yamine 0.10.4 → 0.11.0

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data/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,31 @@
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  # Changelog
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+ ## [0.11.0] — 2026-09-11
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+
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+ ### Added
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+
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+ - **Ruby, git, and curl now trust the local CA — so an app can call
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+ another app at `https://<name>.localhost` with no configuration.** The
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+ gap surfaced when anywaye (a Rails app) tried to reach anymark at
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+ `https://anymark-directory.localhost`: `certificate verify failed`. The
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+ CA was trusted everywhere a human looks (Safari, Chrome, curl) and
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+ nowhere a child process looks — only Node was covered, via
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+ `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`.
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+
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+ The naive fix is wrong in a way that shows up much later. `SSL_CERT_FILE`
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+ does not *add* to OpenSSL's roots, it *replaces* them, so pointing it at
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+ `~/.yamine/ca.pem` would break every public HTTPS call the app makes —
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+ rubygems, payment APIs, an LLM provider — while fixing the local one. So
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+ yamine now builds `~/.yamine/bundle.pem`: the system's roots plus its own
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+ CA, regenerated only when either changes, and exports it as
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+ `SSL_CERT_FILE` and `GIT_SSL_CAINFO` for every child. Node keeps getting
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+ the CA alone, because its variable really is additive.
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+
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+ `yamine doctor` reports the bundle (`bundle: 129 certificates`), so a
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+ missing or stale one is visible before an app fails on it, and a real
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+ TLS handshake against a yamine-minted certificate is pinned by a test —
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+ not just the presence of the environment variables.
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+
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  ## [0.10.4] — 2026-09-11
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  ### Fixed
data/lib/yamine/certs.rb CHANGED
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ module Yamine
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  { cert: File.join(dir, "ca.pem"), key: File.join(dir, "ca-key.pem") }
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  end
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+ # The CA certificate's path on disk. Generated on first ask.
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+ def ca_cert_path(dir = state_dir)
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+ ensure_ca(dir)
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+ ca_paths(dir)[:cert]
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+ end
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+
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  def ensure_ca(dir = state_dir)
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  FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir, mode: 0o755)
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  Ownership.fix(dir)
@@ -79,6 +85,68 @@ module Yamine
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  OpenSSL::PKey.read(File.read(paths[:key]))]
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  end
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+ # A CA bundle a child process can verify against: the system roots
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+ # *plus* this CA.
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+ #
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+ # Why a bundle and not just the CA: `SSL_CERT_FILE` (Ruby/OpenSSL,
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+ # curl, git) *replaces* the default store rather than adding to it, so
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+ # pointing it at a file containing only our CA makes every public
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+ # HTTPS request in that process fail verification. Concatenating gives
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+ # both — yamine's names verify and rubygems, APIs, and git-over-https
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+ # keep working.
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+ #
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+ # Built fresh when the CA or the system store changes, and cached
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+ # otherwise: the bundle is ~230 KB and regenerating it on every boot
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+ # would be pure waste, while serving a stale one after `yamine trust`
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+ # regenerates the CA would silently break every TLS connection in the
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+ # app.
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+ def bundle_path(dir = state_dir)
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+ File.join(dir, "bundle.pem")
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+ end
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+
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+ # The system's own roots, in the order OpenSSL would consider them.
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+ # SSL_CERT_FILE wins when set (that is the variable we are about to
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+ # write, and a caller may have pointed it somewhere deliberately),
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+ # else OpenSSL's compiled-in file, else the usual macOS/Linux paths.
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+ def system_bundle
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+ candidates = [ENV["SSL_CERT_FILE"],
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+ OpenSSL::X509::DEFAULT_CERT_FILE,
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+ "/etc/ssl/cert.pem",
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+ "/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt",
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+ "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"].compact
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+ candidates.find { |path| File.file?(path) && File.size(path).positive? }
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+ end
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+
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+ def ensure_bundle(dir = state_dir)
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+ paths = ensure_ca(dir)
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+ target = bundle_path(dir)
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+ ca = File.read(paths[:cert])
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+ system_file = system_bundle
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+ # Regenerate when the CA changed, when the system store changed, or
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+ # when the bundle is missing. mtime comparison is enough: these files
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+ # are written by installers, not edited in place.
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+ return target if bundle_current?(target, paths[:cert], system_file)
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+
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+ FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir)
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+ content = +""
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+ content << File.read(system_file) if system_file
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+ content << "\n" unless content.empty? || content.end_with?("\n")
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+ content << ca
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+ File.write(target, content, mode: "w", perm: 0o644)
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+ Ownership.fix(target)
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+ target
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+ end
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+
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+ def bundle_current?(target, ca_path, system_file)
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+ return false unless File.file?(target)
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+
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+ target_mtime = File.mtime(target)
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+ return false if File.mtime(ca_path) > target_mtime
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+ return false if system_file && File.mtime(system_file) > target_mtime
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+
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+ true
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+ end
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+
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  # Mint a leaf cert for one hostname, signed by the CA.
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  def mint_host(hostname, ca_cert, ca_key)
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  key = OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate("prime256v1")
data/lib/yamine/doctor.rb CHANGED
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ module Yamine
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  checks << check_routes(store)
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  checks << check_dns(store)
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  checks << check_ca
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+ checks << check_ca_bundle
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  checks
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  end
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@@ -195,6 +196,22 @@ module Yamine
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  end
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  end
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+ # The child-process trust bundle. Its absence is not theoretical: an
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+ # app whose process was started before the bundle existed (or with a
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+ # regenerated CA) fails every call to another *.localhost with
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+ # "certificate verify failed". Regenerating it here is safe and is
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+ # exactly what the next boot would do anyway.
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+ def check_ca_bundle
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+ dir = Certs.state_dir
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+ return Check.new(name: "bundle", ok: false, message: "no CA yet — run: yamine trust") unless File.file?(Certs.ca_paths(dir)[:cert])
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+
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+ target = Certs.ensure_bundle(dir)
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+ count = File.read(target).scan("BEGIN CERTIFICATE").size
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+ Check.new(name: "bundle", ok: true, message: "#{count} certificates (system roots + yamine CA)")
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+ rescue StandardError => e
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+ Check.new(name: "bundle", ok: false, message: "could not build #{Certs.bundle_path(dir)}: #{e.message}")
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+ end
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+
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  # How many trusted certificates carry one of our CA names without
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  # being the CA currently on disk. Best-effort: 0 when the keychain
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  # cannot be read (doctor must never fail on a read-only probe).
data/lib/yamine/runner.rb CHANGED
@@ -155,8 +155,26 @@ module Yamine
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  env = { "YAMINE_URL" => url }
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  env["PORT"] = port.to_s if port
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  env["HOST"] = "127.0.0.1"
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- ca = File.join(Certs.state_dir, "ca.pem")
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- env["NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS"] = ca if File.file?(ca)
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+
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+ # TLS: yamine's names present certificates signed by its own CA, so
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+ # every process that talks to one of them has to be told to trust it.
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+ # Three clients, three conventions — and getting this wrong is not
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+ # subtle. A Ruby app calling https://other-app.localhost fails with
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+ # "certificate verify failed", which reads as a broken app rather
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+ # than a missing trust setting:
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+ #
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+ # * Ruby/OpenSSL, curl, and git honor SSL_CERT_FILE — but it
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+ # *replaces* the store, so it points at the bundle (the system's
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+ # roots plus our CA), never at our CA alone; a CA-only file would
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+ # break every public HTTPS call the app makes.
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+ # * git takes GIT_SSL_CAINFO as its own override.
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+ # * Node ignores both and reads NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, which is
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+ # additive — the CA by itself is right there.
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+ bundle = Certs.ensure_bundle
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+ env["NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS"] = Certs.ca_cert_path
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+ env["SSL_CERT_FILE"] = bundle
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+ env["GIT_SSL_CAINFO"] = bundle
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+
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  # Rails blocks unknown Host headers in development. Allow the
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  # proxied hostname so Rails apps boot behind yamine with zero
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  # config — this replaces the yamine-rails hosts patch.
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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  # frozen_string_literal: true
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  module Yamine
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- VERSION = "0.10.4"
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+ VERSION = "0.11.0"
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  end
metadata CHANGED
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  --- !ruby/object:Gem::Specification
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  name: yamine
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  version: !ruby/object:Gem::Version
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- version: 0.10.4
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+ version: 0.11.0
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  platform: ruby
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  authors:
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  - Kaka Ruto