tina4ruby 3.13.121 → 3.13.123

data/lib/tina4/middleware.rb

@@ -1,818 +1,847 @@
-# frozen_string_literal: true
-
-require "cgi"
-
-module Tina4
-  class Middleware
-    class << self
-      def before_handlers
-        @before_handlers ||= []
-      end
-
-      def after_handlers
-        @after_handlers ||= []
-      end
-
-      # Registry of class-based middleware (registered via Router.use)
-      def global_middleware
-        @global_middleware ||= []
-      end
-
-      # Parity alias matching Python/PHP/Node orchestrators.
-      def get_global
-        global_middleware.dup
-      end
-
-      def before(pattern = nil, &block)
-        before_handlers << { pattern: pattern, handler: block }
-      end
-
-      def after(pattern = nil, &block)
-        after_handlers << { pattern: pattern, handler: block }
-      end
-
-      # Register a class-based middleware globally.
-      # The class should define static before_* and/or after_* methods.
-      def use(klass)
-        global_middleware << klass unless global_middleware.include?(klass)
-      end
-
-      # Global middleware that runs BEFORE route matching.
-      #
-      # A middleware opts in by declaring `def self.pre_match?; true; end`.
-      #
-      # NOT `before_match?` - the hook discovery treats every `before_*` method
-      # as a middleware hook and calls it with (request, response), so that name
-      # made the flag itself run as middleware and 500 the request.
-      # Everything else stays where it has always run - after matching - so
-      # this is additive and no existing middleware changes behaviour.
-      #
-      # The split exists because the two groups need opposite things. CORS must
-      # run before matching so its headers survive a short-circuited 401/403;
-      # a browser that gets a 401 without them reports a CORS error and the real
-      # status is invisible. CSRF must run AFTER, because it reads the matched
-      # route's metadata to honour a route marked no_auth - PHP shipped exactly
-      # that bypass as dead code once, because the metadata was not set yet.
-      def pre_match_middleware
-        global_middleware.select { |k| k.respond_to?(:pre_match?) && k.pre_match? }
-      end
-
-      # Global middleware that runs after matching, once the matched route's
-      # metadata is readable. This is the default.
-      def post_match_middleware
-        global_middleware.reject { |k| k.respond_to?(:pre_match?) && k.pre_match? }
-      end
-
-      def clear!
-        @before_handlers = []
-        @after_handlers = []
-        @global_middleware = []
-      end
-
-      # Run all "before" hooks: block-based handlers, then class-based before_*
-      # methods (in definition order).
-      #
-      # Signature matches Python/PHP/Node orchestrators: pass the list of
-      # middleware classes explicitly.
-      #
-      # THE RETURN-VALUE CONTRACT is #apply_before_result below — one table,
-      # applied to EVERY before_* hook at EVERY scope. Per-route middleware
-      # comes through this same method (Tina4::Route#run_middleware), so there
-      # is exactly one implementation of the table, not two.
-      #
-      # M2 — visible-but-resilient: every before_* call is wrapped so a THROW
-      # never crashes the worker. On a throw the error is LOGGED and the
-      # response becomes a clean 500 ({"error":"Internal Server Error",
-      # "status":500}), then processing halts (handler skipped) — deterministic,
-      # never an unhandled exception. after_* still run on either halt path
-      # (see the dispatcher / #run_after docstring).
-      #
-      # Returns true on success, or false to halt the request (handler skipped).
-      def run_before(middleware_classes, request, response)
-        # The response object the CALLER holds. A hook may hand back a
-        # different Response; on a halt that object IS the answer, so its state
-        # is adopted onto this one before returning — otherwise the dispatcher
-        # would serve the object it still has a reference to and the
-        # short-circuit would silently vanish.
-        origin = response
-
-        # 1. Block-based before handlers (pattern-matched). These are a
-        #    Ruby-only surface (Python/PHP/Node have no block form) and keep
-        #    their historical "false halts" contract: a block's value is its
-        #    last expression, so reading a returned Response as a
-        #    short-circuit would fire on any block ending in a chainable
-        #    response call.
-        before_handlers.each do |entry|
-          next unless matches_pattern?(request.path, entry[:pattern])
-
-          begin
-            result = entry[:handler].call(request, response)
-          rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
-            middleware_500(response, "before handler", error)
-            return false
-          end
-          return false if result == false
-        end
-
-        # 2. Class-based middleware: call every before_* method (definition order)
-        middleware_classes.each do |klass|
-          before_methods_for(klass).each do |method_name|
-            begin
-              result = klass.send(method_name, request, response)
-            rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
-              middleware_500(response, "#{class_label(klass)}.#{method_name}", error)
-              return false
-            end
-
-            halt, request, response = apply_before_result(result, request, response)
-            next unless halt
-
-            adopt_response(origin, response) unless response.equal?(origin)
-            return false
-          end
-        end
-
-        true
-      end
-
-      # Run all "after" hooks: block-based handlers, then class-based after_*
-      # methods (in definition order).
-      #
-      # Signature matches Python/PHP/Node orchestrators: pass the list of
-      # middleware classes explicitly.
-      #
-      # AFTER-ON-4xx RULE (M2, documented + consistent across all 4 frameworks):
-      # after_* ALWAYS run even when a before_* short-circuited with status >= 400
-      # and the handler was skipped — so they can still add headers / logging.
-      # The dispatcher calls #run_after unconditionally after the before/handler
-      # block (including on the 4xx / throw halt path).
-      #
-      # M2 — every after_* call is wrapped: a THROW is LOGGED and turns the
-      # response into a clean 500, then the REMAINING after_* still run (they
-      # may add headers/logging). Never an unhandled crash.
-      #
-      # RETURN VALUES: an after_* hook shapes the response the same way a
-      # before_* one does — a returned Tina4::Response BECOMES the response, a
-      # returned [request, response] pair rebinds both. What it CANNOT do is
-      # halt: the handler has already run, so there is nothing left to skip,
-      # and stopping the remaining after_* would contradict the AFTER-ON-4xx
-      # resilience rule above (they exist to add headers/logging on every path).
-      # So `false` and a >= 400 status are inert here by design.
-      def run_after(middleware_classes, request, response)
-        origin = response
-
-        # 1. Block-based after handlers (pattern-matched)
-        after_handlers.each do |entry|
-          next unless matches_pattern?(request.path, entry[:pattern])
-
-          begin
-            entry[:handler].call(request, response)
-          rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
-            middleware_500(response, "after handler", error)
-          end
-        end
-
-        # 2. Class-based middleware: call every after_* method (definition order)
-        middleware_classes.each do |klass|
-          after_methods_for(klass).each do |method_name|
-            begin
-              result = klass.send(method_name, request, response)
-            rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
-              middleware_500(response, "#{class_label(klass)}.#{method_name}", error)
-              next
-            end
-            if result.is_a?(Tina4::Response)
-              response = result
-            elsif result.is_a?(Array) && result.length == 2
-              request, response = result
-            end
-          end
-        end
-
-        adopt_response(origin, response) unless response.equal?(origin)
-        response
-      end
-
-      # Deterministic clean 500 for a middleware that threw. Logs the cause
-      # (NEVER silent) then sets the response to the canonical error shape —
-      # byte-identical to the Python master ({"error":"Internal Server Error",
-      # "status":500} + status 500). Returns the response for chaining.
-      def middleware_500(response, label, error)
-        begin
-          Tina4::Log.error(
-            "Middleware #{label} raised #{error.class.name}: #{error.message}"
-          )
-        rescue StandardError
-          begin
-            $stderr.puts("Middleware #{label} raised #{error.class.name}: #{error.message}")
-            $stderr.flush
-          rescue StandardError
-            # never let logging break the worker
-          end
-        end
-        response.json({ error: "Internal Server Error", status: 500 }, 500)
-      end
-
-      # The `false` row of the return-value table, on its own.
-      #
-      # A middleware that halts by returning false keeps the response it set;
-      # only a response still left default/empty becomes a 403. Public because
-      # per-route "filter" middleware (a 2-arg callable returning false, see
-      # Tina4::Route#run_middleware) must obey the SAME row as a before_* hook,
-      # and the rule should exist exactly once.
-      def refuse(request, response)
-        forbid(request, response) if default_response?(response)
-        response
-      end
-
-      private
-
-      # ── THE BEFORE-HOOK RETURN-VALUE TABLE ────────────────────────────────
-      #
-      # Interpret ONE before_* hook's return value. Identical in Python, PHP,
-      # Ruby and Node, and applied at EVERY scope — global (Router.use) and
-      # per-route (route.middleware) both land here.
-      #
-      #   a Tina4::Response      SHORT-CIRCUIT. That object IS the response, at
-      #                          ANY status. This is the PRIMARY rule: it is the
-      #                          only one that can express a 302 redirect.
-      #   [request, response]    rebind both, continue
-      #   false                  SHORT-CIRCUIT. Send the response AS SET; only
-      #                          when it is still default/empty does it become a
-      #                          403. (Per-route middleware used to answer a
-      #                          halt with a HARDCODED 403 that threw away
-      #                          whatever the middleware had set — that is gone.)
-      #   nil / anything else    continue
-      #
-      # LEGACY COMPATIBILITY PATH (retained, deliberately NOT the main
-      # mechanism): after the hook returns, a response status >= 400 also
-      # short-circuits, even when the hook returned nil. Middleware written
-      # before the Response rule existed signals refusal that way, so it stays
-      # honoured — but it cannot express a 3xx redirect, which is exactly why
-      # the Response rule above is primary and this one is the fallback.
-      #
-      # This check used to be nested INSIDE the "returned a 2-element Array"
-      # branch, so a hook that set 403 and returned nil was ignored and the
-      # handler RAN — an auth middleware that refused without returning the pair
-      # was a no-op. Python, PHP and Node all check the status unconditionally
-      # after the call; Rails short-circuits on the response STATE, not on what
-      # the filter returned. Now it is unconditional here too.
-      #
-      # Returns [halt?, request, response].
-      def apply_before_result(result, request, response)
-        if result.is_a?(Tina4::Response)
-          return [true, request, result]
-        elsif result.is_a?(Array) && result.length == 2
-          request, response = result
-        elsif result == false
-          refuse(request, response)
-          return [true, request, response]
-        end
-
-        status = status_of(response)
-        return [true, request, response] if status.is_a?(Integer) && status >= 400
-
-        [false, request, response]
-      end
-
-      # Read a response's status defensively — a middleware may hand back any
-      # response-shaped object. Mirrors the Python master's
-      # `getattr(response, "status_code", None) or getattr(response, "status", 0)`.
-      def status_of(response)
-        return response.status_code if response.respond_to?(:status_code)
-        return response.status if response.respond_to?(:status)
-
-        nil
-      end
-
-      # Has this response been left untouched? Only then does a `false` return
-      # get turned into a 403 — a middleware that already answered keeps its
-      # own answer.
-      def default_response?(response)
-        status = status_of(response)
-        return false unless status.nil? || status == 200
-
-        body = response.respond_to?(:body) ? response.body : nil
-        body.to_s.empty?
-      end
-
-      # The canonical refusal (ERR-DEC-01/ERR-DEC-02): routed through the SAME
-      # negotiated renderer 404/500 use, so a middleware refusal looks like
-      # every other error page - a user template if the app ships one, the
-      # framework's 403.twig otherwise, negotiated JSON for an API client -
-      # instead of the old bare/un-negotiated `{"error":"Forbidden","status":403}`.
-      def forbid(request, response)
-        request_id = Tina4::Log.get_request_id || ""
-        accept = request.respond_to?(:headers) ? (request.headers["accept"] || "") : ""
-
-        if Tina4::Template.wants_json?(accept)
-          set_response_json(response, error_json_body(request_id))
-          return response
-        end
-
-        path = request.respond_to?(:path) ? request.path.to_s : ""
-        html = begin
-          Tina4::Template.render_error(403, { "path" => CGI.escapeHTML(path), "request_id" => request_id })
-        rescue StandardError
-          nil
-        end
-
-        if html && response.respond_to?(:html)
-          response.html(html, 403)
-        else
-          set_response_json(response, error_json_body(request_id))
-        end
-        response
-      end
-
-      # The canonical JSON error envelope (ERR-DEC-02) - the SAME shape
-      # Python/PHP/Node build: {error: true, code, message, status, request_id}.
-      def error_json_body(request_id)
-        { error: true, code: "FORBIDDEN", message: "Forbidden", status: 403, request_id: request_id }
-      end
-
-      def set_response_json(response, body)
-        if response.respond_to?(:json)
-          response.json(body, 403)
-        elsif response.respond_to?(:status_code=)
-          response.status_code = 403
-        end
-      end
-
-      # Copy a response's state onto the object the CALLER still holds.
-      #
-      # Ruby passes references, so a hook that MUTATES the response it was given
-      # needs nothing from us. This exists for the hook that hands back a
-      # DIFFERENT Response object: the contract says that object IS the
-      # response, and the dispatcher only ever serves the one it passed in.
-      # Applied on the halt paths, where the response is the answer.
-      def adopt_response(target, source)
-        return target unless target.is_a?(Tina4::Response) && source.is_a?(Tina4::Response)
-
-        target.status_code = source.status_code
-        target.headers     = source.headers
-        target.body        = source.body
-        target.cookies     = source.cookies
-        target
-      end
-
-      # Human-readable label for a middleware (class name, or the class of an
-      # instance) used in the logged 500 message.
-      def class_label(klass)
-        if klass.is_a?(Class) || klass.is_a?(Module)
-          klass.name || klass.to_s
-        else
-          klass.class.name || klass.class.to_s
-        end
-      end
-
-      def matches_pattern?(path, pattern)
-        return true if pattern.nil?
-        case pattern
-        when String
-          path.start_with?(pattern)
-        when Regexp
-          pattern.match?(path)
-        else
-          true
-        end
-      end
-
-      # Collect all class methods matching before_* in DEFINITION order.
-      def before_methods_for(klass)
-        discover_methods(klass, "before_")
-      end
-
-      # Collect all class methods matching after_* in DEFINITION order.
-      def after_methods_for(klass)
-        discover_methods(klass, "after_")
-      end
-
-      # ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-      # MIDDLEWARE ORDERING (M1) — within a class, before_*/after_* methods run
-      # in SOURCE-DEFINITION order, NOT alphabetical. Cross-class order is the
-      # natural iteration of the registered middleware list (registration
-      # order). before_* run before the handler, after_* after.
-      #
-      # WHY source line numbers, not instance_methods(false): in Ruby/PRISM
-      # `instance_methods(false)` is NOT a reliable definition-order report —
-      # once a method NAME (symbol) has been defined on any other class first,
-      # that name can sort ahead in a later class's list. So we sort the
-      # matching methods by their `source_location` line number, which IS the
-      # true source-definition order and is immune to the symbol-table quirk.
-      # (Methods with no source_location — e.g. C-defined — sort to the front
-      # deterministically by name.) We walk the ancestry base→derived so
-      # inherited middleware methods run before a subclass's own, de-duping
-      # overrides to their first (base) position. Mirrors the Python master's
-      # Middleware._discover_methods MRO walk (which leans on __dict__ insertion
-      # order — the equivalent of source-definition order).
-      def discover_methods(klass, prefix)
-        target = klass.is_a?(Class) || klass.is_a?(Module) ? klass.singleton_class : klass.class
-        seen = {}
-        names = []
-        target.ancestors.reverse_each do |ancestor|
-          matched = begin
-                      ancestor.instance_methods(false).select do |name|
-                        name.to_s.start_with?(prefix) &&
-                          !seen.key?(name) &&
-                          klass.respond_to?(name)
-                      end
-                    rescue StandardError
-                      []
-                    end
-
-          ordered = matched.sort_by.with_index do |name, idx|
-            line = begin
-                     loc = ancestor.instance_method(name).source_location
-                     loc ? loc[1] : -1
-                   rescue StandardError
-                     -1
-                   end
-            # Tie-break on the symbol-table index so the result is total/stable.
-            [line, idx]
-          end
-
-          ordered.each do |name|
-            seen[name] = true
-            names << name
-          end
-        end
-        names
-      end
-    end
-  end
-
-  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  # Built-in class-based middleware
-  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-  # CorsClassMiddleware -- sets CORS headers from env vars on every response.
-  #
-  # A thin adapter over Tina4::CorsMiddleware, which owns the whole policy.
-  # It used to be a SECOND, independent implementation of the same rules and
-  # the two had already drifted: this copy had no wildcard/credentials guard,
-  # fell back to the Referer header (a full URL, not an origin), and on an
-  # allow-list MISS returned `allowed.first` - stamping some OTHER allowed
-  # origin onto the response of an origin that was not allowed at all. One
-  # feature, one implementation.
-  class CorsClassMiddleware
-    class << self
-      def before_cors(request, response)
-        env = request.respond_to?(:env) && request.env ? request.env : {}
-        origin = request.headers["origin"] if request.respond_to?(:headers)
-        env = env.merge("HTTP_ORIGIN" => origin) if origin
-
-        Tina4::CorsMiddleware.apply_headers(response.headers, env)
-
-        [request, response]
-      end
-    end
-  end
-
-  # RateLimiterMiddleware -- tracks requests per IP, returns 429 when exceeded.
-  # Config via env: TINA4_RATE_LIMIT (default 100), TINA4_RATE_WINDOW (default 60s).
-  class RateLimiterMiddleware
-    @store = {}
-    @mutex = Mutex.new
-    @last_cleanup = Time.now
-
-    class << self
-      def before_rate_limit(request, response)
-        limit  = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_LIMIT"]  || 100).to_i
-        window = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_WINDOW"] || 60).to_i
-        ip = request.ip || "unknown"
-        now = Time.now
-
-        cleanup_if_needed(now, window)
-
-        @mutex.synchronize do
-          @store[ip] ||= []
-          entries = @store[ip]
-
-          # Sliding window -- drop expired timestamps
-          cutoff = now - window
-          entries.reject! { |t| t < cutoff }
-
-          if entries.length >= limit
-            oldest = entries.first
-            retry_after = [(oldest + window - now).ceil, 1].max
-
-            response.headers["X-RateLimit-Limit"]     = limit.to_s
-            response.headers["X-RateLimit-Remaining"]  = "0"
-            response.headers["X-RateLimit-Reset"]      = (oldest + window).to_i.to_s
-            response.headers["Retry-After"]            = retry_after.to_s
-            response.json({ error: "Too Many Requests", retry_after: retry_after }, 429)
-
-            return [request, response]
-          end
-
-          entries << now
-
-          response.headers["X-RateLimit-Limit"]     = limit.to_s
-          response.headers["X-RateLimit-Remaining"]  = (limit - entries.length).to_s
-          response.headers["X-RateLimit-Reset"]      = (now + window).to_i.to_s
-        end
-
-        [request, response]
-      end
-
-      def check(ip)
-        limit  = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_LIMIT"]  || 100).to_i
-        window = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_WINDOW"] || 60).to_i
-        now = Time.now
-
-        @mutex.synchronize do
-          @store[ip] ||= []
-          entries = @store[ip]
-          entries.reject! { |t| t < now - window }
-
-          remaining = [limit - entries.length, 0].max
-          reset_at  = entries.empty? ? window : (entries.first + window - now).ceil
-
-          if entries.length >= limit
-            return [false, { limit: limit, remaining: 0, reset: reset_at, window: window }]
-          end
-
-          entries << now
-          [true, { limit: limit, remaining: remaining - 1, reset: window, window: window }]
-        end
-      end
-
-      # Allow resetting state (useful in tests)
-      def reset!
-        @mutex.synchronize { @store.clear }
-      end
-
-      private
-
-      def cleanup_if_needed(now, window)
-        return if now - @last_cleanup < window
-
-        @mutex.synchronize do
-          return if now - @last_cleanup < window
-
-          cutoff = now - window
-          @store.delete_if do |_ip, entries|
-            entries.reject! { |t| t < cutoff }
-            entries.empty?
-          end
-          @last_cleanup = now
-        end
-      end
-    end
-  end
-
-  # RequestLoggerMiddleware -- logs method, path, and elapsed time for every request.
-  class RequestLoggerMiddleware
-    @request_times = {}
-    @mutex = Mutex.new
-
-    class << self
-      def before_log(request, response)
-        request_key = "#{request.object_id}"
-        @mutex.synchronize do
-          @request_times[request_key] = Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
-        end
-        [request, response]
-      end
-
-      def after_log(request, response)
-        request_key = "#{request.object_id}"
-        start_time = @mutex.synchronize { @request_times.delete(request_key) }
-
-        if start_time
-          elapsed_ms = ((Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC) - start_time) * 1000).round(3)
-        else
-          elapsed_ms = 0.0
-        end
-
-        # v3.13.14: dropped the "[RequestLogger]" prefix for format parity
-        # with Python/PHP/Node — the line is just METHOD PATH -> STATUS (Nms).
-        Tina4::Log.info("#{request.method} #{request.path} -> #{response.status_code} (#{elapsed_ms}ms)")
-        [request, response]
-      end
-
-      def reset!
-        @mutex.synchronize { @request_times.clear }
-      end
-    end
-  end
-
-  # CsrfMiddleware -- validates form tokens on state-changing requests.
-  #
-  # OFF by default: the middleware is NOT attached unless TINA4_CSRF is truthy
-  # (true/1/yes/on -- see .attach_from_env, called once at boot in
-  # Tina4.initialize!) OR it is registered explicitly via
-  # Router.use(CsrfMiddleware). Once attached, TINA4_CSRF=false (or 0/no) is the
-  # kill switch that disables enforcement again.
-  #
-  # Behaviour (identical to the Python master's CsrfMiddleware.before_csrf):
-  #   - Skips GET, HEAD, OPTIONS (safe methods).
-  #   - Skips a public write route (.no_auth / auth: false -- auth_required
-  #     false). The matched Route is attached to the request before this
-  #     post-match middleware runs, so a genuinely public endpoint (login,
-  #     webhook) is not gated.
-  #   - Fails CLOSED: with TINA4_SECRET unset the signing secret resolves to
-  #     blank (there is NO built-in default), and a blank HMAC key is publicly
-  #     reproducible -- so no token can be trusted and every write is rejected
-  #     (403). This is the SEC-01 no-default-secret guarantee.
-  #   - Skips a request carrying a valid Authorization: Bearer token (API clients).
-  #   - Reads request.body["formToken"] then the X-Form-Token header.
-  #   - Rejects a token sent in the query string (403 + a logged warning) -- a
-  #     URL leaks through logs, referers and history.
-  #   - Validates the token with Auth.valid_token using the resolved secret, and
-  #     enforces that the token's "type" claim is "form" -- a non-form JWT in the
-  #     formToken slot is rejected even when its signature verifies.
-  #   - If the token carries a session_id, it must match the request session's id.
-  #   - Every rejection is HTTP 403 with the CSRF_INVALID envelope
-  #     ({error:true, code:"CSRF_INVALID", message:, status:403}) via
-  #     response.error -- byte-identical to Python/PHP/Node.
-  class CsrfMiddleware
-    class << self
-      def before_csrf(request, response)
-        # 1. Kill switch -- TINA4_CSRF in {false,0,no} disables all CSRF checks,
-        #    even when the middleware is attached explicitly. Unset = enforced.
-        csrf_env = ENV["TINA4_CSRF"].to_s.strip.downcase
-        return [request, response] if %w[false 0 no].include?(csrf_env)
-
-        # 2. Safe HTTP methods never change state -- skip.
-        method = (request.method || "GET").upcase
-        return [request, response] if %w[GET HEAD OPTIONS].include?(method)
-
-        # 3. Public write routes (.no_auth / auth: false) skip CSRF -- a
-        #    genuinely public endpoint has no session to protect. The matched
-        #    Route is attached to the request before this post-match middleware
-        #    runs (DispatchPipeline#prepare_route_request); a public write route
-        #    has auth_required == false -- the SAME signal the auth gate reads.
-        #    (Reading request.handler, as this once did, was dead code: the live
-        #    request never carries a handler, so the no_auth skip never fired.)
-        route = request.respond_to?(:route) ? request.route : nil
-        if route.respond_to?(:auth_required) && route.auth_required == false
-          return [request, response]
-        end
-
-        # 4/5. Resolve the signing secret ONCE, fail-closed. TINA4_SECRET unset
-        #      resolves to blank (there is NO built-in default); a blank HMAC key
-        #      is publicly reproducible, so a token signed with it -- or with the
-        #      retired public 'tina4-default-secret' -- is a forgery. Reject every
-        #      write rather than validate against a guessable key. SEC-01.
-        secret = Tina4::Auth.hmac_secret
-        if secret.to_s.empty?
-          return [request, response.error(
-            "CSRF_INVALID",
-            "CSRF token cannot be validated: TINA4_SECRET is not set",
-            403
-          )]
-        end
-
-        # 6. A valid Bearer JWT means an API client authenticating per request --
-        #    not subject to the cookie-replay attack CSRF defends against.
-        headers = request.respond_to?(:headers) ? request.headers : {}
-        auth_header = (headers["authorization"] || headers["Authorization"] || "").to_s
-        if auth_header.start_with?("Bearer ")
-          bearer_token = auth_header[7..].to_s.strip
-          return [request, response] if !bearer_token.empty? && Tina4::Auth.valid_token(bearer_token)
-        end
-
-        # 7. A token in the query string leaks through logs/referers/history --
-        #    reject it. Read the QUERY STRING only, never request.params, which
-        #    merges the body (a legit body token would false-trip this check).
-        query = request.respond_to?(:query) ? request.query : {}
-        query = {} unless query.is_a?(Hash)
-        if !query["formToken"].to_s.empty?
-          Tina4::Log.warning("[CSRF] Token found in query string — rejected for security")
-          return [request, response.error(
-            "CSRF_INVALID",
-            "Form token must not be sent in the URL query string",
-            403
-          )]
-        end
-
-        # 8. Extract the token: body first, then the X-Form-Token header.
-        token = nil
-        body = request.respond_to?(:body) ? request.body : nil
-        token = body["formToken"] if body.is_a?(Hash)
-        if token.nil? || token.to_s.empty?
-          token = headers["X-Form-Token"] || headers["x-form-token"]
-        end
-
-        # 9. Missing token -- reject.
-        if token.nil? || token.to_s.empty?
-          return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
-        end
-
-        # 10. Validate signature + expiry with the resolved secret. valid_token
-        #     returns the verified payload Hash (or nil) in 3.13.0+.
-        payload = Tina4::Auth.valid_token(token.to_s)
-        unless payload
-          return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
-        end
-
-        # 11. Enforce the form-token TYPE -- a valid signature is not enough. A
-        #     non-form JWT (e.g. an auth/session token) must never be accepted in
-        #     the formToken slot.
-        payload = {} unless payload.is_a?(Hash)
-        if payload["type"] != "form"
-          return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
-        end
-
-        # 12. Session binding -- a token minted for one session cannot be replayed
-        #     against another. Read the request session's OWN id: Tina4::Session
-        #     exposes get_session_id (NOT session_id -- reading session_id then
-        #     session.get("session_id") looked up a DATA key, never the id, so
-        #     binding silently never fired against a real session). A plain Hash
-        #     session exposes "session_id".
-        token_session_id = payload["session_id"]
-        if token_session_id
-          session = request.respond_to?(:session) ? request.session : nil
-          current_session_id =
-            if session.nil?
-              nil
-            elsif session.respond_to?(:session_id)
-              session.session_id
-            elsif session.respond_to?(:get_session_id)
-              session.get_session_id
-            elsif session.is_a?(Hash)
-              session["session_id"]
-            end
-
-          if current_session_id && token_session_id != current_session_id
-            return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
-          end
-        end
-
-        # 13. All checks passed.
-        [request, response]
-      end
-
-      # Auto-attach CsrfMiddleware when TINA4_CSRF is enabled in the environment.
-      #
-      # CSRF is OFF by default: with TINA4_CSRF unset the middleware is never
-      # attached, so a default app has no CSRF gate. A truthy value
-      # (true/1/yes/on, case-insensitive) attaches it globally so every
-      # state-changing route is gated -- the env flag is the switch, no code
-      # change needed. Idempotent (Middleware.use de-dupes). Returns true when the
-      # middleware is now attached. Mirrors the Python master's
-      # attach_csrf_from_env; the framework calls it once at boot
-      # (Tina4.initialize!). A false/0/no value still lets an explicit
-      # Router.use(CsrfMiddleware) opt-in be disabled at runtime by the kill
-      # switch in before_csrf.
-      def attach_from_env
-        value = ENV["TINA4_CSRF"].to_s.strip.downcase
-        if %w[true 1 yes on].include?(value)
-          Tina4::Middleware.use(Tina4::CsrfMiddleware)
-          return true
-        end
-        false
-      end
-    end
-  end
-
-  # SecurityHeadersMiddleware -- injects security headers on every response.
-  # Config via env:
-  #   TINA4_FRAME_OPTIONS       — X-Frame-Options (default: SAMEORIGIN)
-  #   TINA4_HSTS                — Strict-Transport-Security max-age (default: "" = off)
-  #   TINA4_CSP                 — Content-Security-Policy (default: "default-src 'self'")
-  #   TINA4_REFERRER_POLICY     — Referrer-Policy (default: strict-origin-when-cross-origin)
-  #   TINA4_PERMISSIONS_POLICY  — Permissions-Policy (default: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=())
-  class SecurityHeadersMiddleware
-    class << self
-      # Register this middleware in the default chain (secure-by-default).
-      #
-      # Unlike CSRF (opt-in via TINA4_CSRF) this is UNCONDITIONAL: a default app
-      # ships the security headers with no opt-in -- the SECHDR-DEC-01 posture
-      # that closes the SECHDR-OFF-BY-DEFAULT gap (the middleware existed with good
-      # defaults but was never registered). Idempotent (Middleware.use de-dupes).
-      # The framework calls it once at boot (Tina4.initialize!). Returns true.
-      def attach
-        Tina4::Middleware.use(self)
-        true
-      end
-
-      def before_security(request, response)
-        response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = ENV["TINA4_FRAME_OPTIONS"] || "SAMEORIGIN"
-        response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
-
-        # HSTS is HTTPS-only (SECHDR-DEC-02): a downgrade-protection header on a
-        # plain-HTTP response is inert at best and ships a bad max-age on an
-        # unencrypted scheme at worst. Emit it ONLY when TINA4_HSTS is set AND the
-        # request is HTTPS -- Request.secure_scheme? honours x-forwarded-proto
-        # (first hop) then rack.url_scheme, the same source of truth the session
-        # cookie's Secure flag uses. Defensive env lookup keeps a non-Request from
-        # turning every response into a 500 now that this runs on every request.
-        hsts = ENV["TINA4_HSTS"] || ""
-        env = request.respond_to?(:env) ? request.env : {}
-        if !hsts.empty? && Tina4::Request.secure_scheme?(env)
-          response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = "max-age=#{hsts}; includeSubDomains"
-        end
-
-        response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = ENV["TINA4_CSP"] || "default-src 'self'"
-        response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = ENV["TINA4_REFERRER_POLICY"] || "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
-        response.headers["X-XSS-Protection"] = "0"
-        response.headers["Permissions-Policy"] = ENV["TINA4_PERMISSIONS_POLICY"] || "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
-
-        [request, response]
-      end
-    end
-  end
-end
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require "cgi"
+
+module Tina4
+  class Middleware
+    class << self
+      def before_handlers
+        @before_handlers ||= []
+      end
+
+      def after_handlers
+        @after_handlers ||= []
+      end
+
+      # Registry of class-based middleware (registered via Router.use)
+      def global_middleware
+        @global_middleware ||= []
+      end
+
+      # Parity alias matching Python/PHP/Node orchestrators.
+      def get_global
+        global_middleware.dup
+      end
+
+      def before(pattern = nil, &block)
+        before_handlers << { pattern: pattern, handler: block }
+      end
+
+      def after(pattern = nil, &block)
+        after_handlers << { pattern: pattern, handler: block }
+      end
+
+      # Register a class-based middleware globally.
+      # The class should define static before_* and/or after_* methods.
+      def use(klass)
+        global_middleware << klass unless global_middleware.include?(klass)
+      end
+
+      # Global middleware that runs BEFORE route matching.
+      #
+      # A middleware opts in by declaring `def self.pre_match?; true; end`.
+      #
+      # NOT `before_match?` - the hook discovery treats every `before_*` method
+      # as a middleware hook and calls it with (request, response), so that name
+      # made the flag itself run as middleware and 500 the request.
+      # Everything else stays where it has always run - after matching - so
+      # this is additive and no existing middleware changes behaviour.
+      #
+      # The split exists because the two groups need opposite things. CORS must
+      # run before matching so its headers survive a short-circuited 401/403;
+      # a browser that gets a 401 without them reports a CORS error and the real
+      # status is invisible. CSRF must run AFTER, because it reads the matched
+      # route's metadata to honour a route marked no_auth - PHP shipped exactly
+      # that bypass as dead code once, because the metadata was not set yet.
+      def pre_match_middleware
+        global_middleware.select { |k| k.respond_to?(:pre_match?) && k.pre_match? }
+      end
+
+      # Global middleware that runs after matching, once the matched route's
+      # metadata is readable. This is the default.
+      def post_match_middleware
+        global_middleware.reject { |k| k.respond_to?(:pre_match?) && k.pre_match? }
+      end
+
+      def clear!
+        @before_handlers = []
+        @after_handlers = []
+        @global_middleware = []
+      end
+
+      # Run all "before" hooks: block-based handlers, then class-based before_*
+      # methods (in definition order).
+      #
+      # Signature matches Python/PHP/Node orchestrators: pass the list of
+      # middleware classes explicitly.
+      #
+      # THE RETURN-VALUE CONTRACT is #apply_before_result below — one table,
+      # applied to EVERY before_* hook at EVERY scope. Per-route middleware
+      # comes through this same method (Tina4::Route#run_middleware), so there
+      # is exactly one implementation of the table, not two.
+      #
+      # M2 — visible-but-resilient: every before_* call is wrapped so a THROW
+      # never crashes the worker. On a throw the error is LOGGED and the
+      # response becomes a clean 500 ({"error":"Internal Server Error",
+      # "status":500}), then processing halts (handler skipped) — deterministic,
+      # never an unhandled exception. after_* still run on either halt path
+      # (see the dispatcher / #run_after docstring).
+      #
+      # Returns true on success, or false to halt the request (handler skipped).
+      def run_before(middleware_classes, request, response)
+        # The response object the CALLER holds. A hook may hand back a
+        # different Response; on a halt that object IS the answer, so its state
+        # is adopted onto this one before returning — otherwise the dispatcher
+        # would serve the object it still has a reference to and the
+        # short-circuit would silently vanish.
+        origin = response
+
+        # 1. Block-based before handlers (pattern-matched). These are a
+        #    Ruby-only surface (Python/PHP/Node have no block form) and keep
+        #    their historical "false halts" contract: a block's value is its
+        #    last expression, so reading a returned Response as a
+        #    short-circuit would fire on any block ending in a chainable
+        #    response call.
+        before_handlers.each do |entry|
+          next unless matches_pattern?(request.path, entry[:pattern])
+
+          begin
+            result = entry[:handler].call(request, response)
+          rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
+            middleware_500(response, "before handler", error)
+            return false
+          end
+          return false if result == false
+        end
+
+        # 2. Class-based middleware: call every before_* method (definition order)
+        middleware_classes.each do |klass|
+          before_methods_for(klass).each do |method_name|
+            begin
+              result = klass.send(method_name, request, response)
+            rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
+              middleware_500(response, "#{class_label(klass)}.#{method_name}", error)
+              return false
+            end
+
+            halt, request, response = apply_before_result(result, request, response)
+            next unless halt
+
+            adopt_response(origin, response) unless response.equal?(origin)
+            return false
+          end
+        end
+
+        true
+      end
+
+      # Run all "after" hooks: block-based handlers, then class-based after_*
+      # methods (in definition order).
+      #
+      # Signature matches Python/PHP/Node orchestrators: pass the list of
+      # middleware classes explicitly.
+      #
+      # AFTER-ON-4xx RULE (M2, documented + consistent across all 4 frameworks):
+      # after_* ALWAYS run even when a before_* short-circuited with status >= 400
+      # and the handler was skipped — so they can still add headers / logging.
+      # The dispatcher calls #run_after unconditionally after the before/handler
+      # block (including on the 4xx / throw halt path).
+      #
+      # M2 — every after_* call is wrapped: a THROW is LOGGED and turns the
+      # response into a clean 500, then the REMAINING after_* still run (they
+      # may add headers/logging). Never an unhandled crash.
+      #
+      # RETURN VALUES: an after_* hook shapes the response the same way a
+      # before_* one does — a returned Tina4::Response BECOMES the response, a
+      # returned [request, response] pair rebinds both. What it CANNOT do is
+      # halt: the handler has already run, so there is nothing left to skip,
+      # and stopping the remaining after_* would contradict the AFTER-ON-4xx
+      # resilience rule above (they exist to add headers/logging on every path).
+      # So `false` and a >= 400 status are inert here by design.
+      def run_after(middleware_classes, request, response)
+        origin = response
+
+        # 1. Block-based after handlers (pattern-matched)
+        after_handlers.each do |entry|
+          next unless matches_pattern?(request.path, entry[:pattern])
+
+          begin
+            entry[:handler].call(request, response)
+          rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
+            middleware_500(response, "after handler", error)
+          end
+        end
+
+        # 2. Class-based middleware: call every after_* method (definition order)
+        middleware_classes.each do |klass|
+          after_methods_for(klass).each do |method_name|
+            begin
+              result = klass.send(method_name, request, response)
+            rescue StandardError, ScriptError => error
+              middleware_500(response, "#{class_label(klass)}.#{method_name}", error)
+              next
+            end
+            if result.is_a?(Tina4::Response)
+              response = result
+            elsif result.is_a?(Array) && result.length == 2
+              request, response = result
+            end
+          end
+        end
+
+        adopt_response(origin, response) unless response.equal?(origin)
+        response
+      end
+
+      # Deterministic clean 500 for a middleware that threw. Logs the cause
+      # (NEVER silent) then sets the response to the canonical error shape —
+      # byte-identical to the Python master ({"error":"Internal Server Error",
+      # "status":500} + status 500). Returns the response for chaining.
+      def middleware_500(response, label, error)
+        begin
+          Tina4::Log.error(
+            "Middleware #{label} raised #{error.class.name}: #{error.message}"
+          )
+        rescue StandardError
+          begin
+            $stderr.puts("Middleware #{label} raised #{error.class.name}: #{error.message}")
+            $stderr.flush
+          rescue StandardError
+            # never let logging break the worker
+          end
+        end
+        response.json({ error: "Internal Server Error", status: 500 }, 500)
+      end
+
+      # The `false` row of the return-value table, on its own.
+      #
+      # A middleware that halts by returning false keeps the response it set;
+      # only a response still left default/empty becomes a 403. Public because
+      # per-route "filter" middleware (a 2-arg callable returning false, see
+      # Tina4::Route#run_middleware) must obey the SAME row as a before_* hook,
+      # and the rule should exist exactly once.
+      def refuse(request, response)
+        forbid(request, response) if default_response?(response)
+        response
+      end
+
+      private
+
+      # ── THE BEFORE-HOOK RETURN-VALUE TABLE ────────────────────────────────
+      #
+      # Interpret ONE before_* hook's return value. Identical in Python, PHP,
+      # Ruby and Node, and applied at EVERY scope — global (Router.use) and
+      # per-route (route.middleware) both land here.
+      #
+      #   a Tina4::Response      SHORT-CIRCUIT. That object IS the response, at
+      #                          ANY status. This is the PRIMARY rule: it is the
+      #                          only one that can express a 302 redirect.
+      #   [request, response]    rebind both, continue
+      #   false                  SHORT-CIRCUIT. Send the response AS SET; only
+      #                          when it is still default/empty does it become a
+      #                          403. (Per-route middleware used to answer a
+      #                          halt with a HARDCODED 403 that threw away
+      #                          whatever the middleware had set — that is gone.)
+      #   nil / anything else    continue
+      #
+      # LEGACY COMPATIBILITY PATH (retained, deliberately NOT the main
+      # mechanism): after the hook returns, a response status >= 400 also
+      # short-circuits, even when the hook returned nil. Middleware written
+      # before the Response rule existed signals refusal that way, so it stays
+      # honoured — but it cannot express a 3xx redirect, which is exactly why
+      # the Response rule above is primary and this one is the fallback.
+      #
+      # This check used to be nested INSIDE the "returned a 2-element Array"
+      # branch, so a hook that set 403 and returned nil was ignored and the
+      # handler RAN — an auth middleware that refused without returning the pair
+      # was a no-op. Python, PHP and Node all check the status unconditionally
+      # after the call; Rails short-circuits on the response STATE, not on what
+      # the filter returned. Now it is unconditional here too.
+      #
+      # Returns [halt?, request, response].
+      def apply_before_result(result, request, response)
+        if result.is_a?(Tina4::Response)
+          return [true, request, result]
+        elsif result.is_a?(Array) && result.length == 2
+          request, response = result
+        elsif result == false
+          refuse(request, response)
+          return [true, request, response]
+        end
+
+        status = status_of(response)
+        return [true, request, response] if status.is_a?(Integer) && status >= 400
+
+        [false, request, response]
+      end
+
+      # Read a response's status defensively — a middleware may hand back any
+      # response-shaped object. Mirrors the Python master's
+      # `getattr(response, "status_code", None) or getattr(response, "status", 0)`.
+      def status_of(response)
+        return response.status_code if response.respond_to?(:status_code)
+        return response.status if response.respond_to?(:status)
+
+        nil
+      end
+
+      # Has this response been left untouched? Only then does a `false` return
+      # get turned into a 403 — a middleware that already answered keeps its
+      # own answer.
+      def default_response?(response)
+        status = status_of(response)
+        return false unless status.nil? || status == 200
+
+        body = response.respond_to?(:body) ? response.body : nil
+        body.to_s.empty?
+      end
+
+      # The canonical refusal (ERR-DEC-01/ERR-DEC-02): routed through the SAME
+      # negotiated renderer 404/500 use, so a middleware refusal looks like
+      # every other error page - a user template if the app ships one, the
+      # framework's 403.twig otherwise, negotiated JSON for an API client -
+      # instead of the old bare/un-negotiated `{"error":"Forbidden","status":403}`.
+      def forbid(request, response)
+        request_id = Tina4::Log.get_request_id || ""
+        accept = request.respond_to?(:headers) ? (request.headers["accept"] || "") : ""
+
+        if Tina4::Template.wants_json?(accept)
+          set_response_json(response, error_json_body(request_id))
+          return response
+        end
+
+        path = request.respond_to?(:path) ? request.path.to_s : ""
+        html = begin
+          Tina4::Template.render_error(403, { "path" => CGI.escapeHTML(path), "request_id" => request_id })
+        rescue StandardError
+          nil
+        end
+
+        if html && response.respond_to?(:html)
+          response.html(html, 403)
+        else
+          set_response_json(response, error_json_body(request_id))
+        end
+        response
+      end
+
+      # The canonical JSON error envelope (ERR-DEC-02) - the SAME shape
+      # Python/PHP/Node build: {error: true, code, message, status, request_id}.
+      def error_json_body(request_id)
+        { error: true, code: "FORBIDDEN", message: "Forbidden", status: 403, request_id: request_id }
+      end
+
+      def set_response_json(response, body)
+        if response.respond_to?(:json)
+          response.json(body, 403)
+        elsif response.respond_to?(:status_code=)
+          response.status_code = 403
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Copy a response's state onto the object the CALLER still holds.
+      #
+      # Ruby passes references, so a hook that MUTATES the response it was given
+      # needs nothing from us. This exists for the hook that hands back a
+      # DIFFERENT Response object: the contract says that object IS the
+      # response, and the dispatcher only ever serves the one it passed in.
+      # Applied on the halt paths, where the response is the answer.
+      def adopt_response(target, source)
+        return target unless target.is_a?(Tina4::Response) && source.is_a?(Tina4::Response)
+
+        target.status_code = source.status_code
+        target.headers     = source.headers
+        target.body        = source.body
+        target.cookies     = source.cookies
+        target
+      end
+
+      # Human-readable label for a middleware (class name, or the class of an
+      # instance) used in the logged 500 message.
+      def class_label(klass)
+        if klass.is_a?(Class) || klass.is_a?(Module)
+          klass.name || klass.to_s
+        else
+          klass.class.name || klass.class.to_s
+        end
+      end
+
+      def matches_pattern?(path, pattern)
+        return true if pattern.nil?
+        case pattern
+        when String
+          path.start_with?(pattern)
+        when Regexp
+          pattern.match?(path)
+        else
+          true
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Collect all class methods matching before_* in DEFINITION order.
+      def before_methods_for(klass)
+        discover_methods(klass, "before_")
+      end
+
+      # Collect all class methods matching after_* in DEFINITION order.
+      def after_methods_for(klass)
+        discover_methods(klass, "after_")
+      end
+
+      # ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+      # MIDDLEWARE ORDERING (M1) — within a class, before_*/after_* methods run
+      # in SOURCE-DEFINITION order, NOT alphabetical. Cross-class order is the
+      # natural iteration of the registered middleware list (registration
+      # order). before_* run before the handler, after_* after.
+      #
+      # WHY source line numbers, not instance_methods(false): in Ruby/PRISM
+      # `instance_methods(false)` is NOT a reliable definition-order report —
+      # once a method NAME (symbol) has been defined on any other class first,
+      # that name can sort ahead in a later class's list. So we sort the
+      # matching methods by their `source_location` line number, which IS the
+      # true source-definition order and is immune to the symbol-table quirk.
+      # (Methods with no source_location — e.g. C-defined — sort to the front
+      # deterministically by name.) We walk the ancestry base→derived so
+      # inherited middleware methods run before a subclass's own, de-duping
+      # overrides to their first (base) position. Mirrors the Python master's
+      # Middleware._discover_methods MRO walk (which leans on __dict__ insertion
+      # order — the equivalent of source-definition order).
+      def discover_methods(klass, prefix)
+        target = klass.is_a?(Class) || klass.is_a?(Module) ? klass.singleton_class : klass.class
+        seen = {}
+        names = []
+        target.ancestors.reverse_each do |ancestor|
+          matched = begin
+                      ancestor.instance_methods(false).select do |name|
+                        name.to_s.start_with?(prefix) &&
+                          !seen.key?(name) &&
+                          klass.respond_to?(name)
+                      end
+                    rescue StandardError
+                      []
+                    end
+
+          ordered = matched.sort_by.with_index do |name, idx|
+            line = begin
+                     loc = ancestor.instance_method(name).source_location
+                     loc ? loc[1] : -1
+                   rescue StandardError
+                     -1
+                   end
+            # Tie-break on the symbol-table index so the result is total/stable.
+            [line, idx]
+          end
+
+          ordered.each do |name|
+            seen[name] = true
+            names << name
+          end
+        end
+        names
+      end
+    end
+  end
+
+  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  # Built-in class-based middleware
+  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  # CorsClassMiddleware -- sets CORS headers from env vars on every response.
+  #
+  # A thin adapter over Tina4::CorsMiddleware, which owns the whole policy.
+  # It used to be a SECOND, independent implementation of the same rules and
+  # the two had already drifted: this copy had no wildcard/credentials guard,
+  # fell back to the Referer header (a full URL, not an origin), and on an
+  # allow-list MISS returned `allowed.first` - stamping some OTHER allowed
+  # origin onto the response of an origin that was not allowed at all. One
+  # feature, one implementation.
+  class CorsClassMiddleware
+    class << self
+      def before_cors(request, response)
+        env = request.respond_to?(:env) && request.env ? request.env : {}
+        origin = request.headers["origin"] if request.respond_to?(:headers)
+        env = env.merge("HTTP_ORIGIN" => origin) if origin
+
+        Tina4::CorsMiddleware.apply_headers(response.headers, env)
+
+        [request, response]
+      end
+    end
+  end
+
+  # RateLimiterMiddleware -- tracks requests per IP, returns 429 when exceeded.
+  # Config via env: TINA4_RATE_LIMIT (default 100), TINA4_RATE_WINDOW (default 60s).
+  class RateLimiterMiddleware
+    @store = {}
+    @mutex = Mutex.new
+    @last_cleanup = Time.now
+
+    class << self
+      def before_rate_limit(request, response)
+        limit  = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_LIMIT"]  || 100).to_i
+        window = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_WINDOW"] || 60).to_i
+        ip = request.ip || "unknown"
+        now = Time.now
+
+        cleanup_if_needed(now, window)
+
+        @mutex.synchronize do
+          @store[ip] ||= []
+          entries = @store[ip]
+
+          # Sliding window -- drop expired timestamps
+          cutoff = now - window
+          entries.reject! { |t| t < cutoff }
+
+          if entries.length >= limit
+            oldest = entries.first
+            retry_after = [(oldest + window - now).ceil, 1].max
+
+            response.headers["X-RateLimit-Limit"]     = limit.to_s
+            response.headers["X-RateLimit-Remaining"]  = "0"
+            response.headers["X-RateLimit-Reset"]      = (oldest + window).to_i.to_s
+            response.headers["Retry-After"]            = retry_after.to_s
+            response.json({ error: "Too Many Requests", retry_after: retry_after }, 429)
+
+            return [request, response]
+          end
+
+          entries << now
+
+          response.headers["X-RateLimit-Limit"]     = limit.to_s
+          response.headers["X-RateLimit-Remaining"]  = (limit - entries.length).to_s
+          response.headers["X-RateLimit-Reset"]      = (now + window).to_i.to_s
+        end
+
+        [request, response]
+      end
+
+      def check(ip)
+        limit  = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_LIMIT"]  || 100).to_i
+        window = (ENV["TINA4_RATE_WINDOW"] || 60).to_i
+        now = Time.now
+
+        @mutex.synchronize do
+          @store[ip] ||= []
+          entries = @store[ip]
+          entries.reject! { |t| t < now - window }
+
+          remaining = [limit - entries.length, 0].max
+          reset_at  = entries.empty? ? window : (entries.first + window - now).ceil
+
+          if entries.length >= limit
+            return [false, { limit: limit, remaining: 0, reset: reset_at, window: window }]
+          end
+
+          entries << now
+          [true, { limit: limit, remaining: remaining - 1, reset: window, window: window }]
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Allow resetting state (useful in tests)
+      def reset!
+        @mutex.synchronize { @store.clear }
+      end
+
+      private
+
+      def cleanup_if_needed(now, window)
+        return if now - @last_cleanup < window
+
+        @mutex.synchronize do
+          return if now - @last_cleanup < window
+
+          cutoff = now - window
+          @store.delete_if do |_ip, entries|
+            entries.reject! { |t| t < cutoff }
+            entries.empty?
+          end
+          @last_cleanup = now
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+
+  # RequestLoggerMiddleware -- logs method, path, and elapsed time for every request.
+  class RequestLoggerMiddleware
+    @request_times = {}
+    @mutex = Mutex.new
+
+    class << self
+      def before_log(request, response)
+        request_key = "#{request.object_id}"
+        @mutex.synchronize do
+          @request_times[request_key] = Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
+        end
+        [request, response]
+      end
+
+      def after_log(request, response)
+        request_key = "#{request.object_id}"
+        start_time = @mutex.synchronize { @request_times.delete(request_key) }
+
+        if start_time
+          elapsed_ms = ((Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC) - start_time) * 1000).round(3)
+        else
+          elapsed_ms = 0.0
+        end
+
+        # v3.13.14: dropped the "[RequestLogger]" prefix for format parity
+        # with Python/PHP/Node — the line is just METHOD PATH -> STATUS (Nms).
+        Tina4::Log.info("#{request.method} #{request.path} -> #{response.status_code} (#{elapsed_ms}ms)")
+        [request, response]
+      end
+
+      def reset!
+        @mutex.synchronize { @request_times.clear }
+      end
+    end
+  end
+
+  # CsrfMiddleware -- validates form tokens on state-changing requests.
+  #
+  # OFF by default: the middleware is NOT attached unless TINA4_CSRF is truthy
+  # (true/1/yes/on -- see .attach_from_env, called once at boot in
+  # Tina4.initialize!) OR it is registered explicitly via
+  # Router.use(CsrfMiddleware). Once attached, TINA4_CSRF=false (or 0/no) is the
+  # kill switch that disables enforcement again.
+  #
+  # Behaviour (identical to the Python master's CsrfMiddleware.before_csrf):
+  #   - Skips GET, HEAD, OPTIONS (safe methods).
+  #   - Skips a public write route (.no_auth / auth: false -- auth_required
+  #     false). The matched Route is attached to the request before this
+  #     post-match middleware runs, so a genuinely public endpoint (login,
+  #     webhook) is not gated.
+  #   - Fails CLOSED: with TINA4_SECRET unset the signing secret resolves to
+  #     blank (there is NO built-in default), and a blank HMAC key is publicly
+  #     reproducible -- so no token can be trusted and every write is rejected
+  #     (403). This is the SEC-01 no-default-secret guarantee.
+  #   - Skips a request carrying a valid Authorization: Bearer token (API clients).
+  #   - Reads request.body["formToken"] then the X-Form-Token header.
+  #   - Rejects a token sent in the query string (403 + a logged warning) -- a
+  #     URL leaks through logs, referers and history.
+  #   - Validates the token with Auth.valid_token using the resolved secret, and
+  #     enforces that the token's "type" claim is "form" -- a non-form JWT in the
+  #     formToken slot is rejected even when its signature verifies.
+  #   - If the token carries a session_id, it must match the request session's id.
+  #   - Every rejection is HTTP 403 with the CSRF_INVALID envelope
+  #     ({error:true, code:"CSRF_INVALID", message:, status:403}) via
+  #     response.error -- byte-identical to Python/PHP/Node.
+  class CsrfMiddleware
+    class << self
+      def before_csrf(request, response)
+        # 1. Kill switch -- TINA4_CSRF in {false,0,no} disables all CSRF checks,
+        #    even when the middleware is attached explicitly. Unset = enforced.
+        csrf_env = ENV["TINA4_CSRF"].to_s.strip.downcase
+        return [request, response] if %w[false 0 no].include?(csrf_env)
+
+        # 2. Safe HTTP methods never change state -- skip.
+        method = (request.method || "GET").upcase
+        return [request, response] if %w[GET HEAD OPTIONS].include?(method)
+
+        # 3. Public write routes (.no_auth / auth: false) skip CSRF -- a
+        #    genuinely public endpoint has no session to protect. The matched
+        #    Route is attached to the request before this post-match middleware
+        #    runs (DispatchPipeline#prepare_route_request); a public write route
+        #    has auth_required == false -- the SAME signal the auth gate reads.
+        #    (Reading request.handler, as this once did, was dead code: the live
+        #    request never carries a handler, so the no_auth skip never fired.)
+        route = request.respond_to?(:route) ? request.route : nil
+        if route.respond_to?(:auth_required) && route.auth_required == false
+          return [request, response]
+        end
+
+        # 4/5. Resolve the signing secret ONCE, fail-closed. TINA4_SECRET unset
+        #      resolves to blank (there is NO built-in default); a blank HMAC key
+        #      is publicly reproducible, so a token signed with it -- or with the
+        #      retired public 'tina4-default-secret' -- is a forgery. Reject every
+        #      write rather than validate against a guessable key. SEC-01.
+        secret = Tina4::Auth.hmac_secret
+        if secret.to_s.empty?
+          return [request, response.error(
+            "CSRF_INVALID",
+            "CSRF token cannot be validated: TINA4_SECRET is not set",
+            403
+          )]
+        end
+
+        # 6. A valid Bearer JWT means an API client authenticating per request --
+        #    not subject to the cookie-replay attack CSRF defends against.
+        headers = request.respond_to?(:headers) ? request.headers : {}
+        auth_header = (headers["authorization"] || headers["Authorization"] || "").to_s
+        if auth_header.start_with?("Bearer ")
+          bearer_token = auth_header[7..].to_s.strip
+          return [request, response] if !bearer_token.empty? && Tina4::Auth.valid_token(bearer_token)
+        end
+
+        # 7. A token in the query string leaks through logs/referers/history --
+        #    reject it. Read the QUERY STRING only, never request.params, which
+        #    merges the body (a legit body token would false-trip this check).
+        query = request.respond_to?(:query) ? request.query : {}
+        query = {} unless query.is_a?(Hash)
+        if !query["formToken"].to_s.empty?
+          Tina4::Log.warning("[CSRF] Token found in query string — rejected for security")
+          return [request, response.error(
+            "CSRF_INVALID",
+            "Form token must not be sent in the URL query string",
+            403
+          )]
+        end
+
+        # 8. Extract the token: body first, then the X-Form-Token header.
+        token = nil
+        body = request.respond_to?(:body) ? request.body : nil
+        token = body["formToken"] if body.is_a?(Hash)
+        if token.nil? || token.to_s.empty?
+          token = headers["X-Form-Token"] || headers["x-form-token"]
+        end
+
+        # 9. Missing token -- reject.
+        if token.nil? || token.to_s.empty?
+          return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
+        end
+
+        # 10. Validate signature + expiry with the resolved secret. valid_token
+        #     returns the verified payload Hash (or nil) in 3.13.0+.
+        payload = Tina4::Auth.valid_token(token.to_s)
+        unless payload
+          return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
+        end
+
+        # 11. Enforce the form-token TYPE -- a valid signature is not enough. A
+        #     non-form JWT (e.g. an auth/session token) must never be accepted in
+        #     the formToken slot.
+        payload = {} unless payload.is_a?(Hash)
+        if payload["type"] != "form"
+          return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
+        end
+
+        # 12. Session binding -- a token minted for one session cannot be replayed
+        #     against another. Read the request session's OWN id: Tina4::Session
+        #     exposes get_session_id (NOT session_id -- reading session_id then
+        #     session.get("session_id") looked up a DATA key, never the id, so
+        #     binding silently never fired against a real session). A plain Hash
+        #     session exposes "session_id".
+        token_session_id = payload["session_id"]
+        if token_session_id
+          session = request.respond_to?(:session) ? request.session : nil
+          current_session_id =
+            if session.nil?
+              nil
+            elsif session.respond_to?(:session_id)
+              session.session_id
+            elsif session.respond_to?(:get_session_id)
+              session.get_session_id
+            elsif session.is_a?(Hash)
+              session["session_id"]
+            end
+
+          if current_session_id && token_session_id != current_session_id
+            return [request, response.error("CSRF_INVALID", "Invalid or missing form token", 403)]
+          end
+        end
+
+        # 13. All checks passed.
+        [request, response]
+      end
+
+      # Auto-attach CsrfMiddleware when TINA4_CSRF is enabled in the environment.
+      #
+      # CSRF is OFF by default: with TINA4_CSRF unset the middleware is never
+      # attached, so a default app has no CSRF gate. A truthy value
+      # (true/1/yes/on, case-insensitive) attaches it globally so every
+      # state-changing route is gated -- the env flag is the switch, no code
+      # change needed. Idempotent (Middleware.use de-dupes). Returns true when the
+      # middleware is now attached. Mirrors the Python master's
+      # attach_csrf_from_env; the framework calls it once at boot
+      # (Tina4.initialize!). A false/0/no value still lets an explicit
+      # Router.use(CsrfMiddleware) opt-in be disabled at runtime by the kill
+      # switch in before_csrf.
+      def attach_from_env
+        value = ENV["TINA4_CSRF"].to_s.strip.downcase
+        if %w[true 1 yes on].include?(value)
+          Tina4::Middleware.use(Tina4::CsrfMiddleware)
+          return true
+        end
+        false
+      end
+    end
+  end
+
+  # SecurityHeadersMiddleware -- injects security headers on every response.
+  # Config via env:
+  #   TINA4_FRAME_OPTIONS       — X-Frame-Options (default: SAMEORIGIN)
+  #   TINA4_HSTS                — Strict-Transport-Security max-age (default: "" = off)
+  #   TINA4_CSP                 — Content-Security-Policy (default: "default-src 'self'")
+  #   TINA4_REFERRER_POLICY     — Referrer-Policy (default: strict-origin-when-cross-origin)
+  #   TINA4_PERMISSIONS_POLICY  — Permissions-Policy (default: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=())
+  class SecurityHeadersMiddleware
+    class << self
+      # Register this middleware in the default chain (secure-by-default).
+      #
+      # Unlike CSRF (opt-in via TINA4_CSRF) this is UNCONDITIONAL: a default app
+      # ships the security headers with no opt-in -- the SECHDR-DEC-01 posture
+      # that closes the SECHDR-OFF-BY-DEFAULT gap (the middleware existed with good
+      # defaults but was never registered). Idempotent (Middleware.use de-dupes).
+      # The framework calls it once at boot (Tina4.initialize!). Returns true.
+      def attach
+        Tina4::Middleware.use(self)
+        true
+      end
+
+      def before_security(request, response)
+        response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = ENV["TINA4_FRAME_OPTIONS"] || "SAMEORIGIN"
+        response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
+
+        # HSTS is HTTPS-only (SECHDR-DEC-02): a downgrade-protection header on a
+        # plain-HTTP response is inert at best and ships a bad max-age on an
+        # unencrypted scheme at worst. Emit it ONLY when TINA4_HSTS is set AND the
+        # request is HTTPS -- Request.secure_scheme? honours x-forwarded-proto
+        # (first hop) then rack.url_scheme, the same source of truth the session
+        # cookie's Secure flag uses. Defensive env lookup keeps a non-Request from
+        # turning every response into a 500 now that this runs on every request.
+        hsts = ENV["TINA4_HSTS"] || ""
+        env = request.respond_to?(:env) ? request.env : {}
+        if !hsts.empty? && Tina4::Request.secure_scheme?(env)
+          response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = "max-age=#{hsts}; includeSubDomains"
+        end
+
+        warn_csp_default_once if ENV["TINA4_CSP"].nil?
+        response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = ENV["TINA4_CSP"] || "default-src 'self'"
+        response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = ENV["TINA4_REFERRER_POLICY"] || "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
+        response.headers["X-XSS-Protection"] = "0"
+        response.headers["Permissions-Policy"] = ENV["TINA4_PERMISSIONS_POLICY"] || "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
+
+        [request, response]
+      end
+
+      # Warn once per process that the default CSP is in force (TINA4_CSP unset).
+      #
+      # Secure-by-default keeps `default-src 'self'` (SECHDR-DEC-01), but that
+      # default is invisible: it blocks runtime-injected inline styles, cross-origin
+      # fonts/scripts/CDNs, `data:` URIs, and cross-origin WebSocket/XHR (a separate
+      # API or LiveKit host) -- and the failure surfaces only in the browser at
+      # runtime, long after a deploy has gone green. So the framework says so once,
+      # naming the escape hatch. It NEVER fails the boot or a request -- logging a
+      # heads-up must not be the reason the server or a request dies. Fires only when
+      # TINA4_CSP is ABSENT; setting it (even to empty) is an explicit opt-in.
+      def warn_csp_default_once
+        return if @csp_default_warned
+
+        @csp_default_warned = true
+        message = "TINA4_CSP is not set, so Tina4 is serving the default Content-Security-Policy " \
+          "\"default-src 'self'\" on every response. That default blocks runtime-injected " \
+          "inline styles, cross-origin fonts/scripts/CDNs, data: URIs, and cross-origin " \
+          "WebSocket/XHR (e.g. a separate API or LiveKit host). If your app uses any of " \
+          "these, set TINA4_CSP to a policy that allows them (see https://tina4.com); to " \
+          "silence this notice without changing behaviour, set TINA4_CSP=\"default-src 'self'\"."
+        begin
+          Tina4::Log.warning(message)
+        rescue StandardError
+          # Logging must never break a request.
+          warn(message)
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end