rack 2.2.13
Rack has an Unbounded-Parameter DoS in Rack::QueryParser
high severity CVE-2025-46727~> 2.2.14, ~> 3.0.16, >= 3.1.14
Summary
Rack::QueryParser parses query strings and
application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies into Ruby data structures
without imposing any limit on the number of parameters, allowing
attackers to send requests with extremely large numbers of parameters.
Details
The vulnerability arises because Rack::QueryParser iterates over
each &-separated key-value pair and adds it to a Hash without
enforcing an upper bound on the total number of parameters. This
allows an attacker to send a single request containing hundreds of
thousands (or more) of parameters, which consumes excessive memory
and CPU during parsing.
Impact
An attacker can trigger denial of service by sending specifically crafted HTTP requests, which can cause memory exhaustion or pin CPU resources, stalling or crashing the Rack server. This results in full service disruption until the affected worker is restarted.
Mitigation
- Update to a version of Rack that limits the number of parameters parsed, or
- Use middleware to enforce a maximum query string size or parameter count, or
- Employ a reverse proxy (such as Nginx) to limit request sizes and reject oversized query strings or bodies.
Limiting request body sizes and query string lengths at the web server or CDN level is an effective mitigation.
Rack session gets restored after deletion
medium severity CVE-2025-32441>= 2.2.14
Summary
When using the Rack::Session::Pool middleware, simultaneous rack
requests can restore a deleted rack session, which allows the
unauthenticated user to occupy that session.
Details
Rack session middleware prepares the session at the beginning of request, then saves is back to the store with possible changes applied by host rack application. This way the session becomes to be a subject of race conditions in general sense over concurrent rack requests.
Impact
When using the Rack::Session::Pool middleware, and provided the
attacker can acquire a session cookie (already a major issue), the
session may be restored if the attacker can trigger a long running
request (within that same session) adjacent to the user logging out,
in order to retain illicit access even after a user has attempted to logout.
Mitigation
- Update to the latest version of
rack, or - Ensure your application invalidates sessions atomically by marking
them as logged out e.g., using a
logged_outflag, instead of deleting them, and check this flag on every request to prevent reuse, or - Implement a custom session store that tracks session invalidation timestamps and refuses to accept session data if the session was invalidated after the request began.
Related
As this code was moved to rack-session in Rack 3+, see
https://github.com/rack/rack-session/security/advisories/GHSA-9j94-67jr-4cqj
for the equivalent advisory in rack-session (affecting Rack 3+ only).
No officially reported memory leakage issues detected.
This gem version does not have any officially reported memory leaked issues.
No license issues detected.
This gem version has a license in the gemspec.
This gem version is available.
This gem version has not been yanked and is still available for usage.