rack 3.1.16
Rack's multipart parser buffers unbounded per-part headers, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)
high severity CVE-2025-61772~> 2.2.19, ~> 3.1.17, >= 3.2.2
Summary
Rack::Multipart::Parser can accumulate unbounded data when a
multipart part’s header block never terminates with the required
blank line (CRLFCRLF). The parser keeps appending incoming bytes
to memory without a size cap, allowing a remote attacker to exhaust
memory and cause a denial of service (DoS).
Details
While reading multipart headers, the parser waits for CRLFCRLF using:
@sbuf.scan_until(/(.*?\r
)\r
/m)
If the terminator never appears, it continues appending data
(@sbuf.concat(content)) indefinitely. There is no limit on
accumulated header bytes, so a single malformed part can consume
memory proportional to the request body size.
Impact
Attackers can send incomplete multipart headers to trigger high memory use, leading to process termination (OOM) or severe slowdown. The effect scales with request size limits and concurrency. All applications handling multipart uploads may be affected.
Mitigation
-
Upgrade to a patched Rack version that caps per-part header size (e.g., 64 KiB).
-
Until then, restrict maximum request sizes at the proxy or web server layer (e.g., Nginx
client_max_body_size).
Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)
high severity CVE-2025-61771~> 2.2.19, ~> 3.1.17, >= 3.2.2
Summary
Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without
a filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single
large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of
megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially
leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).
Details
During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:
body = String.new # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body << content
There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any
large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into
process memory before being added to params.
Impact
Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.
Mitigation
-
Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
-
Workarounds:
- Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy
layer (e.g., Nginx
client_max_body_size). - Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.
- Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy
layer (e.g., Nginx
Rack's unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion)
high severity CVE-2025-61770~> 2.2.19, ~> 3.1.17, >= 3.2.2
Summary
Rack::Multipart::Parser buffers the entire multipart preamble
(bytes before the first boundary) in memory without any size limit.
A client can send a large preamble followed by a valid boundary,
causing significant memory use and potential process termination
due to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions.
Details
While searching for the first boundary, the parser appends incoming
data into a shared buffer (@sbuf.concat(content)) and scans for
the boundary pattern:
@sbuf.scan_until(@body_regex)
If the boundary is not yet found, the parser continues buffering data indefinitely. There is no trimming or size cap on the preamble, allowing attackers to send arbitrary amounts of data before the first boundary.
Impact
Remote attackers can trigger large transient memory spikes by including a long preamble in multipart/form-data requests. The impact scales with allowed request sizes and concurrency, potentially causing worker crashes or severe slowdown due to garbage collection.
Mitigation
-
Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a preamble size limit (e.g., 16 KiB) or discards preamble data entirely per RFC 2046 § 5.1.1.
-
Workarounds:
- Limit total request body size at the proxy or web server level.
- Monitor memory and set per-process limits to prevent OOM conditions.
No officially reported memory leakage issues detected.
This gem version does not have any officially reported memory leaked issues.
No license issues detected.
This gem version has a license in the gemspec.
This gem version is available.
This gem version has not been yanked and is still available for usage.