whatsapp_notifier 0.6.0 → 0.7.0

data/lib/whatsapp_notifier/services/web_automation/media.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,585 @@
+import { test, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, utimesSync } from 'fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'os';
+import { join, resolve, sep } from 'path';
+import {
+    INLINE_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES,
+    configureMedia,
+    sanitizeId,
+    mediaPaths,
+    writeMedia,
+    readMedia,
+    deleteMedia,
+    clearUserMedia,
+    mediaExists,
+    mediaDiskBytes,
+    mediaTtlMs,
+    maxDocumentBytes,
+    maxDiskBytes,
+    downloadPolicy,
+    sweepExpired,
+    resolveMediaForMessage,
+    verifyMediaToken,
+    mediaGetResponse,
+    mediaDeleteResponse,
+    resetMediaState
+} from './media';
+
+const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wa-media-'));
+let mediaRoot: string;
+let caseId = 0;
+
+const ENV_KEYS = ['WHATSAPP_MEDIA_TTL_MS', 'WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES', 'WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_DISK_BYTES'];
+const savedEnv: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    for (const key of ENV_KEYS) { savedEnv[key] = process.env[key]; delete process.env[key]; }
+    mediaRoot = join(root, `media-${caseId++}`);
+    configureMedia(() => mediaRoot);
+    resetMediaState();
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    for (const key of ENV_KEYS) {
+        if (savedEnv[key] === undefined) delete process.env[key];
+        else process.env[key] = savedEnv[key];
+    }
+});
+
+afterAll(() => {
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+const USER = '42';
+const MSG_ID = 'true_919999000001@c.us_ABC';
+
+function bytes(text: string) {
+    return new TextEncoder().encode(text);
+}
+
+// ── sanitizeId ──
+
+test('sanitizeId passes real ids through and strips hostile characters', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeId(MSG_ID)).toBe(MSG_ID);
+    expect(sanitizeId('42')).toBe('42');
+    expect(sanitizeId('a/b\\c d#e?f')).toBe('abcdef');     // path + query chars stripped
+    expect(sanitizeId('../../etc/passwd')).toBe('....etcpasswd'); // traversal neutered
+});
+
+test('sanitizeId rejects empty, dot-only, oversized and non-string ids', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeId('')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeId('///')).toBeNull();        // strips to empty
+    expect(sanitizeId('.')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeId('..')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeId('...')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeId('x'.repeat(201))).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeId(null)).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeId(undefined)).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeId(42 as any)).toBeNull();
+});
+
+// ── mediaPaths ──
+
+test('mediaPaths lays files out under <root>/<user>/<messageId> and never escapes the root', () => {
+    const paths = mediaPaths(USER, MSG_ID)!;
+    expect(paths.dir).toBe(resolve(mediaRoot, USER));
+    expect(paths.dataPath).toBe(resolve(mediaRoot, USER, MSG_ID));
+    // '~' is outside the sanitize charset, so no message id can ever name a sidecar.
+    expect(paths.metaPath).toBe(`${paths.dataPath}~meta.json`);
+    expect(paths.dataPath.startsWith(resolve(mediaRoot) + sep)).toBe(true);
+
+    const hostile = mediaPaths('../../outside', '../../../etc/passwd')!;
+    expect(hostile.dataPath.startsWith(resolve(mediaRoot) + sep)).toBe(true);
+});
+
+// Regression: a sanitized message id ending in ".json" used to land in the
+// sidecar namespace — skipped by accounting, deletable as an orphan, and able
+// to overwrite another message's sidecar.
+test('a message id ending in .json cannot collide with a sidecar', () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1', bytes('real-payload'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    // Hostile/unlucky id: exactly the OLD sidecar name of message m1.
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1.json', bytes('12345'), { mime: 'application/json' });
+
+    // m1's sidecar survives intact — the second write touched different files.
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'm1')!.mime).toBe('image/png');
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'm1.json')!.size).toBe(5);
+
+    // Accounting counts BOTH payloads (the .json one is data, not a sidecar).
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(17);
+
+    // The sweep treats it as data too: fresh → kept, not reaped as an orphan.
+    expect(sweepExpired()).toBe(0);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'm1.json')).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(17);
+
+    // And deleting one message never touches the other's files.
+    expect(deleteMedia(USER, 'm1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'm1')).toBeNull();
+    expect(readMedia(USER, 'm1.json')!.data.toString()).toBe('12345');
+});
+
+test('mediaPaths returns null when either id fails sanitization', () => {
+    expect(mediaPaths('..', MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+    expect(mediaPaths(USER, '//')).toBeNull();
+});
+
+// ── write / read / delete / exists ──
+
+test('writeMedia + mediaExists + readMedia roundtrip bytes and sidecar metadata', () => {
+    const data = bytes('jpeg-bytes');
+    expect(writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, data, { mime: 'image/jpeg', filename: 'beach.jpg' })).toBe(true);
+
+    const meta = mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)!;
+    expect(meta.mime).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(meta.filename).toBe('beach.jpg');
+    expect(meta.size).toBe(data.byteLength);
+    expect(meta.capturedAt).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+    const found = readMedia(USER, MSG_ID)!;
+    expect(new Uint8Array(found.data)).toEqual(data);
+    expect(found.meta.mime).toBe('image/jpeg');
+
+    // Sidecar is real JSON on disk next to the payload.
+    const sidecar = JSON.parse(readFileSync(mediaPaths(USER, MSG_ID)!.metaPath, 'utf8'));
+    expect(sidecar.size).toBe(data.byteLength);
+});
+
+test('writeMedia stores a null filename and refuses invalid ids and fs failures', () => {
+    expect(writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('x'), { mime: 'audio/ogg' })).toBe(true);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)!.filename).toBeNull();
+
+    expect(writeMedia('..', MSG_ID, bytes('x'), { mime: 'audio/ogg' })).toBe(false);
+
+    // A FILE squatting on the user dir path makes mkdir/write explode → false.
+    mkdirSync(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(join(mediaRoot, 'blocked'), 'not-a-dir');
+    expect(writeMedia('blocked', MSG_ID, bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/png' })).toBe(false);
+});
+
+test('mediaExists is null for missing pairs, half-written pairs and corrupt sidecars', () => {
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'never-written')).toBeNull();
+    expect(mediaExists('..', MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+
+    const paths = mediaPaths(USER, MSG_ID)!;
+    mkdirSync(paths.dir, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(paths.dataPath, 'payload-without-sidecar');
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+
+    writeFileSync(paths.metaPath, 'not json');
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+});
+
+test('mediaExists tolerates a sidecar with junk field types', () => {
+    const paths = mediaPaths(USER, MSG_ID)!;
+    mkdirSync(paths.dir, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(paths.dataPath, 'x');
+    writeFileSync(paths.metaPath, JSON.stringify({ mime: 5, filename: 7, size: 'big', capturedAt: 'now' }));
+
+    const meta = mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)!;
+    expect(meta.mime).toBe('application/octet-stream');
+    expect(meta.filename).toBeNull();
+    expect(meta.size).toBe(0);
+    expect(meta.capturedAt).toBe(0);
+});
+
+test('readMedia is null when the payload vanished after the sidecar check', () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    rmSync(mediaPaths(USER, MSG_ID)!.dataPath);
+    // Sidecar alone → mediaExists already says no.
+    expect(readMedia(USER, MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+});
+
+test('deleteMedia removes the pair, is idempotent, and rejects invalid ids', () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    expect(deleteMedia(USER, MSG_ID)).toBe(true);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+    expect(existsSync(mediaPaths(USER, MSG_ID)!.dataPath)).toBe(false);
+
+    expect(deleteMedia(USER, MSG_ID)).toBe(true); // second delete: still fine
+    expect(deleteMedia('..', MSG_ID)).toBe(false);
+});
+
+// ── clearUserMedia (logout privacy contract) ──
+
+test('clearUserMedia removes every file for the user and fixes the accounting', () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1', bytes('12345'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm2', bytes('1234567890'), { mime: 'application/pdf', filename: 'doc.pdf' });
+    writeMedia('7', 'other', bytes('123'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(18);
+
+    expect(clearUserMedia(USER)).toBe(true);
+
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'm1')).toBeNull();
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'm2')).toBeNull();
+    expect(existsSync(join(mediaRoot, USER))).toBe(false);   // dir itself gone
+    expect(mediaExists('7', 'other')).not.toBeNull();        // scoped per user
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(3);                        // cap accounting refreshed
+});
+
+test('clearUserMedia is idempotent and safe before any media was stored', () => {
+    expect(clearUserMedia(USER)).toBe(true);                 // nothing on disk yet
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1', bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    expect(clearUserMedia(USER)).toBe(true);
+    expect(clearUserMedia(USER)).toBe(true);                 // repeat is fine
+});
+
+test('clearUserMedia refuses traversal-hostile user ids without touching the root', () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1', bytes('payload'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+
+    expect(clearUserMedia('..')).toBe(false);
+    expect(clearUserMedia('../..')).toBe(false);
+    expect(clearUserMedia('')).toBe(false);
+    expect(clearUserMedia(null as any)).toBe(false);
+
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'm1')).not.toBeNull();          // nothing collateral
+    expect(existsSync(mediaRoot)).toBe(true);                // root untouched
+});
+
+// ── disk accounting ──
+
+test('mediaDiskBytes counts payload bytes only and tracks writes and deletes', () => {
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(0);
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1', bytes('12345'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    writeMedia('7', 'm2', bytes('1234567890'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(15); // sidecar JSON not counted
+
+    deleteMedia(USER, 'm1');
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(10);
+
+    // Fresh process (cache reset) recomputes the same truth from disk.
+    resetMediaState();
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(10);
+});
+
+// ── downloadPolicy ──
+
+test('downloadPolicy allows image/audio/ptt up to 16MB and rejects above', () => {
+    for (const type of ['image', 'audio', 'ptt']) {
+        expect(downloadPolicy(type, INLINE_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES)).toEqual({ download: true });
+        expect(downloadPolicy(type, INLINE_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES + 1)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'too_large' });
+    }
+});
+
+test('downloadPolicy caps documents at WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES (default 25MB)', () => {
+    expect(maxDocumentBytes()).toBe(25 * 1024 * 1024);
+    expect(downloadPolicy('document', 25 * 1024 * 1024)).toEqual({ download: true });
+    expect(downloadPolicy('document', 25 * 1024 * 1024 + 1)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'too_large' });
+
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES = '10';
+    expect(downloadPolicy('document', 10)).toEqual({ download: true });
+    expect(downloadPolicy('document', 11)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'too_large' });
+});
+
+test('downloadPolicy skips stickers, videos, unknown types and view-once media', () => {
+    expect(downloadPolicy('sticker', 10)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'unsupported_type' });
+    expect(downloadPolicy('video', 10)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'unsupported_type' });
+    expect(downloadPolicy('chat', 10)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'unsupported_type' });
+    expect(downloadPolicy('image', 10, true)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'unsupported_type' });
+});
+
+// Malformed env → NaN → every comparison false → sweep + cap silently off.
+test('malformed limit envs fall back to the defaults instead of NaN', () => {
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_TTL_MS = '2 days';
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES = 'garbage';
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_DISK_BYTES = '50GB';
+
+    expect(mediaTtlMs()).toBe(48 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    expect(maxDocumentBytes()).toBe(25 * 1024 * 1024);
+    expect(maxDiskBytes()).toBe(5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
+
+    // The guards stay live: the document cap still rejects oversize media...
+    expect(downloadPolicy('document', 25 * 1024 * 1024 + 1))
+        .toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'too_large' });
+
+    // ...and the TTL sweep still evicts media older than the default 48h.
+    writeMedia(USER, 'old', bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    expect(sweepExpired(Date.now() + 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000 + 1000)).toBe(1);
+});
+
+test('downloadPolicy refuses a download that would blow the disk cap', () => {
+    expect(maxDiskBytes()).toBe(5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_DISK_BYTES = '12';
+    writeMedia(USER, 'taken', bytes('1234567890'), { mime: 'image/png' }); // 10 bytes used
+
+    expect(downloadPolicy('image', 2)).toEqual({ download: true });
+    expect(downloadPolicy('image', 3)).toEqual({ download: false, reason: 'disk_full' });
+});
+
+// ── sweepExpired ──
+
+test('sweepExpired removes media past the TTL, keeps fresh media, refreshes the cap total', () => {
+    expect(mediaTtlMs()).toBe(48 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    writeMedia(USER, 'old', bytes('old-bytes'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    writeMedia(USER, 'fresh', bytes('fresh'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+
+    // Backdate the sidecar's capturedAt beyond the TTL.
+    const oldPaths = mediaPaths(USER, 'old')!;
+    const sidecar = JSON.parse(readFileSync(oldPaths.metaPath, 'utf8'));
+    sidecar.capturedAt = Date.now() - mediaTtlMs() - 1000;
+    writeFileSync(oldPaths.metaPath, JSON.stringify(sidecar));
+
+    expect(sweepExpired()).toBe(1);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'old')).toBeNull();
+    expect(existsSync(oldPaths.metaPath)).toBe(false);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, 'fresh')).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(mediaDiskBytes()).toBe(5); // 'fresh' only
+});
+
+test('sweepExpired honours the WHATSAPP_MEDIA_TTL_MS override', () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1', bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/png' });
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_TTL_MS = '50';
+    expect(sweepExpired(Date.now() + 200)).toBe(1);
+});
+
+test('sweepExpired falls back to file mtime for payloads with no sidecar', () => {
+    const paths = mediaPaths(USER, 'orphan')!;
+    mkdirSync(paths.dir, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(paths.dataPath, 'orphan-bytes');
+    const past = (Date.now() - mediaTtlMs() - 60000) / 1000;
+    utimesSync(paths.dataPath, past, past);
+
+    expect(sweepExpired()).toBe(1);
+    expect(existsSync(paths.dataPath)).toBe(false);
+});
+
+test('sweepExpired removes orphaned sidecars and survives a missing media root', () => {
+    const paths = mediaPaths(USER, 'gone')!;
+    mkdirSync(paths.dir, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(paths.metaPath, JSON.stringify({ mime: 'image/png', size: 1, capturedAt: Date.now() }));
+
+    expect(sweepExpired()).toBe(0); // orphans don't count as expired media
+    expect(existsSync(paths.metaPath)).toBe(false);
+
+    configureMedia(() => join(root, 'never-created'));
+    expect(sweepExpired()).toBe(0);
+});
+
+// ── resolveMediaForMessage ──
+
+function mediaMsg(overrides: any = {}, dataOverrides: any = {}) {
+    return {
+        from: '919999000001@c.us',
+        id: { _serialized: MSG_ID },
+        timestamp: 1717000000,
+        type: 'image',
+        hasMedia: true,
+        _data: { size: 1024, mimetype: 'image/jpeg', ...dataOverrides },
+        downloadMedia: async () => ({
+            data: Buffer.from('jpeg-bytes').toString('base64'),
+            mimetype: 'image/jpeg',
+            filename: 'beach.jpg'
+        }),
+        ...overrides
+    };
+}
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage downloads, persists and reports an available verdict', async () => {
+    const verdict = await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, mediaMsg());
+
+    expect(verdict).toEqual({
+        mediaStatus: 'available',
+        mediaMime: 'image/jpeg',
+        mediaFilename: 'beach.jpg',
+        mediaSize: 10
+    });
+    const stored = readMedia(USER, MSG_ID)!;
+    expect(stored.data.toString()).toBe('jpeg-bytes');
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage short-circuits when the media is already on disk (backfill)', async () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('cached'), { mime: 'image/png', filename: 'c.png' });
+
+    let downloads = 0;
+    const msg = mediaMsg({ downloadMedia: async () => { downloads += 1; return null; } });
+    const verdict = await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, msg);
+
+    expect(downloads).toBe(0);
+    expect(verdict).toEqual({
+        mediaStatus: 'available', mediaMime: 'image/png', mediaFilename: 'c.png', mediaSize: 6
+    });
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage skips unsupported types and view-once without downloading', async () => {
+    let downloads = 0;
+    const dl = async () => { downloads += 1; return null; };
+
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, mediaMsg({ type: 'video', downloadMedia: dl })))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'unsupported_type' });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, mediaMsg({ downloadMedia: dl }, { isViewOnce: true })))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'unsupported_type' });
+    expect(downloads).toBe(0);
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage rejects on the declared size before downloading', async () => {
+    const msg = mediaMsg({}, { size: INLINE_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES + 1 });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, msg))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'too_large' });
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage re-checks the real byte size after download', async () => {
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES = '5';
+    // Declared size lies (says 3), actual payload is 10 bytes.
+    const msg = mediaMsg({ type: 'document' }, { size: 3, mimetype: 'application/pdf' });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, msg))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'too_large' });
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage reports disk_full when the actual bytes blow the cap', async () => {
+    process.env.WHATSAPP_MEDIA_MAX_DISK_BYTES = '12';
+    writeMedia(USER, 'taken', bytes('12345678'), { mime: 'image/png' }); // 8 used
+    // Unknown declared size sails through the pre-check; the 10 real bytes don't fit.
+    const msg = mediaMsg({}, { size: undefined });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, msg))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'disk_full' });
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage maps undefined download results to expired', async () => {
+    const noMedia = mediaMsg({ downloadMedia: async () => undefined });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, noMedia))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'expired' });
+
+    const dataless = mediaMsg({ downloadMedia: async () => ({ mimetype: 'image/jpeg' }) });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, dataless))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'expired' });
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage maps a throwing or hanging download to download_failed', async () => {
+    const throwing = mediaMsg({ downloadMedia: async () => { throw new Error('boom'); } });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, throwing))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'download_failed' });
+
+    const syncThrow = mediaMsg({ downloadMedia: () => { throw new Error('sync boom'); } });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, syncThrow))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'download_failed' });
+
+    const hanging = mediaMsg({ downloadMedia: () => new Promise(() => {}) });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, hanging, { timeoutMs: 20 }))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'download_failed' });
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage reports invalid_id for unsanitizable ids', async () => {
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage('..', mediaMsg()))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'invalid_id' });
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, mediaMsg({ id: { _serialized: '//' } })))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'invalid_id' });
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage falls back to the from-timestamp message id', async () => {
+    const msg = mediaMsg({ id: undefined });
+    const verdict = await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, msg);
+    expect(verdict.mediaStatus).toBe('available');
+    // Same fallback normalizeInbound uses → host can address the file.
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, '919999000001@c.us-1717000000')).not.toBeNull();
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage fills mime/filename gaps and omits a missing filename', async () => {
+    const msg = mediaMsg(
+        { downloadMedia: async () => ({ data: Buffer.from('x').toString('base64') }) },
+        { mimetype: 'image/webp' }
+    );
+    const verdict = await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, msg);
+
+    expect(verdict.mediaMime).toBe('image/webp');       // from _data when payload lacks it
+    expect(verdict.mediaSize).toBe(1);
+    expect('mediaFilename' in verdict).toBe(false);     // no filename anywhere → omitted
+
+    const bare = mediaMsg({
+        id: { _serialized: 'bare-1' },
+        downloadMedia: async () => ({ data: Buffer.from('y').toString('base64') }),
+        _data: undefined
+    });
+    expect((await resolveMediaForMessage(USER, bare)).mediaMime).toBe('application/octet-stream');
+});
+
+test('resolveMediaForMessage reports download_failed when persisting fails', async () => {
+    // A FILE squatting on the user dir path makes writeMedia fail.
+    mkdirSync(mediaRoot, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(join(mediaRoot, 'squat'), 'not-a-dir');
+
+    expect(await resolveMediaForMessage('squat', mediaMsg()))
+        .toEqual({ mediaStatus: 'unavailable', mediaError: 'download_failed' });
+});
+
+// ── verifyMediaToken ──
+
+test('verifyMediaToken enforces only when the service has a token configured', () => {
+    expect(verifyMediaToken(undefined, undefined)).toBe(true);   // unset → open
+    expect(verifyMediaToken('anything', undefined)).toBe(true);
+    expect(verifyMediaToken('secret', 'secret')).toBe(true);
+    expect(verifyMediaToken('wrong', 'secret')).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifyMediaToken(undefined, 'secret')).toBe(false);   // missing header
+    expect(verifyMediaToken('', 'secret')).toBe(false);
+});
+
+// ── GET /media route contract ──
+
+test('mediaGetResponse serves raw bytes with mime, length and disposition headers', async () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('jpeg-bytes'), { mime: 'image/jpeg', filename: 'beach.jpg' });
+
+    const res = mediaGetResponse(USER, MSG_ID, undefined, undefined);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers.get('Content-Type')).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(res.headers.get('Content-Length')).toBe('10');
+    expect(res.headers.get('Content-Disposition')).toBe('attachment; filename="beach.jpg"');
+    expect(new TextDecoder().decode(await res.arrayBuffer())).toBe('jpeg-bytes');
+});
+
+test('mediaGetResponse sanitizes hostile filenames and handles missing ones', async () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm1', bytes('x'), { mime: 'application/pdf', filename: 'a"b\r\nSet-Cookie: x.pdf' });
+    const evil = mediaGetResponse(USER, 'm1', undefined, undefined);
+    expect(evil.headers.get('Content-Disposition')).toBe('attachment; filename="a_b__Set-Cookie_ x.pdf"');
+
+    writeMedia(USER, 'm2', bytes('y'), { mime: 'audio/ogg' });
+    const bare = mediaGetResponse(USER, 'm2', undefined, undefined);
+    expect(bare.headers.get('Content-Disposition')).toBe('attachment');
+});
+
+test('mediaGetResponse answers the same 404 for unknown, swept and invalid ids', async () => {
+    const missing = mediaGetResponse(USER, 'never-stored', undefined, undefined);
+    expect(missing.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await missing.json()).toEqual({ error: 'not_found' });
+
+    const invalid = mediaGetResponse('..', '..', undefined, undefined);
+    expect(invalid.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await invalid.json()).toEqual({ error: 'not_found' });
+});
+
+test('mediaGetResponse rejects a bad token before touching the store', async () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('secret-bytes'), { mime: 'image/jpeg' });
+
+    const res = mediaGetResponse(USER, MSG_ID, 'wrong', 'expected');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(await res.json()).toEqual({ error: 'unauthorized' });
+
+    expect(mediaGetResponse(USER, MSG_ID, 'expected', 'expected').status).toBe(200);
+});
+
+// ── DELETE /media route contract ──
+
+test('mediaDeleteResponse deletes the pair and stays successful on repeats', async () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/jpeg' });
+
+    const first = mediaDeleteResponse(USER, MSG_ID, undefined, undefined);
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await first.json()).toEqual({ success: true });
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+
+    const again = mediaDeleteResponse(USER, MSG_ID, undefined, undefined);
+    expect(await again.json()).toEqual({ success: true }); // idempotent
+
+    const never = mediaDeleteResponse(USER, 'never-stored', undefined, undefined);
+    expect(await never.json()).toEqual({ success: true });
+});
+
+test('mediaDeleteResponse enforces the token when configured', async () => {
+    writeMedia(USER, MSG_ID, bytes('x'), { mime: 'image/jpeg' });
+
+    const denied = mediaDeleteResponse(USER, MSG_ID, undefined, 'expected');
+    expect(denied.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)).not.toBeNull(); // nothing deleted
+
+    expect(mediaDeleteResponse(USER, MSG_ID, 'expected', 'expected').status).toBe(200);
+    expect(mediaExists(USER, MSG_ID)).toBeNull();
+});