opensecret 0.0.988 → 0.0.9925

data/lib/interprete/export.rb

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/ruby
-	
-module OpenSecret
-
-  require 'openssl'
-
-  # The <tt>export use case</tt> moves doubly encrypted material <b>from the frozen</b>
-  # (key and crypt) stores, <b>into an (encrypted) session envelope</b>.
-  #
-  # Material within the auspices of the session envelope can be manipulated by commands
-  # like {OpenSecret::Put} and remove and also read by commands like peep, look and update.
-  #
-  # <b>Export | Pre-Conditions</b>
-  #
-  # To deliver on its core promise of moving the encrypted (key and crypt) stores
-  # to an encrypted session envelope, <b>export</b> expects
-  #
-  # - the local key and crypt stores to be pulled (refreshed) from remote
-  # - the destination session path to either be empty (or)
-  # - a populated session path containing equivalent data (ie cannot be overwritten)
-  # - both the human (agent) password and workstation key to be correct
-  #
-  # <b>Export | Alternate Flows</b>
-  #
-  # This use case requires the human (agent) password unless the <tt>--no-human-password</tt>
-  # flag was posted along with the <tt>init</tt> command. In this instance an agent password
-  # will have been generated and encrypted with the user's home tree.
-  #
-  # <b>Export | Observable Value</b>
-  #
-  # The observable value proffered by export is
-  #
-  # - validating the existence of the requested secret path
-  # - validation of the human password and workstation key
-  # - the keys and crypt at the paths are decrypted
-  # - the session envelope is stuffed with the crypted material
-  # - an encrypted session envelope (post-stuffing)
-  #
-  # @example
-  #
-  #     These use case steps are implemented and ready to go.
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret open geo/countries
-  #     $ opensecret put uganda/capital kampala
-  #     $ opensecret put kenya/capital nairobi
-  #     $ opensecret put france/capital paris
-  #     $ opensecret put france/population 23000000
-  #     $ opensecret lock
-  #     $ opensecret export geo/countries --with=asdfasdf
-  #
-  #     Below are future examples with use cases like list and print
-  #     which curently have not been implemented.
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret init bobby@example.com --with="hUM4n-0pen$3cr3t"
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret open my/gadgets
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret put laptop/login/username bob
-  #     $ opensecret put laptop/login/password bob$_p455w0rd
-  #     $ opensecret put iphone/pin 8529
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret lock
-  #     $ opensecret list
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret export my/gadgets --with="hUM4n-0pen$3cr3t"
-  #     $ opensecret print
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret put wifi/ssid Virgin-HGPAS
-  #     $ opensecret put wifi/password SDBLJHGPASDFA1234ZNF
-  #
-  #     $ opensecret print
-  #     $ opensecret lock
-  #
-  class Export < Command
-
-    attr_writer :outer_path, :master_p4ss
-
-
-    # The <tt>lock use case</tt> is called after {OpenSecret::Open} and {OpenSecret::Put}
-    # and its effect is to dispatch the doubly encrypted materrial to the configured storage
-    # platform, be it Git, S3, SSH or just an accessible file-system.
-    #
-    # <b>Main Flow of Events</b>
-    #
-    # To seal the envelope built up by put, file and add amongst others requires
-    # that we
-    #
-    # - get the encrypted envelope
-    # - create a strong asymmetric key
-    # - lock the envelope using opensecret's double encrypt modus operandi
-    # - place the doubly encrypted result into the crypt store
-    # - lock the asymmetric key again with opensecret's double encrypt modus operandi
-    # - place the doubly encrypted result into the key store
-    #
-    # The second double lock of the crypted envelope is done with the public key
-    # aspect of an asymmetric key created here.
-    #
-    # The second double lock of the crypted private key (created here) is done with
-    # the master public key created in the {Init.execute} use case main flow.
-    #
-    # <b>Lock | Observable Value</b>
-    #
-    # The observable value after the lock use case has completed entails
-    #
-    # - a doubly encrypted data envelope placed in the backend store
-    # - a doubly encrypted private key placed in the frontend store
-    # - both stores sync'd with off-machine Git (S3, ...) mirrors
-    # - deletion of the (encrypted) envelope {Open}ed and stuffed with {Put}
-    # - deletion of {Open}ed session data to locate and decrypt envelope
-    def execute
-
-      instantiate_collateral
-
-      keys_store = Store::ColdStore.new( @collateral.frontend_keystore_path )
-      main_store = Store::ColdStore.new( @collateral.backend_cryptstore_path )
-
-      keys_crypt = keys_store.read @outer_path
-      main_crypt = main_store.read @outer_path
-
-      unless @master_p4ss
-        @master_p4ss = ToolBelt::Collect.secret_text(
-          @c[:global][:min_passwd_len],
-          false,
-          "Enter Master Password "
-        )
-      end
-
-      workstation_rawkey = Mapper::Settings.read @collateral.domain_name, @c[:global][:machine_key_id]
-      original_timestamp = Mapper::Settings.read @collateral.domain_name, @c[:global][:time_stamp_id]
-      workstation_cipher = Base64.urlsafe_decode64( workstation_rawkey )
-      crypt_key_segments = [ @master_p4ss, @c[:global][:separator_a], original_timestamp ]
-      workstation_lock_x = crypt_key_segments.alphanumeric_union.concat_length
-
-      workstation_string = ToolBelt::Blowfish.decryptor workstation_cipher, workstation_lock_x
-      private_key_lock_x = ToolBelt::Amalgam.passwords @master_p4ss, workstation_string, @c[:global][:ratio]
-      private_key_cipher = @collateral.read_private_key
-      private_key_object = unlock_private_key( private_key_cipher, private_key_lock_x )
-
-      string_private_key = ToolBelt::Cipher.decrypt_it( private_key_object, keys_crypt )
-      plain_message_text = ToolBelt::Cipher.decrypt_it( to_private_key(string_private_key), main_crypt )
-
-      puts
-      puts JSON.pretty_generate( JSON.parse( plain_message_text ) )
-      puts
-
-    end
-
-
-    # Perform pre-conditional validations in preparation to executing the main flow
-    # of events for this use case. This method may throw the below exceptions.
-    #
-    # @raise [SafeDirNotConfigured] if the safe's url has not been configured
-    # @raise [EmailAddrNotConfigured] if the email address has not been configured
-    # @raise [StoreUrlNotConfigured] if the crypt store url is not configured
-    def pre_validation
-
-    end
-
-
-  end
-
-
-end

data/lib/interprete/init.rb

@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/ruby
-	
-module OpenSecret
-
-  require 'openssl'
-
-  # The <b>init use case</b> initializes opensecret thus preparing it
-  # for the ability to lock secrets, unlock them, transport their keys and
-  # much more.
-  #
-  # Like all use cases, +init+ validates to ensure that the pre-conditions
-  # have been met and then proceeds to execute its core offering and deliver
-  # observable value.
-  #
-  # == RAGE | Resource Allocation Geography
-  #
-  # Resources are situated in a manner that delivers the maximum possible
-  # security, with as much usability and simplicity that can be accomodated
-  # and all the while ensuring the owner retains access to the secrets in
-  # the face of multiple disasters befalling the environment.
-  #
-  # The session concept married with public/private key cryptology are the
-  # main vehicles for delivering both simplicity and security. A system that
-  # enables one to lock away secrets without exposing the master password
-  # is more secure than those that don't.
-  #
-  #
-  # == Frontend Store | USB Connected Device ( eg Keys, Phones )
-  #
-  # The frontend store (usually on a USB or other external but filesystem accessible
-  # drive) contains the
-  #
-  # - encrypted private key | created by {Init}, updated by {ReKey}, read by {Open} {Export}
-  # - public key | created by {Init}, updated by {ReKey}, read by {Seal} {Post} {Open}
-  # - encrypted open envelopes tree | created/read/updated by {Put} {Add}, deleted by {Discard}
-  # - encrypted libary keys tree | created by {Seal}, updated by {ReKey}, read by {Open} {Export}
-  #
-  #
-  # == Workstation Configuration File
-  #
-  # The global configuration filepath is <tt>~/.opensecret.io/opensecret.io.configuration.ini</tt>
-  #
-  # The global configuration file is managed through the {OpenSecret::Mapper::Settings} and
-  # the {OpenSecret::Mapper::Collateral.config_file} classes and points to the
-  #
-  # - current domain | created/updated by {Init}, updated by {Set}, read by most
-  # - domain frontend path | created by {Init}, updated by {Set} and read by most
-  # - domain store id | created/updated by {Set}, read by {Post}
-  # - the domain's initialization time stamp | created by {Init}, read by {Seal}
-  # - the encrypted machine (workstation) key | created by {Init}, read by {Seal}
-  #
-  # As well as the global config file, the workstation store contains the logs and most
-  # importantly the mirrored departures/arrival lounge.
-  #
-  #
-  # == Workstation Departure/Arrival Lounge
-  #
-  # The departures and arrivals lounge holds sealed envelopes that are either
-  #
-  # - waiting to (depart) be posted to the remote mirror
-  # - waiting to be read/updated after (arrival) from the remote mirror
-  # - posing as the remote mirror whilst no backend store exists
-  #
-  # The contents of the backend mirror (aka departure/arrival lounge) are
-  #
-  # - created by {Seal} and two-way {Post}
-  # - read by {Open}
-  # - deleted by {Delete}
-  #
-  #
-  # == Workstation | Share and Transfers Lounge
-  #
-  # The self-evident power of opensecret blooms when you share secrets with others in
-  # and out of a domain. The simplest application is when two users belong to the same
-  # domain - the only thing they actually share is the remote back-end store and their
-  # public keys. The lounge tree contains
-  #
-  # - key envelopes for ownership transfer
-  # - key envelopes for sharing
-  # - key envelopes for telling (sender never actual owns the sealed envelope)
-  #
-  #
-  # == Observable Value
-  #
-  # The observable value from the <b>init use case</b> init boils down to
-  #
-  # - the public key and <b>8192 bit encrypted private key</b> in the safe
-  # - the <b>encrypted workstation key</b> in the user's configuration file
-  # - the <b>encrypted public key signature</b> in the user's configuration file
-  # - a robust password (for unlocking secrets) +stashed in a human brain+
-  # - successful test of the open, put, list, lock, read and tell use cases
-  #
-  # No cloud or other external access occurs as per the opensecret policy.
-  #
-  # == Thwart Public Key Switch Attacks
-  #
-  # A <b><em>public key switch attack</em></b> tries to access <b>future secrets</b>
-  # (not the ones already encrypted) via unwitting encryption using a public key
-  # the attacker controls.
-  #
-  # <b>opensecret</b> thwarts this by continual verification against an
-  # encrypted <em>public key signature</em> aboard the workstation.
-  class Init < Command
-
-    attr_writer :master_p4ss, :domain_name, :base_path
-
-
-    # The init use case prepares <b>opensecret</b> so that you can <b>open</b> a packet,
-    # <b>put</b> secrets into it and then <b>lock</b> it, effectively writing the crypt
-    # material into the backend store.
-    #
-    # <b>Main Flow of Events</b>
-    #
-    # So to prepare for the <b><em>modus operandi</em></b> that encrypts, decrypts and if
-    # required transports secrets, we
-    #
-    # - if the base path exists, look for base.opensecret.io below, in and above the path
-    # - if found we configure the config path as appropriate
-    #
-    #
-    #
-    # - collect the human password (twice) and verify its robustness
-    # - manufacture workstation key that will be encrypted b4 it rests on machine
-    # - create amalgamated human/workstation password for locking the private key
-    # - create a long cryptographically strong symmetric encryption key
-    # - encrypt workstation key and put crypt into the opensecret configuration file
-    # - create a super sized 8192 bit private key (and its asymmetric public key)
-    # - write the AES 256bit encrypted private key into safe-store's master keys
-    # - create a text bundle for signing composed of the keys, email and date/time
-    # - sign the bundle and save the signature in the master keys store
-    # - put the public key in the configuration file (off the homedirectory)
-    # - test the core open, put, list, lock, read and tell use case commands
-    #
-    # <b>Observable (Configuration) Value</b>
-    #
-    # The <tt>init use case</tt> observable value post-conditions are
-    #
-    # - the domain_name (group) and domain_path (key) exist in configuration file
-    # - a directory  called <tt>ops.<domain_name></tt> exists at/below or above domain_path
-    #
-    #
-    # - the <b>8192 bit encrypted private key</b> in the master keys safe
-    # - the <b>public key</b>, time stamp and encrypted workstation key in config
-    # - the <b>encrypted workstation key</b> in the user's configuration file
-    # - the <b>asymmetric keys, time stamp and email</b> signature in master keys safe
-    # - a robust password (for unlocking secrets) +stashed in a human brain+
-    #
-    # <b>Alternate Flows</b>
-    #
-    # - if the base path exists, look for base.opensecret.io below, in and above the path
-    # - two or more different domains under the same base is fine however there is a catch
-    # - domain names cannot be duplicated (even if a different base path is given)
-    # - domain duplication is disallowed as domains are group keys in the config file
-    #
-    # <b>Error Flows</b>
-    #
-    # An error will be thrown
-    #
-    # - if ops can't create or extend the base directory
-    # - if the domain is already in the configuration file
-    # - if domain has non alphanums, excl hyphens, underscores, @ symbols, periods
-    # - if domain does not begin or end with alphanums.
-    # - if non alpha-nums (excl at signs) appear consecutively
-    # - if no alpha-nums appear in the string
-    # - if the domain string's length is less than 5
-    # - if "base.opensecret.io" appears twice (or more) in a directory tree
-    #
-    def execute
-
-      return unless ops_key_exists?
-
-      Mapper::Settings.stash @c[:global][:domain_now_id], @domain_name
-      Mapper::Settings.write @domain_name, @c[:global][:front_path_id], @base_path
-
-      instantiate_collateral
-      unless @master_p4ss
-        @master_p4ss = ToolBelt::Collect.secret_text(
-          @c[:global][:min_passwd_len],
-          true,
-          @c[:global][:prompt_1],
-          @c[:global][:prompt_2]
-        )
-      end
-
-      locking_key = create_crypt_store_locking_key
-
-      asymmetric_keys = OpenSSL::PKey::RSA.new @c[:global][:bit_key_size]
-      secured_keytext = asymmetric_keys.export @c[:global][:key_cipher], locking_key
-      @collateral.write_public_key asymmetric_keys.public_key.to_pem
-      @collateral.write_private_key secured_keytext
-
-      print_success_initializing
-
-    end
-
-
-    def pre_validation
-
-    end
-
-
-  end
-
-
-end

data/lib/interprete/key.rb

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/ruby
-	
-module OpenSecret
-
-  # The <tt>key use case</tt> prints out an encrypted session key tied
-  # to the workstation and shell environment. It should be called like this
-  # and <tt>printenv</tt> can be used to verify that a shell-scoped
-  # environment variable tying OPS_KEY to an (approximately) 48 character
-  # session password, has been created.
-  #
-  #    export OPS_KEY=`ops key`
-  #    printenv
-  #
-  # Note the <b>back-ticks</b> surrounding the <tt>ops key</tt> call.
-  #
-  # == Algorithm or Creating the Key
-  #
-  # An (approximately) 48 character key is acquired and then the four
-  # data points below are used to symmetrically encrypt it.
-  #
-  # - <b>the parent shell's ID</b>
-  # - <em>the first MAC address</em>
-  # - <b>the machine's hostname</b>
-  # - <em>the current timestamp</em>
-  #
-  # The result is Base64 encoded in url safe mode and printed to standard
-  # out <b>without a trailing newline</b>.
-  #
-  # == Removing Equals from Key
-  #
-  # An environment variable holds the key's value and the <b>equals sign</b>
-  # is not allowed within environment variables (in some operating systems)
-  # mainly due to the fact that it is used as the key/value separator.
-  #
-  # The url safe base64 coding may produce one, two or three equal signs in
-  # a bid to pad the string into a multiple of 4 length.
-  #
-  # Thus, we replace the equals signs with the @ symbol when encoding and
-  # vice versa when decoding.
-  #
-  # For added security the key should auto time (or be zeroed) out.
-  class Key < Command
-
-
-    # The <tt>key use case</tt> prints out an encrypted session key tied
-    # to the workstation and shell environment. It should be called like this
-    # and <tt>printenv</tt> can be used to verify that a shell-scoped
-    # environment variable tying OPS_KEY to an (approximately) 48 character
-    # session password, has been created.
-    #
-    #    export OPS_KEY=`ops key`
-    #    printenv
-    #
-    # Note the <b>back-ticks</b> surrounding the <tt>ops key</tt> call.
-    #
-    # <b>The 3 Session Keys</b>
-    #
-    # Three keys are involved here.
-    #
-    # - the 48 character random session key
-    # - the encryption key which is an amalgam
-    # - the base64 encoded key cipher text
-    #
-    #
-    # == Removing Equals from Key
-    #
-    # An environment variable holds the key's value and the <b>equals sign</b>
-    # is not allowed within environment variables (in some operating systems)
-    # mainly due to the fact that it is used as the key/value separator.
-    #
-    # The url safe base64 coding may produce one, two or three equal signs in
-    # a bid to pad the string into a multiple of 4 length.
-    #
-    # Thus, we replace the equals signs with the @ symbol when encoding and
-    # vice versa when decoding.
-    #
-    # @example
-    #
-    #    Session Key => QE6tlTt1fgwvKCYj9aG1K3cwks0EBMy9RgPT1KLqbnDUVRCdlq1EMxirW3ixyaSA
-    #    Encrypt Key => 20cf3067dec35817data-crunch18083.0321.02.878296898
-    #    An Open Key => FvxETEpmoVUetyJ0jJk19aus1pQkzLZ8OVJccatYnC9GxDE4Iy3AyWNZ...
-    #
-    #    $ printenv
-    #    $ export OPS_KEY=`ops key`
-    #    $ printenv
-    #
-    #    The 2nd printenv should reveal a shell specific environment variable.
-    #
-    #    OPS_KEY=FvxETEpmoVUetyJ0jJk19aus1pQkzLZ8OVJccatYnC9GxDE4Iy3AyWNZ...
-    #
-    def execute
-
-      session_key = ToolBelt::Engineer.strong_key( 48 )
-      openkey_key = Base64.urlsafe_encode64(
-        ToolBelt::Blowfish.encryptor( session_key, session_key_password )
-      ).gsub("=","@")
-
-      print openkey_key
-
-    end
-
-
-    # Perform pre-conditional validations in preparation to executing the main flow
-    # of events for this use case. This method may throw the below exceptions.
-    #
-    # @raise [SafeDirNotConfigured] if the safe's url has not been configured
-    # @raise [EmailAddrNotConfigured] if the email address has not been configured
-    # @raise [StoreUrlNotConfigured] if the crypt store url is not configured
-    def pre_validation
-
-
-    end
-
-
-  end
-
-
-end
-