yamine 0.10.4 → 0.11.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/CHANGELOG.md +26 -0
- data/lib/yamine/certs.rb +68 -0
- data/lib/yamine/doctor.rb +17 -0
- data/lib/yamine/runner.rb +20 -2
- data/lib/yamine/version.rb +1 -1
- metadata +1 -1
checksums.yaml
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metadata.gz: 1efaa2b9488a10007f6a386cf874eb78b3e8489e9b772efb2e88713286e98e2d
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data.tar.gz: 410ac56d153c94589d1d36fd1a6b5670ac215c6c5999ca956590acd3d7c46a98
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metadata.gz: ed28898e26abce37591fb15902697e2f96d2dc4ed4bc20d951872c48f586e19482affdafb24606bbe8c95cd0016b63a637d45f23c15fd7778f6ebd9a2415e0b7
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data.tar.gz: 075d1d80e12a0578377d956421bfbc7ac9dc61e414552262d0ffd61ea9613f1382732135c5b8e7c7af8fbfb9d54e02905d05bc53347cba7054ced38879fef0d4
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data/CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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## [0.11.0] — 2026-09-11
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### Added
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- **Ruby, git, and curl now trust the local CA — so an app can call
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another app at `https://<name>.localhost` with no configuration.** The
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gap surfaced when anywaye (a Rails app) tried to reach anymark at
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`https://anymark-directory.localhost`: `certificate verify failed`. The
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CA was trusted everywhere a human looks (Safari, Chrome, curl) and
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nowhere a child process looks — only Node was covered, via
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`NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`.
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The naive fix is wrong in a way that shows up much later. `SSL_CERT_FILE`
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does not *add* to OpenSSL's roots, it *replaces* them, so pointing it at
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`~/.yamine/ca.pem` would break every public HTTPS call the app makes —
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rubygems, payment APIs, an LLM provider — while fixing the local one. So
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yamine now builds `~/.yamine/bundle.pem`: the system's roots plus its own
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CA, regenerated only when either changes, and exports it as
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`SSL_CERT_FILE` and `GIT_SSL_CAINFO` for every child. Node keeps getting
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the CA alone, because its variable really is additive.
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`yamine doctor` reports the bundle (`bundle: 129 certificates`), so a
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missing or stale one is visible before an app fails on it, and a real
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TLS handshake against a yamine-minted certificate is pinned by a test —
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not just the presence of the environment variables.
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## [0.10.4] — 2026-09-11
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### Fixed
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data/lib/yamine/certs.rb
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@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ module Yamine
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{ cert: File.join(dir, "ca.pem"), key: File.join(dir, "ca-key.pem") }
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end
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# The CA certificate's path on disk. Generated on first ask.
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def ca_cert_path(dir = state_dir)
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ensure_ca(dir)
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ca_paths(dir)[:cert]
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end
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def ensure_ca(dir = state_dir)
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FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir, mode: 0o755)
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Ownership.fix(dir)
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@@ -79,6 +85,68 @@ module Yamine
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OpenSSL::PKey.read(File.read(paths[:key]))]
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end
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# A CA bundle a child process can verify against: the system roots
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# *plus* this CA.
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#
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# Why a bundle and not just the CA: `SSL_CERT_FILE` (Ruby/OpenSSL,
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# curl, git) *replaces* the default store rather than adding to it, so
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# pointing it at a file containing only our CA makes every public
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# HTTPS request in that process fail verification. Concatenating gives
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# both — yamine's names verify and rubygems, APIs, and git-over-https
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# keep working.
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#
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# Built fresh when the CA or the system store changes, and cached
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# otherwise: the bundle is ~230 KB and regenerating it on every boot
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# would be pure waste, while serving a stale one after `yamine trust`
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# regenerates the CA would silently break every TLS connection in the
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# app.
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def bundle_path(dir = state_dir)
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File.join(dir, "bundle.pem")
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end
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# The system's own roots, in the order OpenSSL would consider them.
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# SSL_CERT_FILE wins when set (that is the variable we are about to
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# write, and a caller may have pointed it somewhere deliberately),
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# else OpenSSL's compiled-in file, else the usual macOS/Linux paths.
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def system_bundle
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candidates = [ENV["SSL_CERT_FILE"],
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OpenSSL::X509::DEFAULT_CERT_FILE,
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"/etc/ssl/cert.pem",
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"/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt",
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"/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"].compact
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candidates.find { |path| File.file?(path) && File.size(path).positive? }
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end
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def ensure_bundle(dir = state_dir)
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paths = ensure_ca(dir)
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target = bundle_path(dir)
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ca = File.read(paths[:cert])
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system_file = system_bundle
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# Regenerate when the CA changed, when the system store changed, or
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# when the bundle is missing. mtime comparison is enough: these files
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# are written by installers, not edited in place.
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return target if bundle_current?(target, paths[:cert], system_file)
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FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir)
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content = +""
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content << File.read(system_file) if system_file
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content << "\n" unless content.empty? || content.end_with?("\n")
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content << ca
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File.write(target, content, mode: "w", perm: 0o644)
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Ownership.fix(target)
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target
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end
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def bundle_current?(target, ca_path, system_file)
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return false unless File.file?(target)
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target_mtime = File.mtime(target)
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return false if File.mtime(ca_path) > target_mtime
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return false if system_file && File.mtime(system_file) > target_mtime
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true
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end
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# Mint a leaf cert for one hostname, signed by the CA.
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def mint_host(hostname, ca_cert, ca_key)
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key = OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate("prime256v1")
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data/lib/yamine/doctor.rb
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checks << check_routes(store)
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checks << check_dns(store)
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checks << check_ca
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checks << check_ca_bundle
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checks
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end
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end
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end
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# The child-process trust bundle. Its absence is not theoretical: an
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# app whose process was started before the bundle existed (or with a
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# regenerated CA) fails every call to another *.localhost with
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# "certificate verify failed". Regenerating it here is safe and is
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# exactly what the next boot would do anyway.
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def check_ca_bundle
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dir = Certs.state_dir
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return Check.new(name: "bundle", ok: false, message: "no CA yet — run: yamine trust") unless File.file?(Certs.ca_paths(dir)[:cert])
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target = Certs.ensure_bundle(dir)
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count = File.read(target).scan("BEGIN CERTIFICATE").size
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Check.new(name: "bundle", ok: true, message: "#{count} certificates (system roots + yamine CA)")
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rescue StandardError => e
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Check.new(name: "bundle", ok: false, message: "could not build #{Certs.bundle_path(dir)}: #{e.message}")
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end
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# How many trusted certificates carry one of our CA names without
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# being the CA currently on disk. Best-effort: 0 when the keychain
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# cannot be read (doctor must never fail on a read-only probe).
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data/lib/yamine/runner.rb
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env = { "YAMINE_URL" => url }
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env["PORT"] = port.to_s if port
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env["HOST"] = "127.0.0.1"
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-
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# TLS: yamine's names present certificates signed by its own CA, so
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# every process that talks to one of them has to be told to trust it.
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# Three clients, three conventions — and getting this wrong is not
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# subtle. A Ruby app calling https://other-app.localhost fails with
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# "certificate verify failed", which reads as a broken app rather
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# than a missing trust setting:
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#
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# * Ruby/OpenSSL, curl, and git honor SSL_CERT_FILE — but it
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# *replaces* the store, so it points at the bundle (the system's
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# roots plus our CA), never at our CA alone; a CA-only file would
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# break every public HTTPS call the app makes.
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# * git takes GIT_SSL_CAINFO as its own override.
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# * Node ignores both and reads NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, which is
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# additive — the CA by itself is right there.
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bundle = Certs.ensure_bundle
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env["NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS"] = Certs.ca_cert_path
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env["SSL_CERT_FILE"] = bundle
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env["GIT_SSL_CAINFO"] = bundle
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# Rails blocks unknown Host headers in development. Allow the
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# proxied hostname so Rails apps boot behind yamine with zero
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# config — this replaces the yamine-rails hosts patch.
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data/lib/yamine/version.rb
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