rubik 0.9.0 → 0.10.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (130) hide show
  1. checksums.yaml +4 -4
  2. data/ATTRIBUTION.md +1 -1
  3. data/CHANGELOG.md +250 -43
  4. data/README.md +5 -1
  5. data/lib/rubik/adapter/base.rb +21 -1
  6. data/lib/rubik/adapter/generic.rb +0 -14
  7. data/lib/rubik/adapter/node.rb +2 -0
  8. data/lib/rubik/adapter/process.rb +28 -67
  9. data/lib/rubik/ast/treesitter/zig_walker.rb +15 -2
  10. data/lib/rubik/benchmark/vakanuvis_adoption.rb +10 -3
  11. data/lib/rubik/buffer/apply_contract.rb +3 -3
  12. data/lib/rubik/buffer/apply_transaction.rb +165 -0
  13. data/lib/rubik/buffer/manager.rb +26 -120
  14. data/lib/rubik/cli/workspace_trust.rb +16 -0
  15. data/lib/rubik/config/deep_ops.rb +4 -1
  16. data/lib/rubik/config/defaults.rb +29 -3
  17. data/lib/rubik/config/schema.rb +8 -0
  18. data/lib/rubik/config/secret_policy.rb +197 -0
  19. data/lib/rubik/config/store.rb +14 -0
  20. data/lib/rubik/config.rb +11 -0
  21. data/lib/rubik/diagnostics/collector.rb +0 -9
  22. data/lib/rubik/errors.rb +15 -0
  23. data/lib/rubik/event_bus.rb +2 -1
  24. data/lib/rubik/kernel/dispatcher.rb +16 -11
  25. data/lib/rubik/kernel/unit.rb +4 -1
  26. data/lib/rubik/llm/registry.rb +12 -9
  27. data/lib/rubik/llm/router.rb +2 -5
  28. data/lib/rubik/log.rb +23 -1
  29. data/lib/rubik/lsp/client.rb +152 -445
  30. data/lib/rubik/lsp/document_store.rb +209 -0
  31. data/lib/rubik/lsp/manager.rb +14 -10
  32. data/lib/rubik/lsp/transport.rb +365 -0
  33. data/lib/rubik/mcp/boot_lifecycle.rb +6 -2
  34. data/lib/rubik/mcp/boot_run.rb +190 -0
  35. data/lib/rubik/mcp/client.rb +4 -3
  36. data/lib/rubik/mcp/manager.rb +46 -165
  37. data/lib/rubik/mcp/transport/stdio.rb +55 -10
  38. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/auto_apply.rb +4 -3
  39. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/continuation_manager.rb +3 -22
  40. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_session.rb +519 -0
  41. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/loop.rb +28 -47
  42. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/maestro_gate.rb +5 -7
  43. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_recovery.rb +4 -2
  44. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_resolver.rb +4 -2
  45. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/resume_window.rb +96 -0
  46. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/shell_deps.rb +16 -0
  47. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/stream_manager.rb +2 -1
  48. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/deferred_spec.rb +4 -1
  49. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/instance.rb +11 -12
  50. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/journal.rb +2 -1
  51. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/lifecycle.rb +3 -1
  52. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/questioner.rb +24 -7
  53. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/reaper.rb +3 -5
  54. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/resilience.rb +4 -2
  55. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/result_archive.rb +0 -4
  56. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/run_cycle.rb +2 -7
  57. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/spawn_transaction.rb +11 -2
  58. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/step_runner.rb +11 -3
  59. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/teardown.rb +4 -0
  60. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/transcript_formatter.rb +2 -1
  61. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/type_definition.rb +0 -4
  62. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/tool_timeout.rb +121 -1
  63. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator.rb +1 -0
  64. data/lib/rubik/platform/io_drain.rb +2 -1
  65. data/lib/rubik/platform/process.rb +144 -54
  66. data/lib/rubik/platform.rb +17 -1
  67. data/lib/rubik/plugin/manager.rb +2 -1
  68. data/lib/rubik/plugin/storage.rb +20 -29
  69. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_context.rb +9 -8
  70. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_execution.rb +20 -502
  71. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_models.rb +4 -3
  72. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_providers.rb +43 -2
  73. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/base.rb +47 -2
  74. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/buffer.rb +6 -5
  75. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/lsp.rb +3 -2
  76. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/pruner.rb +2 -1
  77. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/secrets.rb +151 -0
  78. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace.rb +60 -150
  79. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace_approval.rb +209 -0
  80. data/lib/rubik/repl/config_wiring.rb +3 -3
  81. data/lib/rubik/repl/hooks.rb +2 -1
  82. data/lib/rubik/repl/input_execution.rb +158 -76
  83. data/lib/rubik/repl/input_loop.rb +3 -2
  84. data/lib/rubik/repl/lifecycle.rb +82 -204
  85. data/lib/rubik/repl/notice_router.rb +319 -0
  86. data/lib/rubik/repl/paste_support.rb +3 -1
  87. data/lib/rubik/repl/presentation.rb +5 -3
  88. data/lib/rubik/repl/pruner/gate.rb +3 -1
  89. data/lib/rubik/repl/pruner/harness.rb +2 -1
  90. data/lib/rubik/repl/shell.rb +4 -3
  91. data/lib/rubik/repl/turn_recorder.rb +6 -5
  92. data/lib/rubik/runtime/discovery.rb +3 -2
  93. data/lib/rubik/runtime/loop_service.rb +4 -3
  94. data/lib/rubik/runtime/manifest_store.rb +124 -0
  95. data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_guard.rb +127 -0
  96. data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_storage.rb +269 -272
  97. data/lib/rubik/runtime/task_manager.rb +71 -27
  98. data/lib/rubik/runtime.rb +1 -0
  99. data/lib/rubik/sandbox/driver/docker.rb +5 -1
  100. data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb +16 -15
  101. data/lib/rubik/security/allowlist.rb +167 -0
  102. data/lib/rubik/security/audit_log.rb +72 -0
  103. data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/classifier.rb +8 -0
  104. data/lib/rubik/security/command_gate.rb +591 -0
  105. data/lib/rubik/security/guard.rb +94 -1077
  106. data/lib/rubik/security/path_policy.rb +117 -0
  107. data/lib/rubik/security/secret_store.rb +463 -0
  108. data/lib/rubik/security/synthesis_gate.rb +297 -0
  109. data/lib/rubik/security.rb +5 -0
  110. data/lib/rubik/session/manager.rb +7 -1
  111. data/lib/rubik/skills/manager.rb +2 -3
  112. data/lib/rubik/storage/ranking.rb +113 -0
  113. data/lib/rubik/storage/search.rb +49 -0
  114. data/lib/rubik/storage/store.rb +15 -112
  115. data/lib/rubik/storage/transcript_indexer.rb +2 -3
  116. data/lib/rubik/storage/vakanuvis/harness.rb +2 -3
  117. data/lib/rubik/tools/base.rb +22 -0
  118. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/files.rb +3 -15
  119. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/grep.rb +3 -9
  120. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/lifecycle.rb +96 -92
  121. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/synthesis.rb +3 -0
  122. data/lib/rubik/tools/lifecycle_rollbacks.rb +100 -0
  123. data/lib/rubik/tools/native_search.rb +2 -1
  124. data/lib/rubik/tools/truncator.rb +73 -36
  125. data/lib/rubik/ui/banner.rb +4 -3
  126. data/lib/rubik/ui/spinner.rb +3 -1
  127. data/lib/rubik/ui/statusline.rb +6 -5
  128. data/lib/rubik/version.rb +1 -1
  129. data/lib/rubik.rb +1 -2
  130. metadata +23 -1
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
1
+ # frozen_string_literal: true
2
+
3
+ require_relative "../platform"
4
+ require_relative "errors"
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+
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+ module Rubik
7
+ module Security
8
+ # Critical-path write policy, split out of Guard (#403): the default
9
+ # critical patterns, the path-write verifier, the workspace-root
10
+ # verifier, and the command write-target walk. Receives the shared
11
+ # AuditLog instance — every block decision is audit-logged there.
12
+ class PathPolicy
13
+ DEFAULT_CRITICAL_PATTERNS = [
14
+ ".git/**",
15
+ ".rubik/**",
16
+ "**/.rubik/**",
17
+ ".env*",
18
+ "secrets.*",
19
+ "*.pem",
20
+ "*.key",
21
+ "id_rsa*"
22
+ ].freeze
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+
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+ def initialize(audit:, custom_patterns: [])
25
+ @critical_patterns = (DEFAULT_CRITICAL_PATTERNS + custom_patterns).uniq
26
+ @audit = audit
27
+ end
28
+
29
+ def verify_path_write!(path)
30
+ return true if path.nil? || path.to_s.strip.empty?
31
+
32
+ raw = Rubik::Platform.normalize_path_raw(path.to_s)
33
+ expanded = Rubik::Platform.normalize_path_raw(File.expand_path(path.to_s))
34
+
35
+ # Check raw relative path, expanded path, and relative-from-pwd
36
+ candidates = [raw, expanded]
37
+ begin
38
+ pwd_raw = Rubik::Platform.normalize_path_raw(Dir.pwd)
39
+ candidates << expanded.delete_prefix("#{pwd_raw}/") if expanded.start_with?("#{pwd_raw}/")
40
+ rescue SystemCallError, ArgumentError
41
+ nil
42
+ end
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+
44
+ candidates.uniq.each do |c|
45
+ if critical_path?(c)
46
+ @audit.log_audit("blocked_write", path: path.to_s, reason: "critical_path")
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+ raise BlockedWriteError, "Write blocked on critical path: #{path}"
48
+ end
49
+ end
50
+
51
+ # Symlink re-check (fail-closed): the lexical candidates above cannot
52
+ # see `foo -> .git/config`. Resolve the deepest EXISTING ancestor and
53
+ # re-check; a missing tail is reattached lexically so ordinary
54
+ # new-file writes resolve to their lexical equivalent. A nil here
55
+ # means containment is unprovable (symlink loop / permission wall).
56
+ resolved = Rubik::Platform.resolved_path(path.to_s, strict: true)
57
+ if resolved.nil?
58
+ @audit.log_audit("blocked_write", path: path.to_s, reason: "path_resolution_failed")
59
+ raise BlockedWriteError, "Write blocked: path could not be safely resolved: #{path}"
60
+ end
61
+ if critical_path?(resolved)
62
+ @audit.log_audit("blocked_write", path: path.to_s, reason: "critical_path_symlink", resolved: resolved)
63
+ raise BlockedWriteError, "Write blocked on critical path (symlink-resolved): #{path} -> #{resolved}"
64
+ end
65
+ true
66
+ end
67
+
68
+ def verify_root_safety!(path)
69
+ return true if path.nil? || path.to_s.strip.empty?
70
+
71
+ expanded = File.expand_path(path.to_s)
72
+ normalized = Rubik::Platform.normalize_path(expanded)
73
+ dangerous_roots = Rubik::Platform.dangerous_system_roots
74
+
75
+ if dangerous_roots.include?(normalized) ||
76
+ Rubik::Platform.drive_root?(expanded) ||
77
+ Rubik::Platform.path_equal?(expanded, Rubik::Platform.home_dir)
78
+ @audit.log_audit("blocked_root_addition", path: expanded, reason: "dangerous_system_root")
79
+ raise BlockedWriteError, "Adding dangerous system root as workspace is blocked: #{path} (#{expanded})"
80
+ end
81
+ true
82
+ end
83
+
84
+ def critical_path?(path)
85
+ norm_path = path.to_s.tr("\\", "/").gsub(%r{^\./}, "")
86
+ @critical_patterns.any? do |pattern|
87
+ File.fnmatch?(pattern, norm_path, File::FNM_PATHNAME | File::FNM_DOTMATCH) ||
88
+ File.fnmatch?("**/#{pattern}", norm_path, File::FNM_PATHNAME | File::FNM_DOTMATCH)
89
+ end
90
+ end
91
+
92
+ def check_critical_path_writes!(ast, cmd_str)
93
+ ast_commands = ast.respond_to?(:commands) ? ast.commands.to_a : []
94
+ write_targets = ast_commands.flat_map do |c|
95
+ targets = Array(c.respond_to?(:write_paths) ? c.write_paths : nil)
96
+ cmd_name = c.respond_to?(:command) ? c.command.to_a.first.to_s : ""
97
+ targets.concat(c.positionals.to_a) if ["cp", "mv", "tee", "touch", "ln", "install"].include?(cmd_name) && c.respond_to?(:positionals)
98
+ targets
99
+ end.compact.reject(&:empty?)
100
+
101
+ write_targets.concat(ast.write_paths.to_a) if ast.respond_to?(:write_paths)
102
+
103
+ write_targets.uniq.each do |wp|
104
+ next unless critical_path?(wp)
105
+
106
+ @audit.log_audit("blocked_command", command: cmd_str, reason: "critical_path_write", path: wp)
107
+ raise BlockedWriteError.new(
108
+ "Command write to critical path blocked: #{wp} in `#{cmd_str}`",
109
+ kind: :critical_path_write,
110
+ blocked_command: cmd_str,
111
+ path: wp
112
+ )
113
+ end
114
+ end
115
+ end
116
+ end
117
+ end
@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
1
+ # frozen_string_literal: true
2
+
3
+ require "yaml"
4
+ require "fileutils"
5
+ require "open3"
6
+ require "tempfile"
7
+ require "tmpdir"
8
+ require_relative "../platform"
9
+
10
+ module Rubik
11
+ module Security
12
+ # Keeps provider credentials out of plain config files.
13
+ #
14
+ # Interface (class-level, the only surface callers may use):
15
+ # - reference?(value) -> true when value is a stored-secret pointer
16
+ # - reference_for(name) -> the pointer string for a SecretStore.name
17
+ # - resolve(value) -> pointer -> stored value; anything else as-is
18
+ # - set(name, value) -> store secret, return its pointer
19
+ # - fetch(name) -> stored value or nil (a miss never raises)
20
+ # - delete(name) -> idempotent removal
21
+ # - backend_name -> symbol for the active backend
22
+ #
23
+ # A "name" is the config dot-path that owns the secret, e.g.
24
+ # "providers.openai.api_key". Config files never receive the secret
25
+ # itself, only the pointer ("rubik-secret:<name>"), so a config file may
26
+ # be committed, synced, or shared without leaking credentials.
27
+ #
28
+ # Backend chain (first available wins, file fallback always exists):
29
+ # macOS - Keychain generic passwords via the security CLI; the
30
+ # secret travels on stdin (flag-then-stdin mode), never argv
31
+ # Windows - Credential Manager via PowerShell PasswordVault; payloads
32
+ # travel as env vars into FIXED scripts (secret base64)
33
+ # Linux - secret-service D-Bus via secret-tool; secret on stdin
34
+ # always - a ruthlessly simple owner-only 0600 YAML store at
35
+ # ~/.rubik/secrets.yml — plaintext on disk is the honest
36
+ # last resort, surfaced via backend_name
37
+ #
38
+ # Test seam: SecretStore.backend= injects any object responding to
39
+ # read/write/delete, so unit tests never touch a host keyring.
40
+ class SecretStore
41
+ REFERENCE_PREFIX = "rubik-secret:"
42
+ SERVICE = "rubik"
43
+ NAME_PATTERN = /\A\w[\w.-]*\z/
44
+
45
+ class Error < StandardError; end
46
+
47
+ @monitor = Monitor.new
48
+ @backend = nil
49
+
50
+ class << self
51
+ def backend_name
52
+ monitor_sync { backend_class_name(backend) }
53
+ end
54
+
55
+ def available?
56
+ true
57
+ end
58
+
59
+ def reference?(value)
60
+ value.is_a?(String) && value.start_with?(REFERENCE_PREFIX)
61
+ end
62
+
63
+ def reference_for(name)
64
+ "#{REFERENCE_PREFIX}#{validate_name!(name)}"
65
+ end
66
+
67
+ def resolve(value)
68
+ return value unless reference?(value)
69
+
70
+ fetch(value.delete_prefix(REFERENCE_PREFIX))
71
+ rescue Error
72
+ # A hand-edited pointer (empty name, hostile characters) must not
73
+ # crash provider builds or REPL boot — an unresolvable reference
74
+ # resolves to nil, and Registry warns loudly instead.
75
+ nil
76
+ end
77
+
78
+ # Stores the secret and returns its reference. Raises Error when the
79
+ # active OS backend refuses; Config decides the fallback policy.
80
+ def set(name, value)
81
+ validate_name!(name)
82
+ value = value.to_s unless value.is_a?(String)
83
+ raise Error, "secret value must be a non-empty string" unless value.is_a?(String) && !value.empty?
84
+
85
+ backend.write(name, value)
86
+ reference_for(name)
87
+ end
88
+
89
+ def fetch(name)
90
+ validate_name!(name)
91
+ backend.read(name)
92
+ end
93
+
94
+ def delete(name)
95
+ validate_name!(name)
96
+ backend.delete(name)
97
+ true
98
+ end
99
+
100
+ # Test seam: inject a backend object responding to read/write/delete.
101
+ def backend=(backend_obj)
102
+ monitor_sync { @backend = backend_obj }
103
+ end
104
+
105
+ def reset!
106
+ monitor_sync { @backend = nil }
107
+ end
108
+
109
+ private
110
+
111
+ def backend
112
+ monitor_sync { @backend ||= select_backend }
113
+ end
114
+
115
+ def monitor_sync(&)
116
+ @monitor.synchronize(&)
117
+ end
118
+
119
+ def validate_name!(name)
120
+ name_str = name.to_s
121
+ return name_str if name_str.match?(NAME_PATTERN)
122
+
123
+ raise Error, "invalid secret name: #{name_str.inspect} (expected a dot-path like providers.openai.api_key)"
124
+ end
125
+ end
126
+
127
+ # Shared command plumbing. Backends are the internal seam; tests may
128
+ # subclass and override #run to avoid touching a host keyring.
129
+ class CommandBackend
130
+ private
131
+
132
+ # Single spawn point for every backend: receives a fully-formed
133
+ # argument vector (never a shell string) plus optional stdin payload.
134
+ def run(argv, input: nil, env: nil)
135
+ env_hash = env.is_a?(Hash) ? env : {}
136
+ merged = ENV.to_h.merge(env_hash)
137
+ Open3.popen3(merged, *argv) do |pin, pout, perr, waiter|
138
+ pin.write(input.to_s)
139
+ pin.close
140
+ [pout.read, perr.read, waiter.value]
141
+ end
142
+ end
143
+ end
144
+
145
+ class MacosKeychainBackend < CommandBackend
146
+ SECURITY = "/usr/bin/security"
147
+
148
+ def self.available?
149
+ Rubik::Platform.macos? && File.executable?(SECURITY)
150
+ end
151
+
152
+ def write(name, value)
153
+ out, err, st = run(security_write_argv(name), input: value)
154
+ return true if st.success?
155
+
156
+ raise Error, "keychain write failed (#{st.exitstatus}): #{err} #{out}"
157
+ end
158
+
159
+ def read(name)
160
+ out, _err, st = run(security_read_argv(name))
161
+ # 44 = errSecItemNotFound (honest miss); any other nonzero exit is
162
+ # a denied/failed lookup and must not surface as an empty key.
163
+ return nil unless st.success? || st.exitstatus == 44
164
+
165
+ val = out.strip
166
+ val.empty? ? nil : val
167
+ end
168
+
169
+ def delete(name)
170
+ _out, _err, _st = run(security_delete_argv(name))
171
+ true
172
+ end
173
+
174
+ private
175
+
176
+ # The security CLI owns this contract: "-w" with no value asks the
177
+ # tool to read the password from its standard input, so the secret
178
+ # never rides argv or `ps` output.
179
+ def security_write_argv(name)
180
+ [SECURITY, "add-generic-password", "-U", "-s", SERVICE, "-a", name, "-w"]
181
+ end
182
+
183
+ def security_read_argv(name)
184
+ [SECURITY, "find-generic-password", "-s", SERVICE, "-a", name, "-w"]
185
+ end
186
+
187
+ def security_delete_argv(name)
188
+ [SECURITY, "delete-generic-password", "-s", SERVICE, "-a", name]
189
+ end
190
+ end
191
+
192
+ class WindowsCredManBackend < CommandBackend
193
+ PS = "powershell.exe"
194
+
195
+ def self.available?
196
+ Rubik::Platform.windows? && WindowsCredManBackend.find_in_path(PS)
197
+ end
198
+
199
+ def self.find_in_path(binary)
200
+ ENV["PATH"].to_s.split(File::PATH_SEPARATOR).any? do |dir|
201
+ File.executable?(File.join(dir, binary))
202
+ end
203
+ end
204
+
205
+ def write(name, value)
206
+ # The secret travels base64-encoded through the environment into a
207
+ # FIXED script: no caller-controlled text is interpolated into any
208
+ # command string, and the base64 alphabet cannot carry metacharacters.
209
+ payload = {
210
+ "RUBIK_SECRET_NAME" => name,
211
+ "RUBIK_SECRET_VALUE_B64" => [value].pack("m0")
212
+ }
213
+ _out, err, st = run(write_script_argv, env: payload)
214
+ # $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop' makes the script exit nonzero on
215
+ # any vault failure; ignoring the status would hand back a dangling
216
+ # pointer while reporting success.
217
+ return true if st.success?
218
+
219
+ raise Error, "PasswordVault write failed (#{st.exitstatus}): #{err.to_s.strip}"
220
+ end
221
+
222
+ def read(name)
223
+ out, = run(read_script_argv, env: name_payload(name))
224
+ encoded = out.to_s.strip
225
+ encoded.empty? ? nil : encoded.unpack1("m0").force_encoding(Encoding::UTF_8)
226
+ end
227
+
228
+ def delete(name)
229
+ run(delete_script_argv, env: name_payload(name))
230
+ true
231
+ end
232
+
233
+ # FIXED scripts (frozen at load, no interpolation): WinRT
234
+ # PasswordVault via Windows PowerShell 5.1, present on every
235
+ # supported Windows release. cmdkey cannot read secrets back, so the
236
+ # vault API is the only stdlib-reachable read path.
237
+ WRITE_PS = <<~PS
238
+ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
239
+ [void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Foundation,ContentType=WindowsRuntime]
240
+ $v = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault
241
+ $p = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($env:RUBIK_SECRET_VALUE_B64))
242
+ $c = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordCredential('rubik', $env:RUBIK_SECRET_NAME, $p)
243
+ $v.Add($c)
244
+ Write-Output 'ok'
245
+ PS
246
+
247
+ READ_PS = <<~PS
248
+ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
249
+ [void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Foundation,ContentType=WindowsRuntime]
250
+ $v = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault
251
+ $c = $v.Retrieve('rubik', $env:RUBIK_SECRET_NAME)
252
+ $c.RetrievePassword()
253
+ Write-Output ([Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($c.Password)))
254
+ PS
255
+
256
+ DELETE_PS = <<~PS
257
+ [void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Foundation,ContentType=WindowsRuntime]
258
+ $v = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault
259
+ try { $c = $v.Retrieve('rubik', $env:RUBIK_SECRET_NAME); $v.Remove($c) } catch { }
260
+ Write-Output 'ok'
261
+ PS
262
+
263
+ private
264
+
265
+ def name_payload(name)
266
+ { "RUBIK_SECRET_NAME" => name }
267
+ end
268
+
269
+ def write_script_argv
270
+ [PS, "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", WRITE_PS]
271
+ end
272
+
273
+ def read_script_argv
274
+ [PS, "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", READ_PS]
275
+ end
276
+
277
+ def delete_script_argv
278
+ [PS, "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", DELETE_PS]
279
+ end
280
+ end
281
+
282
+ class LinuxSecretToolBackend < CommandBackend
283
+ TOOL = "secret-tool"
284
+
285
+ def self.available?
286
+ return false unless Rubik::Platform.linux? && LinuxSecretToolBackend.find_in_path(TOOL)
287
+
288
+ # Canary probe: headless boxes ship the binary without a running
289
+ # secret service ("Cannot autolaunch D-Bus"), so binary presence
290
+ # alone lies. A missed lookup (exit 1) is a working service; a
291
+ # crashed lookup (other nonzero) is not.
292
+ new.canary_ok?
293
+ end
294
+
295
+ def self.find_in_path(binary)
296
+ ENV["PATH"].to_s.split(File::PATH_SEPARATOR).any? do |dir|
297
+ File.executable?(File.join(dir, binary))
298
+ end
299
+ end
300
+
301
+ def write(name, value)
302
+ _out, err, st = run(store_argv(name), input: value)
303
+ return true if st.success?
304
+
305
+ raise Error, "secret-tool store failed (#{st.exitstatus}): #{err}"
306
+ end
307
+
308
+ def read(name)
309
+ out, = run(lookup_argv(name))
310
+ val = out.to_s.strip
311
+ val.empty? ? nil : val
312
+ end
313
+
314
+ def delete(name)
315
+ run(clear_argv(name))
316
+ true
317
+ end
318
+
319
+ def canary_ok?
320
+ _out, _err, st = run(lookup_argv("rubik-availability-probe"))
321
+ st.exitstatus == 1 || st.success?
322
+ end
323
+
324
+ private
325
+
326
+ # The secret travels on stdin — never argv — per secret-service
327
+ # convention; attrs (service, account) name the lookup key.
328
+ def store_argv(name)
329
+ [TOOL, "store", "--label=rubik", "service", SERVICE, "account", name]
330
+ end
331
+
332
+ def lookup_argv(name)
333
+ [TOOL, "lookup", "service", SERVICE, "account", name]
334
+ end
335
+
336
+ def clear_argv(name)
337
+ [TOOL, "clear", "service", SERVICE, "account", name]
338
+ end
339
+ end
340
+
341
+ # The always-present fallback: owner-only store next to the global
342
+ # config, created 0600 from the first byte (same discipline as
343
+ # Config::Store#ensure_owner_only!), atomic replace on every write.
344
+ class FileBackend
345
+ def initialize(path = default_path)
346
+ @path = path
347
+ end
348
+
349
+ attr_reader :path
350
+
351
+ def write(name, value)
352
+ ensure_owner_only!
353
+ data = read_all
354
+ data[name] = value
355
+ atomic_replace(data)
356
+ end
357
+
358
+ def read(name)
359
+ read_all[name]
360
+ end
361
+
362
+ def delete(name)
363
+ data = read_all
364
+ data.delete(name)
365
+ atomic_replace(data)
366
+ true
367
+ end
368
+
369
+ private
370
+
371
+ def read_all
372
+ return {} unless File.exist?(@path)
373
+
374
+ parsed = YAML.safe_load_file(@path, permitted_classes: [], aliases: false)
375
+ parsed.is_a?(Hash) ? parsed : {}
376
+ rescue Psych::Exception
377
+ {}
378
+ end
379
+
380
+ def atomic_replace(data)
381
+ dir = File.dirname(@path)
382
+ FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir)
383
+ # Tempfile.new (NOT the block form of Tempfile.create, which
384
+ # unlinks the file when the block exits): the temp file must
385
+ # SURVIVE until the rename, and must be CLOSED before it —
386
+ # Windows refuses to rename an open file.
387
+ tmp = Tempfile.new("rubik-secrets-", dir)
388
+ begin
389
+ tmp.write(YAML.dump(data))
390
+ tmp.flush
391
+ tmp.chmod(0o600)
392
+ tmp.close
393
+ File.rename(tmp.path, @path)
394
+ rescue SystemCallError
395
+ # Windows rename can still refuse an existing destination:
396
+ # fall back to a short delete-then-rename window.
397
+ tmp.close
398
+ FileUtils.rm_f(@path)
399
+ File.rename(tmp.path, @path)
400
+ ensure
401
+ tmp.close
402
+ tmp.unlink
403
+ end
404
+ rescue SystemCallError => e
405
+ raise Error, "secret file store write failed: #{e.message}"
406
+ end
407
+
408
+ def ensure_owner_only!
409
+ FileUtils.touch(@path) unless File.exist?(@path)
410
+ File.chmod(0o600, @path)
411
+ rescue SystemCallError
412
+ nil
413
+ end
414
+
415
+ def default_path
416
+ home = if defined?(Rubik::Platform) && Rubik::Platform.respond_to?(:home_dir)
417
+ begin
418
+ Rubik::Platform.home_dir
419
+ rescue StandardError
420
+ nil
421
+ end
422
+ else
423
+ ENV["USERPROFILE"] || ENV.fetch("HOME", nil)
424
+ end
425
+ # No "." fallback: an owner-only secret store must never land in
426
+ # the working tree just because HOME is unset.
427
+ raise Error, "no home directory available for the secret file store (set HOME/USERPROFILE)" if home.nil? || home.to_s.strip.empty?
428
+
429
+ File.join(home.to_s, ".rubik", "secrets.yml")
430
+ end
431
+ end
432
+
433
+ def self.select_backend
434
+ # Test armor (RUBIK_TEST=1, the repo-wide convention): a test run
435
+ # must NEVER touch the host keyring, even through an un-injected
436
+ # path — an interactive-authorization `security` spawn on a headless
437
+ # CI runner hangs forever. Un-injected tests get the owner-only
438
+ # file store in a temp location instead.
439
+ return FileBackend.new(test_file_backend_path) if ENV["RUBIK_TEST"] == "1"
440
+
441
+ [MacosKeychainBackend, WindowsCredManBackend, LinuxSecretToolBackend].each do |klass|
442
+ return klass.new if klass.available?
443
+ end
444
+ FileBackend.new
445
+ end
446
+
447
+ # Process-unique path so parallel test workers cannot observe each
448
+ # other's writes; stays under the OS tempdir, never the worktree.
449
+ def self.test_file_backend_path
450
+ File.join(Dir.tmpdir, "rubik-test-secrets-#{Process.pid}.yml")
451
+ end
452
+
453
+ def self.backend_class_name(backend_obj)
454
+ case backend_obj
455
+ when MacosKeychainBackend then :macos_keychain
456
+ when WindowsCredManBackend then :windows_credman
457
+ when LinuxSecretToolBackend then :linux_secret_service
458
+ else :file
459
+ end
460
+ end
461
+ end
462
+ end
463
+ end