rubik 0.12.0 → 0.14.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/ATTRIBUTION.md +1 -1
- data/CHANGELOG.md +71 -1
- data/bin/rubik +11 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ast/c_extractor.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ast/graph.rb +38 -57
- data/lib/rubik/ast/graph_extensions.rb +57 -15
- data/lib/rubik/ast/ruby_extractor.rb +4 -0
- data/lib/rubik/ast/treesitter/c_walker.rb +11 -3
- data/lib/rubik/buffer/manager.rb +33 -11
- data/lib/rubik/buffer/snapshot.rb +23 -3
- data/lib/rubik/cli/connect.rb +49 -0
- data/lib/rubik/config/defaults.rb +4 -7
- data/lib/rubik/config/env_guard.rb +43 -0
- data/lib/rubik/config/schema.rb +8 -1
- data/lib/rubik/config/secret_policy.rb +6 -5
- data/lib/rubik/config.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/connect/http.rb +85 -0
- data/lib/rubik/connect/models_dev.rb +173 -0
- data/lib/rubik/connect/probes.rb +103 -0
- data/lib/rubik/connect/prompt_ui.rb +139 -0
- data/lib/rubik/connect/wizard.rb +540 -0
- data/lib/rubik/connect.rb +7 -0
- data/lib/rubik/context/repo_context_reader.rb +8 -4
- data/lib/rubik/llm/chunk_assembler.rb +12 -1
- data/lib/rubik/llm/formatter.rb +14 -0
- data/lib/rubik/llm/openai_compatible.rb +4 -1
- data/lib/rubik/llm/provider_key.rb +32 -0
- data/lib/rubik/llm/registry.rb +18 -2
- data/lib/rubik/llm/router.rb +19 -1
- data/lib/rubik/llm/session_header.rb +128 -0
- data/lib/rubik/llm/sse_parser.rb +57 -10
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/client.rb +11 -5
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/transport.rb +17 -7
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/transport/stdio.rb +42 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/continuation_manager.rb +14 -5
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/ledger.rb +18 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/observation_projection.rb +13 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/validator.rb +46 -7
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/verifier.rb +8 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_session.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/loop.rb +8 -11
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_resolver.rb +29 -6
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/step_executor.rb +17 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/instance.rb +24 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/notices.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/reaper.rb +21 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/start_gate.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/step_runner.rb +7 -7
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/supervisor.rb +10 -3
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/turn_executor/user_channel.rb +27 -5
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/turn_executor.rb +24 -8
- data/lib/rubik/platform/filesystem.rb +52 -24
- data/lib/rubik/plugin/storage.rb +20 -0
- data/lib/rubik/prompt/context_builder.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repair/loop.rb +22 -2
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_context.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_execution.rb +20 -15
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/buffer.rb +15 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/connect.rb +51 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/lsp.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/plugins.rb +31 -31
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/session.rb +5 -5
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands.rb +2 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/input_execution.rb +30 -29
- data/lib/rubik/repl/input_loop.rb +10 -4
- data/lib/rubik/repl/lifecycle.rb +38 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/notice_router.rb +11 -5
- data/lib/rubik/repl/paste_support.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/prompt_grace.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/repl/shell.rb +10 -2
- data/lib/rubik/repl/turn_recorder.rb +14 -3
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/context.rb +33 -27
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/manager.rb +23 -15
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/driver/bubblewrap.rb +58 -8
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/driver/process.rb +32 -1
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb +9 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/classifier.rb +147 -13
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/commands/docker.yaml +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/commands/git.yaml +27 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/commands/sed.yaml +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/security/classifier/database.rb +2 -2
- data/lib/rubik/security/command_gate.rb +8 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/redactor.rb +62 -19
- data/lib/rubik/session/recorder.rb +13 -18
- data/lib/rubik/session/replayer.rb +29 -7
- data/lib/rubik/storage/store.rb +19 -5
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/exec.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/files.rb +8 -12
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/grep.rb +3 -2
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/lsp.rb +31 -7
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/show_file.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/synthesis.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/tools/result_normalizer.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ui/banner.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/ui/dialog.rb +10 -7
- data/lib/rubik/ui/diff_viewer.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/ui/frame.rb +13 -3
- data/lib/rubik/ui/markdown_stream.rb +8 -2
- data/lib/rubik/ui/panel.rb +11 -11
- data/lib/rubik/ui/renderer.rb +6 -6
- data/lib/rubik/ui/spinner.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ui/statusline.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/ui/theme.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/version.rb +1 -1
- metadata +12 -1
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@@ -9,6 +9,26 @@ module Rubik
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module Sandbox
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module Driver
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class BubblewrapDriver < Base
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# Minimal read-only system trees needed to run a shell and common
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# tools. The host root is deliberately NOT mounted: binding only these
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# trees keeps ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials and ~/.rubik/secrets.yml out
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# of the sandbox, so READONLY cat/less/strings cannot leak them into
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# model-visible output. Workspace and explicitly allowed dirs are
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# bind-mounted read-write below; everything else is absent.
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# NOTE: this provides integrity/isolation, NOT secret confinement —
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# the sandbox is not a confidentiality boundary for host credentials.
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MINIMAL_RO_BINDS = ["/usr", "/bin", "/sbin", "/lib", "/lib64", "/etc"].freeze
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private_constant :MINIMAL_RO_BINDS
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# Docker-style --tmpfs mount options. bubblewrap has never accepted a
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# colon-suffixed DEST, so this is used only when a one-time capability
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# probe confirms the installed binary supports it (see
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# .tmpfs_supports_options?). Passing it to an unsupported bwrap makes
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# bwrap try to create a literal directory by that name and fail the
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# command, so older binaries fall back to a plain /tmp mount.
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TMPFS_HARDENED = "/tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid"
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private_constant :TMPFS_HARDENED
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def name
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"bwrap"
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end
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def run(cmd, timeout: 15, chdir: Dir.pwd, allow_network: false, memory_limit_mb: 512, cpus: "1.0") # rubocop:disable Lint/UnusedMethodArgument
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workspace = File.expand_path(chdir)
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bwrap_cmd = [
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"--
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bwrap_cmd = ["bwrap"]
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MINIMAL_RO_BINDS.each do |path|
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bwrap_cmd.push("--ro-bind", path, path) if File.directory?(path)
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end
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bwrap_cmd.push("--dev", "/dev")
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bwrap_cmd.push("--proc", "/proc")
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bwrap_cmd.push("--tmpfs", tmpfs_dest)
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bwrap_cmd.push("--bind", workspace, workspace)
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if @options[:allowed_dirs]
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Array(@options[:allowed_dirs]).each do |dir|
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bwrap_cmd.push("--chdir", workspace)
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bwrap_cmd.push("--unshare-net") unless allow_network
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bwrap_cmd.push("--unshare-pid", "--die-with-parent")
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bwrap_cmd.push("--new-session", "--unshare-ipc", "--unshare-uts")
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bwrap_cmd.push("sh", "-c", cmd)
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res = Rubik::Platform.popen_capture(
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driver: "bwrap"
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}
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end
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# Probe the installed bwrap once. bubblewrap's --tmpfs has only ever
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# taken a destination path; the ":rw,noexec,nosuid" suffix is a Docker
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# extension. A future bwrap that gains mount-option support is picked
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# up automatically, while current binaries keep a working plain /tmp.
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# Public so tests can stub either branch deterministically.
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def self.tmpfs_supports_options?
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return @tmpfs_supports_options if defined?(@tmpfs_supports_options)
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bwrap = Rubik::Platform.which("bwrap")
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@tmpfs_supports_options = begin
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!!(bwrap && system(bwrap, "--ro-bind", "/", "/", "--tmpfs", TMPFS_HARDENED, "/bin/true",
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out: File::NULL, err: File::NULL))
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rescue StandardError
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false
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end
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end
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private
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# Resolved lazily so the capability probe runs at most once per process
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# and only when a sandbox is actually executed.
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def tmpfs_dest
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return @tmpfs_dest if defined?(@tmpfs_dest)
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@tmpfs_dest = self.class.tmpfs_supports_options? ? TMPFS_HARDENED : "/tmp"
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end
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end
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end
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end
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module Sandbox
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module Driver
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class ProcessDriver < Base
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# Credential-shaped variable names stripped from the child environment.
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# Spawn semantics require an explicit nil to UNSET an inherited variable;
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# the previous `env = {}` inherited the entire host environment, and the
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# READONLY `env`/`printenv` commands could dump it into model-visible
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# output. Matching is by underscore-delimited segment (case-insensitive)
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# so SCREAMING_SNAKE names such as OPENAI_API_KEY, MY_SECRET and
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# AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID are covered without matching words like "tokenizer".
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# NOTE: this is integrity hygiene, NOT a secret-confinement boundary —
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# the child still inherits non-credential host variables by design.
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CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN = /
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(?:_|\A)(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PAT|CREDENTIALS?)(?:_|\z)
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|\A(?:DATABASE|REDIS|MONGO|POSTGRES|MYSQL|AMQP)_URL\z
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|_(?:DATABASE|CONNECTION)_URL\z
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/ix
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private_constant :CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN
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def available?
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true
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end
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def run(cmd, timeout: 15, chdir: Dir.pwd, allow_network: false, memory_limit_mb: 512, cpus: "1.0") # rubocop:disable Lint/UnusedMethodArgument -- sürücü arayüzü kwarg'leri korunuyor
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resolved = ShellResolver.resolve(cmd, preference: @options[:shell] || "auto")
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env =
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env = child_env
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res = Rubik::Platform.popen_capture(
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env,
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# Environment handed to Open3.popen3. Start from the shared sanitized
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# spawn env (bundler/Ruby runtime vars already nil'd), then explicitly
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# nil every credential-shaped variable present in the host ENV so the
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# child cannot observe or dump them. Benign variables are left out of
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# the hash entirely and therefore remain normally inheritable, which
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# keeps legitimate command execution (PATH, HOME, locale, proxies…)
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# working. See CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN for the shape that is stripped.
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def child_env
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env = Rubik::Platform.sanitized_spawn_env
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ENV.each_key do |key|
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env[key] = nil if key.match?(CREDENTIAL_ENV_PATTERN)
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end
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env
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end
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# as a bare string (Ruby's string spawn form routes exactly there).
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data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb
CHANGED
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class Runner
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attr_reader :root_dir, :driver, :allowed_external_dirs, :config, :guard, :context
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# Honest description of what sandboxing actually guarantees. The drivers
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# restrict writes/network and strip credential-shaped env vars, but they
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# are NOT a confidentiality boundary: bubblewrap still exposes the
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# workspace and any explicitly allowed read-only binds, and the process
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# driver runs on the host with only command-level guardrails.
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INTEGRITY_ONLY_NOTE = "integrity only, NOT a secret-confinement boundary " \
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"(only credential-shaped env vars are stripped; allowed read-only binds can still expose host files)"
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def initialize(root_dir: Dir.pwd, allow_network: false, driver: nil, config: nil, allowed_external_dirs: [], guard: nil, context: nil)
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@root_dir = File.expand_path(root_dir)
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@config = config
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def isolation_disclosure
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net_status = allow_network? ? "allowed" : "none"
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"🔍 Isolation: sandbox (#{@driver.name}, network=#{net_status}) — #{INTEGRITY_ONLY_NOTE}"
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end
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READ_OPERATORS = ["<"].freeze
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# PERF: Hoist home token array to avoid per-path array allocations in system_path? check.
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HOME_TOKENS = ["~", "~/", "$HOME", "${HOME}"].freeze
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# Variables whose VALUE the host command executes as a shell command
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# (git ssh/editor/pager hooks, shell startup files, askpass helpers).
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# An unclassifiable payload here must fail closed instead of hiding
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# behind a clean outer allowlist entry (issue #540).
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EXECUTED_ENV_VARS = [
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"GIT_SSH_COMMAND", "GIT_EDITOR", "GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR", "GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF",
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"GIT_PAGER", "GIT_ASKPASS", "EDITOR", "VISUAL", "PAGER", "SHELL", "BASH_ENV", "ENV",
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"SSH_ASKPASS", "SSH_COMMAND", "LESSOPEN"
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].freeze
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EXECUTED_ENV_PREFIXES = ["GIT_CONFIG_"].freeze
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# Pre-subcommand git config assignments that redirect execution
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# (editors, hooks, pagers, ssh, aliases). Global-option stripping
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# removes these before subcommand options are evaluated, so the
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# Engine must gate them from the raw argv (#539 residual).
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GIT_CONFIG_FLAGS = ["-c", "--config"].freeze
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DANGEROUS_GIT_CONFIG_KEYS = [
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"core.editor", "core.hookspath", "core.pager", "core.sshcommand",
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"core.fsmonitor", "core.gitproxy", "diff.external"
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].freeze
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def self.default_database
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@default_database ||= CommandDatabase.new
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# as a sibling inner command BEFORE redirects/system-path checks
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# so the rest of the pipeline sees the elevation.
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result = apply_assignment_payloads(result, inv, parse_warnings)
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result = apply_git_config_overrides(result, inv, parse_warnings)
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write_paths, read_paths, all_temp = extract_paths(inv.redirects)
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result = apply_redirects(result, inv.redirects, write_paths, all_temp)
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@@ -101,25 +121,36 @@ module Rubik
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101
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|
def apply_assignment_payloads(result, inv, parse_warnings)
|
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return result if inv.assignments.empty?
|
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123
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-
inners = inv.assignments.
|
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+
inners = inv.assignments.flat_map do |assignment|
|
|
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|
name, value = assignment.split("=", 2)
|
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value = Matcher::Delegation.strip_quotes(value.to_s)
|
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-
next
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+
next [] if value.strip.empty?
|
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|
|
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109
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|
inner_invs, warnings = Parser.parse(value, shell: @shell)
|
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|
Matcher::Delegation.record_warnings(parse_warnings, warnings)
|
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-
next
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+
next [] if inner_invs.empty?
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+
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executed = executed_env_var?(name)
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shaped = command_shaped?(inner_invs)
|
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# A host-executed variable whose payload we cannot classify is
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+
# the #540 bypass: `GIT_SSH_COMMAND='nc ...' git push` used to
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# read as a clean `git push`. Floor it to UNKNOWN so the gate
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# fails closed instead of trusting the outer allowlist entry.
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+
next [] if !shaped && !executed
|
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+
|
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+
floor = executed && !shaped ? Classification::UNKNOWN : nil
|
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inner_invs.map do |inner_inv|
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Matcher::Delegation.match_inner_command(
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inner_inv.argv, @database,
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|
delegation_mode: "env_assignment",
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delegation_source: name,
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+
min_classification: floor,
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parse_warnings: parse_warnings,
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redirects: inner_inv.redirects
|
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|
) { |i, db, w| Matcher.match_command(i, db, w, shell: @shell) }
|
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121
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|
end
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-
end
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|
+
end
|
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154
|
return result if inners.empty?
|
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155
|
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classification = result.classification
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@@ -136,15 +167,14 @@ module Rubik
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|
classification: classification, risk: risk, classification_reason: reason)
|
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168
|
end
|
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169
|
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|
-
# False-positive firewall
|
|
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|
-
# or config blobs (CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall", PS1="\u@\h").
|
|
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|
-
# as a command payload only when it parses into an
|
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|
-
# binary the database KNOWS or that is invoked by
|
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|
-
# trust boundary the matcher applies to any
|
|
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|
-
#
|
|
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|
-
#
|
|
146
|
-
#
|
|
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|
-
# known-env-exec-binaries list (GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_EDITOR, SHELL).
|
|
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|
+
# False-positive firewall for ORDINARY env values: they are usually
|
|
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|
+
# scalars (LANG=C) or config blobs (CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall", PS1="\u@\h").
|
|
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|
+
# A value counts as a command payload only when it parses into an
|
|
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|
+
# invocation whose binary the database KNOWS or that is invoked by
|
|
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|
+
# path — the same trust boundary the matcher applies to any argv[0].
|
|
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|
+
# Host-executed variables (EXECUTED_ENV_VARS / EXECUTED_ENV_PREFIXES)
|
|
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|
+
# bypass this firewall in apply_assignment_payloads and fail closed
|
|
177
|
+
# with an UNKNOWN floor when their payload cannot be classified.
|
|
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|
def command_shaped?(inner_invs)
|
|
149
179
|
inner_invs.any? do |inv|
|
|
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180
|
binary = inv.argv.first.to_s
|
|
@@ -153,6 +183,79 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
153
183
|
end
|
|
154
184
|
end
|
|
155
185
|
|
|
186
|
+
def executed_env_var?(name)
|
|
187
|
+
n = name.to_s
|
|
188
|
+
EXECUTED_ENV_VARS.include?(n) || EXECUTED_ENV_PREFIXES.any? { |prefix| n.start_with?(prefix) }
|
|
189
|
+
end
|
|
190
|
+
|
|
191
|
+
def dangerous_git_config_key?(key)
|
|
192
|
+
k = key.to_s.downcase
|
|
193
|
+
DANGEROUS_GIT_CONFIG_KEYS.include?(k) || k.start_with?("alias.")
|
|
194
|
+
end
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
def dangerous_git_config_assignments(result, argv)
|
|
197
|
+
# Only the pre-subcommand region: global options are stripped there
|
|
198
|
+
# before subcommand options run (#539 residual). Post-subcommand
|
|
199
|
+
# -c/--config stays owned by the command definitions; restricting
|
|
200
|
+
# the scan also avoids flagging config-like text inside -m/--grep.
|
|
201
|
+
subcommand = result.command[1..].first
|
|
202
|
+
limit = subcommand ? (argv.index(subcommand) || argv.size) : argv.size
|
|
203
|
+
candidates = argv[1...limit] || []
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
assignments = []
|
|
206
|
+
candidates.each_with_index do |token, i|
|
|
207
|
+
if GIT_CONFIG_FLAGS.include?(token)
|
|
208
|
+
value = candidates[i + 1].to_s
|
|
209
|
+
next unless value.include?("=")
|
|
210
|
+
|
|
211
|
+
key, payload = value.split("=", 2)
|
|
212
|
+
assignments << [key, payload] if dangerous_git_config_key?(key)
|
|
213
|
+
elsif token.start_with?("--config=")
|
|
214
|
+
spec = token.delete_prefix("--config=")
|
|
215
|
+
next unless spec.include?("=")
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
217
|
+
key, payload = spec.split("=", 2)
|
|
218
|
+
assignments << [key, payload] if dangerous_git_config_key?(key)
|
|
219
|
+
end
|
|
220
|
+
end
|
|
221
|
+
assignments
|
|
222
|
+
end
|
|
223
|
+
|
|
224
|
+
# `git -c core.editor='curl ... | bash' clone ...` is stripped as a
|
|
225
|
+
# global option before subcommand options run, so the payload stayed
|
|
226
|
+
# invisible (#539 residual). Gate the dangerous key directly and
|
|
227
|
+
# surface its value through inner-command classification so the
|
|
228
|
+
# verdict is at least as strict as typing the payload itself.
|
|
229
|
+
def apply_git_config_overrides(result, inv, parse_warnings)
|
|
230
|
+
return result unless result.command.first.to_s == "git"
|
|
231
|
+
|
|
232
|
+
assignments = dangerous_git_config_assignments(result, inv.argv)
|
|
233
|
+
return result if assignments.empty?
|
|
234
|
+
|
|
235
|
+
inners = assignments.flat_map do |key, value|
|
|
236
|
+
inner_invs, warnings = Parser.parse(value, shell: @shell)
|
|
237
|
+
Matcher::Delegation.record_warnings(parse_warnings, warnings)
|
|
238
|
+
inner_invs.map do |inner_inv|
|
|
239
|
+
Matcher::Delegation.match_inner_command(
|
|
240
|
+
inner_inv.argv, @database,
|
|
241
|
+
delegation_mode: "git_config",
|
|
242
|
+
delegation_source: key,
|
|
243
|
+
parse_warnings: parse_warnings,
|
|
244
|
+
redirects: inner_inv.redirects
|
|
245
|
+
) { |i, db, w| Matcher.match_command(i, db, w, shell: @shell) }
|
|
246
|
+
end
|
|
247
|
+
end
|
|
248
|
+
|
|
249
|
+
reason = append_reason(result.classification_reason,
|
|
250
|
+
"dangerous git config #{assignments.map(&:first).join(', ')}")
|
|
251
|
+
result.with(
|
|
252
|
+
inner_commands: result.inner_commands + inners,
|
|
253
|
+
classification: Classification::DANGEROUS,
|
|
254
|
+
risk: Risk::HIGH,
|
|
255
|
+
classification_reason: reason
|
|
256
|
+
)
|
|
257
|
+
end
|
|
258
|
+
|
|
156
259
|
def extract_paths(redirects)
|
|
157
260
|
write_paths = []
|
|
158
261
|
read_paths = []
|
|
@@ -361,6 +464,13 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
361
464
|
|
|
362
465
|
p = p[1..-2] if (p.start_with?('"') && p.end_with?('"')) || (p.start_with?("'") && p.end_with?("'"))
|
|
363
466
|
return false if p.empty? || p.start_with?("-")
|
|
467
|
+
|
|
468
|
+
# The current user's home is a system path however it is spelled —
|
|
469
|
+
# ~, $HOME/... and a literal /home/<user>/... must agree (#540).
|
|
470
|
+
# Checked before the temp exemption so a HOME under /tmp (test
|
|
471
|
+
# harnesses, containers) cannot slip through as a "temp path".
|
|
472
|
+
return true if home_path?(p)
|
|
473
|
+
|
|
364
474
|
return false if !p.include?("..") && (temp_path?(p) || DEV_PATHS.any? { |dev| p == dev || p.start_with?(dev) })
|
|
365
475
|
|
|
366
476
|
# Bare drive prefix without separator is NOT a drive root or system path
|
|
@@ -401,6 +511,30 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
401
511
|
end
|
|
402
512
|
public :system_path?
|
|
403
513
|
|
|
514
|
+
# Prefix containment against the current user's home. HOME_TOKENS
|
|
515
|
+
# covers ~/$HOME spellings; this covers the literal absolute spelling
|
|
516
|
+
# that dangerous_system_roots only matched exactly (#540). Any
|
|
517
|
+
# expansion/containment failure (EACCES/EPERM, malformed HOME) is
|
|
518
|
+
# unprovable, so skip this elevation and let the other checks decide.
|
|
519
|
+
def home_path?(path)
|
|
520
|
+
p = path.to_s
|
|
521
|
+
# Only absolute spellings: ~/$HOME are covered by HOME_TOKENS, and
|
|
522
|
+
# expanding relative paths would flag every path under a home-rooted cwd.
|
|
523
|
+
return false unless p.start_with?("/") || p.match?(%r{\A[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]})
|
|
524
|
+
|
|
525
|
+
home = Rubik::Platform.home_dir
|
|
526
|
+
return false if home.nil? || home.to_s.empty?
|
|
527
|
+
|
|
528
|
+
home_abs = safe_expand_path(home.to_s)
|
|
529
|
+
return false unless home_abs.to_s.match?(%r{\A/}) || home_abs.to_s.match?(%r{\A[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]})
|
|
530
|
+
|
|
531
|
+
path_abs = safe_expand_path(path)
|
|
532
|
+
Rubik::Platform.path_under?(Rubik::Platform.normalize_path(path_abs),
|
|
533
|
+
Rubik::Platform.normalize_path(home_abs))
|
|
534
|
+
rescue StandardError
|
|
535
|
+
false
|
|
536
|
+
end
|
|
537
|
+
|
|
404
538
|
def safe_expand_path(path)
|
|
405
539
|
File.expand_path(path)
|
|
406
540
|
rescue ArgumentError, TypeError
|
|
@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@ subcommands:
|
|
|
48
48
|
ls-remote:
|
|
49
49
|
classification: READONLY
|
|
50
50
|
strict: false
|
|
51
|
+
# Transport/config options that spawn a shell or hijack execution (issue #539).
|
|
52
|
+
options:
|
|
53
|
+
--upload-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
54
|
+
--receive-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
55
|
+
--exec: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
56
|
+
-c: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
57
|
+
--config: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
51
58
|
ls-tree:
|
|
52
59
|
classification: READONLY
|
|
53
60
|
strict: false
|
|
@@ -307,16 +314,33 @@ subcommands:
|
|
|
307
314
|
pull:
|
|
308
315
|
classification: LOCAL_EFFECTS
|
|
309
316
|
strict: false
|
|
317
|
+
options:
|
|
318
|
+
--upload-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
319
|
+
--receive-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
320
|
+
--exec: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
321
|
+
-c: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
322
|
+
--config: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
310
323
|
fetch:
|
|
311
324
|
classification: LOCAL_EFFECTS
|
|
312
325
|
risk: LOW
|
|
313
326
|
strict: false
|
|
314
327
|
options:
|
|
315
328
|
--prune: {overrides: LOCAL_EFFECTS}
|
|
329
|
+
--upload-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
330
|
+
--receive-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
331
|
+
--exec: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
332
|
+
-c: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
333
|
+
--config: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
316
334
|
clone:
|
|
317
335
|
classification: LOCAL_EFFECTS
|
|
318
336
|
risk: LOW
|
|
319
337
|
strict: false
|
|
338
|
+
options:
|
|
339
|
+
--upload-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
340
|
+
--receive-pack: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
341
|
+
--exec: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
342
|
+
-c: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
343
|
+
--config: {overrides: DANGEROUS, takes_value: true, risk: HIGH}
|
|
320
344
|
init:
|
|
321
345
|
classification: LOCAL_EFFECTS
|
|
322
346
|
risk: LOW
|
|
@@ -436,7 +460,9 @@ subcommands:
|
|
|
436
460
|
classification: READONLY
|
|
437
461
|
strict: false
|
|
438
462
|
foreach:
|
|
439
|
-
|
|
463
|
+
# git evaluates the argument as a shell command in every submodule;
|
|
464
|
+
# typing the payload directly would be DANGEROUS (issue #539).
|
|
465
|
+
classification: DANGEROUS
|
|
440
466
|
strict: false
|
|
441
467
|
init:
|
|
442
468
|
classification: LOCAL_EFFECTS
|
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
# $schema: ../../../schemas/command.schema.json
|
|
2
2
|
command: sed
|
|
3
3
|
description: "Stream editor for filtering and transforming text"
|
|
4
|
-
classification:
|
|
4
|
+
classification: LOCAL_EFFECTS
|
|
5
5
|
strict: false
|
|
6
6
|
global_options:
|
|
7
7
|
--help: {overrides: READONLY}
|
|
@@ -10,5 +10,5 @@ options:
|
|
|
10
10
|
--in-place: {overrides: DANGEROUS, risk: HIGH, aliases: [-i]}
|
|
11
11
|
-e: {takes_value: true}
|
|
12
12
|
--expression: {takes_value: true, aliases: [-e]}
|
|
13
|
-
-f: {takes_value: true}
|
|
14
|
-
--file: {takes_value: true, aliases: [-f]}
|
|
13
|
+
-f: {overrides: DANGEROUS, risk: HIGH, takes_value: true}
|
|
14
|
+
--file: {overrides: DANGEROUS, risk: HIGH, takes_value: true, aliases: [-f]}
|
|
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
81
81
|
key_s = self.class.yaml_str(key)
|
|
82
82
|
return true if shell == :powershell && PwshRules.key?(key_s)
|
|
83
83
|
|
|
84
|
-
@cache.key?(key_s) || @files.key?(key_s) || PwshRules.key?(key_s)
|
|
84
|
+
synchronize { @cache.key?(key_s) || @files.key?(key_s) || PwshRules.key?(key_s) }
|
|
85
85
|
end
|
|
86
86
|
|
|
87
87
|
def resolve_alias(command_def)
|
|
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
97
97
|
end
|
|
98
98
|
|
|
99
99
|
def keys
|
|
100
|
-
(@files.keys + PwshRules.definitions.keys).uniq
|
|
100
|
+
synchronize { (@files.keys + PwshRules.definitions.keys).uniq }
|
|
101
101
|
end
|
|
102
102
|
|
|
103
103
|
def size
|
|
@@ -197,7 +197,14 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
197
197
|
block_ambiguous_parse!(ast, cmd_str)
|
|
198
198
|
end
|
|
199
199
|
|
|
200
|
-
|
|
200
|
+
# Classification-based allow verdicts must not skip the un-bypassable
|
|
201
|
+
# fallback regex: every other allow path runs it (directly or via
|
|
202
|
+
# operator_allowlist_pass?). An under-rated database entry must not
|
|
203
|
+
# become a silent full bypass of the final safety layer.
|
|
204
|
+
if [:readonly, :local_effects, :external_effects].include?(ast.classification) && ast.parse_warnings.empty?
|
|
205
|
+
verify_command_fallback_regex!(cmd_str)
|
|
206
|
+
return true
|
|
207
|
+
end
|
|
201
208
|
rescue BlockedWriteError
|
|
202
209
|
raise
|
|
203
210
|
rescue StandardError => e
|
|
@@ -17,8 +17,15 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
17
17
|
%r{(https?://[^\s/@:]+:)([^\s/@:]+)@}
|
|
18
18
|
].freeze
|
|
19
19
|
|
|
20
|
-
|
|
21
|
-
|
|
20
|
+
# Generic NAME <sep> VALUE assignment. The name is normalized (camelCase
|
|
21
|
+
# boundaries -> snake_case, downcase) and classified by #secret_key? at
|
|
22
|
+
# match time, so `password=...`, `OPENAI_API_KEY=...`, `apiKey=...` and the
|
|
23
|
+
# `--key=...` flag form all share ONE rule. The optional `--` prefix is
|
|
24
|
+
# what makes provider CLI flags land here (issue #542).
|
|
25
|
+
ASSIGNMENT_KEY_REGEX = /(--)?\b([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)(\s*[:=]\s*)(['"][^'"]*['"]|[^\s,;'"]+)/
|
|
26
|
+
# Positional counterpart of `--key=...`: `!provider set <name> key <value>`
|
|
27
|
+
# has no separator, so it needs its own bounded shape (no prose masking).
|
|
28
|
+
CLI_POSITIONAL_KEY_REGEX = /\b(set\s+\S+\s+(?:key|api[_-]?key|secret|token|password|passwd)\s+)(['"][^'"]*['"]|[^\s,;'"]+)/i
|
|
22
29
|
|
|
23
30
|
# PERF: Pre-compiled constants to avoid re-allocation inside hot loops
|
|
24
31
|
URL_PATTERN = %r{(https?://[^\s/@:]+:)([^\s/@:]+)@}
|
|
@@ -26,13 +33,18 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
26
33
|
STATIC_PATTERNS = PATTERNS.reject { |pattern| pattern == URL_PATTERN }.freeze
|
|
27
34
|
# Skip static replacement passes for assignment-only and URL-only inputs.
|
|
28
35
|
STATIC_PATTERNS_COMBINED_REGEX = Regexp.union(STATIC_PATTERNS).freeze
|
|
29
|
-
|
|
36
|
+
# `key` is load-bearing: without it `--key=...` and `apiKey` take the
|
|
37
|
+
# fast path and keep the credential verbatim (issue #542).
|
|
38
|
+
QUICK_CHECK_REGEX = %r{sk-|AKIA|ghp_|github_pat_|AIza|bearer|PRIVATE KEY|://[^\s/@:]+:|password|passwd|api_key|secret|token|\bkey\b}i
|
|
30
39
|
|
|
31
40
|
# Anahtar-maskeleme desenleri (Session::Recorder#mask_payload ile aynı
|
|
32
41
|
# aile): sır görünümlü anahtarların değerleri desen eşleşmese bile
|
|
33
|
-
# maskelenir
|
|
34
|
-
|
|
35
|
-
|
|
42
|
+
# maskelenir. Her iki desen de NORMALİZE anahtara uygulanır; sayaç
|
|
43
|
+
# istisnası tam adla eşleşir, yoksa `auth_tokens` gibi bir sır anahtarı
|
|
44
|
+
# `tokens` alt dizgisi yüzünden yanlışlıkla istisna sayılırdı (#542).
|
|
45
|
+
SECRET_KEY_REGEX = /(?:api_key|auth|password|passwd|secret|_token\z|\Atoken\b|\bkey\b)/i
|
|
46
|
+
TOKEN_COUNT_REGEX = /\A(?:tokens|token_count|max_tokens)\z/i
|
|
47
|
+
TOKEN_NAME_REGEX = /(?:\Atoken\b|_token\z)/i
|
|
36
48
|
|
|
37
49
|
def self.redact(text)
|
|
38
50
|
return text unless text.is_a?(String)
|
|
@@ -59,23 +71,56 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
59
71
|
result.gsub!(URL_PATTERN, URL_MASK)
|
|
60
72
|
|
|
61
73
|
result.gsub!(ASSIGNMENT_KEY_REGEX) do
|
|
62
|
-
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
65
|
-
|
|
66
|
-
|
|
67
|
-
|
|
68
|
-
|
|
69
|
-
if val =~ /\A['"]?\d+['"]?\z/
|
|
70
|
-
match
|
|
74
|
+
full = Regexp.last_match(0)
|
|
75
|
+
flag = Regexp.last_match(1)
|
|
76
|
+
name = Regexp.last_match(2)
|
|
77
|
+
sep = Regexp.last_match(3)
|
|
78
|
+
value = Regexp.last_match(4)
|
|
79
|
+
if maskable_assignment?(name, value)
|
|
80
|
+
"#{flag}#{name}#{sep}#{MASK_STRING}"
|
|
71
81
|
else
|
|
72
|
-
|
|
82
|
+
full
|
|
73
83
|
end
|
|
74
84
|
end
|
|
75
85
|
|
|
86
|
+
result.gsub!(CLI_POSITIONAL_KEY_REGEX) do
|
|
87
|
+
"#{Regexp.last_match(1)}#{MASK_STRING}"
|
|
88
|
+
end
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
76
90
|
result
|
|
77
91
|
end
|
|
78
92
|
|
|
93
|
+
# camelCase / SCREAMING_SNAKE -> lower snake_case, so one vocabulary
|
|
94
|
+
# recognizes `apiKey`, `APIKey`, `OPENAI_API_KEY` and `api_key` alike.
|
|
95
|
+
# Both patterns are FIXED-LENGTH: the old `([A-Z]+)([A-Z][a-z])` had a
|
|
96
|
+
# repeated class immediately followed by an overlapping class, which
|
|
97
|
+
# backtracks polynomially on a long uppercase run (CodeQL rb/polynomial-
|
|
98
|
+
# redos). Matching a single uppercase before the boundary is equivalent
|
|
99
|
+
# — the preceding uppercase chars are simply copied — and linear.
|
|
100
|
+
def self.normalize_key(key)
|
|
101
|
+
key.to_s
|
|
102
|
+
.gsub(/([A-Z])([A-Z][a-z])/, '\1_\2')
|
|
103
|
+
.gsub(/([a-z\d])([A-Z])/, '\1_\2')
|
|
104
|
+
.downcase
|
|
105
|
+
end
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
107
|
+
# True for a secret-looking key, with counter names excluded by EXACT
|
|
108
|
+
# match (so `auth_tokens` stays a secret while `max_tokens` does not).
|
|
109
|
+
def self.secret_key?(key)
|
|
110
|
+
normalized = normalize_key(key)
|
|
111
|
+
normalized.match?(SECRET_KEY_REGEX) && !normalized.match?(TOKEN_COUNT_REGEX)
|
|
112
|
+
end
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
# Token-valued assignments keep a numeric value (the existing contract:
|
|
115
|
+
# `token: 20` / `max_tokens: 100` are counters, not credentials).
|
|
116
|
+
def self.maskable_assignment?(name, value)
|
|
117
|
+
normalized = normalize_key(name)
|
|
118
|
+
return false unless normalized.match?(SECRET_KEY_REGEX) && !normalized.match?(TOKEN_COUNT_REGEX)
|
|
119
|
+
return false if normalized.match?(TOKEN_NAME_REGEX) && value.to_s.match?(/\A['"]?\d+['"]?\z/)
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
true
|
|
122
|
+
end
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
79
124
|
# Bir payload ağacında (Hash/Array/String) her metne redact uygular ve
|
|
80
125
|
# sır görünümlü anahtarların değerlerini komple maskeler — kalıcı
|
|
81
126
|
# serileştirmeden önce satır başına çağrılır (transcript sağlığı
|
|
@@ -88,9 +133,7 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
88
133
|
case payload
|
|
89
134
|
when Hash
|
|
90
135
|
payload.each_with_object({}) do |(k, v), h|
|
|
91
|
-
|
|
92
|
-
is_secret_key = key_str.match?(SECRET_KEY_REGEX) && !key_str.match?(TOKEN_COUNT_REGEX)
|
|
93
|
-
h[k] = is_secret_key ? MASK_STRING : mask_value(v)
|
|
136
|
+
h[k] = secret_key?(k) ? MASK_STRING : mask_value(v)
|
|
94
137
|
end
|
|
95
138
|
when Array
|
|
96
139
|
payload.map { |v| mask_value(v) }
|