rubik 0.9.0 → 0.9.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/ATTRIBUTION.md +1 -1
- data/CHANGELOG.md +108 -43
- data/README.md +5 -1
- data/lib/rubik/adapter/base.rb +19 -0
- data/lib/rubik/adapter/generic.rb +0 -14
- data/lib/rubik/adapter/node.rb +2 -0
- data/lib/rubik/ast/treesitter/zig_walker.rb +15 -2
- data/lib/rubik/cli/workspace_trust.rb +16 -0
- data/lib/rubik/config/defaults.rb +23 -0
- data/lib/rubik/config/store.rb +14 -0
- data/lib/rubik/kernel/dispatcher.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/log.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/client.rb +83 -180
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/document_store.rb +209 -0
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/client.rb +4 -3
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/manager.rb +6 -2
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/transport/stdio.rb +51 -9
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_session.rb +505 -0
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/instance.rb +4 -0
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/journal.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/questioner.rb +21 -6
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/step_runner.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/teardown.rb +4 -0
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/transcript_formatter.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator.rb +1 -0
- data/lib/rubik/platform.rb +15 -0
- data/lib/rubik/plugin/storage.rb +20 -29
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_context.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_execution.rb +7 -470
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/buffer.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/lsp.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/input_loop.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/lifecycle.rb +28 -0
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/manifest_store.rb +116 -0
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_storage.rb +247 -196
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/task_manager.rb +7 -2
- data/lib/rubik/runtime.rb +1 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/allowlist.rb +167 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/audit_log.rb +72 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/classifier.rb +8 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/command_gate.rb +567 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/guard.rb +88 -1075
- data/lib/rubik/security/path_policy.rb +117 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/synthesis_gate.rb +300 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security.rb +5 -0
- data/lib/rubik/storage/ranking.rb +113 -0
- data/lib/rubik/storage/store.rb +2 -92
- data/lib/rubik/storage/transcript_indexer.rb +2 -3
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/grep.rb +2 -3
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/lifecycle.rb +90 -87
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/synthesis.rb +3 -0
- data/lib/rubik/tools/lifecycle_rollbacks.rb +87 -0
- data/lib/rubik/tools/native_search.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/truncator.rb +25 -0
- data/lib/rubik/version.rb +1 -1
- metadata +11 -1
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# frozen_string_literal: true
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require "shellwords"
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require_relative "../platform"
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require_relative "classifier"
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module Rubik
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module Security
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# Operator-controlled command allowlist (Plan: komut-allowlist-güvenlik-kapısı),
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# split out of Guard (#403) as the allowlist leaf: state (@command_allowlist),
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# the AST gate, the raw Shellwords gate, and every token-prefix matcher.
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# Entries are token-prefixes: "node" allows every node invocation (broad);
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# "node .gitnexus/run.cjs" allows only that script (narrow — preferred).
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# Applied AFTER classifier verdict, BEFORE the raise, and the catastrophic
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# fallback regex still runs afterwards (defense-in-depth is never skipped).
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class Allowlist
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# Shell metacharacters that make a raw (AST-less) token-prefix allowlist
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# match dishonest: they can join, redirect, substitute, or line-split
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# the string, so "the first tokens match" would not mean "the whole
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# simple command matches". The classifier-crash rescue only accepts a
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# single simple command; anything else fails closed.
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RAW_ALLOWLIST_UNSAFE_PATTERN = /[;&|<>`$(){}\[\]\\\n\r]/
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def initialize(entries = [])
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@command_allowlist = normalize_allowlist(entries)
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end
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def command_allowlist
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@command_allowlist.dup
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end
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def allowed_commands=(entries)
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@command_allowlist = normalize_allowlist(entries)
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end
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alias set_allowed_commands allowed_commands=
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def command_allowlisted?(ast, cmd_str: nil)
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_ = cmd_str
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return false if @command_allowlist.empty?
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return false unless ast.respond_to?(:commands)
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ast_commands = ast.commands.to_a
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return false if ast_commands.empty?
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# EVERY dangerous segment (recursively incl. pipeline inner commands)
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# must match an entry — a single allowlisted prefix cannot rescue
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# `allowlisted-cmd && rm -rf /` chains.
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ast_commands.all? { |c| command_matches_allowlist?(c) }
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end
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# Token-prefix allowlist check for an input whose AST does not exist
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# (classifier crashed). Only a single simple command qualifies: with
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# shell metacharacters present the string may hold several segments
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# and the gate's "every segment must match" contract cannot be
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# honored — fail closed instead of over-promising the prefix match.
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# Quoting is handled by Shellwords; an unparseable string (unbalanced
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# quote) fails closed.
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def command_allowlisted_raw?(cmd_str)
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return false if @command_allowlist.empty?
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return false if cmd_str.match?(RAW_ALLOWLIST_UNSAFE_PATTERN)
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tokens = nil
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begin
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tokens = Shellwords.split(cmd_str)
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rescue ArgumentError
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return false
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end
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return false if tokens.empty?
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return false if Rubik::Security::Classifier::Engine.builtin_dangerous?(tokens[0])
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allowlist_match_argv?(tokens)
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end
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private
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def normalize_allowlist(entries)
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Array(entries).filter_map do |e|
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tokens = e.to_s.strip.split(/\s+/).reject(&:empty?)
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tokens unless tokens.empty?
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end
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end
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def canonical_binary_path(bin)
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return nil if bin.nil? || bin.to_s.empty?
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str = bin.to_s
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if str.include?("/") || str.include?("\\") || File.exist?(str)
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Rubik::Platform.normalize_path(File.expand_path(str))
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else
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resolved = Rubik::Platform.which(str)
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resolved ? Rubik::Platform.normalize_path(resolved) : nil
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end
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end
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def binary_allowlist_match?(arg, token)
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return true if arg == token
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# Windows exe-alias fast path (#103): on a windows host "node.exe"
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# IS the allowlisted "node" — a lexical alias, no filesystem probe.
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# The canonical-path probe below resolves through Platform.which +
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# File.file?, a second host seam the windows? stub cannot cover (a
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# linux host has no node.exe on disk, so the probe fails and the
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# allowlist would dead-close). On a posix host the alias is FALSE:
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# node.exe is a different binary than node there.
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return true if windows_executable_alias?(arg, token)
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c_arg = canonical_binary_path(arg)
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c_token = canonical_binary_path(token)
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return true if c_arg && c_token && Rubik::Platform.path_equal?(c_arg, c_token)
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false
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end
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# True when arg carries an executable extension from PATHEXT and its
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# stem equals the token (case-insensitive — windows path semantics).
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# Bare stems only: a path-form arg ("C:/x/node.exe") keeps going
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# through the canonical-path probe, which resolves both sides.
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def windows_executable_alias?(arg, token)
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return false unless Rubik::Platform.windows?
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ext = ::File.extname(arg)
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return false if ext.empty? || !Rubik::Platform.pathext.include?(ext.downcase)
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arg.delete_suffix(ext).casecmp?(token)
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end
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def command_matches_allowlist?(result)
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# Missing argv (e.g. empty invocation) can never be allowlisted.
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argv = result.respond_to?(:argv) ? result.argv : nil
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return false if argv.nil? || argv.empty?
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# Dangerous shell builtins (`source`, `.`) are never rescuable by
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# allowlist: they execute arbitrary file content by design.
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return false if Rubik::Security::Classifier::Engine.builtin_dangerous?(argv[0])
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# W6: If this command wraps inner commands, EVERY inner command must also match allowlist
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if result.respond_to?(:inner_commands) && result.inner_commands && !result.inner_commands.empty? && !result.inner_commands.all? do |inner|
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command_matches_allowlist?(inner)
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end
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return false
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end
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allowlist_match_argv?(argv)
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end
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# The single token-prefix matching home shared by the AST path
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# (#command_matches_allowlist?) and the raw Shellwords path
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# (#command_allowlisted_raw?) — two callers, one contract: an entry
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# matches when its tokens are a prefix of argv (position 0 through the
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# binary canonical-path probe, the rest by equality).
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def allowlist_match_argv?(argv)
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@command_allowlist.any? do |entry|
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next false if entry.length > argv.length
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entry.each_with_index.all? do |token, i|
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arg = argv[i]
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if i.zero?
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binary_allowlist_match?(arg, token)
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else
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arg == token
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end
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end
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end
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end
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end
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end
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end
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# frozen_string_literal: true
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require "json"
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require "time"
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require "fileutils"
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require_relative "../platform"
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require_relative "redactor"
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module Rubik
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module Security
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# The shared audit leaf of the Guard split (#403): owns the audit
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# destination (@audit_log_path), secret masking, and the JSONL append.
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# Every other security module (PathPolicy, CommandGate, SynthesisGate)
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# receives an instance of this class and routes its log_audit calls
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# through it — the audit trail has exactly one home.
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class AuditLog
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MASK_PATTERNS = Rubik::Security::Redactor::PATTERNS
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attr_reader :audit_log_path
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# Default audit location, resolved at call time (not a load-time
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# constant) so Platform.home_dir stubs in tests and runtime HOME
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# changes are honored. Single source shared by the constructor
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# default and Guard.for_config.
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def self.default_audit_log_path
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File.join(Rubik::Platform.home_dir, ".rubik", "audit.log")
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end
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def initialize(audit_log_path = AuditLog.default_audit_log_path)
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@audit_log_path = audit_log_path
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end
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# Live-reconfigurable audit destination (ConfigWiring applies config
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# changes in place — zero restart). Same blank-means-disabled semantics
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# as for_config; non-string values pass through and surface loudly in
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# log_audit's unconditional warn.
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def audit_log_path=(val)
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@audit_log_path = val.is_a?(String) && val.strip.empty? ? nil : val
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end
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def mask_text(text)
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Rubik::Security::Redactor.redact(text)
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end
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def log_audit(action, details = {})
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return if @audit_log_path.nil? || @audit_log_path.to_s.strip.empty?
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# Nil-safety: a nil details hash (or nil value) must never crash the
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# command path — audit failure is already swallowed below.
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masked_details = (details || {}).transform_values { |v| v.nil? ? "" : mask_text(v.to_s) }
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entry = {
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ts: Time.now.iso8601,
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action: action,
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details: masked_details
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}
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dir = File.dirname(@audit_log_path)
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FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir) unless File.directory?(dir)
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File.open(@audit_log_path, "a") do |f|
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f.puts(JSON.dump(entry))
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end
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rescue StandardError => e
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# Unconditional: an audit trail failing silently is indistinguishable
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# from an operator's intentional disable — the one warn in the guard
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# that must not hide behind RUBIK_DEBUG.
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warn "[WARN] Failed to write audit log #{@audit_log_path}: #{e.message}"
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end
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end
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end
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end
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new(database: database, shell: shell).classify(expression)
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end
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# Public interface predicate over the Matcher's builtin vocabulary.
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# External gates (e.g. Guard's allowlist) depend on this instead of
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# reaching into Matcher::BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_CMDS — a non-interface
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# constant of another module.
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def self.builtin_dangerous?(binary)
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Matcher::BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_CMDS.include?(binary.to_s)
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end
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def initialize(database: nil, shell: nil)
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@database = database || self.class.default_database
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@shell = shell
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