precedent 0.0.2

data/lib/precedent/grammar/inline.treetop

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# encoding: UTF-8
+
+module Precedent
+  grammar Inline
+    rule inline
+      first:inline_element
+      subsequent:(single_newline? inline_element)*
+      {
+        def build
+          elems = subsequent.elements.map(&:build).flatten
+          # Members of `subsequent` come in [nil, Node] lists when there
+          # is no preceding line break. The car values can't be ignored,
+          # as we need to convert newlines to spaces when they occur.
+          ret = elems.reduce([first.build]) do |mem, e|
+            last = mem.last
+            # Start the output list with the first element
+            if e.nil?
+              mem
+            # Concatenate contiguous strings
+            elsif last.is_a?(String) && e.is_a?(String)
+              mem + [mem.pop + e]
+            else # Hash
+              mem + [e]
+            end
+          end
+          # If there is just one content element, give the element
+          # rather than a one-element list.
+          ret.count == 1 ? ret.first : ret
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule inline_element
+      citation /
+      emphasis /
+      smallcaps /
+      reference /
+      page_break /
+      space /
+      word
+    end
+
+    rule smallcaps
+      '<<' content:inline '>>'
+      {
+        def build
+          { :type => :smallcaps,
+            :content => content.build }
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule emphasis
+      '\\\\' content:inline '\\\\'
+      {
+        def build
+          { :type => :emphasis,
+            :content => content.build }
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule citation
+      '{{' content:inline '}}'
+      {
+        def build
+          { :type => :citation,
+            :content => content.build }
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule page_break
+      '@@' page:[0-9]+ '@@'
+      {
+        def build
+          { :type => :break,
+            :page => page.text_value.to_i }
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule reference
+      '[[' marker:[0-9*†‡]+ ']]'
+      {
+        def build
+          { :type => :reference,
+            :marker => marker.text_value }
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule single_newline
+      "\n"
+      {
+        def build
+          ' '
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule word
+      (
+        # not a starting or ending token
+        !(
+          '{{' / '}}' / # citations
+          '<<' / '>>' / # smallcaps
+          '[[' / ']]' / # references
+          '\\\\' /      # italics
+          '@@'          # page breaks
+        )
+        char
+      )+
+      {
+        def build
+          text_value
+        end
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule space
+      ' '
+      {
+        def build
+          ' '
+        end 
+      }
+    end
+
+    rule char
+      [\S]
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/precedent/grammar/node_patch.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+module Treetop
+  module Runtime
+    class SyntaxNode
+      # Convenience pass-through method for building ASTs. Intersitial
+      # Treetop nodes can just label subrules their "content" and pass
+      # through during AST construction.
+      def build
+        elements.map(&:build) if elements
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/precedent/parser.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# encoding: UTF-8
+
+require_relative 'grammar/node_patch'
+require_relative 'grammar/inline'
+
+module Precedent
+  class Parser
+    # cached instance of the parser for inline elements
+    @@inline_parser = InlineParser.new
+
+    def parse(input)
+      post_process(parse_blocks(input))
+    end
+
+    def post_process(raw_hash)
+      raw_blocks = raw_hash.delete(:blocks)
+      document_blocks = raw_blocks.reduce(
+        body: [], footnotes: []
+      ) do |mem, block|
+        content = block[:content]
+        if content
+          ast = @@inline_parser.parse(content.join(' ').gsub(/ +/, ' '))
+          block.merge!(content: ast.build)
+        end
+
+        type = block[:type]
+        if type == :footnote
+          mem[:footnotes] << block
+        else
+          mem[:body] << block
+        end
+        mem
+      end
+      raw_hash.merge(document_blocks)
+    end
+
+    def build_block(type, first_content=nil)
+      if first_content
+        { :type => type, :content => [first_content] }
+      else
+        { :type => type }
+      end
+    end
+
+    BLANK_LINE = /^\s*$/
+    COMMENT_LINE = /^%/
+    FLUSH_LINE = /^([^ ].+)$/
+    FLUSH_QUOTE = /^    (.+)$/
+    FOOTNOTE_CONTINUE = /^\^\s+(.+)$/
+    FOOTNOTE_START = /^\^([^ ]+)\s+(.+)$/
+    HEADING = /^(#+)\s+(.+)$/
+    INDENTED = /^  (.+)$/
+    INDENTED_QUOTE = /^      (.+)$/
+    METADATA = /^([A-Z][[:ascii:]]*): (.+)$/
+    RAGGED_LEFT = /^        (.+)$/
+    RULE_BODY = /^\* \* \*\s*$/
+    RULE_QUOTE = /^    \* \* \*\s*$/
+
+    def parse_blocks(input)
+      block_ended = false
+      meta_ended = false
+
+      blocks = []
+      meta = {}
+      out = {:meta => meta, :blocks => blocks}
+
+      input.lines.each do |line|
+        line.chomp!
+        if BLANK_LINE =~ line
+          block_ended = true
+          meta_ended = true
+        elsif COMMENT_LINE =~ line # skip
+        elsif METADATA =~ line && !meta_ended
+          meta[$1.downcase.to_sym] = meta_value($2)
+        elsif block_ended || blocks.empty?
+          # Start a new block-level element
+          start_block(blocks, line)
+          block_ended = false
+        else
+          blocks.last[:content] << line
+        end
+      end
+
+      out
+    end
+
+    def start_block(blocks, line)
+      case line
+      when RULE_QUOTE
+        blocks << build_block(:rule_quote)
+      when RULE_BODY
+        blocks << build_block(:rule)
+      when HEADING
+        blocks << build_block(:heading, $2).merge(level: $1.length)
+      when FOOTNOTE_START
+        blocks << build_block(:footnote, $2).merge(marker: $1)
+      when FOOTNOTE_CONTINUE
+        blocks << build_block(:footnote, $1)
+      when RAGGED_LEFT
+        blocks << build_block(:ragged_left, $1)
+      when INDENTED_QUOTE
+        blocks << build_block(:indented_quote, $1)
+      when FLUSH_QUOTE
+        blocks << build_block(:flush_quote, $1)
+      when INDENTED
+        blocks << build_block(:indented, $1)
+      else # Flush
+        blocks << build_block(:flush, line)
+      end
+    end
+
+    def meta_value(value)
+      v = value.strip
+      case v
+      when /^\d+$/ then v.to_i
+      when /^\d\d\d\d-\d\d-\d\d$/ then Date.parse(v)
+      when /^true|yes$/i then true
+      when /^false|no$/i then false
+      else v
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/precedent/translator.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+require_relative 'parser'
+
+module Precedent
+  class Translator
+    @@parser = Parser.new
+
+    def initialize(input)
+      @input = input
+    end
+
+    def to_hashes
+      raw_parser_output
+    end
+
+    private
+
+    def raw_parser_output
+      return @raw if @raw
+      @raw = @@parser.parse(@input)
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/precedent/treetop_patch.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# nathansobo/treetop/commit/6551d549ef9215be72b04e8c1be8e66c7d19ae68
+
+module Treetop
+  module Compiler
+    class GrammarCompiler
+      def compile(source_path, target_path = source_path.gsub(/\.(treetop|tt)\Z/, '.rb'))
+        File.open(target_path, 'w') do |target_file|
+          generated_source = ruby_source(source_path)
+          first_line_break = generated_source.index("\n")
+          first_line = generated_source.slice(0..first_line_break)
+          if /(coding|encoding): (\S+)/.match(first_line)
+            target_file.write(first_line)
+            target_file.write(AUTOGENERATED+"\n\n")
+            target_file.write(generated_source.slice((first_line_break + 1)..-1))
+          else
+            target_file.write(AUTOGENERATED+"\n\n")
+            target_file.write(generated_source)
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/precedent/version.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+module Precedent
+  VERSION = "0.0.2"
+end

data/precedent.gemspec

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# -*- encoding: utf-8 -*-
+lib = File.expand_path('../lib', __FILE__)
+$LOAD_PATH.unshift(lib) unless $LOAD_PATH.include?(lib)
+require 'precedent/version'
+
+Gem::Specification.new do |gem|
+  gem.name          = 'precedent'
+  gem.version       = Precedent::VERSION
+  gem.authors       = ['Kyle Mitchell']
+  gem.email         = ['kyle@blackacrelabs.org']
+  gem.description   = <<-eof
+    Precedent is a lightweight markup language for legal documents
+    heavily inspired by Markdown, LaTeX, and the print style of the
+    United States Reports, the official reports of decisions of the
+    United States Supreme Court.
+  eof
+  gem.summary       = %q{Markdown-esque markup for legal documents}
+  gem.homepage      = 'https://github.com/BlackacreLabs/precedent'
+  gem.license       = 'MIT'
+
+  gem.files         = `git ls-files`.split($/)
+  gem.executables   = gem.files.grep(%r{^bin/}).map{ |f| File.basename(f) }
+  gem.test_files    = gem.files.grep(%r{spec/})
+  gem.require_paths = ['lib']
+
+  gem.required_ruby_version = '~>1.9.3'
+
+  gem.add_dependency 'activesupport', '~>3.2'
+  gem.add_dependency 'nokogiri', '~>1.5'
+  gem.add_dependency 'thor', '~>0.16'
+  gem.add_dependency 'treetop', '~>1.4'
+
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'faker'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'guard-bundler'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'guard-rspec'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'guard-treetop'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'rspec', '~>2.12'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'ruby-prof'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'simplecov'
+end

data/spec/fixtures/long_opinion.pre

@@ -0,0 +1,1289 @@
+Author: Roberts
+Page: 497
+Type: Court
+
+  <<Chief Justice Roberts>> delivered the opinion of the Court.
+
+  The International Court of Justice (ICJ), located in the Hague,
+is a tribunal established pursuant to the United Nations Charter to
+adjudicate disputes between member states. In the {{\\Case Concerning
+Avena and Other Mexican Nationals\\ (\\Mex.\\ v. \\U. S.\\), 2004 I.
+C. J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31) (\\Avena\\)}}, that tribunal considered
+a claim brought by Mexico against the United States. The ICJ held
+that, based on violations of the Vienna Convention, 51 named Mexican
+nation@@498@@ als were entitled to review and reconsideration of their
+state-court convictions and sentences in the United States. This was so
+regardless of any forfeiture of the right to raise Vienna Convention
+claims because of a failure to comply with generally applicable state
+rules governing challenges to criminal convictions.
+
+  In {{\\Sanchez-Llamas\\ v. \\Oregon,\\ 548 U. S. 331
+(2006)}}—issued after \\Avena\\ but involving individuals who were not
+named in the \\Avena\\ judgment—we held that, contrary to the ICJ’s
+determination, the Vienna Convention did not preclude the application
+of state default rules. After the \\Avena\\ decision, President George
+W. Bush determined, through a Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb.
+28, 2005), App. to Pet. for Cert. 187a (Memorandum or President’s
+Memorandum), that the United States would “discharge its international
+obligations” under \\Avena\\ “by having State courts give effect to
+the decision.”
+
+  Petitioner José Ernesto Medellín, who had been convicted and
+sentenced in Texas state court for murder, is one of the 51 Mexican
+nationals named in the \\Avena\\ decision. Relying on the ICJ’s
+decision and the President’s Memorandum, Medellín filed an
+application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. The Texas Court
+of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellín’s application as an abuse
+of the writ under state law, given Medellín’s failure to raise his
+Vienna Convention claim in a timely manner under state law. We granted
+certiorari to decide two questions. \\First,\\ is the ICJ’s judgment
+in \\Avena\\ directly enforceable as domestic law in a state court
+in the United States? \\Second,\\ does the President’s Memorandum
+independently require the States to provide review and reconsideration
+of the claims of the 51 Mexican nationals named in \\Avena\\ without
+regard to state procedural default rules? We conclude that neither
+\\Avena\\ nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly
+enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the @@499@@
+filing of successive habeas petitions. We therefore affirm the decision
+below.
+
+# I
+
+## A
+
+  In 1969, the United States, upon the advice and consent of the
+Senate, ratified the {{Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
+Convention or Convention), Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U. S. T. 77, T. I.
+A. S. No. 6820}}, and the {{Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
+Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention (Optional Protocol
+or Protocol), Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U. S. T. 325, T. I. A. S. No.
+6820}}. The preamble to the Convention provides that its purpose is to
+“contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations.”
+{{21 U. S. T., at 79; \\Sanchez-Llamas, supra,\\ at 337.}} Toward
+that end, Article 36 of the Convention was drafted to “facilitat[e]
+the exercise of consular functions.” {{Art. 36(1), 21 U. S. T., at
+100.}} It provides that if a person detained by a foreign country “so
+requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
+without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State” of such
+detention, and “inform the [detainee] of his righ[t]” to request
+assistance from the consul of his own state. {{Art. 36(1)(b), \\id.,\\
+at 101.}}
+
+  The Optional Protocol provides a venue for the resolution of disputes
+arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna
+Convention. {{Art. I, 21 U. S. T., at 326.}} Under the Protocol,
+such disputes “shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
+International Court of Justice” and “may accordingly be brought
+before the [ICJ] . . . by any party to the dispute being a Party to
+the present Protocol.” {{\\Ibid.\\}}
+
+  The ICJ is “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”
+{{United Nations Charter, Art. 92, 59 Stat. 1051, T. S. No. 993
+(1945).}} It was established in 1945 pursuant to the United
+Nations Charter. The ICJ Statute—annexed to the @@500@@ U. N.
+Charter—provides the organizational framework and governing procedures
+for cases brought before the ICJ. {{Statute of the International Court
+of Justice (ICJ Statute), 59 Stat. 1055, T. S. No. 993 (1945).}}
+
+  Under Article 94(1) of the U. N. Charter, “[e]ach Member of the
+United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in
+any case to which it is a party.” {{59 Stat. 1051.}} The ICJ’s
+jurisdiction in any particular case, however, is dependent upon the
+consent of the parties. {{See Art. 36, \\id.,\\ at 1060.}} The ICJ
+Statute delineates two ways in which a nation may consent to ICJ
+jurisdiction: It may consent generally to jurisdiction on any question
+arising under a treaty or general international law, {{Art. 36(2),
+\\ibid.\\}}, or it may consent specifically to jurisdiction over a
+particular category of cases or disputes pursuant to a separate treaty,
+{{Art. 36(1), \\ibid.\\}} The United States originally consented to the
+general jurisdiction of the ICJ when it filed a declaration recognizing
+compulsory jurisdiction under Art. 36(2) in 1946. The United States
+withdrew from general ICJ jurisdiction in 1985. {{See U. S. Dept. of
+State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ
+Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I. L. M. 1742
+(1985).}} By ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention,
+the United States consented to the specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with
+respect to claims arising out of the Vienna Convention. On March 7,
+2005, subsequent to the ICJ’s judgment in \\Avena,\\ the United States
+gave notice of withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
+Convention. {{Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi
+A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations.}}
+
+# B
+
+  Petitioner José Ernesto Medellín, a Mexican national, has lived in
+the United States since preschool. A member of the @@501@@ “Black and
+Whites” gang, Medellín was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
+to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal murders of two Houston
+teenagers.
+
+  On June 24, 1993, 14-year-old Jennifer Ertman and 16-yearold Elizabeth
+Pena were walking home when they encountered Medellín and several
+fellow gang members. Medellín attempted to engage Elizabeth in
+conversation. When she tried to run, petitioner threw her to the ground.
+Jennifer was grabbed by other gang members when she, in response to her
+friend’s cries, ran back to help. The gang members raped both girls
+for over an hour. Then, to prevent their victims from identifying them,
+Medellín and his fellow gang members murdered the girls and discarded
+their bodies in a wooded area. Medellín was personally responsible for
+strangling at least one of the girls with her own shoelace.
+
+  Medellín was arrested at approximately 4 a.m. on June 29, 1993.
+A few hours later, between 5:54 and 7:23 a.m., Medellín was given
+\\Miranda\\ warnings; he then signed a written waiver and gave a
+detailed written confession. {{App. to Brief for Respondent 32–36.}}
+Local law enforcement officers did not, however, inform Medellín of
+his Vienna Convention right to notify the Mexican consulate of his
+detention. Brief for Petitioner 6–7. Medellín was convicted of
+capital murder and sentenced to death; his conviction and sentence were
+affirmed on appeal. {{\\Medellín\\ v. \\State,\\ No. 71,997 (Tex. Crim.
+App., May 16, 1997), App. to Brief for Respondent 2–31.}}
+
+  Medellín first raised his Vienna Convention claim in his first
+application for state postconviction relief. The state trial court held
+that the claim was procedurally defaulted because Medellín had failed
+to raise it at trial or on direct review. The trial court also rejected
+the Vienna Convention claim on the merits, finding that Medellín had
+“fail[ed] to show that any non-notification of the Mexican authorities
+im@@502@@pacted on the validity of his conviction or punishment.”
+{{\\Id.,\\ at 62.}}[[1]] The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
+{{\\Id.,\\ at 64–65.}}
+
+  Medellín then filed a habeas petition in Federal District Court.
+The District Court denied relief, holding that Medellín’s Vienna
+Convention claim was procedurally defaulted and that Medellín had
+failed to show prejudice arising from the Vienna Convention violation.
+{{See \\Medellín\\ v. \\Cockrell,\\ Civ. Action No. H–01–4078 (SD
+Tex., June 26, 2003), App. to Brief for Respondent 66, 86–92.}}
+
+  While Medellín’s application for a certificate of appealability was
+pending in the Fifth Circuit, the ICJ issued its decision in \\Avena.\\
+The ICJ held that the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the
+Vienna Convention by failing to inform the 51 named Mexican nationals,
+including Medellín, of their Vienna Convention rights. {{2004 I. C.
+J., at 53–55.}} In the ICJ’s determination, the United States
+was obligated “to provide, by means of its own choosing, review
+and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the @@503@@
+[affected] Mexican nationals.” {{\\Id.,\\ at 72, ¶ 153(9).}} The
+ICJ indicated that such review was required without regard to state
+procedural default rules. {{\\Id.,\\ at 56–57.}}
+
+
+^1 The requirement of Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention that the
+detaining state notify the detainee’s consulate “without delay”
+is satisfied, according to the ICJ, where notice is provided within
+three working days. {{\\Avena,\\ 2004 I. C. J. 12, 52, ¶ 97 (Judgment
+of Mar. 31). See \\Sanchez-Llamas\\ v. \\Oregon,\\ 548 U. S. 331, 362
+(2006) (<<Ginsburg,>> J., concurring in judgment).}} Here, Medellín
+confessed within three hours of his arrest—before there could be a
+violation of his Vienna Convention right to consulate notification. App.
+to Brief for Respondent 32–36. In a second state habeas application,
+Medellín sought to expand his claim of prejudice by contending that
+the State’s noncompliance with the Vienna Convention deprived him of
+assistance in developing mitigation evidence during the capital phase of
+his trial. This argument, however, was likely waived: Medellín had the
+assistance of consulate counsel during the preparation of his \\first\\
+application for state postconviction relief, yet failed to raise this
+argument at that time. {{See Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in
+\\Ex parte Medellín,\\ No. 675430–A (Tex. Crim. App., Mar. 26, 1998),
+pp. 25–31.}} In light of our disposition of this case, we need not
+consider whether Medellín was prejudiced in any way by the violation of
+his Vienna Convention rights.
+
+  The Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
+{{\\Medellín\\ v. \\Dretke,\\ 371 F. 3d 270, 281 (2004).}} The court
+concluded that the Vienna Convention did not confer individually
+enforceable rights. \\Id.,\\ at 280. The court further ruled that it
+was in any event bound by this Court’s decision in {{\\Breard\\ v.
+\\Greene,\\ 523 U. S. 371, 375 (1998) (\\per curiam\\)}}, which held
+that Vienna Convention claims are subject to procedural default rules,
+rather than by the ICJ’s contrary decision in {{\\Avena.\\ 371 F. 3d,
+at 280}}.
+
+  This Court granted certiorari. {{\\Medellín\\ v. \\Dretke,\\ 544
+U. S. 660, 661 (2005) (\\per curiam\\) (\\Medellín I\\).}} Before
+we heard oral argument, however, President George W. Bush issued his
+Memorandum for the United States Attorney General, providing:
+
+    “I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as
+    President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of
+    America, that the United States will discharge its international
+    obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice
+    in [\\Avena\\], by hav ing State courts give effect to the decision
+    in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by
+    the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.” {{App. to
+    Pet. for Cert. 187a.}}
+
+  Medellín, relying on the President’s Memorandum and the ICJ’s
+decision in \\Avena,\\ filed a second application for habeas relief
+in state court. {{\\Ex parte Medellín,\\ 223 S. W. 3d 315, 322–323
+(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).}} Because the state-court proceedings might have
+provided Medellín with the review and reconsideration he requested, and
+because his claim for federal relief might otherwise have been barred,
+we dismissed his petition for certiorari as improvidently granted.
+{{\\Medellín I, supra,\\ at 664.}}@@504@@
+
+  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently dismissed
+Medellín’s second state habeas application as an abuse of the writ.
+{{223 S. W. 3d, at 352.}} In the court’s view, neither the \\Avena\\
+decision nor the President’s Memorandum was “binding federal
+law” that could displace the State’s limitations on the filing of
+successive habeas applications. {{223 S. W. 3d, at 352.}} We again
+granted certiorari. {{550 U. S. 917 (2007).}}
+
+# II
+
+  Medellín first contends that the ICJ’s judgment in \\Avena\\
+constitutes a “binding” obligation on the state and federal courts
+of the United States. He argues that “by virtue of the Supremacy
+Clause, the treaties requiring compliance with the \\Avena\\ judgment
+are \\already\\ the ‘Law of the Land’ by which all state and federal
+courts in this country are ‘bound.’ ” Reply Brief for Petitioner
+1. Accordingly, Medellín argues, \\Avena\\ is a binding federal rule of
+decision that pre-empts contrary state limitations on successive habeas
+petitions.
+
+  No one disputes that the \\Avena\\ decision—a decision that flows
+from the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ
+jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes
+an \\international\\ law obligation on the part of the United States.
+But not all international law obligations automatically constitute
+binding federal law enforceable in United States courts. The question
+we confront here is whether the \\Avena\\ judgment has automatic
+\\domestic\\ legal effect such that the judgment of its own force
+applies in state and federal courts.
+
+  This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that
+automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that—while
+they constitute international law commitments—do not by themselves
+function as binding federal law. The distinction was well explained by
+Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in {{\\Foster\\ v. \\Neilson,\\ 2
+Pet. 253, 315 (1829)}}, @@505@@ overruled on other grounds, {{\\United
+States\\ v. \\Percheman,\\ 7 Pet. 51 (1833)}}, which held that a
+treaty is “equivalent to an act of the legislature,” and hence
+self-executing, when it “operates of itself without the aid of
+any legislative provision.” {{\\Foster, supra,\\ at 314.}} When,
+in contrast, “[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they
+can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into
+effect.” {{\\Whitney\\ v. \\Robertson,\\ 124 U. S. 190, 194 (1888).}}
+In sum, while treaties “may comprise international commitments
+. . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
+implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it
+be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.” {{\\Igartu´
+a-De La Rosa\\ v. \\United States,\\ 417 F. 3d 145, 150 (CA1 2005) (en
+banc) (Boudin, C. J.).}}[[2]]
+
+  A treaty is, of course, “primarily a compact between independent
+nations.” {{\\Head Money Cases,\\ 112 U. S. 580, 598 (1884).}}
+It ordinarily “depends for the enforcement of its provisions on
+the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to
+it.”{{ \\Ibid.\\; see also The Federalist No. 33, p. 207 (J. Cooke
+ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (comparing laws that individuals are “bound
+to observe” as “the \\supreme law\\ of the land” with “a mere
+treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties”).}} “If these
+[interests] fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
+negotiations and reclamations . . . . It is obvious that with all
+this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.”
+{{\\Head Money Cases, supra,\\ at 598.}} Only “[i]f the treaty
+contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no
+legislation to make them operative, [will] they have the force
+
+^2 The label “self-executing” has on occasion been used to convey
+different meanings. What we mean by “self-executing” is that the
+treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.
+Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by itself give
+rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty
+has domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by
+Congress. @@506@@ and effect of a legislative enactment.” {{\\Whitney,
+supra,\\ at 194.}}[[3]]
+
+  Medellín and his \\amici\\ nonetheless contend that the Optional
+Protocol, U. N. Charter, and ICJ Statute supply the “relevant
+obligation” to give the \\Avena\\ judgment binding effect in the
+domestic courts of the United States. {{Reply Brief for Petitioner
+5–6.}}[[4]] Because none of these treaty sources creates binding
+federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it
+is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the
+\\Avena\\ judgment is not automatically binding domestic law.
+
+## A
+
+  The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute,
+begins with its text. {{\\Air France\\ v. \\Saks,\\ 470 @@507@@ U. S.
+392, 396–397 (1985).}} Because a treaty ratified by the United States
+is “an agreement among sovereign powers,” we have also considered as
+“aids to its interpretation” the negotiation and drafting history
+of the treaty as well as “the postratification understanding” of
+signatory nations. {{\\Zicherman\\ v. \\Korean Air Lines Co.,\\ 516
+U. S. 217, 226 (1996); see also \\United States\\ v. \\Stuart,\\ 489 U.
+S. 353, 365–366 (1989); \\Choctaw Nation\\ v. \\United States,\\ 318
+U. S. 423, 431–432 (1943).}}
+
+^3 Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create
+federal law, the background presumption is that “[i]nternational
+agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally
+do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action
+in domestic courts.” {{2 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
+of the United States § 907, Comment \\a,\\ p. 395 (1986) (hereinafter
+Restatement).}} Accordingly, a number of the Courts of Appeals have
+presumed that treaties do not create privately enforceable rights
+in the absence of express language to the contrary. {{See, \\e. g.,
+United States\\ v. \\Emuegbunam,\\ 268 F. 3d 377, 389 (CA6 2001);
+\\United States\\ v. \\Jimenez-Nava,\\ 243 F. 3d 192, 195 (CA5 2001);
+\\United States\\ v. \\Li,\\ 206 F. 3d 56, 60–61 (CA1 2000) (en banc);
+\\Goldstar\\ (\\Panama\\) \\S. A.\\ v. \\United States,\\ 967 F. 2d 965,
+968 (CA4 1992); \\Canadian Transp. Co.\\ v. \\United States,\\ 663 F.
+2d 1081, 1092 (CADC 1980); \\Mannington Mills, Inc.\\ v. \\Congoleum
+Corp.,\\ 595 F. 2d 1287, 1298 (CA3 1979).}}
+
+^4 The question is whether the \\Avena\\ judgment has binding effect
+in domestic courts under the Optional Protocol, ICJ Statute, and U.
+N. Charter. Consequently, it is unnecessary to resolve whether the
+Vienna Convention is itself “self-executing” or whether it grants
+Medellín individually enforceable rights. {{See Reply Brief for
+Petitioner 5 (disclaiming reliance on the Vienna Convention).}} As in
+{{\\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ 548 U. S., at 342–343}}, we thus assume, without
+deciding, that Article 36 grants foreign nationals “an individually
+enforceable right to request that their consular officers be notified of
+their detention, and an accompanying right to be informed by authorities
+of the availability of consular notification.”
+
+  As a signatory to the Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to
+submit disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention to the ICJ. The
+Protocol provides: “Disputes arising out of the interpretation or
+application of the [Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory
+jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.” {{Art. I, 21 U.
+S. T., at 326.}} Of course, submitting to jurisdiction and agreeing to
+be bound are two different things. A party could, for example, agree
+to compulsory nonbinding arbitration. Such an agreement would require
+the party to appear before the arbitral tribunal without obligating the
+party to treat the tribunal’s decision as binding. {{See, \\e. g.,\\
+North American Free Trade Agreement, U. S.-Can.-Mex., Art. 2018(1),
+Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I. L. M. 605, 697 (1993) (“On receipt of the final
+report of [the arbitral panel requested by a Party to the agreement],
+the disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute,
+which normally shall conform with the determinations and recommendations
+of the panel”).}}
+
+  The most natural reading of the Optional Protocol is as a bare grant
+of jurisdiction. It provides only that “[d]isputes arising out of
+the interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention shall
+lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
+Justice” and “may accordingly be brought before the [ICJ] . . .
+by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.”
+{{Art. I, 21 U. S. T., at 326.}} The Protocol says nothing about the
+effect of an ICJ decision and does not itself commit signatories to
+@@508@@ comply with an ICJ judgment. The Protocol is similarly silent as
+to any enforcement mechanism.
+
+  The obligation on the part of signatory nations to comply with ICJ
+judgments derives not from the Optional Protocol, but rather from
+Article 94 of the U. N. Charter—the provision that specifically
+addresses the effect of ICJ decisions. Article 94(1) provides that
+“[e]ach Member of the United Nations \\undertakes to comply\\ with
+the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.” {{59
+Stat. 1051 (emphasis added).}} The Executive Branch contends that the
+phrase “undertakes to comply” is not “an acknowledgement that an
+ICJ decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of U. N.
+members,” but rather “a \\commitment\\ on the part of U. N. members
+to take \\future\\ action through their political branches to comply
+with an ICJ decision.” {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus Curiae\\
+in \\MedellínI,\\ O. T. 2004, No. 04–5928, p. 34.}}
+
+  We agree with this construction of Article 94. The Article is not
+a directive to domestic courts. It does not provide that the United
+States “shall” or “must” comply with an ICJ decision, nor
+indicate that the Senate that ratified the U. N. Charter intended to
+vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts.
+Instead, “[t]he words of Article 94 . . . call upon governments to
+take certain action.” {{\\Committee of United States Citizens Living
+in Nicaragua\\ v. \\Reagan,\\ 859 F. 2d 929, 938 (CADC 1988) (quoting
+\\Diggs\\ v. \\Richardson,\\ 555 F. 2d 848, 851 (CADC 1976); internal
+quotation marks omitted). See also \\Foster,\\ 2 Pet., at 314, 315
+(holding a treaty non-self-executing because its text—“ ‘all
+. . . grants of land . . . shall be ratified and confirmed’
+”—did not “act directly on the grants” but rather “pledge[d]
+the faith of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and
+confirm them”).}} In other words, the U. N. Charter reads like
+“a compact between independent nations” that “depends for the
+enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the @@509@@ honor of
+the governments which are parties to it.” {{\\Head Money Cases,\\
+112 U. S., at 598.}}[[5]] The remainder of Article 94 confirms that
+the U. N. Charter does not contemplate the automatic enforceability of
+ICJ decisions in domestic courts.[[6]] Article 94(2)—the enforcement
+provision—provides the sole remedy for noncompliance: referral to
+the United Nations Security Council by an aggrieved state. {{59 Stat.
+1051.}}
+
+  The U. N. Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic—that is,
+nonjudicial—remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments were not
+meant to be enforceable in domestic courts. {{See \\Sanchez-Llamas,\\
+548 U. S., at 347.}} And even this “quintessentially \\international\\
+remed[y],” {{\\id.,\\ at 355}}, is not absolute. First, the Security
+Council must “dee[m] necessary” the issuance of a recommendation
+or measure to effectuate the judgment. {{Art. 94(2), 59 Stat. 1051.}}
+Second, as the President and Senate were undoubtedly aware in
+subscribing to the U. N. Charter and Optional Protocol, the @@510@@
+United States retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any
+Security Council resolution.
+
+^5 We do not read “undertakes” to mean that “ ‘ “[t]he United
+States . . . shall be at liberty to make respecting th[e] matter, such
+laws as they think proper.” ’ ” {{\\Post,\\ at 554(<<Breyer,>>
+J., dissenting) (quoting \\Todok\\ v. \\Union State Bank of Harvard,\\
+281 U. S. 449, 453, 454 (1930) (holding that a treaty with Norway
+did \\not\\ “operat[e] to override the law of [Nebraska] as to the
+disposition of homestead property”)).}} Whether or not the United
+States “undertakes” to comply with a treaty says nothing about what
+laws it may enact. The United States is \\always\\ “at liberty to
+make . . . such laws as [it] think[s] proper.” {{\\Id.,\\ at 453.}}
+Indeed, a later-in-time federal statute supersedes inconsistent treaty
+provisions. {{See, \\e. g., Cook\\ v. \\United States,\\ 288 U. S. 102,
+119–120 (1933).}} Rather, the “undertakes to comply” language
+confirms that further action to give effect to an ICJ judgment was
+contemplated, contrary to the dissent’s position that such judgments
+constitute directly enforceable federal law, without more. {{See also
+\\post,\\ at 533–535 (<<Stevens,>> J., concurring in judgment).}}
+
+^6 Article 94(2) provides in full: “If any party to a case fails to
+perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by
+the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
+which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
+measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.” {{59 Stat.
+1051.}}
+
+  This was the understanding of the Executive Branch when the President
+agreed to the U. N. Charter and the declaration accepting general
+compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. {{See, \\e. g.,\\ The Charter of the
+United Nations for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security:
+Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong.,
+1st Sess., 124–125 (1945) (“[I]f a state fails to perform its
+obligations under a judgment of the [ICJ], the other party may have
+recourse to the Security Council”); \\id.,\\ at 286 (statement of Leo
+Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International
+Organizations and Security Affairs) (“[W]hen the Court has rendered a
+judgment and one of the parties refuses to accept it, then the dispute
+becomes political rather than legal. It is as a political dispute
+that the matter is referred to the Security Council”); A Resolution
+Proposing Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Court
+of Justice: Hearings on S. Res. 196 before the Subcommittee of the
+Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 142 (1946)
+(statement of Charles Fahy, State Dept. Legal Adviser) (while parties
+that accept ICJ jurisdiction have “a moral obligation” to comply
+with ICJ decisions, Article 94(2) provides the exclusive means of
+enforcement).}}
+
+  If ICJ judgments were instead regarded as automatically enforceable
+domestic law, they would be immediately and directly binding on state
+and federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. Mexico or the
+ICJ would have no need to proceed to the Security Council to enforce
+the judgment in this case. Noncompliance with an ICJ judgment through
+exercise of the Security Council veto—always regarded as an option by
+the Executive and ratifying Senate during and after consideration of the
+U. N. Charter, Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute—would no longer be
+a viable alternative. @@511@@ There would be nothing to veto. In light
+of the U. N. Charter’s remedial scheme, there is no reason to believe
+that the President and Senate signed up for such a result.
+
+  In sum, Medellín’s view that ICJ decisions are automatically
+enforceable as domestic law is fatally undermined by the enforcement
+structure established by Article 94. His construction would eliminate
+the option of noncompliance contemplated by Article 94(2), undermining
+the ability of the political branches to determine whether and how to
+comply with an ICJ judgment. Those sensitive foreign policy decisions
+would instead be transferred to state and federal courts charged
+with applying an ICJ judgment directly as domestic law. And those
+courts would not be empowered to decide whether to comply with the
+judgment—again, always regarded as an option by the political
+branches—any more than courts may consider whether to comply with
+any other species of domestic law. This result would be particularly
+anomalous in light of the principle that “[t]he conduct of the foreign
+relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
+Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments.”
+{{\\Oetjen\\ v. \\Central Leather Co.,\\ 246 U. S. 297, 302 (1918).}}
+
+  The ICJ Statute, incorporated into the U. N. Charter, provides further
+evidence that the ICJ’s judgment in \\Avena\\ does not automatically
+constitute federal law judicially enforceable in United States courts.
+{{Art. 59, 59 Stat. 1062.}} To begin with, the ICJ’s “principal
+purpose” is said to be to “arbitrate particular disputes between
+national governments.” {{\\Sanchez-Llamas, supra,\\ at 355 (citing
+59 Stat. 1055).}} Accordingly, the ICJ can hear disputes only between
+nations, not individuals. {{Art. 34(1), \\id.,\\ at 1059 (“Only states
+[\\i. e.,\\ countries] may be parties in cases before the [ICJ]”).}}
+More important, Article 59 of the statute provides that “[t]he
+decision of the [ICJ] has \\no binding force\\ except between the
+parties and in respect of that particular case.” @@512@@ {{\\Id.,\\ at
+1062 (emphasis added).}}The dissent does not explain how Medellín, an
+individual, can be a party to the ICJ proceeding.
+
+  Medellín argues that because the \\Avena\\ case involves him, it
+is clear that he—and the 50 other Mexican nationals named in the
+\\Avena\\ decision—should be regarded as parties to the \\Avena\\
+judgment. {{Brief for Petitioner 21–22.}} But cases before the ICJ
+are often precipitated by disputes involving particular persons or
+entities, disputes that a nation elects to take up as its own. {{See,
+\\e. g., Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.\\
+(\\Belg.\\ v. \\Spain\\), 1970 I. C. J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 5) (claim
+brought by Belgium on behalf of Belgian nationals and shareholders);
+\\Case Concerning the Protection of French Nationals and Protected
+Persons in Egypt\\ (\\Fr.\\ v. \\Egypt\\), 1950 I. C. J. 59 (Order of
+Mar. 29) (claim brought by France on behalf of French nationals and
+protected persons in Egypt); \\Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case\\ (\\U. K.\\
+v. \\Iran\\), 1952 I. C. J. 93, 112 (Judgment of July 22) (claim brought
+by the United Kingdom on behalf of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company).}}
+That has never been understood to alter the express and established
+rules that only nation-states may be parties before the ICJ, {{Art.
+34, 59 Stat. 1059,}} and—contrary to the position of the dissent,
+{{\\post,\\ at 559}}—that ICJ judgments are binding only between those
+parties, {{Art. 59, 59 Stat. 1062.}}[[8]]
+
+^7 Medellín alters this language in his brief to provide that the ICJ
+Statute makes the \\Avena\\ judgment binding “in respect of [his]
+particular case.” {{Brief for Petitioner 22 (internal quotation marks
+omitted).}} Medellín does not and cannot have a case before the ICJ
+under the terms of the ICJ Statute.
+
+^8 The dissent concludes that the ICJ judgment is binding federal law
+based in large part on its belief that the Vienna Convention overrides
+contrary state procedural rules. {{See \\post,\\ at 555–557, 559.}}
+But not even Medellín relies on the Convention. {{See Reply Brief for
+Petitioner 5 (disclaiming reliance).}} For good reason: Such reliance is
+foreclosed by the decision of this Court in {{\\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ 548
+U. S., at 351 (holding that @@513@@ the Convention does not preclude
+the application of state procedural bars); see also \\id.,\\ at 363
+(<<Ginsburg,>> J., concurring in judgment)}}. There is no basis for
+relitigating the issue. Further, to rely on the Convention would
+elide the distinction between a treaty—negotiated by the President
+and signed by Congress—and a judgment rendered pursuant to those
+treaties.@@513@@
+
+  It is, moreover, well settled that the United States’ interpretation
+of a treaty “is entitled to great weight.” {{\\Sumitomo Shoji
+America, Inc.\\ v. \\Avagliano,\\ 457 U. S. 176, 184–185 (1982); see
+also \\El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.\\ v. \\Tsui Yuan Tseng,\\ 525 U. S.
+155, 168 (1999).}} The Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its
+view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable
+federal law. {{See Brief for United States as \\Amicus Curiae\\ 4,
+27–29.}}[[9]]
+
+  The pertinent international agreements, therefore, do not provide for
+implementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic
+courts, and “where a treaty does not provide a particular remedy,
+either expressly or implicitly, it @@514@@ is not for the federal
+courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own.”
+{{\\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ 548 U. S., at 347.}}
+
+^9 In interpreting our treaty obligations, we also consider the
+views of the ICJ itself, “giv[ing] respectful consideration to the
+interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international
+court with jurisdiction to interpret [the treaty].” {{\\Breard\\
+v. \\Greene,\\ 523 U. S. 371, 375 (1998) (\\per curiam\\); see
+\\Sanchez-Llamas, supra,\\ at 355–356.}} It is not clear whether
+that principle would apply when the question is the binding force
+of ICJ judgments themselves, rather than the substantive scope of a
+treaty the ICJ must interpret in resolving disputes. {{Cf. \\Phillips
+Petroleum Co.\\ v. \\Shutts,\\ 472 U. S. 797, 805 (1985) (“[A]
+court adjudicating a dispute may not be able to predetermine the res
+judicata effect of its own judgment”); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, &
+E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4405, p. 82 (2d ed.
+2002) (“The first court does not get to dictate to other courts
+the preclusion consequences of its own judgment”).}} In any event,
+nothing suggests that the ICJ views its judgments as automatically
+enforceable in the domestic courts of signatory nations. The \\Avena\\
+judgment itself directs the United States to provide review and
+reconsideration of the affected convictions and sentences \\“by means
+of its own choosing.”\\ {{2004 I. C. J., at 72, ¶ 153(9) (emphasis
+added).}} This language, as well as the ICJ’s mere suggestion that the
+“judicial process” is best suited to provide such review, {{\\id.,\\
+at 65–66}}, confirm that domestic enforceability in court is not part
+and parcel of an ICJ judgment.
+
+## B
+
+  The dissent faults our analysis because it “looks for the wrong
+thing (explicit textual expression about selfexecution) using the
+wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the treaty language).”
+{{\\Post,\\ at 562.}} Given our obligation to interpret treaty
+provisions to determine whether they are self-executing, we have to
+confess that we do think it rather important to look to the treaty
+language to see what it has to say about the issue. That is after all
+what the Senate looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty.
+
+  The interpretive approach employed by the Court today—resorting
+to the text—is hardly novel. In two early cases involving an
+1819 land-grant treaty between Spain and the United States, Chief
+Justice Marshall found the language of the treaty dispositive. In
+\\Foster,\\ after distinguishing between self-executing treaties (those
+“equivalent to an act of the legislature”) and non-self-executing
+treaties (those “the legislature must execute”), Chief Justice
+Marshall held that the 1819 treaty was non-self-executing. {{2 Pet.,
+at 314.}} Four years later, the Supreme Court considered another claim
+under the same treaty, but concluded that the treaty was self-executing.
+{{See \\Percheman,\\ 7 Pet., at 87.}} The reason was not because the
+treaty was sometimes self-executing and sometimes not, but because
+“the language of” the Spanish translation (brought to the Court’s
+attention for the first time) indicated the parties’ intent to ratify
+and confirm the land grant “by force of the instrument itself.”
+{{\\Id.,\\ at 89.}}
+
+  As against this time-honored textual approach, the dissent proposes
+a multifactor, judgment-by-judgment analysis that would “jettiso[n]
+relative predictability for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of
+factors.” {{\\Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.\\ v. \\Great Lakes Dredge &
+Dock Co.,\\ 513 U. S. 527, 547 (1995).}} @@515@@ The dissent’s novel
+approach to deciding which (or, more accurately, when) treaties give
+rise to directly enforceable federal law is arrestingly indeterminate.
+Treaty language is barely probative. {{\\Post,\\ at 549 (“[T]he
+absence or presence of language in a treaty about a provision’s
+self-execution proves nothing at all”).}} Determining whether treaties
+themselves create federal law is sometimes committed to the political
+branches and sometimes to the judiciary. {{\\Post,\\ at 549–550.}} Of
+those committed to the judiciary, the courts pick and choose which shall
+be binding United States law—trumping not only state but other federal
+law as well—and which shall not. {{\\Post,\\ at 550–562.}} They do
+this on the basis of a multifactor, “context-specific” inquiry.
+\\Post,\\ at 549. Even then, the same treaty sometimes gives rise to
+United States law and sometimes does not, again depending on an ad hoc
+judicial assessment. {{\\Post,\\ at 550–562.}}
+
+  Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that
+must be followed before federal law can be created under the
+Constitution—vesting that decision in the political branches, subject
+to checks and balances. {{U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7.}} They also
+recognized that treaties could create federal law, but again through the
+political branches, with the President making the treaty and the Senate
+approving it. {{Art. II, § 2.}} The dissent’s understanding of the
+treaty route, depending on an ad hoc judgment of the judiciary without
+looking to the treaty language—the very language negotiated by the
+President and approved by the Senate—cannot readily be ascribed to
+those same Framers.
+
+  The dissent’s approach risks the United States’ involvement in
+international agreements. It is hard to believe that the United States
+would enter into treaties that are sometimes enforceable and sometimes
+not. Such a treaty would be the equivalent of writing a blank check to
+the judiciary. Senators could never be quite sure what the treaties on
+which they were voting meant. Only a judge could say for sure and only
+at some future date. This uncertainty could @@516@@ hobble the United
+States’ efforts to negotiate and sign international agreements.
+
+  In this case, the dissent—for a grab bag of no less than seven
+reasons—would tell us that this \\particular\\ ICJ judgment is federal
+law. {{\\Post,\\ at 549–562.}} That is no sort of guidance. Nor is
+it any answer to say that the federal courts will diligently police
+international agreements and enforce the decisions of international
+tribunals only when they \\should be\\ enforced. {{\\Ibid.\\}} The
+point of a non-self-executing treaty is that it “addresses itself to
+the political, \\not\\ the judicial department; and the legislature
+must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”
+{{\\Foster, supra,\\ at 314 (emphasis added); \\Whitney,\\ 124 U. S., at
+195. See also \\Foster, supra,\\ at 307 (“The judiciary is not that
+department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests
+against foreign powers is confided”).}} The dissent’s contrary
+approach would assign to the courts—not the political branches—the
+primary role in deciding when and how international agreements will
+be enforced. To read a treaty so that it sometimes has the effect of
+domestic law and sometimes does not is tantamount to vesting with the
+judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to create the law.
+
+## C
+
+  Our conclusion that \\Avena\\ does not by itself constitute binding
+federal law is confirmed by the “postratification understanding”
+of signatory nations. {{See \\Zicherman,\\ 516 U. S., at 226.}} There
+are currently 47 nations that are parties to the Optional Protocol and
+171 nations that are parties to the Vienna Convention. Yet neither
+Medellín nor his \\amici\\ have identified a single nation that treats
+ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts.[[10]] In determining that
+the @@517@@ Vienna Convention did not require certain relief in United
+States courts in \\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ we found it pertinent that the
+requested relief would not be available under the treaty in any other
+signatory country. {{See 548 U. S., at 343–344, and n. 3.}} So too
+here the lack of any basis for supposing that any other country would
+treat ICJ judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of its domestic
+law strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so viewed in our
+courts.
+
+
+^10 The best that the ICJ experts as \\amici curiae\\ can come up with
+is the contention that local Moroccan courts have referred to ICJ
+judgments as “dispositive.” {{Brief for ICJ Experts as \\Amici
+Curiae\\ 20, n. 31.}} Even the ICJ experts do not cite a case so
+holding, and Moroccan practice is at@@517@@ best inconsistent, for at
+least one local Moroccan court has held that ICJ judgments are not
+binding as a matter of municipal law. {{See, \\e. g., Mackay Radio &
+Tel. Co.\\ v. \\Lal-La Fatma Bent si Mohamed el Khadar,\\ [1954] 21
+Int’l L. Rep. 136 (Tangier, Ct. App. Int’l Trib.) (holding that
+ICJ decisions are not binding on Morocco’s domestic courts); see
+also “\\Socobel”\\ v. \\Greek State,\\ [1951] 18 Int’l L. Rep. 3
+(Belg., Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles) (holding that judgments of the ICJ’s
+predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, were not
+domestically enforceable).}}
+
+
+  Our conclusion is further supported by general principles of
+interpretation. To begin with, we reiterated in \\Sanchez-Llamas\\ what
+we held in \\Breard,\\ that “ ‘absent a clear and express statement
+to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
+implementation of the treaty in that State.’ ” {{548 U. S., at 351
+(quoting \\Breard,\\ 523 U. S., at 375).}} Given that ICJ judgments may
+interfere with state procedural rules, one would expect the ratifying
+parties to the relevant treaties to have clearly stated their intent
+to give those judgments domestic effect, if they had so intended. Here
+there is no statement in the Optional Protocol, the U. N. Charter, or
+the ICJ Statute that supports the notion that ICJ judgments displace
+state procedural rules.
+
+  Moreover, the consequences of Medellín’s argument give pause. An
+ICJ judgment, the argument goes, is not only binding domestic law but
+is also unassailable. As a result, neither Texas nor this Court may
+look behind a judgment and quarrel with its reasoning or result. (We
+already know, from \\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ that this Court disagrees with
+both @@518@@ the reasoning and result in \\Avena.\\) Medellín’s
+interpretation would allow ICJ judgments to override otherwise binding
+state law; there is nothing in his logic that would exempt contrary
+federal law from the same fate. {{See, \\e. g., Cook\\ v. \\United
+States,\\ 288 U. S. 102, 119 (1933) (later-in-time selfexecuting treaty
+supersedes a federal statute if there is a conflict).}} And there is
+nothing to prevent the ICJ from ordering state courts to annul criminal
+convictions and sentences, for any reason deemed sufficient by the ICJ.
+Indeed, that is precisely the relief Mexico requested. {{\\Avena,\\ 2004
+I. C. J., at 58–59.}}
+
+  Even the dissent flinches at reading the relevant treaties to give
+rise to self-executing ICJ judgments in all cases. It admits that
+“Congress is unlikely to authorize automatic judicial enforceability
+of \\all\\ ICJ judgments, for that could include some politically
+sensitive judgments and others better suited for enforcement by other
+branches.” {{\\Post,\\ at 560.}} Our point precisely. But the lesson
+to draw from that insight is hardly that the judiciary should decide
+which judgments are politically sensitive and which are not.
+
+  In short, and as we observed in \\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ “[n]othing in
+the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations
+were intended to be conclusive on our courts.” {{548 U. S., at 354.}}
+Given that holding, it is difficult to see how that same structure and
+purpose can establish, as Medellín argues, that \\judgments\\ of the
+ICJ nonetheless were intended to be conclusive on our courts. A judgment
+is binding only if there is a rule of law that makes it so. And the
+question whether ICJ judgments can bind domestic courts depends upon the
+same analysis undertaken in \\Sanchez-Llamas\\ and set forth above.
+
+  Our prior decisions identified by the dissent as holding a number
+of treaties to be self-executing, {{see \\post,\\ at 545–546}}, and
+Appendix A, stand only for the unremarkable proposition that some
+international agreements are self-executing and others are not. It is
+well settled that the “[i]nterpreta@@519@@tion of [a treaty] . . .
+must, of course, begin with the language of the Treaty itself.”
+{{\\Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,\\ 457 U. S., at 180.}} As a result,
+we have held treaties to be selfexecuting when the textual provisions
+indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to
+have domestic effect.
+
+  Medellín and the dissent cite {{\\Comegys\\ v. \\Vasse,\\ 1 Pet.
+193 (1828)}}, for the proposition that the judgments of international
+tribunals are automatically binding on domestic courts. {{See \\post,\\
+at 546; Reply Brief for Petitioner 2; Brief for Petitioner 19–20.}}
+That case, of course, involved a different treaty than the ones at
+issue here; it stands only for the modest principle that the terms of
+a treaty control the outcome of a case. [[11]] We do not suggest that
+treaties can never afford binding domestic effect to international
+tribunal judgments—only that the U. N. Charter, the Optional Protocol,
+and the ICJ Statute do not do so. And whether the treaties underlying a
+judgment are self-executing so that the judgment is directly enforceable
+as domestic law in our courts is, of course, a matter for this Court to
+decide. {{See \\Sanchez-Llamas, supra,\\ at 353–354.}}
+
+## D
+
+  Our holding does not call into question the ordinary enforcement of
+foreign judgments or international arbitral @@520@@ agreements. Indeed,
+we agree with Medellín that, as a general matter, “an agreement to
+abide by the result” of an international adjudication—or what he
+really means, an agreement to give the result of such adjudication
+domestic legal effect—can be a treaty obligation like any other, so
+long as the agreement is consistent with the Constitution. {{See Brief
+for Petitioner 20.}} The point is that the particular treaty obligations
+on which Medellín relies do not of their own force create domestic law.
+
+^11 The other case Medellín cites for the proposition that the
+judgments of international courts are binding, {{\\La Abra Silver
+Mining Co.\\ v. \\United States,\\ 175 U. S. 423 (1899)}}, and the
+cases he cites for the proposition that this Court has routinely
+enforced treaties under which foreign nationals have asserted rights,
+similarly stand only for the principle that the terms of a treaty
+govern its enforcement. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, 5, and n.
+2. In each case, this Court first interpreted the treaty prior to
+finding it domestically enforceable. {{See, \\e. g., United States\\
+v. \\Rauscher,\\ 119 U. S. 407, 422–423 (1886) (holding that the
+treaty required extradition only for specified offenses); \\Hopkirk\\
+v. \\Bell,\\ 3 Cranch 454, 458 (1806) (holding that the treaty of peace
+between Great Britain and the United States prevented the operation of a
+state statute of limitations on British debts).}}
+
+  The dissent worries that our decision casts doubt on some 70-odd
+treaties under which the United States has agreed to submit disputes
+to the ICJ according to “roughly similar” provisions. {{See
+\\post,\\ at 540–541, 552–553.}} Again, under our established
+precedent, some treaties are self-executing and some are not, depending
+on the treaty. That the judgment of an international tribunal might
+not automatically become domestic law hardly means the underlying
+treaty is “useless.” {{See \\post,\\ at 553; cf. \\post,\\ at 548
+(describing the British system in which treaties “virtually always
+requir[e] parliamentary legislation”).}} Such judgments would still
+constitute international obligations, the proper subject of political
+and diplomatic negotiations. {{See \\Head Money Cases,\\ 112 U. S., at
+598.}} And Congress could elect to give them wholesale effect (rather
+than the judgment-by-judgment approach hypothesized by the dissent,
+\\post,\\ at 560) through implementing legislation, as it regularly
+has. {{See, \\e. g.,\\ Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act
+of 1998, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following 8 U. S. C.
+§ 1231 (directing the “appropriate agencies” to “prescribe
+regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under
+Article 3” of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel,
+Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment); see also \\infra,\\ at
+521–522 (listing examples of legislation implementing international
+obligations).}}
+
+  Further, that an ICJ judgment may not be automatically enforceable
+in domestic courts does not mean the particular @@521@@ underlying
+treaty is not. Indeed, we have held that a number of the “Friendship,
+Commerce, and Navigation” Treaties cited by the dissent, {{see
+Appendix B, \\post,\\}} are selfexecuting—based on “the language of
+the[se] Treat[ies].” {{See \\Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., supra,\\ at
+180, 189–190.}} In {{\\Kolovrat\\ v. \\Oregon,\\ 366 U. S. 187, 191,
+196 (1961)}}, for example, the Court found that Yugoslavian claimants
+denied inheritance under Oregon law were entitled to inherit personal
+property pursuant to an 1881 Treaty of Friendship, Navigation, and
+Commerce between the United States and Serbia. {{See also \\Clark\\ v.
+\\Allen,\\ 331 U. S. 503, 507–511, 517–518 (1947) (finding that the
+right to inherit real property granted German aliens under the Treaty
+of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany prevailed
+over California law).}} Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, {{see
+\\post,\\ at 547}}, neither our approach nor our cases require that a
+treaty provide for self-execution in so many talismanic words; that is
+a caricature of the Court’s opinion. Our cases simply require courts
+to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the
+President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the
+treaty has domestic effect.
+
+  In addition, Congress is up to the task of implementing
+non-self-executing treaties, even those involving complex commercial
+disputes. {{Cf. \\post,\\ at 560 (<<Breyer,>> J., dissenting).}} The
+judgments of a number of international tribunals enjoy a different
+status because of implementing legislation enacted by Congress. {{See,
+\\e. g.,\\ 22 U. S. C. § 1650a(a) (“An award of an arbitral
+tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [Convention on the
+Settlement of Investment Disputes] shall create a right arising under
+a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by
+such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full
+faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of
+general jurisdiction of one of the several States”); 9 U. S. C.
+§§ 201–208 (“The [U. N.] Convention on the Recogni@@522@@tion
+and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be
+enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter,”
+§ 201).}} Such language demonstrates that Congress knows how to accord
+domestic effect to international obligations when it desires such a
+result.[[12]]
+
+  Further, Medellín frames his argument as though giving the \\Avena\\
+judgment binding effect in domestic courts simply conforms to the
+proposition that domestic courts generally give effect to foreign
+judgments. But Medellín does not ask us to enforce a foreign-court
+judgment settling a typical commercial or property dispute. {{See,
+\\e. g., Hilton\\ v. \\Guyot,\\ 159 U. S. 113 (1895); \\United
+States\\ v. \\Arredondo,\\ 6 Pet. 691 (1832); see also Uniform Foreign
+Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 1(2), 13 U. L. A., pt. 2, p. 44
+(2002) (“ ‘[F]oreign judgment’ means any judgment of a foreign
+state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money”).}} Rather,
+Medellín argues that the \\Avena\\ judgment has the effect of enjoining
+the operation of state law. What is more, on Medellín’s view,
+the judgment would force the State to take action to “review and
+reconside[r]” his case. The general rule, however, is that judgments
+of foreign courts awarding injunctive relief, even as to private
+parties, let alone sovereign States, “are not generally entitled to
+enforcement.” {{See 1 Restatement § 481, Comment \\b,\\ at 595.}}
+
+  In sum, while the ICJ’s judgment in \\Avena\\ creates an
+international law obligation on the part of the United States, it
+does not of its own force constitute binding federal law @@523@@
+that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas
+petitions. As we noted in \\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ a contrary conclusion
+would be extraordinary, given that basic rights guaranteed by our own
+Constitution do not have the effect of displacing state procedural
+rules. {{See 548 U. S., at 360.}} Nothing in the text, background,
+negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations
+suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result
+of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status
+than that enjoyed by “many of our most fundamental constitutional
+protections.” {{\\Ibid.\\}}
+
+^12 That this Court has rarely had occasion to find a treaty
+non-selfexecuting is not all that surprising. {{See \\post,\\ at 545
+(<<Breyer,>> J., dissenting).}} To begin with, the Courts of Appeals
+have regularly done so. {{See, \\e. g., Pierre\\ v. \\Gonzales,\\ 502 F.
+3d 109, 119–120 (CA2 2007) (holding that the United Nations Convention
+Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
+Punishment is non-self-executing); \\Singh\\ v. \\Ashcroft,\\ 398 F.
+3d 396, 404, n. 3 (CA6 2005) (same); \\Beazley\\ v. \\Johnson,\\ 242
+F. 3d 248, 267 (CA5 2001) (holding that the International Covenant on
+Civil and Political Rights is non-self-executing).}} Further, as noted,
+Congress has not hesitated to pass implementing legislation for treaties
+
+# III
+
+  Medellín next argues that the ICJ’s judgment in \\Avena\\ is
+binding on state courts by virtue of the President’s February 28, 2005
+Memorandum. The United States contends that while the \\Avena\\ judgment
+does not of its own force require domestic courts to set aside ordinary
+rules of procedural default, that judgment became the law of the land
+with precisely that effect pursuant to the President’s Memorandum
+and his power “to establish binding rules of decision that preempt
+contrary state law.” Brief for United States as \\Amicus Curiae\\ 5.
+Accordingly, we must decide whether the President’s declaration alters
+our conclusion that the \\Avena\\ judgment is not a rule of domestic law
+binding in state and federal courts.[[13]]
+
+## A
+
+  The United States maintains that the President’s constitutional
+role “uniquely qualifies” him to resolve the sensitive @@524@@
+foreign policy decisions that bear on compliance with an ICJ decision
+and “to do so expeditiously.” {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus
+Curiae\\ 11, 12. We do not question these propositions. See, \\e. g.,
+First Nat. City Bank\\ v. \\Banco Nacional de Cuba,\\ 406 U. S. 759,
+767 (1972) (plurality opinion) (The President has “the lead role
+. . . in foreign policy”); \\American Ins. Assn.\\ v. \\Garamendi,\\
+539 U. S. 396, 414 (2003) (Article II of the Constitution places with
+the President the “ ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct
+of our foreign relations’ ” (quoting \\Youngstown Sheet & Tube
+Co.\\ v. \\Sawyer,\\ 343 U. S. 579, 610–611 (1952) (Frankfurter,
+J., concurring))).}} In this case, the President seeks to vindicate
+United States interests in ensuring the reciprocal observance of the
+Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments,
+and demonstrating commitment to the role of international law. These
+interests are plainly compelling.
+
+^13 The dissent refrains from deciding the issue, but finds it
+“difficult to believe that in the exercise of his Article II powers
+pursuant to a ratified treaty, the President can \\never\\ take action
+that would result in setting aside state law.” {{\\Post,\\ at 564.}}
+We agree. The questions here are the far more limited ones of whether
+he may unilaterally create federal law by giving effect to the judgment
+of this international tribunal pursuant to this non-self-executing
+treaty, and, if not, whether he may rely on other authority under the
+Constitution to support the action taken in this partic
+
+  Such considerations, however, do not allow us to set aside first
+principles. The President’s authority to act, as with the exercise
+of any governmental power, “must stem either from an act of Congress
+or from the Constitution itself.” {{\\Youngstown, supra,\\ at 585;
+\\Dames & Moore\\ v. \\Regan,\\ 453 U. S. 654, 668 (1981).}}
+
+  Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted
+framework for evaluating executive action in this area. First, “[w]hen
+the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
+Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
+he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”
+{{\\Youngstown,\\ 343 U. S., at 635 (concurring opinion).}} Second,
+“[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
+or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
+powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
+have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”
+{{\\Id.,\\ at 637.}} In this circumstance, Presidential authority
+can derive support from “congressional inertia, indifference or
+quiescence.” {{\\Ibid.\\}} @@525@@ Finally, “[w]hen the President
+takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
+Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,” and the Court can sustain
+his actions “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
+subject.” {{\\Id.,\\ at 637–638.}}
+
+## B
+
+  The United States marshals two principal arguments in favor of the
+President’s authority “to establish binding rules of decision that
+preempt contrary state law.” {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus
+Curiae\\ 5. T}}he Solicitor General first argues that the relevant
+treaties give the President the authority to implement the \\Avena\\
+judgment and that Congress has acquiesced in the exercise of such
+authority. The United States also relies upon an “independent”
+international dispute-resolution power wholly apart from the asserted
+authority based on the pertinent treaties. Medellín adds the additional
+argument that the President’s Memorandum is a valid exercise of his
+power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
+
+### 1
+
+  The United States maintains that the President’s Memorandum is
+authorized by the Optional Protocol and the U. N. Charter. {{Brief for
+United States as \\Amicus Curiae\\ 9.}} That is, because the relevant
+treaties “create an obligation to comply with \\Avena,\\” they
+“\\implicitly\\ give the President authority to implement that
+treaty-based obligation.” {{\\Id.,\\ at 11 (emphasis added).}} As
+a result, the President’s Memorandum is well grounded in the first
+category of the \\Youngstown\\ framework.
+
+  We disagree. The President has an array of political and diplomatic
+means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally
+converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is
+not among them. The responsibility for transforming an international
+obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law
+falls to @@526@@ Congress. {{\\Foster,\\ 2 Pet., at 315; \\Whitney,\\
+124 U. S., at 194; \\Igartu´ a-De La Rosa,\\ 417 F. 3d, at 150.}}
+As this Court has explained, when treaty stipulations are “not
+self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to
+carry them into effect.” {{\\Whitney, supra,\\ at 194.}} Moreover,
+“[u]ntil such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to
+disregard the existing laws on the subject.” {{\\Foster, supra,\\ at
+315.}}
+
+  The requirement that Congress, rather than the President, implement
+a non-self-executing treaty derives from the text of the Constitution,
+which divides the treaty-making power between the President and the
+Senate. The Constitution vests the President with the authority to
+“make” a treaty. {{Art. II, § 2.}} If the Executive determines
+that a treaty should have domestic effect of its own force, that
+determination may be implemented in “mak[ing]” the treaty, by
+ensuring that it contains language plainly providing for domestic
+enforceability. If the treaty is to be self-executing in this respect,
+the Senate must consent to the treaty by the requisite two-thirds vote,
+{{\\ibid.,\\}} consistent with all other constitutional restraints.
+
+  Once a treaty is ratified without provisions clearly according it
+domestic effect, however, whether the treaty will ever have such effect
+is governed by the fundamental constitutional principle that “
+‘[t]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to
+execute in the President.’ ” {{\\Hamdan\\ v. \\Rumsfeld,\\ 548 U. S.
+557, 591 (2006) (quoting \\Ex parte Milligan,\\ 4 Wall. 2, 139 (1866)
+(opinion of Chase, C. J.)); see U. S. Const., Art. I, § 1 (“All
+legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
+United States”).}} As already noted, the terms of a non-selfexecuting
+treaty can become domestic law only in the same way as any other
+law—through passage of legislation by both Houses of Congress,
+combined with either the President’s signature or a congressional
+override of a Presidential veto. {{See Art. I, §7.}} Indeed, “the
+President’s power to see that @@527@@ the laws are faithfully executed
+refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” {{\\Youngstown,\\ 343
+U. S., at 587.}}
+
+  A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified
+with the understanding that it is not to have domestic effect of its
+own force. That understanding precludes the assertion that Congress has
+implicitly authorized the President—acting on his own—to achieve
+precisely the same result. We therefore conclude, given the absence of
+congressional legislation, that the non-self-executing treaties at issue
+here did not “express[ly] or implied[ly]” vest the President with
+the unilateral authority to make them selfexecuting. {{See \\id.,\\
+at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).}} Accordingly, the President’s
+Memorandum does not fall within the first category of the \\Youngstown\\
+framework.
+
+  Indeed, the preceding discussion should make clear that the
+non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not only refutes
+the notion that the ratifying parties vested the President with the
+authority to unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic
+courts, but also implicitly prohibits him from doing so. When the
+President asserts the power to “enforce” a non-self-executing
+treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with
+the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate. His assertion of
+authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-selfexecuting
+treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson’s third category, not
+the first or even the second. {{See \\id.,\\ at 637–638.}}
+
+  Each of the two means described above for giving domestic effect
+to an international treaty obligation under the Constitution—for
+making law—requires joint action by the Executive and Legislative
+Branches: The Senate can ratify a self-executing treaty “ma[de]”
+by the Executive, or, if the ratified treaty is not self-executing,
+Congress can enact implementing legislation approved by the President.
+It should not be surprising that our Constitution does not contemplate
+vesting such power in the Executive alone. As Madison ex@@528@@plained
+in The Federalist No. 47, under our constitutional system of checks and
+balances, “[t]he magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides
+cannot of himself make a law.” {{J. Cooke ed., p. 326 (1961).}} That
+would, however, seem an apt description of the asserted executive
+authority unilaterally to give the effect of domestic law to obligations
+under a non-self-executing treaty.
+
+  The United States nonetheless maintains that the President’s
+Memorandum should be given effect as domestic law because “this case
+involves a valid Presidential action in the context of Congressional
+‘acquiescence.’ ” {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus Curiae\\
+11, n. 2.}} Under the \\Youngstown\\ tripartite framework, congressional
+acquiescence is pertinent when the President’s action falls within
+the second category—that is, when he “acts in absence of either
+a congressional grant or denial of authority.” {{343 U. S., at 637
+(Jackson, J., concurring).}} Here, however, as we have explained, the
+President’s effort to accord domestic effect to the \\Avena\\ judgment
+does not meet that prerequisite.
+
+  In any event, even if we were persuaded that congressional
+acquiescence could support the President’s asserted authority to
+create domestic law pursuant to a non-selfexecuting treaty, such
+acquiescence does not exist here. The United States first locates
+congressional acquiescence in Congress’s failure to act following the
+President’s resolution of prior ICJ controversies. A review of the
+Executive’s actions in those prior cases, however, cannot support
+the claim that Congress acquiesced in this particular exercise of
+Presidential authority, for none of them remotely involved transforming
+an international obligation into domestic law and thereby displacing
+state law.[[14]]
+
+
+^14 Rather, in the {{\\Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
+Activities in and Against Nicaragua\\ (\\Nicar.\\ v. \\U. S.\\), 1986
+I. C. J. 14 (Judgment of June 27)}}, the President determined that
+the United States would \\not\\ comply with the ICJ’s conclusion
+that the United States owed reparations to Nicaragua. In the {{\\Case
+Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime\\ @@529@@\\Boundary in the Gulf
+of Maine Area\\ (\\Can.\\ v. \\U. S.\\), 1984 I. C. J. 246 (Judgment
+of Oct. 12)}}, a federal agency—the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
+Administration—issued a final rule which complied with the ICJ’s
+boundary determination. The {{\\Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of
+the United States of America in Morocco\\ (\\Fr.\\ v. \\U. S.\\), 1952
+I. C. J. 176 (Judgment of Aug. 27)}}, concerned the legal status of
+United States citizens living in Morocco; it was not enforced in United
+States courts.
+
+^ The final two cases arose under the Vienna Convention. In the
+{{\\LaGrand Case\\ (\\F. R. G.\\ v. \\U. S.\\), 2001 I. C. J. 466
+(Judgment of June 27)}}, the ICJ ordered the review and reconsideration
+of convictions and sentences of German nationals denied consular
+notification. In response, the State Department sent letters to the
+States “encouraging” them to consider the Vienna Convention in
+the clemency process. {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus Curiae\\
+20–21.}} Such encouragement did not give the ICJ judgment direct
+effect as domestic law; thus, it cannot serve as precedent for doing
+so in which Congress might be said to have acquiesced. In the {{\\Case
+Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations\\ (\\Para.\\ v.
+\\U. S.\\), 1998 I. C. J. 248 (Judgment of Apr. 9)}}, the ICJ issued a
+provisional order, directing the United States to “\\take all measures
+at its disposal\\ to ensure that [Breard] is not executed pending the
+final decision in [the ICJ’s] proceedings.” {{\\Breard,\\ 523 U.
+S., at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).}} In
+response, the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of
+Virginia requesting that he stay Breard’s execution. {{\\Id.,\\
+at 378.}} When Paraguay sought a stay of execution from this Court,
+the United States argued that it had taken every measure at its
+disposal: because “our federal system imposes limits on the federal
+government’s ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems
+of the States,” those measures included “only persuasion,” not
+“legal compulsion.” {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus Curiae,\\
+O. T. 1997, No. 97–8214 (A–732), p. 51.}} This of course is
+precedent contrary to the proposition asserted by the Solicitor General
+in this case.@@529@@
+
+  The United States also directs us to the President’s “related”
+statutory responsibilities and to his “established role” in
+litigating foreign policy concerns as support for the President’s
+asserted authority to give the ICJ’s decision in \\Avena\\ the
+force of domestic law. {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus Curiae\\
+16–19.}} Congress has indeed authorized the President to represent
+the United States before the United Nations, the ICJ, and the Security
+Council, {{22 U. S. C. § 287}}, but the authority of the President
+to represent the United @@530@@ States before such bodies speaks to the
+President’s \\international\\ responsibilities, not any unilateral
+authority to create domestic law. The authority expressly conferred by
+Congress in the international realm cannot be said to “invite” the
+Presidential action at issue here. {{See \\Youngstown, supra,\\ at 637
+(Jackson, J., concurring).}} At bottom, none of the sources of authority
+identified by the United States supports the President’s claim that
+Congress has acquiesced in his asserted power to establish on his own
+federal law or to override state law.
+
+  None of this is to say, however, that the combination of a
+non-self-executing treaty and the lack of implementing legislation
+precludes the President from acting to comply with an international
+treaty obligation. It is only to say that the Executive cannot
+unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic
+effect. That is, the non-selfexecuting character of a treaty constrains
+the President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by
+unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts. The President
+may comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means, so long
+as they are consistent with the Constitution. But he may not rely upon a
+non-self-executing treaty to “establish binding rules of decision that
+preempt contrary state law.” {{Brief for United States as \\Amicus
+Curiae\\ 5.}}
+
+### 2
+
+  We thus turn to the United States’ claim that—independent of
+the United States’ treaty obligations—the Memorandum is a valid
+exercise of the President’s foreign affairs authority to resolve
+claims disputes with foreign nations. {{\\Id.,\\ at 12–16.}} The
+United States relies on a series of cases in which this Court has upheld
+the authority of the President to settle foreign claims pursuant to an
+executive agreement. {{See \\Garamendi,\\ 539 U. S., at 415; \\Dames
+& Moore,\\ 453 U. S., at 679–680; \\United States\\ v. \\Pink,\\
+315 U. S. 203, 229 (1942); @@531@@ \\United States\\ v. \\Belmont,\\
+301 U. S. 324, 330 (1937).}} In these cases this Court has explained
+that, if pervasive enough, a history of congressional acquiescence
+can be treated as a “gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the
+President by § 1 of Art. II.” {{\\Dames & Moore, supra,\\ at 686
+(some internal quotation marks omitted).}}
+
+  This argument is of a different nature than the one rejected above.
+Rather than relying on the United States’ treaty obligations, the
+President relies on an independent source of authority in ordering
+Texas to put aside its procedural bar to successive habeas petitions.
+Nevertheless, we find that our claims-settlement cases do not support
+the authority that the President asserts in this case.
+
+  The claims-settlement cases involve a narrow set of circumstances:
+the making of executive agreements to settle civil claims between
+American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals. {{See,
+\\e. g., Belmont, supra,\\ at 327.}} They are based on the view that
+“a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
+knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,” can “raise
+a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its
+consent.” {{\\Dames & Moore, supra,\\ at 686 (internal quotation marks
+omitted).}} As this Court explained in \\Garamendi\\:
+
+    “Making executive agreements to settle claims of Amer ican
+    nationals against foreign governments is a particu larly
+    longstanding practice . . . . Given the fact that the
+    practice goes back over 200 years, and has received congressional
+    acquiescence throughout its history, the conclusion that the
+    President’s control of foreign rela tions includes the settlement
+    of claims is indisputable.” {{539 U. S., at 415 (internal
+    quotation marks and brack ets omitted).}}
+
+Even still, the limitations on this source of executive power are
+clearly set forth and the Court has been careful to note @@532@@ that
+“[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.” {{\\Dames &
+Moore, supra,\\ at 686.}}
+
+  The President’s Memorandum is not supported by a “particularly
+longstanding practice” of congressional acquiescence, see \\Garamendi,
+supra,\\ at 415, but rather is what the United States itself has
+described as “unprecedented action,” {{Brief for United States as
+\\Amicus Curiae\\ in \\Sanchez-Llamas,\\ O. T. 2005, Nos. 05–51 and
+04–10566, pp. 29–30.}} Indeed, the Government has not identified
+a single instance in which the President has attempted (or Congress
+has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts,
+much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State’s police
+powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments
+and set aside neutrally applicable state laws. {{Cf. \\Brecht\\ v.
+\\Abrahamson,\\ 507 U. S. 619, 635 (1993) (“States possess primary
+authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law” (quoting
+\\Engle\\ v. \\Isaac,\\ 456 U. S. 107, 128 (1982); internal quotation
+marks omitted)).}} The Executive’s narrow and strictly limited
+authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an
+executive agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current
+Presidential Memorandum.
+
+### 3
+
+  Medellín argues that the President’s Memorandum is a valid exercise
+of his “[T]ake Care” power. {{Brief for Petitioner 28.}} The United
+States, however, does not rely upon the President’s responsibility to
+“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” {{U. S. Const.,
+Art. II, § 3. }}We think this a wise concession. This authority allows
+the President to execute the laws, not make them. For the reasons we
+have stated, the \\Avena\\ judgment is not domestic law; accordingly,
+the President cannot rely on his Take Care powers here.
+
+  The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
+
+        \\It is so ordered.\\