pwn 0.5.785 → 0.5.787

checksums.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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data/build_gem.sh

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ if [[ $old_ruby_version == $new_ruby_version ]]; then
   export rvmsudo_secure_path=1
   rvmsudo /bin/bash --login -c "cd ${pwn_root} && ./reinstall_gemset.sh"
   cd /tmp && cd "$pwn_root"
-  ruby "${pwn_root}/scripts/build_gate.rb" rvmsudo /bin/bash --login -c "cd ${pwn_root} && bundle exec rake"
+  rvmsudo /bin/bash --login -c "cd ${pwn_root} && bundle exec rake"
   rvmsudo /bin/bash --login -c "cd ${pwn_root} && bundle exec rake install"
   rvmsudo /bin/bash --login -c "cd ${pwn_root} && bundle exec rake rerdoc"
   echo "Invoking bundle-audit Gemfile Scanner..."

data/documentation/Backup-Retention.md

@@ -32,15 +32,14 @@ maintenance. Learning reentrancy is bound to the owning PID and thread; an
 attempt to acquire Learning underneath an unowned backup transaction is rejected.
 Maintenance still defers when the Learning writer is busy.
 
-Before a new folder is admitted, oldest completed, unpinned generations may be
-expired to make room. Prepared/interrupted generations, explicit pins and current
-literal evidence references remain protected. Malformed reference data fails
-closed when expiry would be needed. Pins count **inside** the seven-folder limit:
-if they occupy capacity, the next producer fails before modifying its source.
-Unknown legacy folders count toward capacity but are not silently certified or
-expired. A pre-existing over-limit store can therefore block admission until an
-explicit offline remediation is performed; importing this source does not fix a
-live store or grant permission to prune it.
+Before a new folder is admitted, oldest completed generations may be expired
+to make room. That includes a capture pin that is not listed in the retention
+policy and not named by current evidence. Prepared/interrupted generations,
+retention-policy pins and current literal evidence references remain protected.
+Malformed reference data fails closed when expiry would be needed. If those
+protected folders occupy the seven-folder limit, the next producer fails before
+modifying its source. Unknown legacy folders count toward capacity but are not
+silently certified or expired.
 
 Transactions publish `prepared` before payload/source changes and `complete`
 only after successful return. Exceptions, interrupted/blocked results and failed

data/documentation/Harness-Evaluation.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ replay potentially destructive historical actions.
 
 Reuse the existing policy CLI (`pwn-ai --policy evaluate`, `promote`, `rollback`)
 and frozen snapshots, rather than updating live stores during evaluation.
-`PolicyEvaluation.evaluate` runs the existing standalone worker with a cleared
+`PolicyEvaluation.evaluate` runs a fresh worker with a cleared
 environment and disposable HOME; off/baseline/candidate use frozen policy bytes
 and independently checked tasks. The split-corpus executable experiments clone
 frozen training HOMEs per trial, check input/snapshot hashes and reject duplicate

data/documentation/Installation.md

@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ pwn setup --list-profiles
 | `vision` | `OCR` · `ScannableCodes` · `Reports` · `extro_vision` · tesseract / zbar / graphviz |
 | `voice` | `PWN::Plugins::Voice` · `extro_voice` · espeak-ng / sox |
 | `exploit` | `Metasploit` · `sqlmap` |
-| `hardware` | `Serial` · `BusPirate` · `Android` · `BareSIP` · `YubiKey` (`ykman`) · `extro_serial` · `extro_telecomm` |
+| `hardware` | `Serial` · `BusPirate` · `Android` · `BareSIP` · `YubiKey` (HIDAPI/PC/SC, no `ykman`) · `extro_serial` · `extro_telecomm` |
 | `re` | `Radare2` · `GDB` · `ExploitDev` · `Frida` · Android RE (`apktool`/`jadx`) · `pwndbg` · `ropper` · `rizin` |
 | `full` | everything above |
 

data/documentation/Operability.md

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ a process that is already running. Restart after installing the matching package
 | Mission lifetime | CTRL+C kills the mission through `PWN::AI::Agent::MissionNamespace`. That owner is Ruby plus util-linux `unshare` and Linux pidfds. There is no compiled `pwn_mission` extension and no systemd fallback. |
 | Recovery copies | Every PWN recovery producer uses `PWN::Backups` and `~/.pwn/backup/`, seven generation folders total. Adjacent `.bak` files are not the current producer. |
 | Housekeeping | A fresh install seeds one internal `session_cleanup` coordinator. Curriculum jobs are not seeded. Housekeeping never uses systemd. |
+| YubiKey | `PWN::Plugins::YubiKey` is native Ruby over HIDAPI and PC/SC. `required_bins` is empty and no `ykman` process is started. A library probe is not a connected device. Fixture coverage is not physical interoperability. See [YubiKey](YubiKey.md). |
 
 Details: [Runtime Source Protection](Runtime-Source-Protection.md),
 [Mission Cancellation](Mission-Cancellation.md),

data/documentation/Plugin-Degradation.md

@@ -77,9 +77,11 @@ Required: `subfinder`, `httpx`. Fallback: `NmapIt.scan` + `Corpus.get`.
 
 ## pwn-plugins-yubikey
 
-Required: `ykman` (YubiKey Manager CLI). Preflight checks executable presence
-only; it never opens a device, requests a PIN, or performs a challenge. An `ok`
-status does not establish device availability, provisioning, or authorization.
+Required: none. `required_bins` is empty. Preflight probes HIDAPI and PC/SC
+through `available?` and reports `FIDO native transport` or
+`PC/SC native transport` when a library is missing. It never opens a device,
+requests a PIN, or performs a challenge. An `ok` library probe does not
+establish device availability, provisioning, or authorization.
 Hardware-backed vault operations require the selected YubiKey and its existing
 HMAC-SHA1 OTP slot; missing devices, denied touch, or authentication failures
 raise without falling back to a disk master key or software MFA. Restore device

data/documentation/Plugins.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ show-source PWN::Plugins::Fuzz.http
 |---|---|
 | `OAuth2` · `BasicAuth` · `AuthenticationHelper` | credential flows |
 | `Vault` | Local encrypted configuration and engagement loot helpers; not a HashiCorp Vault client |
-| [`YubiKey`](YubiKey.md) | Guarded ykman operations, HMAC-backed authenticated vaults and OATH codes |
+| [`YubiKey`](YubiKey.md) | Native Ruby HID/PC/SC operations, HMAC-backed vaults and OATH codes |
 
 ### Hardware / Physical
 | Module | Purpose | Doc |

data/documentation/Policy-Benchmark.md

@@ -9,37 +9,37 @@ not a simulated language model.
 
 ## Run from a source checkout
 
-```sh
-ruby scripts/benchmark_policy.rb --self-check
-ruby scripts/benchmark_policy.rb --output /tmp/pwn-policy-benchmark.json
-bundle exec rubocop scripts/benchmark_policy.rb
+There is no standalone `scripts/benchmark_policy.rb`. The worker lives in
+`PWN::AI::Agent::PolicyEvaluation` and runs only in a fresh Ruby process.
+
+```ruby
+require './lib/pwn/ai/agent/policy_evaluation'
+PWN::AI::Agent::PolicyEvaluation.export_training(dir: '/tmp/pwn-policy-snapshots')
 ```
 
-The experiment uses Ruby and its standard libraries; it does not require the
-full application boot sequence. Use a fresh Ruby process, not the live agent
-console. JSON is printed to stdout and optionally written to `--output`.
-`--self-check` runs independent scorer tests, both complete experimental arms,
-and two fresh snapshot workers; it prints short pass messages instead of a
-report. Use the options separately.
-The benchmark exits nonzero if persistence changes during evaluation, splits
-overlap, a negative control succeeds, or a positive control fails. Self-checks
-also require actual training updates in the on arm and none in the off arm.
-They deliberately do **not** require an improvement of a predetermined size.
+`export_training` writes `off.json` and `on.json` under a new directory whose
+parent is a real directory, then returns held-out reports for seeds 0 and 1.
+It does not promote. Frozen snapshots are compared with `evaluate` or
+`pwn-ai --policy evaluate`. Do not load this from the live agent console.
+The worker exits nonzero if persistence changes during evaluation, splits
+overlap, a negative control succeeds, or a positive control fails.
+It does **not** require an improvement of a predetermined size.
 
 ## Relation to existing evaluation
 
 `lib/pwn/ai/agent/curriculum.rb` provides live self-play, judge-based practice,
 mistake-derived evaluation prompts, and adapter training/promotion gates. This
-standalone script does not invoke those paths. It provides a small, independently
+module does not invoke those paths. It provides a small, independently
 scored experiment where the training labels come from actual task achievement,
 not `Reward.judge`, model prose, or a previously assigned reward. It calls
 `Policy.begin_episode`, `observe_step`, and `finish` with those labels during
 training. This is not a test of Reward's verification-record binding, the live
 Loop, Metrics learning, memory retrieval, or adapter training.
 
-The experimental driver remains in `scripts/`. The opt-in `PolicyEvaluation`
-module launches only this fixed runner; it does not load the live agent in its
-workers. Its module autoload does not enable evaluation or promotion.
+The experimental driver is `PWN::AI::Agent::PolicyEvaluation`. Its public
+methods spawn a fresh Ruby process that loads only Policy and Registry after
+clearing the environment. Loading the module does not enable evaluation or
+promotion.
 
 ## Protocol
 
@@ -161,21 +161,19 @@ usage records. Do not present this controller experiment as that study.
 
 ## Opt-in independent snapshot evaluation (R5)
 
-The original commands and `off`/`on` report shape still work. To additionally
-export snapshots and run repeated evaluations in **fresh subprocesses**, use:
+To export snapshots and run repeated evaluations in **fresh subprocesses**:
 
-```sh
-ruby scripts/benchmark_policy.rb --heldout \
-  --snapshot-dir /tmp/pwn-policy-snapshots \
-  --output /tmp/pwn-policy-heldout.json
+```ruby
+require './lib/pwn/ai/agent/policy_evaluation'
+PWN::AI::Agent::PolicyEvaluation.export_training(dir: '/tmp/pwn-policy-snapshots')
 ```
 
-The snapshot directory must be **new**, below `/tmp`, with no symlink parents.
-`off.json` and `on.json` are genuine Policy JSON tables after the same real
-training schedule. Exported `updated_at` metadata is normalized to `null` for
-reproducible snapshot digests; no Q entries or rewards are fabricated. Export
-happens before that arm's evaluation. Neither `--heldout` nor `--snapshot-dir`
-promotes anything or discovers/reads a real home-directory policy.
+The snapshot directory must be **new**. Its parent must be a real directory,
+not a symlink. `off.json` and `on.json` are genuine Policy JSON tables after
+the same real training schedule. Exported `updated_at` metadata is normalized
+to `null` for reproducible snapshot digests; no Q entries or rewards are
+fabricated. Export happens before that arm's evaluation. Export does not
+promote anything or discover/read a real home-directory policy.
 
 The added `heldout` array contains protocol `pwn-policy-heldout-v2`, for suite
 indices 0 and 1. Each worker runs three frozen arms: `off` (baseline snapshot,
@@ -231,13 +229,14 @@ not train or write the live policy. The Ruby API supports other indices 0..7.
 
 From a source checkout, this disposable demonstration stays entirely under a
 new `/tmp` directory (use `pwn-ai` instead of `ruby -Ilib bin/pwn-ai` for an
-installed executable):
+installed executable). Export writes `off.json` and `on.json`; it does not
+promote:
 
 ```sh
 umask 077
 work=$(mktemp -d /tmp/pwn-offline-policy.XXXXXX)
-ruby scripts/benchmark_policy.rb --heldout \
-  --snapshot-dir "$work/snapshots" --output "$work/benchmark.json"
+ruby -Ilib -rpwn/ai/agent/policy_evaluation -e \
+  "PWN::AI::Agent::PolicyEvaluation.export_training(dir: '$work/snapshots')"
 ruby -Ilib bin/pwn-ai --policy evaluate \
   --baseline "$work/snapshots/off.json" --candidate "$work/snapshots/on.json" \
   > "$work/reports.json"

data/documentation/YubiKey-Vaults.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # YubiKey-backed vaults and authentication
 
-See [YubiKey device operations](YubiKey.md) for the `ykman` command families,
-provisioning safeguards and supported hardware/firmware boundaries.
+See [YubiKey device operations](YubiKey.md) for native HID/PC/SC operations,
+provisioning safeguards and the firmware boundary. No `ykman` process is used.
 
 ## Encryption model
 
@@ -53,7 +53,9 @@ end
 ```
 
 `yubikey` is a Hash accepting `slot` (integer 1 or 2; default 2), optional
-`serial`, optional local `ykman` executable path and bounded `timeout` seconds.
+exact decimal `serial`, optional `reader` or `device_path`, and bounded
+`timeout` seconds. An executable path such as `ykman` is rejected. The
+envelope stores slot and serial only; it never stores a backend path.
 `dump`, `decrypt`, `open_credentials` and hardware loot retrieval otherwise use
 the slot/serial stored in their envelope. Selecting another serial permits an
 explicitly provisioned recovery key with the same slot secret; the authentication
@@ -151,10 +153,10 @@ challenge does not accept an authenticator code.
 
 For `pwn_web_cache_deception`, add `--yubikey-account='Example:alice'`, optionally
 `--yubikey-serial=12345678`, and the required `--yubikey-confirm` to the normal
-arguments for a compatible login module. The flag authorizes HOTP counter
-advancement, remembered-key authentication and deletion of invalid cached keys
-during account listing, and upstream `ykman` cleanup that may delete a corrupted
-OATH credential. It is required for TOTP too; PWN never silently supplies consent.
+arguments for a compatible login module. The flag authorizes native OATH
+authentication and HOTP counter advancement. It does not authorize deleting or
+repairing a corrupted credential. It is required for TOTP too; PWN never
+silently supplies consent.
 Confirmation/serial flags without an account are rejected before login.
 
 ## Scope boundaries
@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ existing evidence-storage behavior and need separate access/at-rest protection.
 harvested loot; metadata-only Vault queries do not unlock a device, but Dispatch's
 separate output-redaction step can still require access to protected secrets.
 
-Verification uses fake device processes and synthetic HMAC responses. Tests
-exercise real Ruby encryption, authentication failures, selector validation,
-subprocess cleanup and persistence entry points, but are not evidence of a
-physical YubiKey, live website authentication or every firmware variant.
+Verification uses synthetic native connections and HMAC responses. Tests
+exercise real Ruby encryption, authentication failures, selector validation
+and persistence entry points. They are not evidence of a physical YubiKey,
+live website authentication or every firmware variant.