spiped 0.0.0

checksums.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+SHA1:
+  metadata.gz: 27b671f86f19d8400b9f28f1e43394f0290e74f6
+  data.tar.gz: 81725ffc4e73f64e08b250c35b304c181430fc22
+SHA512:
+  metadata.gz: 966032c8cbcfdaa3c67950c1c7fd53eeb30a54c627c1f177e57f526e2ec1a157bdbcf4708a2c29187e76ff586633614c841b416fc6f02e5dfb331b307905eb57
+  data.tar.gz: 236fdf9e640e837bb7e99a7b3b7c4c4dcdb9538140d3338a14220e4a0a5505d8f99085645750538c3393a23305b7183012ef70741ab75ac9946b6b362ebe4b91

data/ext/spiped/extconf.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+system "cp -R spiped-source/* ./"
+
+

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/BUILDING

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+To build and install spiped, run:
+# make BINDIR=/path/to/target/directory install
+
+To install man pages, add MAN1DIR=/path/to/man.1/directory to the command
+line (e.g., MAN1DIR=/usr/local/man/man1 on FreeBSD).
+
+Spiped should build and run on any IEEE Std 1003.1 (POSIX) compliant
+system which
+1. Includes the Software Development Utilities option,
+2. Has OpenSSL available via -lcrypto and #include <openssl/foo>, and
+3. Provides /dev/urandom.
+
+On some platforms (Solaris, maybe others), additional compiler and/or linker
+options are required to find OpenSSL or system libraries; these can be
+provided by adding e.g., CFLAGS="-I/path/to/openssl/headers" (compiler option)
+or LDADD_EXTRA="-L/usr/sfw/lib -lsocket -lnsl" (linker option) to the make
+command line.
+
+On OS X, the version of OpenSSL included with the operating system is outdated
+(0.9.8) and deprecated, and it is recommended that spiped be built with an
+updated version of OpenSSL.  After installing a newer version of OpenSSL, use
+CFLAGS="-I /path/to/openssl/headers" and LDADD_EXTRA="-L /path/to/openssl/lib"
+to build spiped with your newer OpenSSL.  Note that spiped will still build if
+you set these options wrong: If you see
+    warning: 'AES_set_encrypt_key' is deprecated
+during the build then spiped is still using the outdated version of OpenSSL
+from OS X.
+
+On some platforms (OpenBSD prior to 5.4, and possibly others) you will need to
+add #include <sys/types.h> at the start of
+	lib/dnsthread/dnsthread.c
+	libcperciva/util/sock_util.c
+	proto/proto_conn.c
+	spipe/main.c
+	spipe/pushbits.c
+due to a POSIX-compliance bug on those platforms.
+
+On some platforms (mostly Linuxes) it is possible to install OpenSSL libaries
+wihout the associated header files; the header files are usually in packages
+named "openssl-devel", "libssl-dev", or similar.
+
+If your OS provides random bytes via some mechanism other than /dev/urandom,
+please make local changes to lib/util/entropy.c and notify the author.
+
+If spiped fails to build or run for other reasons, please notify the
+author.

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/CHANGELOG

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+spiped-1.4.1
+* Fix build on OS X, and improve strict POSIX compliance.
+* Improved zeroing of sensitive cryptographic data.
+spiped-1.4.0
+* Add automatic detection of compiler support (at compile-time) and CPU
+  support (at run-time) for x86 "AES New Instructions"; and when available,
+  use these to improve cryptographic performance.
+* Add support for -g option, which makes {spiped, spipe} require perfect
+  forward secrecy by dropping connections if the peer endpoint is detected to
+  be running using the -f option.
+spiped-1.3.1
+* Fix build by adding missing <stdint.h> #include.
+* Minor code cleanups.
+spiped-1.3.0
+* Bug fix: spiped now correctly closes connections which have been reset;
+  in earlier versions spiped could erronously hold "dead" connections open
+  as long as they remained idle.
+* Man pages added.
+* Protocol-layer keep-alives are now enabled by default.
+* New option -j (spipe/spiped): Disable protocol-layer keep-alives.
+* In spiped the target address is now re-resolved every 60 seconds by default.
+* New option -R (spiped): Do not re-resolve target address.
+* New option -r <rtime> (spiped): Re-resolve target address every <rtime>
+  seconds.
+spiped-1.2.2
+* Build fixes for some strictly POSIX-conforming platforms.
+* Detect and work around compilers which are POSIX-noncompliant in their
+  handling of -rt and -lxnet options.
+* Minor documentation and typo fixes.
+spiped-1.2.1
+* Fix build by adding missing <stdint.h> #include.
+spiped-1.2.0
+* New utility "spipe": A client for the spiped protocol, handling a single
+  connection with standard input/output as one end.
+* Code rearrangement with no functional consequences.
+* Minor bug and documentation fixes.
+spiped-1.1.0
+* New option -D: Wait until DNS lookups succeed.
+* New option -F: Don't daemonize.
+* Use SO_REUSEADDR to avoid 'socket address already in use' error (most
+  importantly, if spiped is killed and restarted).
+* Minor bug and style fixes.
+spiped-1.0.0
+* Initial release

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/COPYRIGHT

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+The included code and documentation ("spiped") is distributed under the
+following terms:
+
+Copyright 2005-2014 Colin Percival.  All rights reserved.
+Copyright 2014 Sean Kelly.  All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+In addition to the above, some files are:
+
+Copyright 2012 Andreas Olsson
+
+and distributed under the same terms.  Such files contain individual
+copyright statements and licenses.

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+PKG=	spiped
+PROGS=	spiped spipe
+PUBLISH= ${PROGS} BUILDING CHANGELOG COPYRIGHT README STYLE POSIX lib libcperciva proto
+
+.for D in ${PROGS}
+${PKG}-${VERSION}/${D}/Makefile:
+	echo '.POSIX:' > $@
+	( cd ${D} && echo -n 'PROG=' && make -V PROG ) >> $@
+	( cd ${D} && echo -n 'MAN1=' && make -V MAN1 ) >> $@
+	( cd ${D} && echo -n 'SRCS=' && make -V SRCS | sed -e 's|cpusupport-config.h||' ) >> $@
+	( cd ${D} && echo -n 'IDIRS=' && make -V IDIRS ) >> $@
+	( cd ${D} && echo -n 'LDADD_REQ=' && make -V LDADD_REQ ) >> $@
+	cat Makefile.prog >> $@
+	( cd ${D} && make -V SRCS |	\
+	    sed -e 's| cpusupport-config.h||' |	\
+	    tr ' ' '\n' |		\
+	    sed -E 's/.c$$/.o/' |	\
+	    while read F; do		\
+		S=`make source-$${F}`;	\
+		CF=`make -V cflags-$${F}`;	\
+		echo "$${F}: $${S}";	\
+		echo "	\$${CC} \$${CFLAGS} \$${CFLAGS_POSIX} -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L -DCPUSUPPORT_CONFIG_FILE=\\\"cpusupport-config.h\\\" $${CF} -I .. \$${IDIRS} -c $${S} -o $${F}"; \
+	    done ) >> $@
+.endfor
+
+publish: clean
+	if [ -z "${VERSION}" ]; then			\
+		echo "VERSION must be specified!";	\
+		exit 1;					\
+	fi
+	if find . | grep \~; then					\
+		echo "Delete temporary files before publishing!";	\
+		exit 1;							\
+	fi
+	rm -f ${PKG}-${VERSION}.tgz
+	mkdir ${PKG}-${VERSION}
+	tar -cf- --exclude 'Makefile.*' --exclude Makefile --exclude .svn ${PUBLISH} | \
+	    tar -xf- -C ${PKG}-${VERSION}
+	cp Makefile.POSIX ${PKG}-${VERSION}/Makefile
+.for D in ${PROGS}
+	make ${PKG}-${VERSION}/${D}/Makefile
+.endfor
+	tar -cvzf ${PKG}-${VERSION}.tgz ${PKG}-${VERSION}
+	rm -r ${PKG}-${VERSION}
+
+SUBDIR=	${PROGS}
+.include <bsd.subdir.mk>

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/Makefile.POSIX

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+.POSIX:
+
+PROGS=		spiped spipe
+BINDIR_DEFAULT=	/usr/local/bin
+CFLAGS_DEFAULT=	-O2
+
+all:
+	export CFLAGS="$${CFLAGS:-${CFLAGS_DEFAULT}}";	\
+	export LDADD_POSIX=`export CC="${CC}"; cd POSIX && command -p sh posix-l.sh`;	\
+	export CFLAGS_POSIX=`export CC="${CC}"; cd POSIX && command -p sh posix-cflags.sh`;	\
+	( export CC="${CC}"; cd libcperciva/cpusupport/Build && command -p sh cpusupport.sh ) > cpusupport-config.h;	\
+	. ./cpusupport-config.h;			\
+	for D in ${PROGS}; do				\
+		( cd $${D} && ${MAKE} all ) || exit 2;	\
+	done
+
+install: all
+	export BINDIR=$${BINDIR:-${BINDIR_DEFAULT}};	\
+	for D in ${PROGS}; do				\
+		( cd $${D} && ${MAKE} install ) || exit 2;	\
+	done
+
+clean:
+	rm -f cpusupport-config.h
+	for D in ${PROGS}; do				\
+		( cd $${D} && ${MAKE} clean ) || exit 2;	\
+	done

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/Makefile.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Used by Makefile code which generates POSIX Makefiles
+.for X in ${SRCS}
+source-${X:.c=.o}: ${X}
+	@echo $>
+.endfor
+
+# Defaults for all kivaloo code
+NO_MAN	?=	yes
+WARNS	?=	6
+
+# Make logic (bits which are separated out in individual Makefiles).
+CFLAGS	+=	${IDIRS}
+LDADD	+=	${LDADD_REQ}
+
+# CPU features compiler support detection
+SRCS	+=	cpusupport-config.h
+cpusupport-config.h:
+	( export CFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"; cd ../libcperciva/cpusupport/Build && command -p sh cpusupport.sh ) > cpusupport-config.h
+CLEANFILES+=	cpusupport-config.h
+CFLAGS	+=	-I . -D CPUSUPPORT_CONFIG_FILE=\"cpusupport-config.h\"

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/Makefile.prog

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+
+all:	${PROG}
+
+install:${PROG}
+	mkdir -p ${BINDIR}
+	cp ${PROG} ${BINDIR}/_inst.${PROG}.$$$$_ &&	\
+	    strip ${BINDIR}/_inst.${PROG}.$$$$_ &&	\
+	    chmod 0555 ${BINDIR}/_inst.${PROG}.$$$$_ && \
+	    mv -f ${BINDIR}/_inst.${PROG}.$$$$_ ${BINDIR}/${PROG}
+	if ! [ -z "${MAN1DIR}" ]; then			\
+		for MPAGE in ${MAN1}; do						\
+			cp $$MPAGE ${MAN1DIR}/_inst.$$MPAGE.$$$$_ &&			\
+			    chmod 0444 ${MAN1DIR}/_inst.$$MPAGE.$$$$_ &&		\
+			    mv -f ${MAN1DIR}/_inst.$$MPAGE.$$$$_ ${MAN1DIR}/$$MPAGE;	\
+		done;									\
+	fi
+
+clean:
+	rm -f ${PROG} ${SRCS:.c=.o}
+
+${PROG}:${SRCS:.c=.o}
+	${CC} -o ${PROG} ${SRCS:.c=.o} ${LDADD_EXTRA} ${LDADD_REQ} ${LDADD_POSIX}
+

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/POSIX/README

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+POSIX compatibility code
+------------------------
+
+This code exists to work around some common POSIX compatibility issues.
+
+POSIX specifies that if the first line of a Makefile is ".POSIX:" then the
+Makefile should be processed according to POSIX rules, including with CC=c99.
+Further, c99 is required to understand the -lrt and -lxnet options (and ignore
+them if the routines they specify linkage for are already in the standard C
+library).  Unfortunately some systems fail or one or both of these accounts.

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/POSIX/posix-cflags.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Should be sourced by `command -p sh posix-cflags.sh` from within a Makefile
+if ! ${CC} -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L posix-msg_nosignal.c 2>/dev/null; then
+	printf %s "-DPOSIXFAIL_MSG_NOSIGNAL "
+	echo "WARNING: POSIX violation: <sys/socket.h> not defining MSG_NOSIGNAL" >/dev/stderr
+fi
+if ! ${CC} -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L posix-clock_realtime.c 2>/dev/null; then
+	printf %s "-DPOSIXFAIL_CLOCK_REALTIME"
+	echo "WARNING: POSIX violation: <time.h> not defining CLOCK_REALTIME" >/dev/stderr
+fi
+rm -f a.out

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/POSIX/posix-clock_realtime.c

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#include <time.h>
+
+int main() {return CLOCK_REALTIME;}

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/POSIX/posix-l.c

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+int main() {return 0;}

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/POSIX/posix-l.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Should be sourced by `command -p sh posix-l.sh` from within a Makefile.
+FIRST=YES
+for LIB in rt xnet; do
+	if ${CC} -l${LIB} posix-l.c 2>/dev/null; then
+		if [ ${FIRST} = "NO" ]; then
+			printf " ";
+		fi
+		printf "%s" "-l${LIB}";
+		FIRST=NO;
+	else
+		echo "WARNING: POSIX violation: make's CC doesn't understand -l${LIB}" >/dev/stderr
+	fi
+	rm -f a.out
+done

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/POSIX/posix-msg_nosignal.c

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int main() {return MSG_NOSIGNAL;}

data/ext/spiped/spiped-source/README

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+spiped design
+=============
+
+Introduction
+------------
+
+spiped (pronounced "ess-pipe-dee") is a utility for creating symmetrically
+encrypted and authenticated pipes between socket addresses, so that one may
+connect to one address (e.g., a UNIX socket on localhost) and transparently
+have a connection established to another address (e.g., a UNIX socket on a
+different system).  This is similar to 'ssh -L' functionality, but does not
+use SSH and requires a pre-shared symmetric key.
+
+spipe (pronounced "ess-pipe") is a utility which acts as an spiped protocol
+client (i.e., connects to an spiped daemon), taking input from the standard
+input and writing data read back to the standard output.
+
+Note that spiped:
+1. Requires a strong key file: The file specified via the -k option should
+have at least 256 bits of entropy.  ('dd if=/dev/urandom bs=32 count=1' is
+your friend.)
+2. Requires strong entropy from /dev/urandom.  (Make sure your kernel's
+random number generator is seeded at boot time!)
+3. Does not provide any protection against information leakage via packet
+timing: Running telnet over spiped will protect a password from being directly
+read from the network, but will not obscure the typing rhythm.
+4. Can significantly increase bandwidth usage for interactive sessions: It
+sends data in packets of 1024 bytes, and pads smaller messages up to this
+length, so a 1 byte write could be expanded to 1024 bytes if it cannot be
+coalesced with adjacent bytes.
+5. Uses a symmetric key -- so anyone who can connect to an spiped "server" is
+also able to impersonate it.
+
+Example usage
+-------------
+
+To set up an encrypted and authenticated pipe for sending email between two
+systems (in the author's case, from many systems around the internet to his
+central SMTP server, which then relays email to the rest of the world), one
+might run
+
+# dd if=/dev/urandom bs=32 count=1 of=keyfile
+# spiped -d -s '[0.0.0.0]:8025' -t '[127.0.0.1]:25' -k keyfile
+
+on a server and after copying keyfile to the local system, run
+
+# spiped -e -s '[127.0.0.1]:25' -t $SERVERNAME:8025 -k keyfile
+
+at which point mail delivered via localhost:25 on the local system will be
+securely transmitted to port 25 on the server.
+
+You can also use spiped to protect SSH servers from attackers: Since data is
+authenticated before being forwarded to the target, this can allow you to SSH
+to a host while protecting you in the event that someone finds an exploitable
+bug in the SSH daemon -- this serves the same purpose as port knocking or a
+firewall which restricts source IP addresses which can connect to SSH.  On the
+SSH server, run
+
+# dd if=/dev/urandom bs=32 count=1 of=/etc/ssh/spiped.key
+# spiped -d -s '[0.0.0.0]:8022' -t '[127.0.0.1]:22' -k /etc/ssh/spiped.key
+
+then copy the server's /etc/ssh/spiped.key to ~/.ssh/spiped_HOSTNAME_key on
+your local system and add the lines
+
+	Host HOSTNAME
+	ProxyCommand spipe -t %h:8022 -k ~/.ssh/spiped_%h_key
+
+to the ~/.ssh/config file.  This will cause "ssh HOSTNAME" to automatically
+connect using the spipe client via the spiped daemon; you can then firewall
+off all incoming traffic on port tcp/22.
+
+For a detailed list of the command-line options to spiped and spipe, see the
+README files in the respective subdirectories.
+
+Security requirements
+---------------------
+
+The user is responsible for ensuring that:
+1. The key file contains 256 or more bits of entropy.
+2. The same key file is not used for more than 2^64 connections.
+3. Any individual connection does not transmit more than 2^64 bytes.
+
+Encrypted protocol
+------------------
+
+The client and server share a key file with 256 or more bits of entropy.  On
+launch, they read the key file and compute
+    K = SHA256(key file).
+
+When a connection is established:
+C1. The client generates a 256-bit random value nonce_C and sends it.
+S1. The server generates a 256-bit random value nonce_S and sends it.
+
+C2. The client receives a 256-bit value nonce_S.
+S2. The server receives a 256-bit value nonce_C.
+
+C3/S3. Both parties now compute the 512-bit value
+    dk_1 = PBKDF2-SHA256(K, nonce_C || nonce_S, 1)
+and parse it as a pair of 256-bit values
+    dhmac_C || dhmac_S = dk_1.
+
+C4. The client picks* a value x_C and computes** y_C = 2^x_C mod p, where p is
+the Diffie-Hellman "group #14" modulus, and h_C = HMAC-SHA256(dhmac_C, y_C).
+The client sends y_C || h_C to the server.
+S4. The server receives a 2304-bit value which it parses as y_C || h_C, where
+y_C is 2048 bits and h_C is 256 bits; and drops the connection if h_C is not
+equal to HMAC-SHA256(dhmac_C, y_C) or y_C >= p.
+
+S5. The server picks* a value x_S and computes** y_S = 2^x_S mod p and
+h_S = HMAC-SHA256(dhmac_S, y_S).  The server sends y_S || h_S to the client.
+C5. The client receives a 2304-bit value which it parses as y_S || h_S, where
+y_S is 2048 bits and h_S is 256 bits; and drops the connection if h_S is not
+equal to HMAC-SHA256(dhmac_S, y_S) or y_S >= p.
+
+C6. The client computes** y_SC = y_S^x_C mod p.
+S6. The server computes** y_SC = y_C^x_S mod p.
+(Note that these two compute values are identical.)
+
+C7/S7. Both parties now compute the 1024-bit value
+    dk_2 = PBKDF2-SHA256(K, nonce_C || nonce_S || y_SC, 1)
+and parse it as a 4-tuple of 256-bit values
+    E_C || H_C || E_S || H_S.
+
+Thereafter, the client and server exchange 1060-byte packets P generated from
+plaintext messages M of 1--1024 bytes
+    msg_padded = M || ( 0x00 x (1024 - length(M))) || bigendian32(length(M))
+    msg_encrypted = AES256-CTR(E, msg_padded, packet#)
+    P = msg_encrypted || HMAC-SHA256(H, msg_encrypted || bigendian64(packet#))
+where E and H are E_C and H_C or E_S and H_S depending on whether the packet
+is being sent by the client or the server, and AES256-CTR is computed with
+nonce equal to the packet #, which starts at zero and increments for each
+packet sent in the same direction.
+
+* The values x_C, x_S picked must either be 0 (if forward perfect secrecy
+is not desired) or have 256 bits of entropy (if forward perfect secrecy is
+desired).
+
+** The values y_C, y_S, and y_SC are 2048 bits and big-endian.
+
+Security proof
+--------------
+1. Under the random oracle model, K has at least 255 bits of entropy (it's a
+256-bit hash computed from a value with at least 256 bits of entropy).
+
+2. Provided that at least one party is following the protocol and the key
+file has been used for fewer than 2^64 connections, the probability of the
+tuple (K, nonce_C, nonce_S) being non-unique is less than 2^(-192).
+
+3. Under the random oracle model, the probability of an attacker without
+access to K guessing either of dhmac_C and dhmac_S is less than
+    P(attacker guesses K) +
+    P(the tuple has been input to the oracle before) +
+    P(the attacker directly guesses),
+which is less than
+    2^(-255) + 2^(-192) + 2^(-255) = 2^(-192) + 2^(-254).
+
+4. Consequently, in order for an attacker to convince a protocol-obeying
+party that a tuple (y, h) is legitimate, the attacker must do at least 2^190
+expected work (which we consider to be computationally infeasible and do not
+consider any further).
+
+5. If one of the parties opts to not have perfect forward secrecy, then the
+value y_SC will be equal to 1 and dk_2 will have the same security properties
+as dk_1, i.e., it will be computationally infeasible for an attacker without
+access to K to compute dk_2.
+
+6. If both parties opt for perfect forward secrecy, an attacker who can
+compute y_SC has solved a Diffie-Hellman problem over the 2048-bit group #14,
+which is (under the CDH assumption) computationally infeasible.
+
+7. Consequently, if both parties opt for perfect forward secrecy, an attacker
+who obtains access to K after the handshake has completed will continue to be
+unable to compute dk_2 from information exchanged during the handshake.
+
+8. Under the random oracle model, the packets P are indistinguishable from
+random 1060-byte packets; thus no information about the keys used or the
+plaintext being transmitted is revealed by post-key-exchange communications.
+
+9. Because the values (msg_encrypted || bigendian(packet#)) are distinct for
+each packet, under the random oracle model it is infeasible for an attacker
+without access to the value H to generate a packet which will be accepted as
+valid.
+
+Code layout
+-----------
+
+spiped/*	-- Code specific to the spiped utility.
+  main.c	-- Command-line parsing, initialization, and event loop.
+  dispatch.c	-- Accepts connections and hands them off to protocol code.
+spipe/*		-- Code specific to the spipe utility.
+  main.c	-- Command-line parsing, initialization, and event loop.
+  pushbits.c	-- Copies data between standard input/output and a socket.
+proto/*		-- Implements the spiped protocol.
+  _conn.c	-- Manages the lifecycle of a connection.
+  _handshake.c	-- Performs the handshaking portion of the protocol.
+  _pipe.c	-- Performs the data-shuttling portion of the protocol.
+  _crypt.c	-- Does the cryptographic bits needed by _handshake and _pipe.
+lib/*		-- Library code (mostly originating from tarsnap and kivaloo).