     * that GCM accepts an arbitrary length tag between 1 and 16 bytes. You may
+     * additionally need to check that the received tag has the correct length,
+     * or you allow attackers to forge a valid single byte tag for the tampered
+     * ciphertext with a probability of 1/256.
+     *
+     *   raise "tag is truncated!" unless tag.bytesize == 16
+     *   decipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-gcm').decrypt
+     *   decipher.key = key
+     *   decipher.iv = nonce
+     *   decipher.auth_tag = tag
+     *   decipher.auth_data = auth_data
+     *
+     *   decrypted = decipher.update(encrypted) + decipher.final
+     *
+     *   puts data == decrypted #=> true
+     */
+    cCipher = rb_define_class_under(mOSSL, "Cipher", rb_cObject);
+    eCipherError = rb_define_class_under(cCipher, "CipherError", eOSSLError);
+
+    rb_define_alloc_func(cCipher, ossl_cipher_alloc);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "initialize_copy", ossl_cipher_copy, 1);
+    rb_define_module_function(cCipher, "ciphers", ossl_s_ciphers, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "initialize", ossl_cipher_initialize, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "reset", ossl_cipher_reset, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "encrypt", ossl_cipher_encrypt, -1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "decrypt", ossl_cipher_decrypt, -1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "pkcs5_keyivgen", ossl_cipher_pkcs5_keyivgen, -1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "update", ossl_cipher_update, -1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "final", ossl_cipher_final, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "name", ossl_cipher_name, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "key=", ossl_cipher_set_key, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_data=", ossl_cipher_set_auth_data, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_tag=", ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_tag", ossl_cipher_get_auth_tag, -1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_tag_len=", ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag_len, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "authenticated?", ossl_cipher_is_authenticated, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "key_len=", ossl_cipher_set_key_length, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "key_len", ossl_cipher_key_length, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "iv=", ossl_cipher_set_iv, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "iv_len=", ossl_cipher_set_iv_length, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "iv_len", ossl_cipher_iv_length, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "block_size", ossl_cipher_block_size, 0);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "padding=", ossl_cipher_set_padding, 1);
+    rb_define_method(cCipher, "ccm_data_len=", ossl_cipher_set_ccm_data_len, 1);
+
+    id_auth_tag_len = rb_intern_const("auth_tag_len");
+    id_key_set = rb_intern_const("key_set");
+}