rubik 0.10.0 → 0.11.0

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Files changed (55) hide show
  1. checksums.yaml +4 -4
  2. data/ATTRIBUTION.md +1 -1
  3. data/CHANGELOG.md +61 -1
  4. data/lib/rubik/ast/extractor.rb +2 -1
  5. data/lib/rubik/ast/treesitter_extractor.rb +2 -1
  6. data/lib/rubik/benchmark/vakanuvis_adoption.rb +2 -1
  7. data/lib/rubik/config/secret_policy.rb +6 -5
  8. data/lib/rubik/config/store.rb +2 -1
  9. data/lib/rubik/config.rb +2 -2
  10. data/lib/rubik/context/ignore_rules.rb +193 -0
  11. data/lib/rubik/context/scanner.rb +46 -161
  12. data/lib/rubik/llm/client.rb +6 -200
  13. data/lib/rubik/llm/connection_pool.rb +104 -0
  14. data/lib/rubik/llm/registry.rb +3 -2
  15. data/lib/rubik/llm/sse_parser.rb +110 -0
  16. data/lib/rubik/lsp/circuit_breaker.rb +98 -0
  17. data/lib/rubik/lsp/client_provisioner.rb +49 -0
  18. data/lib/rubik/lsp/manager.rb +55 -88
  19. data/lib/rubik/mcp/manager.rb +25 -13
  20. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/auto_apply.rb +4 -3
  21. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/ledger.rb +12 -1
  22. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/schema_vocabulary.rb +38 -0
  23. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/xml_render.rb +6 -1
  24. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger.rb +1 -0
  25. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/lsp_feedback.rb +1 -1
  26. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/step_executor.rb +2 -1
  27. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/notices.rb +2 -2
  28. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/transcript_formatter.rb +2 -1
  29. data/lib/rubik/platform/io_drain.rb +3 -1
  30. data/lib/rubik/plugin/storage.rb +8 -8
  31. data/lib/rubik/repl/config_wiring.rb +5 -3
  32. data/lib/rubik/repl/input_execution.rb +4 -3
  33. data/lib/rubik/repl/lifecycle.rb +1 -1
  34. data/lib/rubik/repl/tee_io.rb +2 -1
  35. data/lib/rubik/runtime/ast_service.rb +2 -1
  36. data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_storage.rb +17 -17
  37. data/lib/rubik/runtime/task_manager.rb +1 -1
  38. data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb +5 -4
  39. data/lib/rubik/security/audit_log.rb +2 -1
  40. data/lib/rubik/security/command_gate.rb +11 -152
  41. data/lib/rubik/security/guard.rb +1 -1
  42. data/lib/rubik/security/secret_store.rb +32 -3
  43. data/lib/rubik/security/segment_report.rb +161 -0
  44. data/lib/rubik/session/recorder.rb +2 -1
  45. data/lib/rubik/skills/manager.rb +2 -1
  46. data/lib/rubik/storage/transcript_indexer.rb +3 -2
  47. data/lib/rubik/storage/vakanuvis.rb +2 -1
  48. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/goal_ledger.rb +12 -1
  49. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/synthesis.rb +3 -3
  50. data/lib/rubik/tools/preflight_runner.rb +2 -1
  51. data/lib/rubik/tools/uri_resolver.rb +3 -2
  52. data/lib/rubik/ui/capability.rb +1 -0
  53. data/lib/rubik/version.rb +1 -1
  54. data/lib/rubik.rb +3 -3
  55. metadata +8 -1
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
1
1
  # frozen_string_literal: true
2
2
 
3
3
  require "shellwords"
4
+ require_relative "../log"
4
5
  require_relative "allowlist"
5
6
  require_relative "classifier"
6
7
  require_relative "errors"
8
+ require_relative "segment_report"
7
9
 
8
10
  module Rubik
9
11
  module Security
@@ -57,12 +59,6 @@ module Rubik
57
59
  /%0\|%0/
58
60
  ].freeze
59
61
 
60
- # Display caps for the blocked-segment report (guidance rendering, not
61
- # gate semantics): one segment's argv rendering and the one-line
62
- # wrapper preview never exceed these.
63
- SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP = 120
64
- WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP = 60
65
-
66
62
  # Salt version/help probe'ları (Plan: safe-probe muafiyeti): a command
67
63
  # whose ONLY arguments are these flags is read-only by construction.
68
64
  SAFE_PROBE_FLAGS = ["--version", "-v", "--help", "-h"].freeze
@@ -213,11 +209,11 @@ module Rubik
213
209
  # today) keeps flowing into its own deny layers
214
210
  # (DANGEROUS_SYNTHESIS_PATTERNS + RubyVM walk) after this gate.
215
211
  if allow_unknown
216
- warn "[WARN] AST classification error on non-shell input, continuing to synthesis deny layers: #{e.message}"
212
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[WARN] AST classification error on non-shell input, continuing to synthesis deny layers: #{e.message}")
217
213
  @audit.log_audit("classifier_error", command: cmd_str, reason: "#{e.class}: #{e.message}",
218
214
  decision: "synthesis_layers")
219
215
  else
220
- warn "[WARN] AST classification error, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
216
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[WARN] AST classification error, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
221
217
  block_on_classifier_failure!(cmd_str, e)
222
218
  end
223
219
  end
@@ -263,7 +259,7 @@ module Rubik
263
259
  @allowlist.command_allowlisted?(ast, cmd_str: cmd_str)
264
260
  end
265
261
  rescue StandardError => e
266
- warn "[Guard] #{'raw ' if raw}allowlist evaluation failed, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
262
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[Guard] #{'raw ' if raw}allowlist evaluation failed, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
267
263
  false
268
264
  end
269
265
 
@@ -294,10 +290,14 @@ module Rubik
294
290
  # to nil: enrichment must never be able to un-block, so a bug in the
295
291
  # report walk downgrades to nil here and the raise in
296
292
  # block_dangerous_command! still fires.
293
+ # Report assembly delegates to Security::SegmentReport (#500), fail-soft
294
+ # to nil: enrichment must never be able to un-block, so a bug in the
295
+ # report walk downgrades to nil here and the raise in
296
+ # block_dangerous_command! still fires.
297
297
  def dangerous_segment_report_or_nil(commands)
298
- dangerous_segment_report(commands)
298
+ SegmentReport.build(commands)
299
299
  rescue StandardError => e
300
- warn "[Guard] segment report failed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
300
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[Guard] segment report failed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
301
301
  nil
302
302
  end
303
303
 
@@ -413,147 +413,6 @@ module Rubik
413
413
  reason.empty? ? nil : reason
414
414
  end
415
415
 
416
- # Structured report for wrapper/multi-segment blocked-command guidance:
417
- # every innermost dangerous segment with its trigger, the sibling
418
- # commands that passed, a one-line wrapper preview, and the allowlist
419
- # entries that would actually open the gate. Plain data only —
420
- # BlockedWriteError must stay loadable without the classifier stack.
421
- # nil when no single command is dangerous (expression-level elevations
422
- # keep the scalar rule_name guidance path).
423
- def dangerous_segment_report(commands)
424
- segments = []
425
- safe = []
426
- safe_top_argv = []
427
- wrappers = []
428
- collect_dangerous_units(commands, 0, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
429
- return nil if segments.empty?
430
-
431
- # The gate (command_allowlisted?) matches EVERY top-level command,
432
- # safe ones included — the entry set must cover them all to be
433
- # honest: wrapper prefix + top-level dangerous segments + top-level
434
- # safe units.
435
- entries = wrappers.map { |w| wrapper_allowlist_entry(w) }
436
- entries += segments.select { |s| s[:depth].zero? }.map { |s| allowlist_entry_for_argv(s[:argv]) }
437
- entries += safe_top_argv.map { |argv| allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv) }
438
-
439
- {
440
- segments: segments,
441
- safe: safe.uniq,
442
- wrapper_preview: wrappers.empty? ? nil : wrapper_preview(wrappers.first),
443
- allowlist_entries: entries.uniq
444
- }.freeze
445
- end
446
-
447
- # Depth-first walk over the classified command tree. A dangerous
448
- # command whose danger comes from dangerous inners contributes those
449
- # inner leaves instead of itself (bash -c "rm -rf /" reports the inner
450
- # rm, not the wrapper); a dangerous leaf is a segment; non-dangerous
451
- # leaves join the passed roll call. Top-level wrappers (dangerous only
452
- # through their inners) are tracked separately for preview + hint;
453
- # top-level safe units keep their argv for the gate-honest entry set.
454
- def collect_dangerous_units(commands, depth, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
455
- Array(commands).each do |c|
456
- inners = Array(c.inner_commands)
457
- before = segments.size
458
- collect_dangerous_units(inners, depth + 1, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
459
- added = segments.size - before
460
-
461
- if c.classification == :dangerous
462
- if added.positive?
463
- wrappers << c if depth.zero?
464
- else
465
- segments << dangerous_segment_data(c, depth)
466
- end
467
- elsif inners.empty?
468
- safe << safe_segment_name(c)
469
- safe_top_argv << c.argv.dup if depth.zero?
470
- end
471
- end
472
- end
473
-
474
- def dangerous_segment_data(result, depth)
475
- argv = Array(result.argv)
476
- {
477
- display: segment_display(display_tokens(argv, result)),
478
- argv: argv.dup.freeze,
479
- rule: result.matched_rule,
480
- option: result.overriding_option,
481
- reason: result.classification_reason,
482
- depth: depth
483
- }
484
- end
485
-
486
- # Redirect-bearing segments (delegated inners) render their effects,
487
- # not just their argv: `echo pwned > /etc/shadow`, not `echo pwned`.
488
- # Flat operator/target tokens keep segment_display's quoting correct;
489
- # argv itself stays pure — allowlist entries derive from it.
490
- def display_tokens(argv, result)
491
- reds = result.respond_to?(:redirects) ? Array(result.redirects) : []
492
- reds.empty? ? argv : argv + reds.flat_map { |r| [r.operator, r.target] }
493
- end
494
-
495
- # Subcommand-aware roll call of the units that passed ("git checkout",
496
- # not just "git") — matches the operator's mental model of the script.
497
- def safe_segment_name(result)
498
- result.command.join(" ")
499
- end
500
-
501
- # One-line wrapper preview for the guidance first line. The delegated
502
- # payload (the whole -c script) is the argv token that contains
503
- # whitespace — elide it so the full script is never re-embedded in the
504
- # message (the defect this report exists to fix).
505
- def wrapper_preview(result)
506
- argv = Array(result.argv)
507
- tokens = argv.dup
508
- tokens[-1] = "'...'" if tokens.size > 1 && tokens[-1].to_s.match?(/\s/)
509
- preview = segment_display(tokens)
510
- preview.length > WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP ? "#{preview[0, WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP - 1]}..." : preview
511
- end
512
-
513
- # Shortest top-level argv prefix that actually satisfies the gate's
514
- # token-prefix match (command_allowlisted?): the wrapper binary up to
515
- # and including its delegation flag for flag-value payloads
516
- # ("bash -c", "bash -e -c"), the bare binary for rest-argv wrappers
517
- # ("sudo", "xargs"). Deriving it from delegation_source keeps the hint
518
- # gate-honest for flag permutations a naive first-two-tokens guess
519
- # would miss.
520
- def wrapper_allowlist_entry(wrapper)
521
- argv = Array(wrapper.argv)
522
- return argv.first.to_s if argv.size <= 1
523
-
524
- first_inner = Array(wrapper.inner_commands).first
525
- if first_inner&.delegation_mode.to_s == "flag_value_is_expression"
526
- idx = argv.index(first_inner.delegation_source)
527
- return argv[0..idx].join(" ") if idx&.positive?
528
- end
529
- argv.first.to_s
530
- end
531
-
532
- # An allowlist entry can only carry whitespace-free tokens:
533
- # normalize_allowlist splits entries on whitespace, so an argv token
534
- # containing spaces ("feature x") can never be matched by an entry.
535
- # Prefix up to (excluding) the first such token.
536
- def allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv)
537
- prefix = []
538
- Array(argv).each do |token|
539
- break if token.to_s.match?(/\s/)
540
-
541
- prefix << token
542
- end
543
- prefix.empty? ? Array(argv).first.to_s : prefix.join(" ")
544
- end
545
-
546
- # Display-only rendering: collapse newlines, single-quote tokens that
547
- # contain whitespace, hard-cap length. Shellwords.escape would
548
- # backslash-quote every token (noise on Windows paths) — quote
549
- # conditionally instead.
550
- def segment_display(argv)
551
- text = argv.map { |t| t.to_s.tr("\r\n", " ") }
552
- .map { |t| t.match?(/\s/) ? "'#{t}'" : t }
553
- .join(" ")
554
- text.length > SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP ? "#{text[0, SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP - 1]}..." : text
555
- end
556
-
557
416
  def segment_count(report)
558
417
  report ? report[:segments].size : 0
559
418
  end
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ module Rubik
63
63
  # turns "!config set security.audit_log_path false" into boolean
64
64
  # false, which would otherwise reach log_audit and die in a
65
65
  # swallowed TypeError — silently dropping every audit event.
66
- warn "[Guard] security.audit_log_path has non-path value #{raw_audit.inspect}; auditing disabled"
66
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[Guard] security.audit_log_path has non-path value #{raw_audit.inspect}; auditing disabled")
67
67
  nil
68
68
  end
69
69
 
@@ -127,18 +127,39 @@ module Rubik
127
127
  # Shared command plumbing. Backends are the internal seam; tests may
128
128
  # subclass and override #run to avoid touching a host keyring.
129
129
  class CommandBackend
130
+ # Deadline for the stdin payload write (see #run).
131
+ STDIN_WRITE_TIMEOUT = 5.0
132
+
130
133
  private
131
134
 
132
135
  # Single spawn point for every backend: receives a fully-formed
133
136
  # argument vector (never a shell string) plus optional stdin payload.
137
+ #
138
+ # The stdin payload travels through Platform.write_until so a backend
139
+ # that never reads its stdin (headless keychain denial, crashed
140
+ # secret service) fails with a deadline instead of parking the
141
+ # caller forever on a full OS pipe buffer. Every IO failure — a
142
+ # backend that died before reading stdin raising EPIPE, a spawn
143
+ # failure — is converted to Error, because every caller (resolve,
144
+ # set, delete, SecretPolicy, the !secrets commands) rescues only
145
+ # that class.
134
146
  def run(argv, input: nil, env: nil)
135
147
  env_hash = env.is_a?(Hash) ? env : {}
136
148
  merged = ENV.to_h.merge(env_hash)
137
149
  Open3.popen3(merged, *argv) do |pin, pout, perr, waiter|
138
- pin.write(input.to_s)
139
- pin.close
150
+ begin
151
+ Rubik::Platform.write_until(pin, input.to_s, timeout: STDIN_WRITE_TIMEOUT)
152
+ ensure
153
+ begin
154
+ pin.close
155
+ rescue IOError, SystemCallError
156
+ nil
157
+ end
158
+ end
140
159
  [pout.read, perr.read, waiter.value]
141
160
  end
161
+ rescue IOError, SystemCallError => e
162
+ raise Error, "secret backend command failed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
142
163
  end
143
164
  end
144
165
 
@@ -162,7 +183,9 @@ module Rubik
162
183
  # a denied/failed lookup and must not surface as an empty key.
163
184
  return nil unless st.success? || st.exitstatus == 44
164
185
 
165
- val = out.strip
186
+ # The CLI appends exactly one newline; chomp (not strip) so
187
+ # legitimate leading/trailing whitespace in the secret survives.
188
+ val = out.chomp
166
189
  val.empty? ? nil : val
167
190
  end
168
191
 
@@ -299,6 +322,12 @@ module Rubik
299
322
  end
300
323
 
301
324
  def write(name, value)
325
+ # secret-tool store ADDS a new item; it does not upsert, and
326
+ # lookup concatenates the payloads of every matching item — a
327
+ # re-set secret would silently resolve to "key1key2". Clear any
328
+ # prior items first so set is idempotent (mirroring the -U flag
329
+ # the macOS backend passes to add-generic-password).
330
+ run(clear_argv(name))
302
331
  _out, err, st = run(store_argv(name), input: value)
303
332
  return true if st.success?
304
333
 
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
1
+ # frozen_string_literal: true
2
+
3
+ module Rubik
4
+ module Security
5
+ # Structured guidance-evidence builder for blocked dangerous commands
6
+ # (#500): every innermost dangerous segment with its trigger, the sibling
7
+ # commands that passed, a one-line wrapper preview, and the allowlist
8
+ # entries that would actually open the gate. A pure function from the
9
+ # classified command tree to a frozen plain-data hash — deliberately
10
+ # loadable WITHOUT the classifier stack, so BlockedWriteError guidance
11
+ # never drags the classifier in. nil when no single command is dangerous
12
+ # (expression-level elevations keep the scalar rule_name guidance path).
13
+ module SegmentReport
14
+ # Display caps for the blocked-segment report (guidance rendering, not
15
+ # gate semantics): one segment's argv rendering and the one-line
16
+ # wrapper preview never exceed these.
17
+ SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP = 120
18
+ WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP = 60
19
+
20
+ # Build the report for the given classified command tree; see the
21
+ # module comment for shape and the nil contract.
22
+ def build(commands)
23
+ segments = []
24
+ safe = []
25
+ safe_top_argv = []
26
+ wrappers = []
27
+ collect_dangerous_units(commands, 0, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
28
+ return nil if segments.empty?
29
+
30
+ # The gate (command_allowlisted?) matches EVERY top-level command,
31
+ # safe ones included — the entry set must cover them all to be
32
+ # honest: wrapper prefix + top-level dangerous segments + top-level
33
+ # safe units.
34
+ entries = wrappers.map { |w| wrapper_allowlist_entry(w) }
35
+ entries += segments.select { |s| s[:depth].zero? }.map { |s| allowlist_entry_for_argv(s[:argv]) }
36
+ entries += safe_top_argv.map { |argv| allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv) }
37
+
38
+ {
39
+ segments: segments,
40
+ safe: safe.uniq,
41
+ wrapper_preview: wrappers.empty? ? nil : wrapper_preview(wrappers.first),
42
+ allowlist_entries: entries.uniq
43
+ }.freeze
44
+ end
45
+
46
+ # Depth-first walk over the classified command tree. A dangerous
47
+ # command whose danger comes from dangerous inners contributes those
48
+ # inner leaves instead of itself (bash -c "rm -rf /" reports the inner
49
+ # rm, not the wrapper); a dangerous leaf is a segment; non-dangerous
50
+ # leaves join the passed roll call. Top-level wrappers (dangerous only
51
+ # through their inners) are tracked separately for preview + hint;
52
+ # top-level safe units keep their argv for the gate-honest entry set.
53
+ def collect_dangerous_units(commands, depth, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
54
+ Array(commands).each do |c|
55
+ inners = Array(c.inner_commands)
56
+ before = segments.size
57
+ collect_dangerous_units(inners, depth + 1, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
58
+ added = segments.size - before
59
+
60
+ if c.classification == :dangerous
61
+ if added.positive?
62
+ wrappers << c if depth.zero?
63
+ else
64
+ segments << dangerous_segment_data(c, depth)
65
+ end
66
+ elsif inners.empty?
67
+ safe << safe_segment_name(c)
68
+ safe_top_argv << c.argv.dup if depth.zero?
69
+ end
70
+ end
71
+ end
72
+
73
+ def dangerous_segment_data(result, depth)
74
+ argv = Array(result.argv)
75
+ {
76
+ display: segment_display(display_tokens(argv, result)),
77
+ argv: argv.dup.freeze,
78
+ rule: result.matched_rule,
79
+ option: result.overriding_option,
80
+ reason: result.classification_reason,
81
+ depth: depth
82
+ }
83
+ end
84
+
85
+ # Redirect-bearing segments (delegated inners) render their effects,
86
+ # not just their argv: `echo pwned > /etc/shadow`, not `echo pwned`.
87
+ # Flat operator/target tokens keep segment_display's quoting correct;
88
+ # argv itself stays pure — allowlist entries derive from it.
89
+ def display_tokens(argv, result)
90
+ reds = result.respond_to?(:redirects) ? Array(result.redirects) : []
91
+ reds.empty? ? argv : argv + reds.flat_map { |r| [r.operator, r.target] }
92
+ end
93
+
94
+ # Subcommand-aware roll call of the units that passed ("git checkout",
95
+ # not just "git") — matches the operator's mental model of the script.
96
+ def safe_segment_name(result)
97
+ result.command.join(" ")
98
+ end
99
+
100
+ # One-line wrapper preview for the guidance first line. The delegated
101
+ # payload (the whole -c script) is the argv token that contains
102
+ # whitespace — elide it so the full script is never re-embedded in the
103
+ # message (the defect this report exists to fix).
104
+ def wrapper_preview(result)
105
+ argv = Array(result.argv)
106
+ tokens = argv.dup
107
+ tokens[-1] = "'...'" if tokens.size > 1 && tokens[-1].to_s.match?(/\s/)
108
+ preview = segment_display(tokens)
109
+ preview.length > WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP ? "#{preview[0, WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP - 1]}..." : preview
110
+ end
111
+
112
+ # Shortest top-level argv prefix that actually satisfies the gate's
113
+ # token-prefix match (command_allowlisted?): the wrapper binary up to
114
+ # and including its delegation flag for flag-value payloads
115
+ # ("bash -c", "bash -e -c"), the bare binary for rest-argv wrappers
116
+ # ("sudo", "xargs"). Deriving it from delegation_source keeps the hint
117
+ # gate-honest for flag permutations a naive first-two-tokens guess
118
+ # would miss.
119
+ def wrapper_allowlist_entry(wrapper)
120
+ argv = Array(wrapper.argv)
121
+ return argv.first.to_s if argv.size <= 1
122
+
123
+ first_inner = Array(wrapper.inner_commands).first
124
+ if first_inner&.delegation_mode.to_s == "flag_value_is_expression"
125
+ idx = argv.index(first_inner.delegation_source)
126
+ return argv[0..idx].join(" ") if idx&.positive?
127
+ end
128
+ argv.first.to_s
129
+ end
130
+
131
+ # An allowlist entry can only carry whitespace-free tokens:
132
+ # normalize_allowlist splits entries on whitespace, so an argv token
133
+ # containing spaces ("feature x") can never be matched by an entry.
134
+ # Prefix up to (excluding) the first such token.
135
+ def allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv)
136
+ prefix = []
137
+ Array(argv).each do |token|
138
+ break if token.to_s.match?(/\s/)
139
+
140
+ prefix << token
141
+ end
142
+ prefix.empty? ? Array(argv).first.to_s : prefix.join(" ")
143
+ end
144
+
145
+ # Display-only rendering: collapse newlines, single-quote tokens that
146
+ # contain whitespace, hard-cap length. Shellwords.escape would
147
+ # backslash-quote every token (noise on Windows paths) — quote
148
+ # conditionally instead.
149
+ def segment_display(argv)
150
+ text = argv.map { |t| t.to_s.tr("\r\n", " ") }
151
+ .map { |t| t.match?(/\s/) ? "'#{t}'" : t }
152
+ .join(" ")
153
+ text.length > SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP ? "#{text[0, SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP - 1]}..." : text
154
+ end
155
+
156
+ module_function :build, :collect_dangerous_units, :dangerous_segment_data, :display_tokens,
157
+ :safe_segment_name, :wrapper_preview, :wrapper_allowlist_entry,
158
+ :allowlist_entry_for_argv, :segment_display
159
+ end
160
+ end
161
+ end
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
3
3
  require "json"
4
4
  require "fileutils"
5
5
  require "time"
6
+ require_relative "../log"
6
7
  require_relative "../platform"
7
8
  require_relative "../security/redactor"
8
9
 
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ module Rubik
20
21
  begin
21
22
  FileUtils.mkdir_p(@sessions_dir)
22
23
  rescue SystemCallError => e
23
- warn "[WARN] Failed to create sessions directory #{@sessions_dir}: #{e.message}" if ENV["RUBIK_DEBUG"]
24
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:session, "[WARN] Failed to create sessions directory #{@sessions_dir}: #{e.message}") if ENV["RUBIK_DEBUG"]
24
25
  end
25
26
 
26
27
  filename = session_name || "session_#{Time.now.strftime('%Y%m%d_%H%M%S')}_#{Process.pid}_#{(Time.now.to_f * 1000).to_i % 1000}.jsonl"
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
1
1
  # frozen_string_literal: true
2
2
 
3
3
  require "monitor"
4
+ require_relative "../log"
4
5
  require_relative "frontmatter"
5
6
  require_relative "../storage/layout"
6
7
  require_relative "storage"
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ module Rubik
118
119
  result.issues.each { |issue| Rubik::Platform.debug_warn("skill #{issue.path}: #{issue.field} #{issue.message}") }
119
120
  true
120
121
  rescue StandardError => e
121
- warn "[rubik] skills reload failed (previous snapshot kept): #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
122
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:skills, "[rubik] skills reload failed (previous snapshot kept): #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
122
123
  false
123
124
  end
124
125
 
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
1
1
  # frozen_string_literal: true
2
2
 
3
3
  require "json"
4
+ require_relative "../log"
4
5
  require_relative "../security/redactor"
5
6
  require_relative "../tools/truncator"
6
7
  require_relative "../uris"
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ module Rubik
57
58
  )
58
59
  rescue StandardError => e
59
60
  label = inst.respond_to?(:id) ? inst.id : inst.class
60
- warn "[Storage] transcript index failed for #{label}: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
61
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:storage, "[Storage] transcript index failed for #{label}: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
61
62
  end
62
63
 
63
64
  # Task: transcript dosyasındaki İLK user satırı (seed'deki brif);
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ module Rubik
106
107
  end
107
108
  nil
108
109
  rescue StandardError => e
109
- warn "[Storage] transcript task read failed for #{file}: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
110
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:storage, "[Storage] transcript task read failed for #{file}: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
110
111
  nil
111
112
  end
112
113
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ module Rubik
58
58
  begin
59
59
  Rubik::Log.warn(SUBSYSTEM, message)
60
60
  rescue StandardError
61
- warn("[vakanuvis] #{message}")
61
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:vakanuvis, message.to_s)
62
62
  end
63
63
  end
64
64
 
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ module Rubik
84
84
  end
85
85
  end
86
86
 
87
+ require_relative "../log"
87
88
  require_relative "vakanuvis/vocabulary"
88
89
  require_relative "vakanuvis/annal_writer"
89
90
  require_relative "vakanuvis/memory_steward"
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
3
3
  require_relative "../base"
4
4
  require_relative "../output"
5
5
  require_relative "../../coeffects"
6
+ require_relative "../../orchestrator/goal_ledger"
6
7
 
7
8
  module Rubik
8
9
  module Tools
@@ -16,12 +17,19 @@ module Rubik
16
17
  class UpdateGoalLedgerTool < BaseTool
17
18
  REQUIRES = [Rubik::Coeffects::GOAL_LEDGER].freeze
18
19
 
20
+ # Model-yüzü öğretim (SSOT türetme): item-grammar sözlüğü yüklenme
21
+ # anında Ledger::PRODUCTION_SCHEMA'dan türetilir — elle yazılan
22
+ # enum/required kopyası YOKTUR; şema değişirse description da değişir.
23
+ # Tükenme feedback'i de aynı sabiti paylaşır (schema_vocabulary).
24
+ GRAMMAR = Rubik::Orchestrator::GoalLedger::Ledger.schema_vocabulary
25
+
19
26
  DECLARATION = Declaration.new(
20
27
  name: "update_goal_ledger", aliases: ["ledger"],
21
28
  description: "Update the structured goal ledger of the RUNNING !goal loop with an RFC 6902 " \
22
29
  "JSON patch ({\"rev\": N, \"ops\": [{\"op\": \"add\"|\"replace\"|\"remove\", \"path\": \"/tasks/0/status\", \"value\": ...}]}). " \
23
30
  "Read current state via read_file(path: 'rubik://goal/ledger') (or 'rubik://goal/ledger.json') and issue " \
24
31
  "the patch against the rev it reports. Items carry 0-based indices (/tasks/0); append via /tasks/-. " \
32
+ "Item grammar: #{GRAMMAR}. " \
25
33
  "Tasks and environment notes may carry declarative verify specs: {\"type\": \"file_exists\", \"path\": ...}, " \
26
34
  "{\"type\": \"file_contains\", \"path\": ..., \"pattern\": ...}, or {\"type\": \"marker\", \"path\": ..., \"marker\": ...}. " \
27
35
  "Rejections carry per-op fix hints; after the retry budget the ledger stays unchanged. A task status of " \
@@ -73,8 +81,11 @@ module Rubik
73
81
  row = %(<goal_ledger_applied rev="#{result.rev}" uri="#{result.uri}" />)
74
82
  ToolOutput.ok(result.uri ? row : %(<goal_ledger_applied rev="#{result.rev}" storage="unavailable (memory-only)" />))
75
83
  when :exhausted
84
+ # Durum-bağımsız gramer hatırlatması (GRAMMAR): tükenme anında
85
+ # öğretmen susmasın — ama cache'lenmiş ret reason'ları DEĞİL
86
+ # (bayat teşhis bilgi zehridir; iyileşme yolu re-read'tir).
76
87
  ToolOutput.error("patch budget exhausted (consecutive rejections); the ledger is unchanged at rev " \
77
- "#{result.rev}. Goal work may continue — read rubik://goal/ledger when you next " \
88
+ "#{result.rev}. #{GRAMMAR} Goal work may continue — read rubik://goal/ledger when you next " \
78
89
  "update state, and issue a valid patch against that rev.")
79
90
  else
80
91
  lines = result.reasons.map do |reason|
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
3
3
  require "json"
4
4
  require "stringio"
5
5
  require "timeout"
6
+ require_relative "../../log"
6
7
  require_relative "../base"
7
8
  require_relative "../output"
8
9
  require_relative "../preflight_runner"
9
10
  require_relative "../../runtime"
10
-
11
11
  module Rubik
12
12
  module Tools
13
13
  class SynthesizeCommandTool < BaseTool
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ module Rubik
118
118
  out_ctx = if ctx
119
119
  ctx
120
120
  elsif @shell.respond_to?(:command_context)
121
- warn "[rubik] custom command invoked without a dispatch CommandContext" unless ENV["RUBIK_TEST"]
121
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:tools, "[rubik] custom command invoked without a dispatch CommandContext") unless ENV["RUBIK_TEST"]
122
122
  @shell.command_context
123
123
  else
124
124
  @shell.output
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ module Rubik
142
142
  end
143
143
  end
144
144
  else
145
- warn "[Synthesize] no runtime context; dispose inverse not registered for '!#{clean_name}'"
145
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:tools, "[Synthesize] no runtime context; dispose inverse not registered for '!#{clean_name}'")
146
146
  end
147
147
  end
148
148
 
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ require "rbconfig"
5
5
  require "stringio"
6
6
  require "timeout"
7
7
 
8
+ require_relative "../log"
8
9
  require_relative "../security/errors"
9
10
  require_relative "../runtime/synthesized_tool_context"
10
11
 
@@ -234,7 +235,7 @@ module Rubik
234
235
  # The spawn→in-process downgrade is a weaker isolation level (the
235
236
  # caller re-executes the same code in this process), so the
236
237
  # infrastructure failure must never vanish without a trace.
237
- warn "[Preflight] subprocess verification failed (#{e.class}: #{e.message}); falling back to in-process"
238
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:tools, "[Preflight] subprocess verification failed (#{e.class}: #{e.message}); falling back to in-process")
238
239
  kill_child(pid) if defined?(pid) && pid
239
240
  :spawn_failed
240
241
  ensure
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
1
1
  # frozen_string_literal: true
2
2
 
3
3
  require "monitor"
4
+ require_relative "../log"
4
5
  require_relative "../uris"
5
6
  require_relative "../coeffects"
6
7
  require_relative "../orchestrator/subagent/transcript_formatter"
@@ -77,8 +78,8 @@ module Rubik
77
78
  # Sözleşme ihlali (adapter read ASLA nil döndürmez) — gramer
78
79
  # reddinden AYRT edilir: nil'i dosya düzlemine düşürmek yanlış
79
80
  # yönlendiren bir dosya-not-found üretirdi; dürüst hata basılır.
80
- warn "[UriResolver] '#{scheme}' adapter violated the read contract (returned nil); " \
81
- "refusing to fall through to the file plane"
81
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:tools, "[UriResolver] '#{scheme}' adapter violated the read contract (returned nil); " \
82
+ "refusing to fall through to the file plane")
82
83
  ToolOutput.error("rubik://#{scheme} read failed: the '#{scheme}' adapter returned no content " \
83
84
  "(contract violation — see runtime log).")
84
85
  end
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
1
1
  # frozen_string_literal: true
2
2
 
3
3
  require "strings-ansi"
4
+ require_relative "../repl/tee_io"
4
5
 
5
6
  module Rubik
6
7
  module UI
data/lib/rubik/version.rb CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
1
  # frozen_string_literal: true
2
2
 
3
3
  module Rubik
4
- VERSION = "0.10.0"
4
+ VERSION = "0.11.0"
5
5
  end
data/lib/rubik.rb CHANGED
@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ module Rubik
57
57
  return if defined?(@ambient_warned) && @ambient_warned
58
58
 
59
59
  @ambient_warned = true
60
- warn "[DEPRECATION] Rubik.runtime is deprecated (sunset). Inject the " \
61
- "'shell' coeffect (Rubik::Coeffects::SHELL) or read the manager " \
62
- "from the owning Shell instead."
60
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:core, "[DEPRECATION] Rubik.runtime is deprecated (sunset). Inject the " \
61
+ "'shell' coeffect (Rubik::Coeffects::SHELL) or read the manager " \
62
+ "from the owning Shell instead.")
63
63
  end
64
64
  end
65
65
  end