oauth2 2.0.18 → 2.0.22

data/OIDC.md

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-# OpenID Connect (OIDC) with ruby-oauth/oauth2
-
-## OIDC Libraries
-
-Libraries built on top of the oauth2 gem that implement OIDC.
-
-- [gamora](https://github.com/amco/gamora-rb) - OpenID Connect Relying Party for Rails apps
-- [omniauth-doximity-oauth2](https://github.com/doximity/omniauth-doximity-oauth2) - OmniAuth strategy for Doximity, supporting OIDC, and using PKCE
-- [omniauth-himari](https://github.com/sorah/himari) - OmniAuth strategy to act as OIDC RP and use [Himari](https://github.com/sorah/himari) for OP
-- [omniauth-mit-oauth2](https://github.com/MITLibraries/omniauth-mit-oauth2) - OmniAuth strategy for MIT OIDC
-
-If any other libraries would like to be added to this list, please open an issue or pull request.
-
-## Raw OIDC with ruby-oauth/oauth2
-
-This document complements the inline documentation by focusing on OpenID Connect (OIDC) 1.0 usage patterns when using this gem as an OAuth 2.0 client library.
-
-Scope of this document
-
-- Audience: Developers building an OAuth 2.0/OIDC Relying Party (RP, aka client) in Ruby.
-- Non-goals: This gem does not implement an OIDC Provider (OP, aka Authorization Server); for OP/server see other projects (e.g., doorkeeper + oidc extensions).
-- Status: Informational documentation with links to normative specs. The gem intentionally remains protocol-agnostic beyond OAuth 2.0; OIDC specifics (like ID Token validation) must be handled by your application.
-
-Key concepts refresher
-
-- OAuth 2.0 delegates authorization; it does not define authentication of the end-user.
-- OIDC layers an identity layer on top of OAuth 2.0, introducing:
-  - ID Token: a JWT carrying claims about the authenticated end-user and the authentication event.
-  - Standardized scopes: openid (mandatory), profile, email, address, phone, offline_access, and others.
-  - UserInfo endpoint: a protected resource for retrieving user profile claims.
-  - Discovery and Dynamic Client Registration (optional for providers/clients that support them).
-
-What this gem provides for OIDC
-
-- All OAuth 2.0 client capabilities required for OIDC flows: building authorization requests, exchanging authorization codes, refreshing tokens, and making authenticated resource requests.
-- Transport and parsing conveniences (snaky hash, Faraday integration, error handling, etc.).
-- Optional client authentication schemes useful with OIDC deployments:
-  - basic_auth (default)
-  - request_body (legacy)
-  - tls_client_auth (MTLS)
-  - private_key_jwt (OIDC-compliant when configured per OP requirements)
-
-What you must add in your app for OIDC
-
-- ID Token validation: This gem surfaces id_token values but does not verify them. Your app should:
-  1) Parse the JWT (header, payload, signature)
-  2) Fetch the OP JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) from discovery (or configure statically)
-  3) Select the correct key by kid (when present) and verify the signature and algorithm
-  4) Validate standard claims (iss, aud, exp, iat, nbf, azp, nonce when used, at_hash/c_hash when applicable)
-  5) Enforce expected client_id, issuer, and clock skew policies
-- Nonce handling for Authorization Code flow with OIDC: generate a cryptographically-random nonce, bind it to the user session before redirect, include it in authorize request, and verify it in the ID Token on return.
-- PKCE is best practice and often required by OPs: generate/verifier, send challenge in authorize, send verifier in token request.
-- Session/state management: continue to validate state to mitigate CSRF; use exact redirect_uri matching.
-
-Minimal OIDC Authorization Code example
-
-```ruby
-require "oauth2"
-require "jwt"         # jwt/ruby-jwt
-require "net/http"
-require "json"
-
-client = OAuth2::Client.new(
-  ENV.fetch("OIDC_CLIENT_ID"),
-  ENV.fetch("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"),
-  site: ENV.fetch("OIDC_ISSUER"),              # e.g. https://accounts.example.com
-  authorize_url: "/authorize",                 # or discovered
-  token_url: "/token",                         # or discovered
-)
-
-# Step 1: Redirect to OP for consent/auth
-state = SecureRandom.hex(16)
-nonce = SecureRandom.hex(16)
-pkce_verifier = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(64)
-pkce_challenge = Base64.urlsafe_encode64(Digest::SHA256.digest(pkce_verifier)).delete("=")
-
-authz_url = client.auth_code.authorize_url(
-  scope: "openid profile email",
-  state: state,
-  nonce: nonce,
-  code_challenge: pkce_challenge,
-  code_challenge_method: "S256",
-  redirect_uri: ENV.fetch("OIDC_REDIRECT_URI"),
-)
-# redirect_to authz_url
-
-# Step 2: Handle callback
-# params[:code], params[:state]
-raise "state mismatch" unless params[:state] == state
-
-token = client.auth_code.get_token(
-  params[:code],
-  redirect_uri: ENV.fetch("OIDC_REDIRECT_URI"),
-  code_verifier: pkce_verifier,
-)
-
-# The token may include: access_token, id_token, refresh_token, etc.
-id_token = token.params["id_token"] || token.params[:id_token]
-
-# Step 3: Validate the ID Token (simplified – add your own checks!)
-# Discover keys (example using .well-known)
-issuer = ENV.fetch("OIDC_ISSUER")
-jwks_uri = JSON.parse(Net::HTTP.get(URI.join(issuer, "/.well-known/openid-configuration"))).
-  fetch("jwks_uri")
-jwks = JSON.parse(Net::HTTP.get(URI(jwks_uri)))
-keys = jwks.fetch("keys")
-
-# Use ruby-jwt JWK loader
-jwk_set = JWT::JWK::Set.new(keys.map { |k| JWT::JWK.import(k) })
-
-decoded, headers = JWT.decode(
-  id_token,
-  nil,
-  true,
-  algorithms: ["RS256", "ES256", "PS256"],
-  jwks: jwk_set,
-  verify_iss: true,
-  iss: issuer,
-  verify_aud: true,
-  aud: ENV.fetch("OIDC_CLIENT_ID"),
-)
-
-# Verify nonce
-raise "nonce mismatch" unless decoded["nonce"] == nonce
-
-# Optionally: call UserInfo
-userinfo = token.get("/userinfo").parsed
-```
-
-Notes on discovery and registration
-
-- Discovery: Most OPs publish configuration at `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` (OIDC Discovery 1.0). From there, resolve authorization_endpoint, token_endpoint, jwks_uri, userinfo_endpoint, etc.
-- Dynamic Client Registration: Some OPs allow registering clients programmatically (OIDC Dynamic Client Registration 1.0). This gem does not implement registration; use a plain HTTP client or Faraday and store credentials securely.
-
-Common pitfalls and tips
-
-- Always request the openid scope when you expect an ID Token. Without it, the OP may behave as vanilla OAuth 2.0.
-- Validate ID Token signature and claims before trusting any identity data. Do not rely solely on the presence of an id_token field.
-- Prefer Authorization Code + PKCE. Avoid Implicit; it is discouraged in modern guidance and may be disabled by providers.
-- Use exact redirect_uri matching, and keep your allow-list short.
-- For public clients that use refresh tokens, prefer sender-constrained tokens (DPoP/MTLS) or rotation with one-time-use refresh tokens, per modern best practices.
-- When using private_key_jwt, ensure the "aud" (or token_url) and "iss/sub" claims are set per the OP’s rules, and include kid in the JWT header when required so the OP can select the right key.
-
-Relevant specifications and references
-
-- OpenID Connect Core 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html
-- OIDC Core (final): https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0-final.html
-- How OIDC works: https://openid.net/developers/how-connect-works/
-- OpenID Connect home: https://openid.net/connect/
-- OIDC Discovery 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html
-- OIDC Dynamic Client Registration 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html
-- OIDC Session Management 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-session-1_0.html
-- OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-rpinitiated-1_0.html
-- OIDC Back-Channel Logout 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-backchannel-1_0.html
-- OIDC Front-Channel Logout 1.0: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-frontchannel-1_0.html
-- Auth0 OIDC overview: https://auth0.com/docs/authenticate/protocols/openid-connect-protocol
-- Spring Authorization Server’s list of OAuth2/OIDC specs: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-authorization-server/wiki/OAuth2-and-OIDC-Specifications
-
-See also
-
-- README sections on OAuth 2.1 notes and OIDC notes
-- Strategy classes under lib/oauth2/strategy for flow helpers
-- Specs under spec/oauth2 for concrete usage patterns
-
-Contributions welcome
-
-- If you discover provider-specific nuances, consider contributing examples or clarifications (without embedding provider-specific hacks into the library).

data/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-# Threat Model Outline for oauth2 Ruby Gem
-
-## 1. Overview
-This document outlines the threat model for the `oauth2` Ruby gem, which implements OAuth 2.0, 2.1, and OIDC Core protocols. The gem is used to facilitate secure authorization and authentication in Ruby applications.
-
-## 2. Assets to Protect
-- OAuth access tokens, refresh tokens, and ID tokens
-- User credentials (if handled)
-- Client secrets and application credentials
-- Sensitive user data accessed via OAuth
-- Private keys and certificates (for signing/verifying tokens)
-
-## 3. Potential Threat Actors
-- External attackers (internet-based)
-- Malicious OAuth clients or resource servers
-- Insiders (developers, maintainers)
-- Compromised dependencies
-
-## 4. Attack Surfaces
-- OAuth endpoints (authorization, token, revocation, introspection)
-- HTTP request/response handling
-- Token storage and management
-- Configuration files and environment variables
-- Dependency supply chain
-
-## 5. Threats and Mitigations
-
-### 5.1 Token Leakage
-- **Threat:** Tokens exposed via logs, URLs, or insecure storage
-- **Mitigations:**
-  - Avoid logging sensitive tokens
-  - Use secure storage mechanisms
-  - Never expose tokens in URLs
-
-### 5.2 Token Replay and Forgery
-- **Threat:** Attackers reuse or forge tokens
-- **Mitigations:**
-  - Validate token signatures and claims
-  - Use short-lived tokens and refresh tokens
-  - Implement token revocation
-
-### 5.3 Insecure Communication
-- **Threat:** Data intercepted via MITM attacks
-- **Mitigations:**
-  - Enforce HTTPS for all communications
-  - Validate SSL/TLS certificates
-
-### 5.4 Client Secret Exposure
-- **Threat:** Client secrets leaked in code or version control
-- **Mitigations:**
-  - Store secrets in environment variables or secure vaults
-  - Never commit secrets to source control
-
-### 5.5 Dependency Vulnerabilities
-- **Threat:** Vulnerabilities in third-party libraries
-- **Mitigations:**
-  - Regularly update dependencies
-  - Use tools like `bundler-audit` for vulnerability scanning
-
-### 5.6 Improper Input Validation
-- **Threat:** Injection attacks via untrusted input
-- **Mitigations:**
-  - Validate and sanitize all inputs
-  - Use parameterized queries and safe APIs
-
-### 5.7 Insufficient Logging and Monitoring
-- **Threat:** Attacks go undetected
-- **Mitigations:**
-  - Log security-relevant events (without sensitive data)
-  - Monitor for suspicious activity
-
-## 6. Assumptions
-- The gem is used in a secure environment with up-to-date Ruby and dependencies
-- End-users are responsible for secure configuration and deployment
-
-## 7. Out of Scope
-- Security of external OAuth providers
-- Application-level business logic
-
-## 8. References
-- [OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations (RFC 6819)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819)
-- [OWASP Top Ten](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
-
----
-This outline should be reviewed and updated regularly as the project evolves.