melos 0.0.2 → 0.1.0

checksums.yaml

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data/README.md

@@ -7,18 +7,70 @@ a [Messaging Layer Security Protocol](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420.htm
 
 (yes, [an mls gem](https://rubygems.org/gems/mls) happened to exist since 2014, so...)
 
-## Note on implementation status
+## Implementation status
 
-As of version 0.0.1, this implements:
+As of version 0.1.0, this implements:
 
-- Serialization/deserialization of messages
-- Key Schedule
-- Encryption Secret Tree
-- Applying Add/Update/Remove/PreSharedKey/GroupContextExtensions Proposal types
-- (thus passes all test vectors in [mls-implementations/test-vectors.md](https://github.com/mlswg/mls-implementations/blob/main/test-vectors.md))
+- Serialization and deserialization of the RFC 9420 structures
+- Key schedule, secret tree, pre-shared keys, transcript hashes
+- The ratchet tree: TreeKEM (creating and processing UpdatePaths), tree hashes, parent hashes
+- Groups: creating a group, Add / Remove / PreSharedKey / GroupContextExtensions proposals,
+  commits with an UpdatePath and the matching Welcome, joining via Welcome,
+  application messages as PrivateMessage, handshake messages as PublicMessage or PrivateMessage
+- Processing Update proposals and commits from other members
+- Most MUST-level validations of the RFC; [docs/validation.md](docs/validation.md) maps each one to the code
+- All test vectors in [mls-implementations/test-vectors.md](https://github.com/mlswg/mls-implementations/blob/main/test-vectors.md),
+  plus round-trip tests in which several members create, join, message and leave a group
 
-but lacks the following (not a complete list):
+It does not yet implement:
 
-- Creating messages
-- Applying ReInit/ExternalInit proposals
-- Validation (rejecting error cases)
+- Creating Update proposals
+- ReInit, external commits (ExternalInit), external senders, resumption PSKs, subgroup branching
+- Decrypting application messages from earlier epochs, and keeping unused keys for out-of-order delivery
+- The deletion schedule of Section 9.2 beyond dropping the previous epoch
+- Credential validation beyond basic credentials (an application hook, `credential_validator:`, is provided)
+- Persistence of client and group state
+- Interop testing against other implementations
+
+## Usage
+
+Messages cross between members as `Melos::Struct::MLSMessage` objects; `raw` gives the bytes to
+send and `Melos::Struct::MLSMessage.new(bytes)` parses them.
+
+```ruby
+require 'melos'
+
+# cipher suite 1 is MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519
+alice = Melos::Client.new(1, identity: 'alice')
+bob   = Melos::Client.new(1, identity: 'bob')
+
+# Bob publishes a KeyPackage
+bob_key_package = bob.create_key_package
+
+# Alice creates a group and adds Bob
+group = alice.create_group("some group id")
+group.create_add_proposal(bob_key_package.message)
+result = group.create_commit
+# result.commit is the Commit to send to the group, result.welcome the Welcome for Bob;
+# merge once the Delivery Service has accepted the commit
+group.merge_commit(result.staged)
+
+# Bob joins
+bob_group = bob.join_group(result.welcome)
+
+# and talks
+message = bob_group.create_application_message("hello")
+group.process_message(message).content.application_data # => "hello"
+```
+
+`Melos::Group` holds one member's view of one group. `Melos::Client` holds the long-lived identity,
+the external PSKs and the KeyPackages it has published.
+
+## Tests
+
+```
+bundle exec rake test
+```
+
+runs a subset of the test vectors; `TEST_ALL=1 bundle exec rake test` runs all of them, for every cipher suite.
+The vectors are the ones from [mls-implementations](https://github.com/mlswg/mls-implementations), in `test_vectors/`.

data/docs/validation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+# RFC 9420 validation checklist
+
+MUST-level requirements of RFC 9420 that apply to a client processing or producing messages,
+mapped to the code; updated as validation lands (last: tier 5). Status:
+
+- **done**: enforced today, with where.
+- **partial**: enforced in some paths or weaker than the RFC asks.
+- **missing**: not enforced.
+- **n/a**: for features melos does not implement yet (external senders, external commits,
+  ReInit, branching); the code rejects these inputs with a clear error instead.
+
+Items marked *(application)* are MUSTs the RFC places on the application or the Authentication
+Service; melos should offer a hook or a documented default, not decide the policy.
+
+## 1. Message framing and unprotect (Sections 6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3)
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 1.1 | Verify the signature with the key selected by sender_type | 6.1 | partial | `Group#unprotect`, `#sender_signature_key`: member only; external, new_member_proposal, new_member_commit raise "not supported" |
+| 1.2 | external sender: content_type MUST be proposal, proposal_type MUST be one allowed for external senders | 6.1, 12.1.8 | n/a | rejected with 1.1 |
+| 1.3 | new_member_commit: content_type MUST be commit; new_member_proposal: proposal of type add | 6.1 | n/a | rejected with 1.1 |
+| 1.4 | PublicMessage: check membership_tag for member senders | 6.2 | done | `PublicMessage#unprotect` returns nil, `Group#unprotect` raises |
+| 1.5 | FramedContentAuthData valid: signature and, for commits, confirmation_tag | 6.1, 6.2, 6.3.1 | done | signature in `Group#unprotect`; tag in `Group#stage` |
+| 1.6 | PrivateMessage padding MUST be all zero bytes; reject otherwise | 6.3.1 | done | `PrivateMessage#unprotect` via `PrivateMessageContent#padding_zero?` |
+| 1.7 | SenderData.leaf_index MUST identify a non-blank leaf | 6.3.2 | partial | caught later by `#sender_signature_key` ("sender leaf is blank") after decryption; the RFC wants it checked when the sender data is parsed |
+| 1.8 | Application data MUST be sent as PrivateMessage | 6 | done | `AuthenticatedContent#sign` raises on send; `#verify` returns false on receive |
+| 1.9 | Proposal and Commit epoch MUST equal the current epoch | 12.1, 12.4.2 | done | `Group#unprotect` |
+| 1.10 | Application messages from earlier epochs may be decrypted (15.3); not a MUST, but today `Group#unprotect` rejects any epoch other than the current one, which is stricter than the RFC | 15.3 | behavior gap | needs per-epoch secret trees kept for a while (also 9.2) |
+| 1.11 | MLSMessage.version MUST be mls10 | 6 | done | `Group.check_message_version!` in `#unprotect`, `.from_welcome`, `#create_add_proposal` |
+| 1.12 | AAD plus ciphertext MUST fit the AEAD limits | 6.3.1, 15.2 | missing *(application)* | no size accounting anywhere |
+
+## 2. Proposals as received (Section 12.1)
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 2.1 | Verify signature and epoch before caching | 12.1 | done | `Group#unprotect`, `#process_proposal` |
+| 2.2 | Add: KeyPackage valid per 10.1 (see section 4) | 12.1.1 | done | `#apply_proposals` -> `#validate_key_package!` |
+| 2.3 | Update: LeafNode valid for an Update per 7.3, source `update`, encryption_key differs from the replaced leaf | 12.1.2, 7.3 | done | `#apply_proposals` -> `#validate_leaf_node!(context: :update)`; creating Update proposals is still unimplemented |
+| 2.4 | Remove: `removed` MUST be a non-blank leaf | 12.1.3 | done | `#apply_proposals` (both sides), `#create_remove_proposal` |
+| 2.5 | PreSharedKey: psk_nonce length MUST be KDF.Nh | 12.1.4 | done | `#psk_secret_for` |
+| 2.6 | PreSharedKey: resumption with usage reinit or branch is invalid outside those operations | 12.1.4, 11.2, 11.3 | **missing** | `#psk_secret_for` looks up any resumption PSK by epoch regardless of usage |
+| 2.7 | ReInit: version MUST NOT be lower than the current one | 12.1.5 | n/a | ReInit rejected as unsupported |
+| 2.8 | GroupContextExtensions: invalid if required_capabilities not supported by all members after the commit | 12.1.7, 11.1 | done | `#validate_members!` after the list is applied |
+| 2.9 | External proposals MUST be PublicMessage; only add, remove, psk, reinit, gce from external senders; external_senders extension must be present | 12.1.8 | n/a | rejected with 1.1 |
+| 2.10 | Unknown (non-default) proposal types MUST be supported by every member that processes the commit | 12.2, 13.2 | done | `#apply_proposals` rejects any type outside `KNOWN_PROPOSAL_TYPES` |
+
+## 3. Proposal list validation (Section 12.2), on both creating and processing a Commit
+
+`Group#validate_proposal_list!` runs in both `#create_commit` and `#stage`.
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 3.1 | Every individual proposal valid (sections 2 and 4) | 12.2 | done (sections 2, 4, 5) |
+| 3.2 | No Update proposal by the committer | 12.2 | done |
+| 3.3 | No Remove of the committer | 12.2 | done (`#stage`, `#create_commit`) |
+| 3.4 | No two Update/Remove proposals for the same leaf | 12.2 | done |
+| 3.5 | No two Adds for the same client (e.g. same signature key) | 12.2 | done (same signature key) |
+| 3.6 | No Add of a client already in the group unless a Remove in the same list removes it | 12.2 | done (same signature key) |
+| 3.7 | No two PreSharedKey proposals with the same PreSharedKeyID | 12.2 | done |
+| 3.8 | At most one GroupContextExtensions proposal | 12.2 | done |
+| 3.9 | ReInit MUST be alone in the list | 12.2 | n/a (ReInit rejected) |
+| 3.10 | No ExternalInit in a regular commit | 12.2 | done by accident (`#apply_proposals` raises "unsupported") |
+| 3.11 | After applying, every leaf in the tree is valid per 7.3 | 12.2 | done: capabilities and key uniqueness of every remaining leaf (`#validate_members!`); signatures were verified when each leaf entered |
+| 3.12 | Reject the Commit if the list is invalid | 12.2 | follows from the above |
+| 3.13 | External commit list rules (exactly one ExternalInit, at most one Remove, PSKs only) | 12.2 | n/a |
+
+## 4. KeyPackage validation (Sections 10, 10.1), when adding and when processing an Add
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 4.1 | cipher_suite and version match the GroupContext | 10.1 | done | `#apply_proposals` (Add) |
+| 4.2 | leaf_node valid for a KeyPackage per 7.3 (section 5 below) | 10.1 | done | `#validate_key_package!` |
+| 4.3 | Signature verifies with the leaf's signature key | 10, 10.1 | done | `#validate_key_package!` |
+| 4.4 | leaf_node.encryption_key MUST differ from init_key | 10.1 | done | `#validate_key_package!` |
+| 4.5 | leaf_node_source MUST be key_package | 10 | done | `#validate_leaf_node!(context: :key_package)` |
+| 4.6 | Extensions in KeyPackage.extensions and leaf_node.extensions MUST be listed in leaf_node.capabilities | 10 | done | `#validate_key_package!`, `#validate_capabilities!` |
+| 4.7 | KeyPackage.version MUST equal the enclosing MLSMessage.version | 10 | done | `Group#create_add_proposal` |
+| 4.8 | Unknown capabilities values and unknown extensions MUST be ignored | 13.4 | done by construction | nothing inspects them yet; keep it that way when 4.6 is added |
+| 4.9 | Sender: init_key MUST be unique among the client's KeyPackages | 10 | done | fresh random key per `KeyPackageBundle.generate` |
+| 4.10 | Sender: capabilities MUST list every supported value and MUST NOT list default proposal/extension types | 7.2 | done | `Melos::Capabilities#set_default` lists no proposal or extension types |
+
+## 5. LeafNode validation (Section 7.3), for Add, Update, the Commit path leaf, and every leaf when joining
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 5.1 | Credential valid per 5.3.1 (Authentication Service) | 7.3, 5.3.1 | done (hook) | `credential_validator:` option; default accepts basic credentials only |
+| 5.2 | Signature valid with signature_key (with group_id and leaf_index for update/commit sources) | 7.3 | done | `#validate_leaf_node!` |
+| 5.3 | If GroupContext has required_capabilities, its extensions, proposals and credential types MUST be in the leaf's capabilities | 7.3, 11.1, 13.4 | done | `#validate_capabilities!` |
+| 5.4 | Credential type supported by all members; leaf supports every credential type in use | 7.3, 13.3 | done | `#validate_leaf_node!`, `#validate_members!` |
+| 5.5 | Lifetime: sender MUST check current time is within lifetime when sending a leaf (Add of a KeyPackage); receiver RECOMMENDED | 7.3 | done | `#validate_leaf_node!(sending: true)` from `#create_add_proposal` and `#create_commit` |
+| 5.6 | Application MUST define a maximum total lifetime and reject longer ones | 7.2 | done (option) | `max_leaf_node_lifetime:`; no default limit because the interop vectors use the full uint64 range |
+| 5.7 | Every non-default extension in the leaf MUST be listed in capabilities.extensions; credential type MUST be in capabilities.credentials | 7.2, 7.3 | done | `#validate_capabilities!` |
+| 5.8 | leaf_node_source matches the context: key_package / update (and new encryption_key) / commit | 7.3 | done | `#validate_leaf_node!` |
+| 5.9 | signature_key and encryption_key unique among members | 7.3, 16.7 | done | `#validate_leaf_node!`, `#validate_members!`, `#validate_tree!` |
+| 5.10 | Each GroupContext extension (non-default) MUST be supported by a new member's capabilities | 13.4 | done | `#validate_capabilities!` |
+
+## 6. Commit processing (Sections 12.4, 12.4.2, 7.5, 7.6, 7.9.2)
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 6.1 | Epoch, membership tag or decryption, signature | 12.4.2 | done | `Group#unprotect` |
+| 6.2 | Proposal list valid (section 3) | 12.4.2 | done | `#validate_proposal_list!` in `#stage` and `#create_commit` |
+| 6.3 | All PreSharedKey proposals available | 12.4.2 | done | `#psk_secret_for` raises |
+| 6.4 | Path MUST be present if the list is empty or has a path-required type | 12.4 | done | `Group#stage` |
+| 6.5 | Path leaf valid per 7.3 with leaf_node_source commit | 12.4.2 | done | `#validate_update_path!` -> `#validate_leaf_node!(context: :commit)` |
+| 6.6 | Path leaf encryption_key MUST differ from the committer's current leaf | 12.4.2 | done | `#validate_update_path!` |
+| 6.7 | None of the UpdatePath public keys appear in any node of the new tree | 12.4.2 | done | `#validate_update_path!` |
+| 6.8 | Recompute the committer's leaf parent_hash and verify it matches the supplied leaf | 7.9.2 | done | `#validate_update_path!` via `RatchetTree#verify_parent_hash_of_path` |
+| 6.9 | Each UpdatePathNode's encrypted_path_secret length MUST equal the copath resolution excluding new leaves | 7.6 | done | `#validate_update_path!` checks every node |
+| 6.10 | Confirmation tag verifies against the new epoch | 12.4.2 | done | `Group#stage` |
+| 6.11 | A Commit that removes us: no further sending, delete state (SHOULD) | 12.4.2 | done | `#stage` returns `removes_us`, `#merge_commit` makes the group inactive; last epoch's secrets are kept for late messages |
+| 6.12 | After a ReInit commit the group MUST NOT be used; wait for the Welcome | 12.4.2 | n/a | ReInit rejected |
+| 6.13 | A member that observed proposals MUST commit before sending application data | 12.4 | done | `#create_application_message` |
+| 6.14 | Generating a Commit MUST NOT modify state; Welcome MUST NOT be delivered until the Commit is accepted | 14 | done / *(application)* | `#create_commit` returns a `StagedCommit`; delivery is the caller's |
+| 6.15 | After processing a path, outdated key material MUST be deleted | 7.5, 9.2 | partial | old epochs are dropped on merge; the `PrivateTree` keeps stale keys for replaced nodes, and `EpochSecrets` memoizes derived secrets for the epoch's lifetime |
+
+## 7. Joining via Welcome (Sections 12.4.3, 12.4.3.1, 12.4.3.3, 13.4)
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 7.1 | Find the entry for one of our KeyPackages; error if none or if cipher suites differ | 12.4.3.1 | done | `Client#join_group` finds the entry; `Group.from_welcome` compares the KeyPackage's cipher_suite with the Welcome's |
+| 7.2 | Error if a PSK in GroupSecrets is unknown | 12.4.3.1 | done | `Group.from_welcome` |
+| 7.3 | A resumption PSK with usage reinit or branch MUST be the only such PSK; GroupInfo epoch MUST be 1; reinit/branch consistency checks | 12.4.3.1, 11.2, 11.3 | n/a | resumption PSKs in a Welcome rejected as unsupported |
+| 7.4 | GroupInfo signature with the signer leaf's key; error if blank or invalid | 12.4.3 | done | `Group.from_welcome` |
+| 7.5 | group_id MUST be unique among the groups the client is in | 12.4.3 | done | `Client#ensure_group_id_free!` on create and join |
+| 7.6 | GroupInfo cipher_suite matches the KeyPackage's | 12.4.3.1 | done | see 7.1 |
+| 7.7 | Tree hash matches GroupContext.tree_hash | 12.4.3.1, 12.4.3.3 | done | `Group.from_welcome` |
+| 7.8 | Every non-blank parent node is parent-hash valid | 12.4.3.1, 7.9.2 | done | `#validate_tree!` via `RatchetTree#parent_hash_valid?` |
+| 7.9 | Every non-blank leaf valid per 7.3 | 12.4.3.1 | done | `#validate_tree!` -> `#validate_leaf_node!(context: :tree)` |
+| 7.10 | unmerged_leaves: each entry is a non-blank descendant leaf; every non-blank node between also lists it; parent encryption keys unique in the tree | 12.4.3.1 | done | `#validate_tree!` |
+| 7.11 | Our leaf is the one identical to the KeyPackage's LeafNode | 12.4.3.1 | done | `Group.from_welcome` matches the whole LeafNode |
+| 7.12 | Derived private keys MUST correspond to the public keys in the nodes | 12.4.3.1 | done | `#validate_joined_state!` via `PrivateTree#consistent?` |
+| 7.13 | Confirmation tag verifies with the derived confirmation key | 12.4.3.1 | done | `Group.from_welcome` |
+| 7.14 | Joiner MUST support every GroupContext extension, else the GroupInfo is invalid | 13.4 | done | our own leaf through `#validate_tree!`; a non-default extension we do not list is rejected |
+| 7.15 | Unknown GroupInfo.extensions MUST be ignored | 12.4.3, 13.4 | done | only ratchet_tree is looked up |
+| 7.16 | ratchet_tree extension: last node non-blank, pad to 2^(d+1)-1 | 12.4.3.3 | done | `RatchetTree.parse`, `#initialize` |
+| 7.17 | Download the tree before processing if not in the Welcome | 12.4.3.1 | done | `ratchet_tree:` argument; error if neither |
+
+## 8. Sending side
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 8.1 | Fresh random 4-byte reuse guard, included in SenderData | 6.3.1 | done | `PrivateMessage.protect` |
+| 8.2 | psk_nonce fresh random of length KDF.Nh | 8.4, 12.1.4 | done | `Group#create_psk_proposal` |
+| 8.3 | Proposal list valid when creating a commit | 12.2, 12.4.1 | done | `#validate_proposal_list!` |
+| 8.4 | Welcome MUST cover every new member; psks in proposal order | 12.4.1 | done | `#create_welcome` |
+| 8.5 | Creator MUST pick the best version/cipher suite supported by all added members | 11 | partial | one suite per group; 4.1 covers the check that an added KeyPackage matches it |
+| 8.6 | Adding a member: its capabilities MUST cover each GroupContext extension and required_capabilities | 13.4, 11.1 | done | `#validate_key_package!` on `#create_add_proposal` |
+| 8.7 | Lifetime of a KeyPackage leaf checked against the current time when sending an Add | 7.3 | done | see 5.5 |
+| 8.8 | Capabilities content (see 4.10) | 7.2 | done | `Melos::Capabilities` |
+
+## 9. Wire format
+
+| # | Requirement | RFC | Status | Code |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 9.1 | Variable-length vector headers MUST use the minimum length; prefix 3 is invalid | 2.1.2 | done | `Melos::Vec.parse_stream`; truncated input raises `ArgumentError` too |
+| 9.2 | Any list of extensions MUST NOT contain two of the same type | 13.4 | done | `Extension.check_unique_types!` on join, creation, GroupContextExtensions proposals and Adds; the commit path leaf is covered by tier 3 |
+| 9.3 | version fields (MLSMessage, KeyPackage, GroupContext) are mls10 | 6, 8.1, 10 | done | `Group` entry points, see 1.11, 4.1, 4.7 |
+| 9.4 | Node hash input optional present iff node non-blank | 7.8 | done by construction | `RatchetTree#tree_hash` |
+
+## Suggested order
+
+1. ~~**Cheap and self-contained**: 1.6 padding, 1.11/9.3 version fields, 9.2 duplicate extensions, 2.4 blank Remove, 2.5 nonce length, 2.10 unknown proposal types, 4.10 Capabilities bug, 6.13 commit-before-send, 6.11 detect our own removal.~~ Done in aee3c38, plus 3.3, 4.1, 4.7 and the 9.1 vector checks.
+2. ~~**Commit integrity**: 6.5 to 6.9 (path leaf validation, key uniqueness, parent hash check, per-node ciphertext counts), then the proposal list rules 3.2 to 3.8 and 3.11, shared by `create_commit` and `stage`.~~ Done.
+3. ~~**KeyPackage and LeafNode validation**: sections 4 and 5 as one `LeafNode` validator parameterized by context (key_package / update / commit / tree), used by Add processing, commit path processing and join; includes signature, source, extension and capability checks, key uniqueness. Credential validation and maximum lifetime become hooks with defaults.~~ Done.
+4. ~~**Join integrity**: 7.8 to 7.12 and 7.14 on top of the validator from step 3.~~ Done.
+5. ~~**Client-level**: 7.5 group_id uniqueness, 7.1 KeyPackage suite check.~~ Done.
+6. **Later, with the features they belong to**: external senders (1.2, 2.9), resumption PSK rules (2.6, 7.3), ReInit, external commits, old-epoch application messages (1.10), deletion schedule (6.15).

data/lib/melos/capabilities.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+class Melos::Capabilities
+  attr_accessor :versions, :cipher_suites, :extensions, :proposals, :credentials
+
+  def initialize
+    set_default
+  end
+
+  def set_default
+    @versions = [1]
+    @cipher_suites = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
+    @extensions = [] # 7.2: likewise the default extension types
+    @proposals = [] # 7.2: the default proposal types (add .. group_context_extensions) MUST NOT be listed
+    @credentials = [1]
+  end
+end

data/lib/melos/client.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+require_relative 'crypto'
+require_relative 'key_package_bundle'
+require_relative 'group'
+require_relative 'struct/structs'
+
+# A client (RFC 9420 Section 5.3): a long-lived identity, i.e. a signature key pair and a
+# credential, plus what a client keeps across groups: the external PSKs it knows (8.4) and the
+# KeyPackages it has published and may still be welcomed into a group with (10).
+class Melos::Client
+  attr_reader :cipher_suite, :credential, :external_psks, :key_packages, :groups
+
+  def initialize(cipher_suite_id, identity: '')
+    @cipher_suite = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite.new(cipher_suite_id)
+    @signature_key_pair = Melos::Crypto.generate_signature_key_pair(@cipher_suite)
+    @credential = Melos::Struct::Credential.create_basic_credential(identity)
+    @external_psks = {} # psk_id -> psk; shared by reference with the groups this client is in
+    @key_packages = {}  # KeyPackageRef -> Melos::KeyPackageBundle, until used to join a group
+    @groups = {}        # group_id -> Melos::Group this client created or joined
+  end
+
+  def signature_private_key
+    Melos::Crypto.serialize_private_key(@cipher_suite, @signature_key_pair)
+  end
+
+  def signature_public_key
+    Melos::Crypto.serialize_public_key(@cipher_suite, @signature_key_pair)
+  end
+
+  # 8.4: an external PSK that commits in this client's groups may reference
+  def add_external_psk(psk_id, psk)
+    @external_psks[psk_id] = psk
+  end
+
+  # 10: publish a KeyPackage. The bundle is kept so that a Welcome addressed to it can be processed.
+  def create_key_package(capabilities: nil, lifetime: nil, extensions: [])
+    bundle = Melos::KeyPackageBundle.generate(
+      @cipher_suite, signature_private_key: signature_private_key, signature_public_key: signature_public_key,
+      credential: @credential, capabilities: capabilities, lifetime: lifetime, extensions: extensions
+    )
+    @key_packages[bundle.ref] = bundle
+    bundle
+  end
+
+  # 11: create a group with this client as its only member.
+  # options are passed to Melos::Group (credential_validator:, max_leaf_node_lifetime:)
+  def create_group(group_id, extensions: [], **options)
+    bundle = Melos::KeyPackageBundle.generate(
+      @cipher_suite, signature_private_key: signature_private_key, signature_public_key: signature_public_key, credential: @credential
+    )
+    ensure_group_id_free!(group_id)
+    @groups[group_id] = Melos::Group.create(
+      @cipher_suite, group_id, bundle.key_package.leaf_node,
+      encryption_private_key: bundle.encryption_private_key, signature_private_key: signature_private_key,
+      extensions: extensions, external_psks: @external_psks, **options
+    )
+  end
+
+  # 12.4.3.1: join the group a Welcome adds us to, using whichever of our KeyPackages it is addressed to.
+  # That KeyPackage is then forgotten: its init key is single-use.
+  def join_group(welcome, ratchet_tree: nil, **options)
+    welcome_struct = welcome.is_a?(Melos::Struct::MLSMessage) ? welcome.welcome : welcome
+    raise ArgumentError.new('not a Welcome message') if welcome_struct.nil?
+    bundle = welcome_struct.secrets.map(&:new_member).filter_map { @key_packages[_1] }.first
+    raise ArgumentError.new('Welcome is not addressed to any KeyPackage of this client') if bundle.nil?
+    group = Melos::Group.from_welcome(
+      @cipher_suite, welcome,
+      key_package: bundle.key_package, init_private_key: bundle.init_private_key,
+      encryption_private_key: bundle.encryption_private_key, signature_private_key: signature_private_key,
+      external_psks: @external_psks, ratchet_tree: ratchet_tree, **options
+    )
+    ensure_group_id_free!(group.group_id)
+    @key_packages.delete(bundle.ref)
+    @groups[group.group_id] = group
+  end
+
+  private
+
+  # 12.4.3: a group_id MUST be unique among the groups this client is participating in;
+  # a group this client has been removed from no longer counts
+  def ensure_group_id_free!(group_id)
+    existing = @groups[group_id]
+    return if existing.nil? || !existing.active?
+    raise ArgumentError.new('this client is already in a group with this group_id')
+  end
+end

data/lib/melos/crypto.rb

@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ require_relative 'vec'
 class Melos::Crypto
   class CipherSuite
     module X25519
+      def self.serialize_public_key(key)
+        key.raw_public_key
+      end
+
+      def self.serialize_private_key(key)
+        key.raw_private_key
+      end
+
       def self.deserialize_public_encapsulation_key(raw)
         OpenSSL::PKey.new_raw_public_key('X25519', raw)
       end
@@ -21,12 +29,28 @@ class Melos::Crypto
         OpenSSL::PKey.new_raw_private_key('ED25519', raw)
       end
 
+      def self.encapsulation_algorithm_name
+        'X25519'
+      end
+      
+      def self.signature_algorithm_name
+        'ED25519'
+      end
+
       def self.hash_algorithm
         nil
       end
     end
 
     module X448
+      def self.serialize_public_key(key)
+        key.raw_public_key
+      end
+
+      def self.serialize_private_key(key)
+        key.raw_private_key
+      end
+
       def self.deserialize_public_encapsulation_key(raw)
         OpenSSL::PKey.new_raw_public_key('X448', raw)
       end
@@ -43,6 +67,14 @@ class Melos::Crypto
         OpenSSL::PKey.new_raw_private_key('ED448', raw)
       end
 
+      def self.encapsulation_algorithm_name
+        'X448'
+      end
+      
+      def self.signature_algorithm_name
+        'ED448'
+      end
+
       def self.hash_algorithm
         nil
       end
@@ -50,6 +82,14 @@ class Melos::Crypto
 
     class EC
       # also would like to depend on HPKE gem...
+      def self.serialize_public_key(key)
+        key.public_key.to_bn.to_s(2)
+      end
+
+      def self.serialize_private_key(key)
+        key.private_key.to_s(2)
+      end
+
       def self.deserialize_private_key(secret)
         asn1_seq = OpenSSL::ASN1.Sequence([
           OpenSSL::ASN1.Integer(1),
@@ -116,49 +156,50 @@ class Melos::Crypto
       end
     end
 
-    attr_accessor :level, :digest, :hpke, :kdf, :pkey
+    attr_accessor :level, :digest, :hpke, :kdf, :pkey, :suite_id
     def initialize(suite_id)
+      @suite_id = suite_id
       case suite_id
       when 1 # MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519
         @level = 128
         @digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha256')
-        @hpke = HPKE.new(:x25519, :sha256, :sha256, :aes_128_gcm)
+        @hpke = HPKE.new(HPKE::DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256, HPKE::HKDF_SHA256, HPKE::AES_128_GCM)
         @kdf = @hpke.hkdf
         @pkey = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X25519
       when 2 # MLS_128_DHKEMP256_AES128GCM_SHA256_P256
         @level = 128
         @digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha256')
-        @hpke = HPKE.new(:p_256, :sha256, :sha256, :aes_128_gcm)
+        @hpke = HPKE.new(HPKE::DHKEM_P256_HKDF_SHA256, HPKE::HKDF_SHA256, HPKE::AES_128_GCM)
         @kdf = @hpke.hkdf
         @pkey = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::P256
       when 3 # MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256_Ed25519
         @level = 128
         @digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha256')
-        @hpke = HPKE.new(:x25519, :sha256, :sha256, :chacha20_poly1305)
+        @hpke = HPKE.new(HPKE::DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256, HPKE::HKDF_SHA256, HPKE::CHACHA20_POLY1305)
         @kdf = @hpke.hkdf
         @pkey = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X25519
       when 4 # MLS_256_DHKEMX448_AES256GCM_SHA512_Ed448
         @level = 256
         @digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha512')
-        @hpke = HPKE.new(:x448, :sha512, :sha512, :aes_256_gcm)
+        @hpke = HPKE.new(HPKE::DHKEM_X448_HKDF_SHA512, HPKE::HKDF_SHA512, HPKE::AES_256_GCM)
         @kdf = @hpke.hkdf
         @pkey = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X448
       when 5 # MLS_256_DHKEMP521_AES256GCM_SHA512_P521
         @level = 256
         @digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha512')
-        @hpke = HPKE.new(:p_521, :sha512, :sha512, :aes_256_gcm)
+        @hpke = HPKE.new(HPKE::DHKEM_P521_HKDF_SHA512, HPKE::HKDF_SHA512, HPKE::AES_256_GCM)
         @kdf = @hpke.hkdf
         @pkey = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::P521
       when 6 # MLS_256_DHKEMX448_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA512_Ed448
         @level = 256
         @digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha512')
-        @hpke = HPKE.new(:x448, :sha512, :sha512, :chacha20_poly1305)
+        @hpke = HPKE.new(HPKE::DHKEM_X448_HKDF_SHA512, HPKE::HKDF_SHA512, HPKE::CHACHA20_POLY1305)
         @kdf = @hpke.hkdf
         @pkey = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X448
       when 7 # MLS_256_DHKEMP384_AES256GCM_SHA384_P384
         @level = 256
         @digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha384')
-        @hpke = HPKE.new(:p_384, :sha384, :sha384, :aes_256_gcm)
+        @hpke = HPKE.new(HPKE::DHKEM_P384_HKDF_SHA384, HPKE::HKDF_SHA384, HPKE::AES_256_GCM)
         @kdf = @hpke.hkdf
         @pkey = Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::P384
       end
@@ -172,7 +213,7 @@ class Melos::Crypto
   end
 
   def self.ref_hash(suite, label, value)
-    ref_hash_input = Melos::Vec.from_string(label) + Melos::Vec.from_string(value)
+    ref_hash_input = Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(label) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(value)
     suite.digest.digest(ref_hash_input)
   end
 
@@ -189,7 +230,7 @@ class Melos::Crypto
   end
 
   def self.expand_with_label(suite, secret, label, context, length)
-    kdf_label = [length].pack('S>') + Melos::Vec.from_string("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.from_string(context)
+    kdf_label = [length].pack('S>') + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(context)
     suite.kdf.expand(secret, kdf_label, length)
   end
 
@@ -227,26 +268,26 @@ class Melos::Crypto
   end
 
   def self.encrypt_with_label(suite, public_key, label, context, plaintext)
-    encrypt_context = Melos::Vec.from_string("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.from_string(context)
+    encrypt_context = Melos::Vec.string_to_vec("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(context)
     pkey = suite.pkey.deserialize_public_encapsulation_key(public_key)
     seal_base(suite, pkey, encrypt_context, "", plaintext)
   end
 
   def self.decrypt_with_label(suite, private_key, label, context, kem_output, ciphertext)
-    encrypt_context = Melos::Vec.from_string("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.from_string(context)
+    encrypt_context = Melos::Vec.string_to_vec("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(context)
     pkey = suite.pkey.deserialize_private_encapsulation_key(private_key)
     open_base(suite, kem_output, pkey, encrypt_context, "", ciphertext)
   end
 
   def self.sign_with_label(suite, signature_key, label, content)
     skey = suite.pkey.deserialize_private_signature_key(signature_key)
-    sign_content = Melos::Vec.from_string("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.from_string(content)
+    sign_content = Melos::Vec.string_to_vec("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(content)
     skey.sign(suite.pkey.hash_algorithm, sign_content)
   end
 
   def self.verify_with_label(suite, verification_key, label, content, signature_value)
     vkey = suite.pkey.deserialize_public_signature_key(verification_key)
-    sign_content = Melos::Vec.from_string("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.from_string(content)
+    sign_content = Melos::Vec.string_to_vec("MLS 1.0 " + label) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(content)
     vkey.verify(suite.pkey.hash_algorithm, signature_value, sign_content)
   end
 
@@ -301,7 +342,35 @@ class Melos::Crypto
   end
 
   def self.parent_hash(suite, encryption_key, ph_of_parent, sibling_hash)
-    parent_hash_input = Melos::Vec.from_string(encryption_key) + Melos::Vec.from_string(ph_of_parent) + Melos::Vec.from_string(sibling_hash)
+    parent_hash_input = Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(encryption_key) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(ph_of_parent) + Melos::Vec.string_to_vec(sibling_hash)
     Melos::Crypto.hash(suite, parent_hash_input)
   end
+
+  def self.generate_encapsulation_key_pair(suite)
+    if suite.pkey.equal?(Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X25519) || suite.pkey.equal?(Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X448)
+      # is an Edwards curve
+      OpenSSL::PKey.generate_key(suite.pkey.encapsulation_algorithm_name)
+    else
+      # is an EC
+      OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate(suite.pkey.curve_name)
+    end
+  end
+
+  def self.generate_signature_key_pair(suite)
+    if suite.pkey.equal?(Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X25519) || suite.pkey.equal?(Melos::Crypto::CipherSuite::X448)
+      # is an Edwards curve
+      OpenSSL::PKey.generate_key(suite.pkey.signature_algorithm_name)
+    else
+      # is an EC
+      OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate(suite.pkey.curve_name)
+    end
+  end
+
+  def self.serialize_public_key(suite, pkey)
+    suite.pkey.serialize_public_key(pkey)
+  end
+
+  def self.serialize_private_key(suite, pkey)
+    suite.pkey.serialize_private_key(pkey)
+  end
 end