rodauth-tools 0.3.0 → 0.4.0

data/README.md

@@ -192,7 +192,38 @@ end
 
 **Documentation:** [docs/features/jwt-secret-guard.md](docs/features/jwt-secret-guard.md)
 
-### 5. Sequel Migration Generator
+### 5. Account ID Obfuscation Feature
+
+Obfuscate the numeric `account_id` that leaks into email-verification links and the
+remember-me cookie, with no database schema change.
+
+```ruby
+class RodauthApp < Roda
+  plugin :rodauth do
+    enable :login, :verify_account, :remember
+    enable :account_id_obfuscation
+
+    # Production: raises error if ACCOUNT_ID_SECRET (>= 32 bytes) missing
+    # Development: uses fallback secret with warning
+  end
+end
+```
+
+Links change from `/verify-account?key=2_SspVz...` to `/verify-account?key=AE946V4SD7Z7RV_SspVz...`.
+
+**Key Features:**
+
+- Keyed, reversible obfuscation (4-round Feistel format-preserving encryption)
+- Covers all email-link features + the remember cookie via two scoped overrides
+- Leaves `split_token`/`convert_token_id` untouched, so `jwt_refresh` is unaffected
+- Backward compatible: in-flight numeric links and legacy cookies keep working
+- Version-tagged tokens enable config-driven secret rotation
+- Dedicated `ACCOUNT_ID_SECRET` (>= 32 bytes), independent of HMAC/JWT secrets
+- Standalone `Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher` primitive (stdlib `openssl` only)
+
+**Documentation:** [docs/features/account-id-obfuscation.md](docs/features/account-id-obfuscation.md)
+
+### 6. Sequel Migration Generator
 
 Generate database migrations for Rodauth features.
 
@@ -306,6 +337,7 @@ Rodauth Features are modules that mix into `Rodauth::Auth` instances at runtime.
 - **[External Identity Feature](docs/features/external-identity.md)** - Track external service identifiers
 - **[HMAC Secret Guard Feature](docs/features/hmac-secret-guard.md)** - Validate HMAC secrets at startup
 - **[JWT Secret Guard Feature](docs/features/jwt-secret-guard.md)** - Validate JWT secrets at startup
+- **[Account ID Obfuscation Feature](docs/features/account-id-obfuscation.md)** - Hide numeric account ids in email links and cookies
 - **[Sequel Migrations](docs/sequel-migrations.md)** - Integrating table_guard with Sequel migrations
 - **[Rodauth Feature API](docs/rodauth-features-api.md)** - Complete DSL reference for feature development
 - **[Rodauth Integration](docs/rodauth-integration.md)** - Framework integration patterns

data/lib/rodauth/features/account_id_obfuscation.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+# lib/rodauth/features/account_id_obfuscation.rb
+#
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require_relative '../tools/account_id_cipher' unless defined?(Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher)
+require_relative '../secret_guard' unless defined?(Rodauth::SecretGuard)
+
+module Rodauth
+  # Obfuscates the numeric account id that Rodauth otherwise leaks in plaintext
+  # inside email-link tokens (e.g. +/verify-account?key=2_...+) and, optionally,
+  # the remember-me cookie. The id is replaced by a fixed-width, URL-safe,
+  # non-sequential token: a one-character non-digit VERSION tag followed by the
+  # 13-char output of {Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher} (keyed format-preserving
+  # encryption). No database schema change is required; the integer primary key
+  # is used everywhere internally and only the value crossing the network is
+  # obfuscated.
+  #
+  # It wraps the two email-token chokepoints in +email_base+ (+token_param_value+
+  # to encode, +account_from_key+ to decode), which together cover ALL email-link
+  # features: verify_account, reset_password, email_auth, verify_login_change and
+  # lockout/unlock. It deliberately does NOT touch the lower-level +split_token+/
+  # +convert_token_id+, so other token consumers (e.g. jwt_refresh) are unaffected.
+  #
+  # This is deterministic pseudonymisation, NOT access control or encryption of
+  # confidential data: the same id always maps to the same token, and the token's
+  # authority is unchanged (the email HMAC still gates the request after the id is
+  # swapped back to the real Integer). Applies to integer/bigint primary keys.
+  #
+  # The VERSION tag makes obfuscated tokens deterministically distinguishable from
+  # legacy decimal ids (Rodauth ids are always digits, never a letter), so legacy
+  # links/cookies pass through untouched. It also selects the secret, enabling
+  # config-driven key rotation via +account_id_obfuscation_previous_secrets+.
+  #
+  # This feature shares its ENV-loading and production-detection plumbing with
+  # +hmac_secret_guard+/+jwt_secret_guard+ via +Rodauth::SecretGuard+ (see
+  # +production_env_check+ and +validate_secrets_on_configure?+ below, which are
+  # the same config methods those two guards expose). It keeps its own
+  # always-on 32-byte minimum, though: {Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher} hard-requires
+  # that floor regardless of environment, unlike the guards' opt-in, production-only
+  # +minimum_secret_length+.
+  #
+  # @example
+  #   plugin :rodauth do
+  #     enable :login, :verify_account, :remember, :account_id_obfuscation
+  #     # ACCOUNT_ID_SECRET must be set (>= 32 bytes) in production
+  #   end
+  #
+  # @example Development / custom secret source
+  #   plugin :rodauth do
+  #     enable :account_id_obfuscation
+  #     account_id_obfuscation_secret_env_key 'MY_ID_SECRET'
+  #     account_id_obfuscation_remember_cookie? false
+  #   end
+  Feature.define(:account_id_obfuscation, :AccountIdObfuscation) do
+    # email_base owns the two chokepoints we wrap; depending on it guarantees it
+    # is loaded and sits lower in the ancestor chain (so our +super+ resolves).
+    depends :email_base
+
+    auth_value_method :account_id_obfuscation_secret, nil
+    auth_value_method :account_id_obfuscation_secret_env_key, 'ACCOUNT_ID_SECRET'
+    auth_value_method :account_id_obfuscation_key_version, 'A' # single non-digit char
+    auth_value_method :account_id_obfuscation_previous_secrets, {}.freeze # {ver_char => old_secret}, decode-only
+    auth_value_method :account_id_obfuscation_remember_cookie?, true
+    # Shared with hmac_secret_guard/jwt_secret_guard (same config method, same
+    # fail-safe default): an unset RACK_ENV is treated as production. Avoid
+    # `proc { ENV['RACK_ENV'] == 'production' }` — when the variable is unset
+    # that returns false and silently falls back to the insecure development
+    # secret in what is really a production deploy.
+    auth_value_method :production_env_check, proc { ENV.fetch('RACK_ENV', 'production') == 'production' }
+    # Shared with hmac_secret_guard/jwt_secret_guard: gates whether post_configure
+    # calls the boot-time validator at all.
+    auth_value_method :validate_secrets_on_configure?, true
+    # Fixed (not random-per-process, unlike the guards' SecureRandom.hex fallback):
+    # obfuscated tokens must stay stable across restarts within a single
+    # development process' lifetime for links/cookies minted before a restart to
+    # keep decoding, and this feature has no server-side session to smooth that
+    # over. Still a placeholder — change it, or better, set ACCOUNT_ID_SECRET.
+    auth_value_method :development_account_id_obfuscation_secret_fallback,
+                      'dev-only-insecure-account-id-obfuscation-secret-please-change-me'
+
+    translatable_method :account_id_obfuscation_secret_missing_error,
+                        'ACCOUNT_ID_SECRET environment variable must be set in production'
+    translatable_method :account_id_obfuscation_secret_too_short_error,
+                        'account id obfuscation secret must be at least 32 bytes'
+    translatable_method :account_id_obfuscation_key_version_error,
+                        'account_id_obfuscation_key_version must be a single non-digit character'
+    translatable_method :account_id_obfuscation_secret_dev_warning,
+                        '[rodauth] WARNING: Using default account id obfuscation secret for development only'
+
+    # post_configure runs on a throwaway instance, so cache the version=>cipher
+    # map lazily per runtime instance rather than in an instance ivar.
+    auth_cached_method :account_id_ciphers
+
+    auth_methods :obfuscate_account_id, :deobfuscate_account_id, :production?,
+                 :validate_secrets!, :validate_account_id_obfuscation_secret!
+
+    def post_configure
+      super
+
+      load_account_id_secret_from_env
+      validate_key_version!
+      validate_account_id_obfuscation_secret! if validate_secrets_on_configure?
+
+      install_remember_cookie_obfuscation if account_id_obfuscation_remember_cookie? && features.include?(:remember)
+    end
+
+    # ---- email-token chokepoints (plain overrides; email_base is a dependency,
+    #      so +super+ always resolves, and internal_request delegates through) ----
+
+    # Encode the id in the outgoing email link. Wraps email_base's token
+    # ("<id><sep><hmac>") and rewrites only the id segment, staying decoupled from
+    # email_base's exact composition.
+    def token_param_value(key)
+      original = super
+      return original if account_id.nil?
+
+      _id, separator, remainder = original.partition(token_separator)
+      remainder.empty? ? original : "#{obfuscate_account_id(account_id)}#{separator}#{remainder}"
+    end
+
+    # Decode the id segment of an incoming token before email_base parses it.
+    # A legacy plaintext token (or any non-token) deobfuscates to nil and passes
+    # through unchanged, so in-flight links keep working.
+    def account_from_key(token, status_id = nil, &)
+      if token.is_a?(String)
+        segment, separator, remainder = token.partition(token_separator)
+        if !remainder.empty? && (real_id = deobfuscate_account_id(segment))
+          token = "#{real_id}#{separator}#{remainder}"
+        end
+      end
+
+      super
+    end
+
+    # ---- public API ----
+
+    # @return [String] version-tagged obfuscated form of an account id
+    def obfuscate_account_id(id)
+      version = account_id_obfuscation_key_version
+      "#{version}#{account_id_ciphers.fetch(version).encode(id)}"
+    end
+
+    # @return [Integer, nil] the real id, or nil if +segment+ is not one of our
+    #   tokens (legacy decimal id, unknown version, wrong width, or bad chars)
+    def deobfuscate_account_id(segment)
+      return nil unless segment.is_a?(String) &&
+                        segment.length == 1 + Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher::WIDTH
+
+      cipher = account_id_ciphers[segment[0]] or return nil
+
+      cipher.decode(segment[1..])
+    end
+
+    # Check if we're running in production environment.
+    #
+    # Delegates to the same +Rodauth::SecretGuard.production?+ that
+    # +hmac_secret_guard+/+jwt_secret_guard+ use, so behavior is identical
+    # whichever guard's copy of this method happens to win when several are
+    # enabled together (see +validate_secrets!+ below for why that collision
+    # matters more for validation than for this read-only check).
+    #
+    # @return [Boolean] true if running in production mode based on production_env_check
+    def production?
+      Rodauth::SecretGuard.production?(self)
+    end
+
+    # Validate that the account-id obfuscation secret(s) are properly
+    # configured. Raises ConfigurationError in production if the current
+    # secret is missing or blank. Always (in every environment) raises if the
+    # current secret, or any +account_id_obfuscation_previous_secrets+ entry,
+    # is present but shorter than +AccountIdCipher::MIN_SECRET_BYTES+ — unlike
+    # +minimum_secret_length+ on the sibling guards, this floor is not
+    # opt-in/production-only, because {Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher} raises
+    # ArgumentError below it regardless of environment. In development, a
+    # missing current secret warns and installs a fallback.
+    #
+    # This is the collision-free entry point: prefer it over +validate_secrets!+
+    # when this feature is co-enabled with +hmac_secret_guard+/+jwt_secret_guard+
+    # (see +post_configure+, which calls this method by name so boot-time
+    # validation never depends on which +validate_secrets!+ wins the MRO).
+    #
+    # @raise [Rodauth::ConfigurationError] if the current or a previous secret is unusable
+    # @return [void]
+    def validate_account_id_obfuscation_secret!
+      secret = account_id_obfuscation_secret
+
+      if Rodauth::SecretGuard.blank?(secret)
+        raise Rodauth::ConfigurationError, account_id_obfuscation_secret_missing_error if Rodauth::SecretGuard.production?(self)
+
+        warn_dev_account_id_secret
+        fallback = development_account_id_obfuscation_secret_fallback
+        self.class.send(:define_method, :account_id_obfuscation_secret) { fallback }
+        secret = fallback
+      end
+
+      too_short = ->(value) { value.to_s.bytesize < Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher::MIN_SECRET_BYTES }
+      if too_short.call(secret) || account_id_obfuscation_previous_secrets.values.any?(&too_short)
+        raise Rodauth::ConfigurationError, account_id_obfuscation_secret_too_short_error
+      end
+
+      # Force the version=>cipher map to build now so any other
+      # AccountIdCipher.new failure (e.g. a future stricter check) also fails
+      # closed at boot instead of lazily on first encode/decode.
+      begin
+        account_id_ciphers
+      rescue ArgumentError => e
+        raise Rodauth::ConfigurationError, e.message
+      end
+    end
+
+    # Backwards-compatible alias for +validate_account_id_obfuscation_secret!+.
+    #
+    # Note: +hmac_secret_guard+ and +jwt_secret_guard+ each define a
+    # +validate_secrets!+ of their own, so when this feature is co-enabled with
+    # either guard this name resolves to only one of them — collision-prone;
+    # not for boot. Boot-time validation does not rely on it (see
+    # +post_configure+); use +validate_account_id_obfuscation_secret!+ for an
+    # unambiguous manual call.
+    #
+    # @raise [Rodauth::ConfigurationError] if the current or a previous secret is unusable
+    # @return [void]
+    def validate_secrets!
+      validate_account_id_obfuscation_secret!
+    end
+
+    private
+
+    # Backing method for the +account_id_ciphers+ auth_cached_method: a
+    # {version_char => AccountIdCipher} map. The current key_version is always
+    # present; previous secrets are added for decode-only rotation support.
+    def _account_id_ciphers
+      map = {}
+      account_id_obfuscation_previous_secrets.each do |version, old_secret|
+        map[version.to_s] = Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher.new(old_secret)
+      end
+      map[account_id_obfuscation_key_version] =
+        Rodauth::Tools::AccountIdCipher.new(account_id_obfuscation_secret)
+      map
+    end
+
+    # Consume ACCOUNT_ID_SECRET from ENV (read + delete for security), unless an
+    # explicit secret was configured. Delegates to the same helper the sibling
+    # guards use, so a whitespace-only env value is treated as absent exactly
+    # like theirs.
+    def load_account_id_secret_from_env
+      Rodauth::SecretGuard.load_from_env!(self, :account_id_obfuscation)
+    end
+
+    # The backward-compat guarantee rests on every version tag (current AND any
+    # +account_id_obfuscation_previous_secrets+ key) being a single, unique,
+    # non-digit char distinct from the separators; fail fast otherwise. A
+    # digit would be ambiguous with a legacy decimal id, and a duplicate would
+    # mean two secrets claim the same version, making rotation nondeterministic.
+    def validate_key_version!
+      versions = [account_id_obfuscation_key_version] + account_id_obfuscation_previous_secrets.keys
+      versions.each { |version| validate_version_char!(version) }
+
+      return if versions.tally.values.all? { |count| count == 1 }
+
+      raise Rodauth::ConfigurationError, account_id_obfuscation_key_version_error
+    end
+
+    def validate_version_char!(version)
+      valid = version.is_a?(String) && version.length == 1 &&
+              version !~ /\d/ && version != token_separator && version != '_'
+
+      raise Rodauth::ConfigurationError, account_id_obfuscation_key_version_error unless valid
+    end
+
+    # Wrap the remember cookie so the id segment is obfuscated on the way out and
+    # restored on the way back in. remember.rb hardcodes '_' (not token_separator)
+    # as the id/key delimiter and splits with limit 2, so an HMAC key containing
+    # '_' stays intact and our version-tagged id (never contains '_', never starts
+    # with a digit) is safe. Legacy numeric cookies deobfuscate to nil -> passthrough.
+    #
+    # Installed directly on the Auth class (not as an ordinary module method) so
+    # the wrapper wins regardless of the order in which +remember+ and this
+    # feature are enabled: a method defined on the class itself always takes
+    # precedence over the included feature modules, whereas an ordinary module
+    # method would be shadowed by +remember+'s own +_set_/_get_remember_cookie+
+    # whenever this feature is enabled BEFORE +remember+ (silently leaving the
+    # cookie un-obfuscated).
+    #
+    # +internal_request+ re-runs +post_configure+ on an internally-created
+    # subclass of the already-configured Auth class. We must NOT re-install there:
+    # a second override on the subclass would resolve its +super+ to the parent
+    # class's override (double-obfuscating the id and crashing on
+    # +Integer("A...")+) instead of to remember.rb. Skipping the subclass leaves
+    # it inheriting the single parent-class wrapper for +_set_remember_cookie+,
+    # while +internal_request+'s own +_get_remember_cookie+ (reading the request
+    # param) still wins for internal requests since it sits higher in that
+    # subclass's ancestry.
+    def install_remember_cookie_obfuscation
+      return if defined?(Rodauth::InternalRequestMethods) && is_a?(Rodauth::InternalRequestMethods)
+
+      self.class.send(:define_method, :_set_remember_cookie) do |account_id, remember_key_value, deadline|
+        super(obfuscate_account_id(account_id), remember_key_value, deadline)
+      end
+
+      self.class.send(:define_method, :_get_remember_cookie) do
+        raw = super()
+        next raw unless raw.is_a?(String)
+
+        segment, _sep, remainder = raw.partition('_')
+        !remainder.empty? && (real_id = deobfuscate_account_id(segment)) ? "#{real_id}_#{remainder}" : raw
+      end
+    end
+
+    def warn_dev_account_id_secret
+      if respond_to?(:logger) && logger
+        logger.warn(account_id_obfuscation_secret_dev_warning)
+      else
+        warn(account_id_obfuscation_secret_dev_warning)
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/rodauth/features/hmac_secret_guard.rb

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 #
 # frozen_string_literal: true
 
+require 'securerandom'
+require_relative '../secret_guard'
+
 module Rodauth
   # Automatically sets hmac_secret based on HMAC_SECRET and validates it is properly
   # configured before the application starts. This helps prevent deployment
@@ -9,23 +12,34 @@ module Rodauth
   # particularly in production environments.
   #
   # By default, this feature checks during +post_configure+ that +hmac_secret+
-  # is set to a non-nil, non-empty value. In production mode, it raises a
+  # is set to a non-blank value. In production mode, it raises a
   # ConfigurationError if the secret is missing. In development mode, it logs
   # a warning and uses a fallback development secret.
   #
+  # This feature and +jwt_secret_guard+ can be enabled together. Their shared
+  # logic lives in +Rodauth::SecretGuard+ and is keyed by secret kind, so each
+  # secret is validated independently at boot.
+  #
   # @example Basic Configuration
   #   plugin :rodauth do
   #     enable :hmac_secret_guard
   #   end
   #
-  # @example Customizing Production Detection
+  # @example Customizing Production Detection (fail-safe)
   #   plugin :rodauth do
   #     enable :hmac_secret_guard
-  #     production_env_check proc { ENV['RACK_ENV'] == 'production' }
-  #     # Or use a boolean:
+  #     # Treat an unset RACK_ENV as production so a misconfigured deploy fails
+  #     # closed rather than silently using the development fallback secret:
+  #     production_env_check proc { ENV.fetch('RACK_ENV', 'production') == 'production' }
+  #     # Or force it:
   #     # production_env_check true
   #   end
   #
+  #   # The default already fails safe: an unset RACK_ENV is treated as
+  #   # production. Avoid `proc { ENV['RACK_ENV'] == 'production' }` — when the
+  #   # variable is unset that returns false and silently falls back to the
+  #   # insecure development secret in what is really a production deploy.
+  #
   # @example Customizing Error Messages
   #   plugin :rodauth do
   #     enable :hmac_secret_guard
@@ -39,6 +53,16 @@ module Rodauth
   #     development_hmac_secret_fallback 'my-custom-dev-secret'
   #   end
   #
+  #   # The default fallback is a random per-process value (SecureRandom.hex),
+  #   # not a constant baked into source. Set an explicit value only if you need
+  #   # HMAC output to be stable across restarts in development.
+  #
+  # @example Enforcing a Minimum Secret Length (production only)
+  #   plugin :rodauth do
+  #     enable :hmac_secret_guard
+  #     minimum_secret_length 32  # reject short secrets in production; 0 disables (default)
+  #   end
+  #
   # @example Disabling Validation
   #   plugin :rodauth do
   #     enable :hmac_secret_guard
@@ -49,8 +73,10 @@ module Rodauth
     auth_value_method :hmac_secret_env_key, 'HMAC_SECRET'
     auth_value_method :production_env_check, proc { ENV.fetch('RACK_ENV', 'production') == 'production' }
     auth_value_method :validate_secrets_on_configure?, true
-    auth_value_method :development_hmac_secret_fallback,
-                      'dev-only-insecure-example-hmac-secret-needs-to-be-changed-in-prod'
+    auth_value_method :minimum_secret_length, 0
+    # Random per-process fallback: never committed to source, and unstable across
+    # restarts so it can't be mistaken for a real, persistent secret.
+    auth_value_method :development_hmac_secret_fallback, SecureRandom.hex(32)
 
     translatable_method :hmac_secret_missing_error, 'HMAC_SECRET environment variable must be set in production'
     translatable_method :hmac_secret_dev_warning, '[rodauth] WARNING: Using default HMAC secret for development only'
@@ -58,62 +84,44 @@ module Rodauth
     def post_configure
       super
 
-      # Auto-set hmac_secret if not already set
-      if hmac_secret.nil? || (hmac_secret.respond_to?(:empty?) && hmac_secret.empty?)
-        env_value = ENV.delete(hmac_secret_env_key)
-        self.class.send(:define_method, :hmac_secret) { env_value } if env_value && !env_value.empty?
-      end
-
-      validate_secrets! if validate_secrets_on_configure?
+      Rodauth::SecretGuard.load_from_env!(self, :hmac)
+      validate_hmac_secret! if validate_secrets_on_configure?
     end
 
-    auth_methods :validate_secrets!, :production?
+    auth_methods :validate_secrets!, :validate_hmac_secret!, :production?
 
     # Check if we're running in production environment.
     #
     # @return [Boolean] true if running in production mode based on production_env_check
     def production?
-      case v = production_env_check
-      when Proc
-        instance_exec(&v)
-      else
-        !!v
-      end
+      Rodauth::SecretGuard.production?(self)
     end
 
-    # Validate that HMAC secret is properly configured.
-    # Raises ConfigurationError in production if secret is missing.
-    # In development, logs a warning and sets a fallback secret.
+    # Validate that the HMAC secret is properly configured. Raises
+    # ConfigurationError in production if the secret is missing, blank, or (when
+    # +minimum_secret_length+ is set) too short. In development it warns and
+    # installs a fallback secret.
     #
-    # @raise [Rodauth::ConfigurationError] if hmac_secret is missing in production
+    # This is the collision-free entry point: prefer it over +validate_secrets!+
+    # when both secret guards are enabled.
+    #
+    # @raise [Rodauth::ConfigurationError] if hmac_secret is unusable in production
     # @return [void]
-    def validate_secrets!
-      # Get the current hmac_secret value (may be nil)
-      current_secret = hmac_secret
-
-      # Check if secret is missing or empty
-      return unless current_secret.nil? || (current_secret.respond_to?(:empty?) && current_secret.empty?)
-      raise Rodauth::ConfigurationError, hmac_secret_missing_error if production?
-
-      # In production, raise an error
-
-      # In development, warn and set a fallback
-      warn_dev_secret
-      self.class.send(:define_method, :hmac_secret) { development_hmac_secret_fallback }
+    def validate_hmac_secret!
+      Rodauth::SecretGuard.validate!(self, :hmac)
     end
 
-    private
-
-    # Warn about using development secret.
-    # Logs to logger if available, otherwise to stderr.
+    # Backwards-compatible alias for +validate_hmac_secret!+.
     #
+    # Note: +jwt_secret_guard+ defines a +validate_secrets!+ of its own, so when
+    # both guards are enabled this name resolves to only one of them. Boot-time
+    # validation does not rely on it (see +post_configure+); use
+    # +validate_hmac_secret!+ for an unambiguous manual call.
+    #
+    # @raise [Rodauth::ConfigurationError] if hmac_secret is unusable in production
     # @return [void]
-    def warn_dev_secret
-      if respond_to?(:logger) && logger
-        logger.warn(hmac_secret_dev_warning)
-      else
-        warn(hmac_secret_dev_warning)
-      end
+    def validate_secrets!
+      validate_hmac_secret!
     end
   end
 end