rubik 0.13.0 → 0.14.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/ATTRIBUTION.md +1 -1
- data/CHANGELOG.md +34 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ast/c_extractor.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ast/graph.rb +38 -57
- data/lib/rubik/ast/graph_extensions.rb +57 -15
- data/lib/rubik/ast/ruby_extractor.rb +4 -0
- data/lib/rubik/ast/treesitter/c_walker.rb +11 -3
- data/lib/rubik/buffer/manager.rb +33 -11
- data/lib/rubik/buffer/snapshot.rb +23 -3
- data/lib/rubik/cli/connect.rb +3 -5
- data/lib/rubik/config/defaults.rb +3 -7
- data/lib/rubik/config/env_guard.rb +43 -0
- data/lib/rubik/config/schema.rb +7 -1
- data/lib/rubik/config/secret_policy.rb +6 -5
- data/lib/rubik/config.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/connect/models_dev.rb +9 -0
- data/lib/rubik/connect/probes.rb +9 -2
- data/lib/rubik/connect/wizard.rb +108 -56
- data/lib/rubik/context/repo_context_reader.rb +8 -4
- data/lib/rubik/llm/chunk_assembler.rb +12 -1
- data/lib/rubik/llm/formatter.rb +14 -0
- data/lib/rubik/llm/provider_key.rb +32 -0
- data/lib/rubik/llm/registry.rb +18 -2
- data/lib/rubik/llm/router.rb +19 -1
- data/lib/rubik/llm/session_header.rb +128 -0
- data/lib/rubik/llm/sse_parser.rb +57 -10
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/client.rb +11 -5
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/transport.rb +17 -7
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/transport/stdio.rb +42 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/continuation_manager.rb +14 -5
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/ledger.rb +18 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/observation_projection.rb +13 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/validator.rb +46 -7
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/verifier.rb +8 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_session.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/loop.rb +8 -11
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_resolver.rb +29 -6
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/step_executor.rb +17 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/instance.rb +24 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/notices.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/reaper.rb +21 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/start_gate.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/step_runner.rb +7 -7
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/supervisor.rb +10 -3
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/turn_executor/user_channel.rb +27 -5
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/turn_executor.rb +24 -8
- data/lib/rubik/platform/filesystem.rb +52 -24
- data/lib/rubik/plugin/storage.rb +20 -0
- data/lib/rubik/prompt/context_builder.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repair/loop.rb +22 -2
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_context.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_execution.rb +20 -15
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/buffer.rb +15 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/connect.rb +0 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/lsp.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/plugins.rb +31 -31
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/session.rb +5 -5
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/repl/input_execution.rb +30 -29
- data/lib/rubik/repl/input_loop.rb +9 -4
- data/lib/rubik/repl/lifecycle.rb +1 -2
- data/lib/rubik/repl/notice_router.rb +11 -5
- data/lib/rubik/repl/paste_support.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/prompt_grace.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/repl/shell.rb +10 -2
- data/lib/rubik/repl/turn_recorder.rb +14 -3
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/context.rb +33 -27
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/manager.rb +23 -15
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/driver/bubblewrap.rb +58 -8
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/driver/process.rb +32 -1
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb +9 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/classifier.rb +147 -13
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/commands/docker.yaml +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/commands/git.yaml +27 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/commands/sed.yaml +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/database.rb +2 -2
- data/lib/rubik/security/command_gate.rb +8 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/redactor.rb +62 -19
- data/lib/rubik/session/recorder.rb +13 -18
- data/lib/rubik/session/replayer.rb +29 -7
- data/lib/rubik/storage/store.rb +19 -5
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/exec.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/files.rb +8 -12
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/grep.rb +3 -2
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/lsp.rb +31 -7
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/show_file.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/synthesis.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/tools/result_normalizer.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ui/banner.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/ui/dialog.rb +10 -7
- data/lib/rubik/ui/diff_viewer.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/ui/frame.rb +13 -3
- data/lib/rubik/ui/markdown_stream.rb +8 -2
- data/lib/rubik/ui/panel.rb +11 -11
- data/lib/rubik/ui/renderer.rb +6 -6
- data/lib/rubik/ui/spinner.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ui/statusline.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/ui/theme.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/version.rb +1 -1
- metadata +4 -1
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ module Rubik
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# effects and is pruned from its parent on every exit.
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class PromptGrace
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ESCAPE_TIMEOUT = 0.03
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STATUS = "
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STATUS = "Sending… Esc: return to editing"
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def initialize(input:, output:, context: nil, clock: nil, reader: nil)
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@input = input
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@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ module Rubik
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# the last processed key. Do not let its Enter submit a later turn.
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if @input.respond_to?(:nread) && @input.nread.positive?
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@input.iflush
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@output.print "\a\r\e[2K[Rubik]
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@output.print "\a\r\e[2K[Rubik] Keys received while waiting were ignored.\r\n"
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end
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return :execute
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end
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# Other keys are intentionally rejected, with immediate feedback.
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# Enter never leaks into the next readline as an accidental submit.
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@output.print "\a\r\e[2K#{STATUS} ·
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@output.print "\a\r\e[2K#{STATUS} · Key ignored"
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@output.flush
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end
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rescue Interrupt
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data/lib/rubik/repl/shell.rb
CHANGED
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# @return [void]
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def execute_input(input_text)
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parsed = CommandParser.parse(input_text)
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-
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# Redact at the record seam, BEFORE the transcript write: provider
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# CLI forms (`--key=…`, `set <name> key <value>`) are accepted here and
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# must never land in the JSONL even if a recorder wrapper changes
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# (issue #542). The recorder masks again as defence in depth.
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clean_input = Rubik::Security::Redactor.redact(input_text)
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@recorder.record(parsed.type, clean_input) if !@replaying && parsed.type != :empty && parsed.type != :prompt
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case parsed.type
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when :empty
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if resume_intent?(parsed.raw)
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execute_resumed_turn!
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else
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-
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# The redacted form is the one that reaches the recorder, the
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# conversation window and every downstream LLM request — a
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# pasted credential must not become durable prompt memory (#542).
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execute_free_text(clean_input)
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end
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end
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Rubik::Platform.debug_warn("input ceiling lookup failed (#{e.class}: #{e.message}); using nil budget")
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nil
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end
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# Serialize the read-compute-replace of the history array with the
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# bus-thread notice injection (issue #557). Both sides use the same
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# mutex owned by NoticeRouter; bare EmitHost doubles skip the lock.
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if respond_to?(:notice_router)
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notice_router.subagent_notices_mutex.synchronize do
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@conversation_history = Rubik::Prompt::ContextCompactor.trim_history_to_budget(
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@conversation_history, ceiling: ceiling, max_entries: MAX_CONVERSATION_ENTRIES
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)
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end
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else
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@conversation_history = Rubik::Prompt::ContextCompactor.trim_history_to_budget(
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@conversation_history, ceiling: ceiling, max_entries: MAX_CONVERSATION_ENTRIES
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)
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end
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rescue StandardError => e
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Rubik::Log.warn(:repl, "conversation trim failed (#{e.class}: #{e.message}); window may exceed token budget")
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nil
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inverse = cleanup_fn || block
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return unless inverse
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# Resolve dmesg before the monitor: walking to the parent while held is a child→parent inversion (#552).
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dmesg = disposed? ? resolve_dmesg : nil
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@monitor.synchronize do
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if @disposed
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# later drain that would run this inverse. Execute it now instead
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# of silently storing it in a dead accumulator (leaked cleanup).
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run_inverse(inverse)
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run_inverse(inverse, dmesg: dmesg)
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@disposables << inverse
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end
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# Resolve dmesg outside monitor to preserve parent→child lock order (F3).
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dmesg = resolve_dmesg
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parent = nil
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@monitor.synchronize do
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children, inverses = @monitor.synchronize do
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return if @disposed
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@disposed = true
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# "beginning" log reports).
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detached = [@children.dup, @disposables.dup]
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@children.clear
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@disposables.clear
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detached
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end
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deferred_interrupt = dispose_children(children)
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drained, drain_signal = drain_inverses(inverses, dmesg: dmesg)
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deferred_interrupt ||= drain_signal
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@monitor.synchronize do
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@services.clear
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@service_inverses.clear
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@child_inverses.clear
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end
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dmesg&.log(:context, :info, "Context dispose complete; #{drained} inverse(s) executed")
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# Release the child's monitor before reaching the parent (lock
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# order), then prune the parent's record of this child.
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parent&.prune_child(self)
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# so the descending iteration never observes mutation. A child's
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# deferred Interrupt/SystemExit is adopted as (possibly) the FIRST
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# signal of this cascade; returns the first deferred child signal.
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def dispose_children
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def dispose_children(children)
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deferred = nil
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children.reverse_each do |child|
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child.dispose unless child.disposed?
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rescue Interrupt, SystemExit => e
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record_deferred_signal(e)
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@children.clear
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deferred
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# by dispose after bookkeeping and the parent prune. Late registration
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# racing the drain is monitor-serialized (pop loop, or the sealed
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# immediate-run path). Returns [drained, first_signal].
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def drain_inverses(dmesg:)
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def drain_inverses(inverses, dmesg:)
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drained = 0
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end
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while (inverse = inverses.pop)
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begin
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rescue Interrupt, SystemExit => e
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ensure
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[drained, deferred]
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end
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def record_deferred_signal(exception)
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@last_dispose_errors << exception
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def run_inverse(inverse, dmesg: nil)
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inverse.call
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dmesg
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dmesg&.log(:context, :err, "Dispose inverse failed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
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def unregister_component(name)
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name_str = name.to_s
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fiber = detach_fiber(name_str)
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return unless fiber
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return if @monitor.synchronize { @fibers[name_str].equal?(fiber) }
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# Reactive retraction (AGENTS.md §5, Finding B): unlike Context#unprovide
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reconcile_all(changed_service: service_name)
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end
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#
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# allowing swap_component to safely invoke unregister_component and register_component
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# from within the same thread without deadlocking.
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# Detach under the monitor; tear down outside it so a factory inverse cannot invert the lock order.
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def swap_component(name, inject: [], requires: [], provides: [], config: {}, &new_factory)
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register_component(name_str, inject: inject, requires: requires, provides: provides, config: config, &new_factory)
|
|
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-
end
|
|
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|
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name_str = name.to_s
|
|
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unregister_component(name_str)
|
|
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register_component(name_str, inject: inject, requires: requires, provides: provides, config: config, &new_factory)
|
|
123
122
|
end
|
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|
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def reconcile_all(changed_service: nil)
|
|
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|
|
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226
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private
|
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|
|
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# Detach a fiber + bookkeeping under the monitor; teardown is deferred.
|
|
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+
def detach_fiber(name_str)
|
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@monitor.synchronize do
|
|
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@fiber_deps.delete(name_str)
|
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@retry_gate.clear(name_str)
|
|
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@fibers.delete(name_str)
|
|
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|
+
end
|
|
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|
+
end
|
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|
|
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|
# Marks the fiber while its factory runs so nested reconciles skip it;
|
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# ensure-based so a raising factory (→ :failed) never wedges the marker.
|
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def with_activation_marker(fiber)
|
|
@@ -9,6 +9,26 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
9
9
|
module Sandbox
|
|
10
10
|
module Driver
|
|
11
11
|
class BubblewrapDriver < Base
|
|
12
|
+
# Minimal read-only system trees needed to run a shell and common
|
|
13
|
+
# tools. The host root is deliberately NOT mounted: binding only these
|
|
14
|
+
# trees keeps ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials and ~/.rubik/secrets.yml out
|
|
15
|
+
# of the sandbox, so READONLY cat/less/strings cannot leak them into
|
|
16
|
+
# model-visible output. Workspace and explicitly allowed dirs are
|
|
17
|
+
# bind-mounted read-write below; everything else is absent.
|
|
18
|
+
# NOTE: this provides integrity/isolation, NOT secret confinement —
|
|
19
|
+
# the sandbox is not a confidentiality boundary for host credentials.
|
|
20
|
+
MINIMAL_RO_BINDS = ["/usr", "/bin", "/sbin", "/lib", "/lib64", "/etc"].freeze
|
|
21
|
+
private_constant :MINIMAL_RO_BINDS
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
# Docker-style --tmpfs mount options. bubblewrap has never accepted a
|
|
24
|
+
# colon-suffixed DEST, so this is used only when a one-time capability
|
|
25
|
+
# probe confirms the installed binary supports it (see
|
|
26
|
+
# .tmpfs_supports_options?). Passing it to an unsupported bwrap makes
|
|
27
|
+
# bwrap try to create a literal directory by that name and fail the
|
|
28
|
+
# command, so older binaries fall back to a plain /tmp mount.
|
|
29
|
+
TMPFS_HARDENED = "/tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid"
|
|
30
|
+
private_constant :TMPFS_HARDENED
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
12
32
|
def name
|
|
13
33
|
"bwrap"
|
|
14
34
|
end
|
|
@@ -20,14 +40,16 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
20
40
|
def run(cmd, timeout: 15, chdir: Dir.pwd, allow_network: false, memory_limit_mb: 512, cpus: "1.0") # rubocop:disable Lint/UnusedMethodArgument
|
|
21
41
|
workspace = File.expand_path(chdir)
|
|
22
42
|
|
|
23
|
-
bwrap_cmd = [
|
|
24
|
-
|
|
25
|
-
|
|
26
|
-
"--
|
|
27
|
-
|
|
28
|
-
|
|
29
|
-
|
|
30
|
-
|
|
43
|
+
bwrap_cmd = ["bwrap"]
|
|
44
|
+
|
|
45
|
+
MINIMAL_RO_BINDS.each do |path|
|
|
46
|
+
bwrap_cmd.push("--ro-bind", path, path) if File.directory?(path)
|
|
47
|
+
end
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
bwrap_cmd.push("--dev", "/dev")
|
|
50
|
+
bwrap_cmd.push("--proc", "/proc")
|
|
51
|
+
bwrap_cmd.push("--tmpfs", tmpfs_dest)
|
|
52
|
+
bwrap_cmd.push("--bind", workspace, workspace)
|
|
31
53
|
|
|
32
54
|
if @options[:allowed_dirs]
|
|
33
55
|
Array(@options[:allowed_dirs]).each do |dir|
|
|
@@ -39,6 +61,7 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
39
61
|
bwrap_cmd.push("--chdir", workspace)
|
|
40
62
|
bwrap_cmd.push("--unshare-net") unless allow_network
|
|
41
63
|
bwrap_cmd.push("--unshare-pid", "--die-with-parent")
|
|
64
|
+
bwrap_cmd.push("--new-session", "--unshare-ipc", "--unshare-uts")
|
|
42
65
|
bwrap_cmd.push("sh", "-c", cmd)
|
|
43
66
|
|
|
44
67
|
res = Rubik::Platform.popen_capture(
|
|
@@ -59,6 +82,33 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
59
82
|
driver: "bwrap"
|
|
60
83
|
}
|
|
61
84
|
end
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
# Probe the installed bwrap once. bubblewrap's --tmpfs has only ever
|
|
87
|
+
# taken a destination path; the ":rw,noexec,nosuid" suffix is a Docker
|
|
88
|
+
# extension. A future bwrap that gains mount-option support is picked
|
|
89
|
+
# up automatically, while current binaries keep a working plain /tmp.
|
|
90
|
+
# Public so tests can stub either branch deterministically.
|
|
91
|
+
def self.tmpfs_supports_options?
|
|
92
|
+
return @tmpfs_supports_options if defined?(@tmpfs_supports_options)
|
|
93
|
+
|
|
94
|
+
bwrap = Rubik::Platform.which("bwrap")
|
|
95
|
+
@tmpfs_supports_options = begin
|
|
96
|
+
!!(bwrap && system(bwrap, "--ro-bind", "/", "/", "--tmpfs", TMPFS_HARDENED, "/bin/true",
|
|
97
|
+
out: File::NULL, err: File::NULL))
|
|
98
|
+
rescue StandardError
|
|
99
|
+
false
|
|
100
|
+
end
|
|
101
|
+
end
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
private
|
|
104
|
+
|
|
105
|
+
# Resolved lazily so the capability probe runs at most once per process
|
|
106
|
+
# and only when a sandbox is actually executed.
|
|
107
|
+
def tmpfs_dest
|
|
108
|
+
return @tmpfs_dest if defined?(@tmpfs_dest)
|
|
109
|
+
|
|
110
|
+
@tmpfs_dest = self.class.tmpfs_supports_options? ? TMPFS_HARDENED : "/tmp"
|
|
111
|
+
end
|
|
62
112
|
end
|
|
63
113
|
end
|
|
64
114
|
end
|
|
@@ -10,13 +10,29 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
10
10
|
module Sandbox
|
|
11
11
|
module Driver
|
|
12
12
|
class ProcessDriver < Base
|
|
13
|
+
# Credential-shaped variable names stripped from the child environment.
|
|
14
|
+
# Spawn semantics require an explicit nil to UNSET an inherited variable;
|
|
15
|
+
# the previous `env = {}` inherited the entire host environment, and the
|
|
16
|
+
# READONLY `env`/`printenv` commands could dump it into model-visible
|
|
17
|
+
# output. Matching is by underscore-delimited segment (case-insensitive)
|
|
18
|
+
# so SCREAMING_SNAKE names such as OPENAI_API_KEY, MY_SECRET and
|
|
19
|
+
# AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID are covered without matching words like "tokenizer".
|
|
20
|
+
# NOTE: this is integrity hygiene, NOT a secret-confinement boundary —
|
|
21
|
+
# the child still inherits non-credential host variables by design.
|
|
22
|
+
CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN = /
|
|
23
|
+
(?:_|\A)(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PAT|CREDENTIALS?)(?:_|\z)
|
|
24
|
+
|\A(?:DATABASE|REDIS|MONGO|POSTGRES|MYSQL|AMQP)_URL\z
|
|
25
|
+
|_(?:DATABASE|CONNECTION)_URL\z
|
|
26
|
+
/ix
|
|
27
|
+
private_constant :CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
13
29
|
def available?
|
|
14
30
|
true
|
|
15
31
|
end
|
|
16
32
|
|
|
17
33
|
def run(cmd, timeout: 15, chdir: Dir.pwd, allow_network: false, memory_limit_mb: 512, cpus: "1.0") # rubocop:disable Lint/UnusedMethodArgument -- sürücü arayüzü kwarg'leri korunuyor
|
|
18
34
|
resolved = ShellResolver.resolve(cmd, preference: @options[:shell] || "auto")
|
|
19
|
-
env =
|
|
35
|
+
env = child_env
|
|
20
36
|
|
|
21
37
|
res = Rubik::Platform.popen_capture(
|
|
22
38
|
env,
|
|
@@ -44,6 +60,21 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
44
60
|
|
|
45
61
|
private
|
|
46
62
|
|
|
63
|
+
# Environment handed to Open3.popen3. Start from the shared sanitized
|
|
64
|
+
# spawn env (bundler/Ruby runtime vars already nil'd), then explicitly
|
|
65
|
+
# nil every credential-shaped variable present in the host ENV so the
|
|
66
|
+
# child cannot observe or dump them. Benign variables are left out of
|
|
67
|
+
# the hash entirely and therefore remain normally inheritable, which
|
|
68
|
+
# keeps legitimate command execution (PATH, HOME, locale, proxies…)
|
|
69
|
+
# working. See CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN for the shape that is stripped.
|
|
70
|
+
def child_env
|
|
71
|
+
env = Rubik::Platform.sanitized_spawn_env
|
|
72
|
+
ENV.each_key do |key|
|
|
73
|
+
env[key] = nil if key.match?(CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN)
|
|
74
|
+
end
|
|
75
|
+
env
|
|
76
|
+
end
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
47
78
|
# cmd.exe parses its tail with its own quoting rules that standard
|
|
48
79
|
# Windows argv quoting cannot express, so the command must reach it
|
|
49
80
|
# as a bare string (Ruby's string spawn form routes exactly there).
|
data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb
CHANGED
|
@@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
12
12
|
class Runner
|
|
13
13
|
attr_reader :root_dir, :driver, :allowed_external_dirs, :config, :guard, :context
|
|
14
14
|
|
|
15
|
+
# Honest description of what sandboxing actually guarantees. The drivers
|
|
16
|
+
# restrict writes/network and strip credential-shaped env vars, but they
|
|
17
|
+
# are NOT a confidentiality boundary: bubblewrap still exposes the
|
|
18
|
+
# workspace and any explicitly allowed read-only binds, and the process
|
|
19
|
+
# driver runs on the host with only command-level guardrails.
|
|
20
|
+
INTEGRITY_ONLY_NOTE = "integrity only, NOT a secret-confinement boundary " \
|
|
21
|
+
"(only credential-shaped env vars are stripped; allowed read-only binds can still expose host files)"
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
15
23
|
def initialize(root_dir: Dir.pwd, allow_network: false, driver: nil, config: nil, allowed_external_dirs: [], guard: nil, context: nil)
|
|
16
24
|
@root_dir = File.expand_path(root_dir)
|
|
17
25
|
@config = config
|
|
@@ -219,7 +227,7 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
219
227
|
def isolation_disclosure
|
|
220
228
|
if sandbox_enabled? && @driver
|
|
221
229
|
net_status = allow_network? ? "allowed" : "none"
|
|
222
|
-
"🔍 Isolation: sandbox (#{@driver.name}, network=#{net_status}) —
|
|
230
|
+
"🔍 Isolation: sandbox (#{@driver.name}, network=#{net_status}) — #{INTEGRITY_ONLY_NOTE}"
|
|
223
231
|
else
|
|
224
232
|
"🔍 Execution: direct (safe execution guardrails active; sandbox disabled)"
|
|
225
233
|
end
|
|
@@ -24,6 +24,25 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
24
24
|
READ_OPERATORS = ["<"].freeze
|
|
25
25
|
# PERF: Hoist home token array to avoid per-path array allocations in system_path? check.
|
|
26
26
|
HOME_TOKENS = ["~", "~/", "$HOME", "${HOME}"].freeze
|
|
27
|
+
# Variables whose VALUE the host command executes as a shell command
|
|
28
|
+
# (git ssh/editor/pager hooks, shell startup files, askpass helpers).
|
|
29
|
+
# An unclassifiable payload here must fail closed instead of hiding
|
|
30
|
+
# behind a clean outer allowlist entry (issue #540).
|
|
31
|
+
EXECUTED_ENV_VARS = [
|
|
32
|
+
"GIT_SSH_COMMAND", "GIT_EDITOR", "GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR", "GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF",
|
|
33
|
+
"GIT_PAGER", "GIT_ASKPASS", "EDITOR", "VISUAL", "PAGER", "SHELL", "BASH_ENV", "ENV",
|
|
34
|
+
"SSH_ASKPASS", "SSH_COMMAND", "LESSOPEN"
|
|
35
|
+
].freeze
|
|
36
|
+
EXECUTED_ENV_PREFIXES = ["GIT_CONFIG_"].freeze
|
|
37
|
+
# Pre-subcommand git config assignments that redirect execution
|
|
38
|
+
# (editors, hooks, pagers, ssh, aliases). Global-option stripping
|
|
39
|
+
# removes these before subcommand options are evaluated, so the
|
|
40
|
+
# Engine must gate them from the raw argv (#539 residual).
|
|
41
|
+
GIT_CONFIG_FLAGS = ["-c", "--config"].freeze
|
|
42
|
+
DANGEROUS_GIT_CONFIG_KEYS = [
|
|
43
|
+
"core.editor", "core.hookspath", "core.pager", "core.sshcommand",
|
|
44
|
+
"core.fsmonitor", "core.gitproxy", "diff.external"
|
|
45
|
+
].freeze
|
|
27
46
|
|
|
28
47
|
def self.default_database
|
|
29
48
|
@default_database ||= CommandDatabase.new
|
|
@@ -82,6 +101,7 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
82
101
|
# as a sibling inner command BEFORE redirects/system-path checks
|
|
83
102
|
# so the rest of the pipeline sees the elevation.
|
|
84
103
|
result = apply_assignment_payloads(result, inv, parse_warnings)
|
|
104
|
+
result = apply_git_config_overrides(result, inv, parse_warnings)
|
|
85
105
|
|
|
86
106
|
write_paths, read_paths, all_temp = extract_paths(inv.redirects)
|
|
87
107
|
result = apply_redirects(result, inv.redirects, write_paths, all_temp)
|
|
@@ -101,25 +121,36 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
101
121
|
def apply_assignment_payloads(result, inv, parse_warnings)
|
|
102
122
|
return result if inv.assignments.empty?
|
|
103
123
|
|
|
104
|
-
inners = inv.assignments.
|
|
124
|
+
inners = inv.assignments.flat_map do |assignment|
|
|
105
125
|
name, value = assignment.split("=", 2)
|
|
106
126
|
value = Matcher::Delegation.strip_quotes(value.to_s)
|
|
107
|
-
next
|
|
127
|
+
next [] if value.strip.empty?
|
|
108
128
|
|
|
109
129
|
inner_invs, warnings = Parser.parse(value, shell: @shell)
|
|
110
130
|
Matcher::Delegation.record_warnings(parse_warnings, warnings)
|
|
111
|
-
next
|
|
131
|
+
next [] if inner_invs.empty?
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
executed = executed_env_var?(name)
|
|
134
|
+
shaped = command_shaped?(inner_invs)
|
|
135
|
+
# A host-executed variable whose payload we cannot classify is
|
|
136
|
+
# the #540 bypass: `GIT_SSH_COMMAND='nc ...' git push` used to
|
|
137
|
+
# read as a clean `git push`. Floor it to UNKNOWN so the gate
|
|
138
|
+
# fails closed instead of trusting the outer allowlist entry.
|
|
139
|
+
next [] if !shaped && !executed
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
floor = executed && !shaped ? Classification::UNKNOWN : nil
|
|
112
142
|
|
|
113
143
|
inner_invs.map do |inner_inv|
|
|
114
144
|
Matcher::Delegation.match_inner_command(
|
|
115
145
|
inner_inv.argv, @database,
|
|
116
146
|
delegation_mode: "env_assignment",
|
|
117
147
|
delegation_source: name,
|
|
148
|
+
min_classification: floor,
|
|
118
149
|
parse_warnings: parse_warnings,
|
|
119
150
|
redirects: inner_inv.redirects
|
|
120
151
|
) { |i, db, w| Matcher.match_command(i, db, w, shell: @shell) }
|
|
121
152
|
end
|
|
122
|
-
end
|
|
153
|
+
end
|
|
123
154
|
return result if inners.empty?
|
|
124
155
|
|
|
125
156
|
classification = result.classification
|
|
@@ -136,15 +167,14 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
136
167
|
classification: classification, risk: risk, classification_reason: reason)
|
|
137
168
|
end
|
|
138
169
|
|
|
139
|
-
# False-positive firewall
|
|
140
|
-
# or config blobs (CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall", PS1="\u@\h").
|
|
141
|
-
# as a command payload only when it parses into an
|
|
142
|
-
# binary the database KNOWS or that is invoked by
|
|
143
|
-
# trust boundary the matcher applies to any
|
|
144
|
-
#
|
|
145
|
-
#
|
|
146
|
-
#
|
|
147
|
-
# known-env-exec-binaries list (GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_EDITOR, SHELL).
|
|
170
|
+
# False-positive firewall for ORDINARY env values: they are usually
|
|
171
|
+
# scalars (LANG=C) or config blobs (CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall", PS1="\u@\h").
|
|
172
|
+
# A value counts as a command payload only when it parses into an
|
|
173
|
+
# invocation whose binary the database KNOWS or that is invoked by
|
|
174
|
+
# path — the same trust boundary the matcher applies to any argv[0].
|
|
175
|
+
# Host-executed variables (EXECUTED_ENV_VARS / EXECUTED_ENV_PREFIXES)
|
|
176
|
+
# bypass this firewall in apply_assignment_payloads and fail closed
|
|
177
|
+
# with an UNKNOWN floor when their payload cannot be classified.
|
|
148
178
|
def command_shaped?(inner_invs)
|
|
149
179
|
inner_invs.any? do |inv|
|
|
150
180
|
binary = inv.argv.first.to_s
|
|
@@ -153,6 +183,79 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
153
183
|
end
|
|
154
184
|
end
|
|
155
185
|
|
|
186
|
+
def executed_env_var?(name)
|
|
187
|
+
n = name.to_s
|
|
188
|
+
EXECUTED_ENV_VARS.include?(n) || EXECUTED_ENV_PREFIXES.any? { |prefix| n.start_with?(prefix) }
|
|
189
|
+
end
|
|
190
|
+
|
|
191
|
+
def dangerous_git_config_key?(key)
|
|
192
|
+
k = key.to_s.downcase
|
|
193
|
+
DANGEROUS_GIT_CONFIG_KEYS.include?(k) || k.start_with?("alias.")
|
|
194
|
+
end
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
def dangerous_git_config_assignments(result, argv)
|
|
197
|
+
# Only the pre-subcommand region: global options are stripped there
|
|
198
|
+
# before subcommand options run (#539 residual). Post-subcommand
|
|
199
|
+
# -c/--config stays owned by the command definitions; restricting
|
|
200
|
+
# the scan also avoids flagging config-like text inside -m/--grep.
|
|
201
|
+
subcommand = result.command[1..].first
|
|
202
|
+
limit = subcommand ? (argv.index(subcommand) || argv.size) : argv.size
|
|
203
|
+
candidates = argv[1...limit] || []
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
assignments = []
|
|
206
|
+
candidates.each_with_index do |token, i|
|
|
207
|
+
if GIT_CONFIG_FLAGS.include?(token)
|
|
208
|
+
value = candidates[i + 1].to_s
|
|
209
|
+
next unless value.include?("=")
|
|
210
|
+
|
|
211
|
+
key, payload = value.split("=", 2)
|
|
212
|
+
assignments << [key, payload] if dangerous_git_config_key?(key)
|
|
213
|
+
elsif token.start_with?("--config=")
|
|
214
|
+
spec = token.delete_prefix("--config=")
|
|
215
|
+
next unless spec.include?("=")
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
217
|
+
key, payload = spec.split("=", 2)
|
|
218
|
+
assignments << [key, payload] if dangerous_git_config_key?(key)
|
|
219
|
+
end
|
|
220
|
+
end
|
|
221
|
+
assignments
|
|
222
|
+
end
|
|
223
|
+
|
|
224
|
+
# `git -c core.editor='curl ... | bash' clone ...` is stripped as a
|
|
225
|
+
# global option before subcommand options run, so the payload stayed
|
|
226
|
+
# invisible (#539 residual). Gate the dangerous key directly and
|
|
227
|
+
# surface its value through inner-command classification so the
|
|
228
|
+
# verdict is at least as strict as typing the payload itself.
|
|
229
|
+
def apply_git_config_overrides(result, inv, parse_warnings)
|
|
230
|
+
return result unless result.command.first.to_s == "git"
|
|
231
|
+
|
|
232
|
+
assignments = dangerous_git_config_assignments(result, inv.argv)
|
|
233
|
+
return result if assignments.empty?
|
|
234
|
+
|
|
235
|
+
inners = assignments.flat_map do |key, value|
|
|
236
|
+
inner_invs, warnings = Parser.parse(value, shell: @shell)
|
|
237
|
+
Matcher::Delegation.record_warnings(parse_warnings, warnings)
|
|
238
|
+
inner_invs.map do |inner_inv|
|
|
239
|
+
Matcher::Delegation.match_inner_command(
|
|
240
|
+
inner_inv.argv, @database,
|
|
241
|
+
delegation_mode: "git_config",
|
|
242
|
+
delegation_source: key,
|
|
243
|
+
parse_warnings: parse_warnings,
|
|
244
|
+
redirects: inner_inv.redirects
|
|
245
|
+
) { |i, db, w| Matcher.match_command(i, db, w, shell: @shell) }
|
|
246
|
+
end
|
|
247
|
+
end
|
|
248
|
+
|
|
249
|
+
reason = append_reason(result.classification_reason,
|
|
250
|
+
"dangerous git config #{assignments.map(&:first).join(', ')}")
|
|
251
|
+
result.with(
|
|
252
|
+
inner_commands: result.inner_commands + inners,
|
|
253
|
+
classification: Classification::DANGEROUS,
|
|
254
|
+
risk: Risk::HIGH,
|
|
255
|
+
classification_reason: reason
|
|
256
|
+
)
|
|
257
|
+
end
|
|
258
|
+
|
|
156
259
|
def extract_paths(redirects)
|
|
157
260
|
write_paths = []
|
|
158
261
|
read_paths = []
|
|
@@ -361,6 +464,13 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
361
464
|
|
|
362
465
|
p = p[1..-2] if (p.start_with?('"') && p.end_with?('"')) || (p.start_with?("'") && p.end_with?("'"))
|
|
363
466
|
return false if p.empty? || p.start_with?("-")
|
|
467
|
+
|
|
468
|
+
# The current user's home is a system path however it is spelled —
|
|
469
|
+
# ~, $HOME/... and a literal /home/<user>/... must agree (#540).
|
|
470
|
+
# Checked before the temp exemption so a HOME under /tmp (test
|
|
471
|
+
# harnesses, containers) cannot slip through as a "temp path".
|
|
472
|
+
return true if home_path?(p)
|
|
473
|
+
|
|
364
474
|
return false if !p.include?("..") && (temp_path?(p) || DEV_PATHS.any? { |dev| p == dev || p.start_with?(dev) })
|
|
365
475
|
|
|
366
476
|
# Bare drive prefix without separator is NOT a drive root or system path
|
|
@@ -401,6 +511,30 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
401
511
|
end
|
|
402
512
|
public :system_path?
|
|
403
513
|
|
|
514
|
+
# Prefix containment against the current user's home. HOME_TOKENS
|
|
515
|
+
# covers ~/$HOME spellings; this covers the literal absolute spelling
|
|
516
|
+
# that dangerous_system_roots only matched exactly (#540). Any
|
|
517
|
+
# expansion/containment failure (EACCES/EPERM, malformed HOME) is
|
|
518
|
+
# unprovable, so skip this elevation and let the other checks decide.
|
|
519
|
+
def home_path?(path)
|
|
520
|
+
p = path.to_s
|
|
521
|
+
# Only absolute spellings: ~/$HOME are covered by HOME_TOKENS, and
|
|
522
|
+
# expanding relative paths would flag every path under a home-rooted cwd.
|
|
523
|
+
return false unless p.start_with?("/") || p.match?(%r{\A[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]})
|
|
524
|
+
|
|
525
|
+
home = Rubik::Platform.home_dir
|
|
526
|
+
return false if home.nil? || home.to_s.empty?
|
|
527
|
+
|
|
528
|
+
home_abs = safe_expand_path(home.to_s)
|
|
529
|
+
return false unless home_abs.to_s.match?(%r{\A/}) || home_abs.to_s.match?(%r{\A[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]})
|
|
530
|
+
|
|
531
|
+
path_abs = safe_expand_path(path)
|
|
532
|
+
Rubik::Platform.path_under?(Rubik::Platform.normalize_path(path_abs),
|
|
533
|
+
Rubik::Platform.normalize_path(home_abs))
|
|
534
|
+
rescue StandardError
|
|
535
|
+
false
|
|
536
|
+
end
|
|
537
|
+
|
|
404
538
|
def safe_expand_path(path)
|
|
405
539
|
File.expand_path(path)
|
|
406
540
|
rescue ArgumentError, TypeError
|