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+{
+  "name": "stig_ibm_db2_v10.5_luw",
+  "date": "2017-11-16",
+  "description": "This Security Technical Implementation Guide is published as a tool to improve the security of Department of Defense (DoD) information systems. The requirements are derived from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-53 and related documents. Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via email to the following address: disa.stig_spt@mail.mil.",
+  "title": "IBM DB2 V10.5 LUW Security Technical Implementation Guide",
+  "version": "1",
+  "item_syntax": "^\\w-\\d+$",
+  "section_separator": null,
+  "items": [
+    {
+      "id": "V-74429",
+      "title": "DB2 must limit the number of concurrent sessions to an organization-defined number per user for all accounts and/or account types.",
+      "description": "Database management includes the ability to control the number of users and user sessions utilizing a DBMS. Unlimited concurrent connections to the DBMS could allow a successful Denial of Service (DoS) attack by exhausting connection resources; and a system can also fail or be degraded by an overload of legitimate users. Limiting the number of concurrent sessions per user is helpful in reducing these risks.\n\nThis requirement addresses concurrent session control for a single account. It does not address concurrent sessions by a single user via multiple system accounts; and it does not deal with the total number of sessions across all accounts.\n\nThe capability to limit the number of concurrent sessions per user must be configured in or added to the DBMS (for example, by use of a logon trigger), when this is technically feasible. Note that it is not sufficient to limit sessions via a web server or application server alone, because legitimate users and adversaries can potentially connect to the DBMS by other means.\n\nThe organization will need to define the maximum number of concurrent sessions by account type, by account, or a combination thereof. In deciding on the appropriate number, it is important to consider the work requirements of the various types of users. For example, 2 might be an acceptable limit for general users accessing the database via an application; but 10 might be too few for a database administrator using a database management GUI tool, where each query tab and navigation pane may count as a separate session.\n\n(Sessions may also be referred to as connections or logons, which for the purposes of this requirement are synonyms.)",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74431",
+      "title": "DB2 must integrate with an organization-level authentication/access mechanism providing account management and automation for all users, groups, roles, and any other principals.",
+      "description": "Enterprise environments make account management for applications and databases challenging and complex. A manual process for account management functions adds the risk of a potential oversight or other error. Managing accounts for the same person in multiple places is inefficient and prone to problems with consistency and synchronization.\n\nA comprehensive application account management process that includes automation helps to ensure that accounts designated as requiring attention are consistently and promptly addressed. \n\nExamples include, but are not limited to, using automation to take action on multiple accounts designated as inactive, suspended, or terminated, or by disabling accounts located in non-centralized account stores, such as multiple servers. Account management functions can also include: assignment of group or role membership; identifying account type; specifying user access authorizations (i.e., privileges); account removal, update, or termination; and administrative alerts. The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using email or text messaging to notify account managers when users are terminated or transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using automated telephone notification to report atypical system account usage.\n\nThe DBMS must be configured to automatically utilize organization-level account management functions, and these functions must immediately enforce the organization's current account policy. \n\nAutomation may be comprised of differing technologies that when placed together contain an overall mechanism supporting an organization's automated account management requirements.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74433",
+      "title": "DB2 must enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.",
+      "description": "Authentication with a DoD-approved PKI certificate does not necessarily imply authorization to access the DBMS.  To mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information by entities that have been issued certificates by DoD-approved PKIs, all DoD systems, including databases, must be properly configured to implement access control policies. \n\nSuccessful authentication must not automatically give an entity access to an asset or security boundary. Authorization procedures and controls must be implemented to ensure each authenticated entity also has a validated and current authorization. Authorization is the process of determining whether an entity, once authenticated, is permitted to access a specific asset. Information systems use access control policies and enforcement mechanisms to implement this requirement. \n\nAccess control policies include identity-based policies, role-based policies, and attribute-based policies. Access enforcement mechanisms include access control lists, access control matrices, and cryptography. These policies and mechanisms must be employed by the application to control access between users (or processes acting on behalf of users) and objects (e.g., devices, files, records, processes, programs, and domains) in the information system. \n\nThis requirement is applicable to access control enforcement applications, a category that includes database management systems.  If the DBMS does not follow applicable policy when approving access, it may be in conflict with networks or other applications in the information system. This may result in users either gaining or being denied access inappropriately and in conflict with applicable policy.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74435",
+      "title": "DB2 must protect against a user falsely repudiating having performed organization-defined actions.",
+      "description": "Non-repudiation of actions taken is required in order to maintain data integrity. Examples of particular actions taken by individuals include creating information, sending a message, approving information (e.g., indicating concurrence or signing a contract), and receiving a message. \n\nNon-repudiation protects against later claims by a user of not having created, modified, or deleted a particular data item or collection of data in the database.\n\nIn designing a database, the organization must define the types of data and the user actions that must be protected from repudiation. The implementation must then include building audit features into the application data tables, and configuring the DBMS' audit tools to capture the necessary audit trail. Design and implementation also must ensure that applications pass individual user identification to the DBMS, even where the application connects to the DBMS with a standard, group account.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74437",
+      "title": "DB2 must provide audit record generation capability for DoD-defined auditable events within all DBMS/database components.",
+      "description": "Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. \n\nAudit records can be generated from various components within the DBMS (e.g., process, module). Certain specific application functionalities may be audited as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records.\n\nDoD has defined the list of events for which the DBMS will provide an audit record generation capability as the following: \n\n(i) Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g., classification levels);\n(ii) Access actions, such as successful and unsuccessful logon attempts, privileged activities, or other system-level access, starting and ending time for user access to the system, concurrent logons from different workstations, successful and unsuccessful accesses to objects, all program initiations, and all direct access to the information system; and\n(iii) All account creation, modification, disabling, and termination actions.\n\nOrganizations may define additional events requiring continuous or ad hoc auditing.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74439",
+      "title": "DB2 must allow only the ISSM (or individuals or roles appointed by the ISSM) to select which auditable events are to be audited.",
+      "description": "Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent or interfere with the auditing of critical events.\n\nSuppression of auditing could permit an adversary to evade detection.\n\nMisconfigured audits can degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74441",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when privileges/permissions are retrieved.",
+      "description": "Under some circumstances, it may be useful to monitor who/what is reading privilege/permission/role information. Therefore, it must be possible to configure auditing to do this. DBMSs typically make such information available through views or functions.\n\nThis requirement addresses explicit requests for privilege/permission/role membership information. It does not refer to the implicit retrieval of privileges/permissions/role memberships that the DBMS continually performs to determine if any and every action on the database is permitted.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74443",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to retrieve privileges/permissions occur.",
+      "description": "Under some circumstances, it may be useful to monitor who/what is reading privilege/permission/role information. Therefore, it must be possible to configure auditing to do this. DBMSs typically make such information available through views or functions.\n\nThis requirement addresses explicit requests for privilege/permission/role membership information. It does not refer to the implicit retrieval of privileges/permissions/role memberships that the DBMS continually performs to determine if any and every action on the database is permitted.\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74445",
+      "title": "DB2 must initiate session auditing upon startup.",
+      "description": "Session auditing is for use when a user's activities are under investigation. To be sure of capturing all activity during those periods when session auditing is in use, it needs to be in operation for the whole time the DBMS is running.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74447",
+      "title": "DB2 must produce audit records containing sufficient information to establish the outcome (success or failure) of the events.",
+      "description": "Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Without information about the outcome of events, security personnel cannot make an accurate assessment as to whether an attack was successful or if changes were made to the security state of the system.\n\nEvent outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred). As such, they also provide a means to measure the impact of an event and help authorized personnel to determine the appropriate response.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74449",
+      "title": "DB2 must include additional, more detailed, organization-defined information in the audit records for audit events identified by type, location, or subject.",
+      "description": "Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Reconstruction of harmful events or forensic analysis is not possible if audit records do not contain enough information. To support analysis, some types of events will need information to be logged that exceeds the basic requirements of event type, time stamps, location, source, outcome, and user identity. If additional information is not available, it could negatively impact forensic investigations into user actions or other malicious events.\n\nThe organization must determine what additional information is required for complete analysis of the audited events. The additional information required is dependent on the type of information (e.g., sensitivity of the data and the environment within which it resides). At a minimum, the organization must employ either full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group users, or both. The organization must maintain audit trails in sufficient detail to reconstruct events to determine the cause and impact of compromise. \n\nExamples of detailed information the organization may require in audit records are full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group account users.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74451",
+      "title": "Unless it has been determined that availability is paramount, DB2 must, upon audit failure, cease all auditable activity.",
+      "description": "It is critical that when the DBMS is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required, it take action to mitigate the failure. Audit processing failures include: software/hardware errors; failures in the audit capturing mechanisms; and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. Responses to audit failure depend upon the nature of the failure mode. \n\nWhen the need for system availability does not outweigh the need for a complete audit trail, the DBMS should cease production of audit records immediately, rolling back all in-flight transactions.  DB2 does this when  configured to track audit errors.\n\nSystems where audit trail completeness is paramount will most likely be at a lower MAC level than MAC I; the final determination is the prerogative of the application owner, subject to Authorizing Official concurrence. In any case, sufficient auditing resources must be allocated to avoid a shutdown in all but the most extreme situations.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74453",
+      "title": "The audit information produced by DB2 must be protected from unauthorized read access.",
+      "description": "If audit data were to become compromised, then competent forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In addition, access to audit records provides information an attacker could potentially use to his or her advantage.\n\nTo ensure the veracity of audit data, the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from any and all unauthorized access. This includes read, write, copy, etc.\n\nThis requirement can be achieved through multiple methods which will depend upon system architecture and design. Some commonly employed methods include ensuring log files enjoy the proper file system permissions utilizing file system protections and limiting log data location. \n\nAdditionally, applications with user interfaces to audit records should not allow for the unfettered manipulation of or access to those records via the application. If the application provides access to the audit data, the application becomes accountable for ensuring that audit information is protected from unauthorized access.\n\nAudit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74455",
+      "title": "The audit information produced by DB2 must be protected from unauthorized modification.",
+      "description": "If audit data were to become compromised, then competent forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve. \n\nTo ensure the veracity of audit data the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from unauthorized modification. \n\nThis requirement can be achieved through multiple methods that will depend upon system architecture and design. Some commonly employed methods include ensuring log files enjoy the proper file system permissions and limiting log data locations. \n\nApplications providing a user interface to audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the data and the corresponding rights that the user enjoys in order to make access decisions regarding the modification of audit data.\n\nAudit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. \n\nModification of database audit data could mask the theft of, or the unauthorized modification of, sensitive data stored in the database.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74457",
+      "title": "The audit information produced by DB2 must be protected from unauthorized deletion.",
+      "description": "If audit data were to become compromised, then competent forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve.\n\nTo ensure the veracity of audit data, the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from unauthorized deletion. This requirement can be achieved through multiple methods which will depend upon system architecture and design.\n\nSome commonly employed methods include: ensuring log files enjoy the proper file system permissions utilizing file system protections; restricting access; and backing up log data to ensure log data is retained.\n\nApplications providing a user interface to audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the data and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the deletion of audit data.\n\nAudit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity.\n\nDeletion of database audit data could mask the theft of, or the unauthorized modification of, sensitive data stored in the database.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74459",
+      "title": "DB2 must protect its audit features from unauthorized access.",
+      "description": "Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. \n\nDepending upon the log format and application, system and application log tools may provide the only means to manipulate and manage application and system log data. It is, therefore, imperative that access to audit tools be controlled and protected from unauthorized access. \n\nApplications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools.\n\nAudit tools include, but are not limited to, OS-provided audit tools, vendor-provided audit tools, and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. \n\nIf an attacker were to gain access to audit tools, he could analyze audit logs for system weaknesses or weaknesses in the auditing itself. An attacker could also manipulate logs to hide evidence of malicious activity.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74461",
+      "title": "DB2 must protect its audit configuration from unauthorized modification.",
+      "description": "Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit data.\n\nApplications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the modification of audit tools.\n\nAudit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74463",
+      "title": "DB2 must protect its audit features from unauthorized removal.",
+      "description": "Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit data.\n\nApplications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the deletion of audit tools.\n\nAudit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74465",
+      "title": "DB2 must limit  privileges to change software modules, to include stored procedures, functions and triggers, and links to software external to DB2.",
+      "description": "If the system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process.\n\nAccordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals shall be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications.\n\nUnmanaged changes that occur to the database software libraries or configuration can lead to unauthorized or compromised installations.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74467",
+      "title": "The OS must limit privileges to change the DB2 software resident within software libraries (including privileged programs).",
+      "description": "If the system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process.\n\nAccordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals shall be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications.\n\nUnmanaged changes that occur to the database software libraries or configuration can lead to unauthorized or compromised installations.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74469",
+      "title": "The DB2 software installation account must be restricted to authorized users.",
+      "description": "When dealing with change control issues, it should be noted any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can have significant effects on the overall security of the system. \n\nIf the system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process.\n\nAccordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals shall be allowed access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications.\n\nDBA and other privileged administrative or application owner accounts are granted privileges that allow actions that can have a great impact on database security and operation. It is especially important to grant privileged access to only those persons who are qualified and authorized to use them.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74471",
+      "title": "Database software, including DBMS configuration files, must be stored in dedicated directories, separate from the host OS and other applications.",
+      "description": "When dealing with change control issues, it should be noted any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the system.\n\nMultiple applications can provide a cumulative negative effect. A vulnerability and subsequent exploit to one application can lead to an exploit of other applications sharing the same security context. For example, an exploit to a web server process that leads to unauthorized administrative access to host system directories can most likely lead to a compromise of all applications hosted by the same system. Database software not installed using dedicated directories both threatens and is threatened by other hosted applications. Access controls defined for one application may by default provide access to the other application's database objects or directories. Any method that provides any level of separation of security context assists in the protection between applications.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74473",
+      "title": "Database objects (including but not limited to tables, indexes, storage, stored procedures, functions, triggers, links to software external to DB2, etc.) must be owned by database/DBMS principals authorized for ownership.",
+      "description": "Within the database, object ownership implies full privileges to the owned object, including the privilege to assign access to the owned objects to other subjects. Database functions and procedures can be coded using definer's rights. This allows anyone who utilizes the object to perform the actions if they were the owner. If not properly managed, this can lead to privileged actions being taken by unauthorized individuals.\n\nConversely, if critical tables or other objects rely on unauthorized owner accounts, these objects may be lost when an account is removed.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74475",
+      "title": "The role(s)/group(s) used to modify database structure (including but not necessarily limited to tables, indexes, storage, etc.) and logic modules (stored procedures, functions, triggers, links to software external to DB2, etc.) must be restricted to authorized users.",
+      "description": "If the DBMS were to allow any user to make changes to database structure or logic, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process.\n\nAccordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals shall be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications.\n\nUnmanaged changes that occur to the database software libraries or configuration can lead to unauthorized or compromised installations.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74477",
+      "title": "Default demonstration and sample databases, database objects, and applications must be removed.",
+      "description": "Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions).\n\nIt is detrimental for software products to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. Examples include, but are not limited to, installing advertising software, demonstrations, or browser plugins not related to requirements or providing a wide array of functionality, not required for every mission, that cannot be disabled.\n\nDBMSs must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities.\n\nDemonstration and sample database objects and applications present publicly known attack points for malicious users. These demonstration and sample objects are meant to provide simple examples of coding specific functions and are not developed to prevent vulnerabilities from being introduced to the DBMS and host system.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74479",
+      "title": "Unused database components, DBMS software, and database objects must be removed.",
+      "description": "Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions).\n\nIt is detrimental for software products to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. \n\nDBMSs must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74481",
+      "title": "Unused database components which are integrated in DB2 and cannot be uninstalled must be disabled.",
+      "description": "Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). \n\nIt is detrimental for software products to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. \n\nDBMSs must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities.\n\nUnused, unnecessary DBMS components increase the attack vector for the DBMS by introducing additional targets for attack. By minimizing the services and applications installed on the system, the number of potential vulnerabilities is reduced. Components of the system that are unused and cannot be uninstalled must be disabled. The techniques available for disabling components will vary by DBMS product, OS and the nature of the component and may include DBMS configuration settings, OS service settings, OS file access security, and DBMS user/group permissions.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74483",
+      "title": "Access to external executables must be disabled or restricted.",
+      "description": "Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). \n\nIt is detrimental for applications to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. \n\nApplications must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities.\n\nDBMSs may spawn additional external processes to execute procedures that are defined in the DBMS but stored in external host files (external procedures). The spawned process used to execute the external procedure may operate within a different OS security context than the DBMS and provide unauthorized access to the host system.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74485",
+      "title": "DB2 must be configured to prohibit or restrict the use of organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and/or services, as defined in the PPSM CAL and vulnerability assessments.",
+      "description": "In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols/services on information systems.\n\nApplications are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., email and web services); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. \n\nTo support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the application must support the organizational requirements providing only essential capabilities and limiting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to conduct official business or to address authorized quality of life issues.\n\nDatabase Management Systems using ports, protocols, and services deemed unsafe are open to attack through those ports, protocols, and services. This can allow unauthorized access to the database and through the database to other components of the information system.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74487",
+      "title": "If passwords are used for authentication, DB2 must transmit only encrypted representations of passwords.",
+      "description": "The DoD standard for authentication is DoD-approved PKI certificates.\n\nAuthentication based on User ID and Password may be used only when it is not possible to employ a PKI certificate, and requires AO approval.\n\nIn such cases, passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords during transmission.\n\nDBMS passwords sent in clear text format across the network are vulnerable to discovery by unauthorized users. Disclosure of passwords may easily lead to unauthorized access to the database.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74489",
+      "title": "Applications using the database must obscure feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.",
+      "description": "To prevent the compromise of authentication information, such as passwords and PINs, during the authentication process, the feedback from the information system must not provide any information that would allow an unauthorized user to compromise the authentication mechanism.\n\nObfuscation of user-provided information when typed into the system is a method used in addressing this risk.\n\nFor example, displaying asterisks when a user types in a password or PIN, is an example of obscuring feedback of authentication information.\n\nDatabase applications may allow for entry of the account name and password as a visible parameter of the application execution command. This practice must be prohibited and disabled to prevent shoulder surfing.\n\nThis calls for the review of applications, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers, and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue is addressed, and must document what has been discovered.",
+      "severity": "high"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74491",
+      "title": "When using command-line tools such as db2, users must use a Connect method that does not expose the password.",
+      "description": "To prevent the compromise of authentication information, such as passwords and PINs, during the authentication process, the feedback from the information system must not provide any information that would allow an unauthorized user to compromise the authentication mechanism.\n\nObfuscation of user-provided information when typed into the system is a method used in addressing this risk.\n\nFor example, displaying asterisks when a user types in a password or PIN, is an example of obscuring feedback of authentication information.\n\n\"db2\" and other command-line tools are part of any DB2 for LUW installation. These tools can accept a plain-text password, but do offer alternative techniques. Since the typical user of these tools is a database administrator, the consequences of password compromise are particularly serious. Therefore, the use of plain-text passwords must be prohibited, as a matter of practice and procedure.",
+      "severity": "high"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74493",
+      "title": "DB2 must use NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules for cryptographic operations.",
+      "description": "Use of weak or not validated cryptographic algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption and digital signatures to protect data.  Weak algorithms can be easily broken and not validated cryptographic modules may not implement algorithms correctly. Unapproved cryptographic modules or algorithms should not be relied on for authentication, confidentiality or integrity. Weak cryptography could allow an attacker to gain access to and modify data stored in the database as well as the administration settings of the DBMS.\n\nApplications, including DBMSs, utilizing cryptography are required to use approved NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.  \n\nThe security functions validated as part of FIPS 140-2 for cryptographic modules are described in FIPS 140-2 Annex A.\n\nThe cryptographic functionality in IBM DB2 for LUW includes features that are fully FIPS 140-2 validated, and others that are not.  To be sure of using only FIPS 140-2 validated modules, specify SSL (TLS) for communication and IBM Database Native Encryption for data at rest.\n\nThe decision whether to employ cryptography is the responsibility of the information owner/steward, who exercises discretion within the framework of applicable rules, policies, and law.",
+      "severity": "high"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74495",
+      "title": "DB2 must separate user functionality (including user interface services) from database management functionality.",
+      "description": "Information system management functionality includes functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers and typically requires privileged user access. \n\nThe separation of user functionality from information system management functionality is either physical or logical and is accomplished by using different computers, different central processing units, different instances of the operating system, different network addresses, combinations of these methods, or other methods, as appropriate. \n\nAn example of this type of separation is observed in web administrative interfaces that use separate authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. \n\nThis may include isolating the administrative interface on a different domain and with additional access controls.\n\nIf administrative functionality or information regarding DBMS management is presented on an interface available for users, information on DBMS settings may be inadvertently made available to the user.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74497",
+      "title": "DB2 must maintain the authenticity of communications sessions by guarding against man-in-the-middle attacks that guess at Session ID values.",
+      "description": "One class of man-in-the-middle, or session hijacking, attack involves the adversary guessing at valid session identifiers based on patterns in identifiers already known.\n\nThe preferred technique for thwarting guesses at Session IDs is the generation of unique session identifiers using a FIPS 140-2 approved random number generator.\n\nHowever, it is recognized that available DBMS products do not all implement the preferred technique yet may have other protections against session hijacking. Therefore, other techniques are acceptable, provided they are demonstrated to be effective.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74499",
+      "title": "In the event of a system failure, DB2 must preserve any information necessary to determine cause of failure and any information necessary to return to operations with least disruption to mission processes.",
+      "description": "Failure to a known state can address safety or security in accordance with the mission/business needs of the organization.\n\nFailure to a known secure state helps prevent a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability in the event of a failure of the information system or a component of the system. \n\nPreserving information system state information helps to facilitate system restart and return to the operational mode of the organization with less disruption of mission/business processes. \n\nSince it is usually not possible to test this capability in a production environment, systems should either be validated in a testing environment or prior to installation. This requirement is normally a function of the design of the IDPS component. Compliance can be verified by acceptance/validation processes or vendor attestation.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74501",
+      "title": "DB2 must protect the confidentiality and integrity of all information at rest.",
+      "description": "This control is intended to address the confidentiality and integrity of information at rest in non-mobile devices and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on a secondary storage device (e.g., disk drive, tape drive) within an organizational information system. Applications and application users generate information throughout the course of their application use. \n\nUser data generated, as well as application-specific configuration data, needs to be protected. Organizations may choose to employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, as appropriate. \n\nIf the confidentiality and integrity of application data is not protected, the data will be open to compromise and unauthorized modification.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74503",
+      "title": "DB2 must isolate security functions from non-security functions.",
+      "description": "An isolation boundary provides access control and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that perform security functions. \n\nSecurity functions are the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection is based.\n\nDevelopers and implementers can increase the assurance in security functions by employing well-defined security policy models; structured, disciplined, and rigorous hardware and software development techniques; and sound system/security engineering principles. \n\nDatabase Management Systems typically separate security functionality from non-security functionality via separate databases or schemas. Database objects or code implementing security functionality should not be commingled with objects or code implementing application logic. When security and non-security functionality are commingled, users who have access to non-security functionality may be able to access security functionality.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74505",
+      "title": "Database contents must be protected from unauthorized and unintended information transfer by enforcement of a data-transfer policy.",
+      "description": "Applications, including DBMSs, must prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources. \n\nData used for the development and testing of applications often involves copying data from production. It is important that specific procedures exist for this process, to include the conditions under which such transfer may take place, where the copies may reside, and the rules for ensuring sensitive data are not exposed.\n\nCopies of sensitive data must not be misplaced or left in a temporary location without the proper controls.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74507",
+      "title": "Access to database files must be limited to relevant processes and to authorized, administrative users.",
+      "description": "Applications, including DBMSs, must prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources. Permitting only DBMS processes and authorized, administrative users to have access to the files where the database resides helps ensure that those files are not shared inappropriately and are not open to backdoor access and manipulation.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74509",
+      "title": "DB2 must check the validity of all data inputs except those specifically identified by the organization.",
+      "description": "Invalid user input occurs when a user inserts data or characters into an application's data entry fields and the application is unprepared to process that data. This results in unanticipated application behavior, potentially leading to an application or information system compromise. Invalid user input is one of the primary methods employed when attempting to compromise an application.\n\nWith respect to database management systems, one class of threat is known as SQL Injection, or more generally, code injection. It takes advantage of the dynamic execution capabilities of various programming languages, including dialects of SQL. Potentially, the attacker can gain unauthorized access to data, including security settings, and severely corrupt or destroy the database.\n\nEven when no such hijacking takes place, invalid input that gets recorded in the database, whether accidental or malicious, reduces the reliability and usability of the system. Available protections include data types, referential constraints, uniqueness constraints, range checking, and application-specific logic. Application-specific logic can be implemented within the database in stored procedures and triggers, where appropriate.\n\nThis calls for the review of applications, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers, and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue is addressed, and must document what has been discovered.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74511",
+      "title": "DB2 and associated applications must reserve the use of dynamic code execution for situations that require it.",
+      "description": "With respect to database management systems, one class of threat is known as SQL Injection, or more generally, code injection. It takes advantage of the dynamic execution capabilities of various programming languages, including dialects of SQL. In such cases, the attacker deduces the manner in which SQL statements are being processed, either from inside knowledge or by observing system behavior in response to invalid inputs. When the attacker identifies scenarios where SQL queries are being assembled by application code (which may be within the database or separate from it) and executed dynamically, the attacker is then able to craft input strings that subvert the intent of the query. Potentially, the attacker can gain unauthorized access to data, including security settings, and severely corrupt or destroy the database.\n\nThe principal protection against code injection is not to use dynamic execution except where it provides necessary functionality that cannot be utilized otherwise. Use strongly typed data items rather than general-purpose strings as input parameters to task-specific, pre-compiled stored procedures and functions (and triggers).\n\nThis calls for the review of applications, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers, and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue is addressed, and must document what has been discovered.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74513",
+      "title": "DB2 and associated applications, when making use of dynamic code execution, must scan input data for invalid values that may indicate a code injection attack.",
+      "description": "With respect to database management systems, one class of threat is known as SQL Injection, or more generally, code injection. It takes advantage of the dynamic execution capabilities of various programming languages, including dialects of SQL. In such cases, the attacker deduces the manner in which SQL statements are being processed, either from inside knowledge or by observing system behavior in response to invalid inputs. When the attacker identifies scenarios where SQL queries are being assembled by application code (which may be within the database or separate from it) and executed dynamically, the attacker is then able to craft input strings that subvert the intent of the query. Potentially, the attacker can gain unauthorized access to data, including security settings, and severely corrupt or destroy the database.\n\nThe principal protection against code injection is not to use dynamic execution except where it provides necessary functionality that cannot be utilized otherwise. Use strongly typed data items rather than general-purpose strings as input parameters to task-specific, pre-compiled stored procedures and functions (and triggers).\n\nWhen dynamic execution is necessary, ways to mitigate the risk include the following, which should be implemented both in the on-screen application and at the database level, in the stored procedures:\n-- Allow strings as input only when necessary. \n-- Rely on data typing to validate numbers, dates, etc. Do not accept invalid values. If substituting other values for them, think carefully about whether this could be subverted.\n-- Limit the size of input strings to what is truly necessary.\n-- If single quotes/apostrophes, double quotes, semicolons, equals signs, angle brackets, or square brackets will never be valid as input, reject them.\n-- If comment markers will never be valid as input, reject them. In SQL, these are -- or /* */ \n-- If HTML and XML tags, entities, comments, etc., will never be valid, reject them.\n-- If wildcards are present, reject them unless truly necessary. In SQL these are the underscore and the percentage sign, and the word ESCAPE is also a clue that wildcards are in use.\n-- If SQL key words, such as SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, CREATE, ALTER, DROP, ESCAPE, UNION, GRANT, REVOKE, DENY, MODIFY will never be valid, reject them. Use case-insensitive comparisons when searching for these. Bear in mind that some of these words, particularly Grant (as a person's name), could also be valid input. \n-- If there are range limits on the values that may be entered, enforce those limits.\n-- Institute procedures for inspection of programs for correct use of dynamic coding, by a party other than the developer.\n-- Conduct rigorous testing of program modules that use dynamic coding, searching for ways to subvert the intended use.\n-- Record the inspection and testing in the system documentation.\n-- Bear in mind that all this applies not only to screen input, but also to the values in an incoming message to a web service or to a stored procedure called by a software component that has not itself been hardened in these ways. Not only can the caller be subject to such vulnerabilities; it may itself be the attacker.\n\nThis calls for the review of applications, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers, and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue is addressed, and must document what has been discovered.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74515",
+      "title": "DB2 must provide non-privileged users with error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.",
+      "description": "Any DBMS or associated application providing too much information in error messages on the screen or printout risks compromising the data and security of the system. The structure and content of error messages need to be carefully considered by the organization and development team.\n\nDatabases can inadvertently provide a wealth of information to an attacker through improperly handled error messages. In addition to sensitive business or personal information, database errors can provide host names, IP addresses, user names, and other system information not required for troubleshooting but very useful to someone targeting the system.\n\nCarefully consider the structure/content of error messages. The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Information that could be exploited by adversaries includes, for example, logon attempts with passwords entered by mistake as the username, mission/business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by) information recorded, and personal information, such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers.\n\nThis calls for the review of applications, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers, and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue is addressed, and must document what has been discovered.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74517",
+      "title": "DB2 must reveal detailed error messages only to the ISSO, ISSM, SA and DBA.",
+      "description": "If the DBMS provides too much information in error logs and administrative messages to the screen, this could lead to compromise. The structure and content of error messages need to be carefully considered by the organization and development team. The extent to which the information system is able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. \n\nSome default DBMS error messages can contain information that could aid an attacker in, among others things, identifying the database type, host address, or state of the database. Custom errors may contain sensitive customer information. \n\nIt is important that detailed error messages be visible only to those who are authorized to view them; that general users receive only generalized acknowledgment that errors have occurred; and that these generalized messages appear only when relevant to the user's task. For example, a message along the lines of, \"An error has occurred. Unable to save your changes. If this problem persists, contact your help desk\" would be relevant. A message such as \"Warning: your transaction generated a large number of page splits\" would likely not be relevant. \n\nAdministrative users authorized to review detailed error messages typically are the ISSO, ISSM, SA and DBA. Other individuals or roles may be specified according to organization-specific needs, with DBA approval.\n\nThis calls for the review of applications, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers, and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue is addressed, and must document what has been discovered.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74519",
+      "title": "DB2 must automatically terminate a user session after organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect.",
+      "description": "This addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in contrast to the termination of network connections that are associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an organizational information system. Such user sessions can be terminated (and thus terminate user access) without terminating network sessions. \n\nSession termination ends all processes associated with a user's logical session except those batch processes/jobs that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. \n\nConditions or trigger events requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, and time-of-day restrictions on information system use.\n\nThis capability is typically reserved for specific cases where the system owner, data owner, or organization requires additional assurance.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74561",
+      "title": "When supporting applications that require security labeling of data, DB2 must associate organization-defined types of security labels having organization-defined security label values with information in storage.",
+      "description": "Without the association of security labels to information, there is no basis for the DBMS to make security-related access-control decisions.\n\nSecurity labels are abstractions representing the basic properties or characteristics of an entity (e.g., subjects and objects) with respect to safeguarding information. \n\nThese labels are typically associated with internal data structures (e.g., tables, rows) within the database and are used to enable the implementation of access control and flow control policies, reflect special dissemination, handling or distribution instructions, or support other aspects of the information security policy. \n\nOne example includes marking data as classified or FOUO. These security labels may be assigned manually or during data processing, but, either way, it is imperative these assignments are maintained while the data is in storage. If the security labels are lost when the data is stored, there is the risk of a data compromise.\n\nThe mechanism used to support security labeling may be a feature of the DBMS product, a third-party product, or custom application code.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74563",
+      "title": "When supporting applications that require security labeling of data, DB2 must associate organization-defined types of security labels having organization-defined security label values with information in process.",
+      "description": "Without the association of security labels to information, there is no basis for the DBMS to make security-related access-control decisions.\n\nSecurity labels are abstractions representing the basic properties or characteristics of an entity (e.g., subjects and objects) with respect to safeguarding information. \n\nThese labels are typically associated with internal data structures (e.g., tables, rows) within the database and are used to enable the implementation of access control and flow control policies, reflect special dissemination, handling or distribution instructions, or support other aspects of the information security policy. \n\nOne example includes marking data as classified or FOUO. These security labels may be assigned manually or during data processing, but, either way, it is imperative these assignments are maintained while the data is in storage. If the security labels are lost when the data is stored, there is the risk of a data compromise.\n\nThe mechanism used to support security labeling may be a feature of the DBMS product, a third-party product, or custom application code.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74565",
+      "title": "DB2 must prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions, to include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures.",
+      "description": "Preventing non-privileged users from executing privileged functions mitigates the risk that unauthorized individuals or processes may gain unnecessary access to information or privileges. \n\nSystem documentation should include a definition of the functionality considered privileged.\n\nDepending on circumstances, privileged functions can include, for example, establishing accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals that do not possess appropriate authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users.\n\nA privileged function in the DBMS/database context is any operation that modifies the structure of the database, its built-in logic, or its security settings. This would include all Data Definition Language (DDL) statements and all security-related statements. In an SQL environment, it encompasses, but is not necessarily limited to: \n\nCREATE\nALTER\nDROP\nGRANT\nREVOKE\nDENY\n\nThere may also be Data Manipulation Language (DML) statements that, subject to context, should be regarded as privileged. Possible examples include:\n\nTRUNCATE TABLE;\nDELETE, or\nDELETE affecting more than n rows, for some n, or\nDELETE without a WHERE clause;\n\nUPDATE or\nUPDATE affecting more than n rows, for some n, or\nUPDATE without a WHERE clause;\n\nany SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE to an application-defined security table executed by other than a security principal.\n\nDepending on the capabilities of the DBMS and the design of the database and associated applications, the prevention of unauthorized use of privileged functions may be achieved by means of DBMS security features, database triggers, other mechanisms, or a combination of these.",
+      "severity": "high"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74567",
+      "title": "DB2 must utilize centralized management of the content captured in audit records generated by all components of DB2.",
+      "description": "Without the ability to centrally manage the content captured in the audit records, identification, troubleshooting, and correlation of suspicious behavior would be difficult and could lead to a delayed or incomplete analysis of an ongoing attack.\n\nThe content captured in audit records must be managed from a central location (necessitating automation). Centralized management of audit records and logs provides for efficiency in maintenance and management of records, as well as the backup and archiving of those records. \n\nThe DBMS may write audit records to database tables, to files in the file system, to other kinds of local repository, or directly to a centralized log management system. Whatever the method used, it must be compatible with off-loading the records to the centralized system.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74569",
+      "title": "DB2 must allocate audit record storage capacity in accordance with organization-defined audit record storage requirements.",
+      "description": "In order to ensure sufficient storage capacity for the audit logs, the DBMS must be able to allocate audit record storage capacity. Although another requirement (SRG-APP-000515-DB-000318) mandates that audit data be off-loaded to a centralized log management system, it remains necessary to provide space on the database server to serve as a buffer against outages and capacity limits of the off-loading mechanism.\n\nThe task of allocating audit record storage capacity is usually performed during initial installation of the DBMS and is closely associated with the DBA and system administrator roles. The DBA or system administrator will usually coordinate the allocation of physical drive space with the application owner/installer and the application will prompt the installer to provide the capacity information, the physical location of the disk, or both.\n\nIn determining the capacity requirements, consider such factors as: total number of users; expected number of concurrent users during busy periods; number and type of events being monitored; types and amounts of data being captured; the frequency/speed with which audit records are off-loaded to the central log management system; and any limitations that exist on the DBMS's ability to reuse the space formerly occupied by off-loaded records.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74571",
+      "title": "DB2 must provide a warning to appropriate support staff when allocated audit record storage volume reaches 75% of maximum audit record storage capacity.",
+      "description": "Organizations are required to use a central log management system, so, under normal conditions, the audit space allocated to the DBMS on its own server will not be an issue. However, space will still be required on the DBMS server for audit records in transit, and, under abnormal conditions, this could fill up. Since a requirement exists to halt processing upon audit failure, a service outage would result.\n\nIf support personnel are not notified immediately upon storage volume utilization reaching 75%, they are unable to plan for storage capacity expansion. \n\nThe appropriate support staff include, at a minimum, the ISSO and the DBA/SA.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74573",
+      "title": "DB2 must provide an immediate real-time alert to appropriate support staff of all audit failure events requiring real-time alerts.",
+      "description": "It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without a real-time alert, security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability, and system operation may be adversely affected. \n\nThe appropriate support staff include, at a minimum, the ISSO and the DBA/SA.\n\nAlerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts provide these messages immediately (i.e., the time from event detection to alert occurs in seconds or less).",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74575",
+      "title": "DB2 must off-load audit data to a separate log management facility; this must be continuous and in near real time for systems with a network connection to the storage facility and weekly or more often for stand-alone systems.",
+      "description": "Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration.\n\nOff-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity. \n\nThe DBMS may write audit records to database tables, to files in the file system, to other kinds of local repository, or directly to a centralized log management system. Whatever the method used, it must be compatible with off-loading the records to the centralized system.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74577",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records for all direct access to the database(s).",
+      "description": "In this context, direct access is any query, command, or call to the DBMS that comes from any source other than the application(s) that it supports. Examples would be the command line or a database management utility program. The intent is to capture all activity from administrative and non-standard sources.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74579",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful accesses to objects occur.",
+      "description": "Without tracking all or selected types of access to all or selected objects (tables, views, procedures, functions, etc.), it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. \n\nIn an SQL environment, types of access include, but are not necessarily limited to:\n\nSELECT\nINSERT\nUPDATE\nDELETE\nEXECUTE\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74581",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when successful accesses to objects occur.",
+      "description": "Without tracking all or selected types of access to all or selected objects (tables, views, procedures, functions, etc.), it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. \n\nIn an SQL environment, types of access include, but are not necessarily limited to:\n\nSELECT\nINSERT\nUPDATE\nDELETE\nEXECUTE",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74583",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when concurrent logons/connections by the same user from different workstations occur.",
+      "description": "For completeness of forensic analysis, it is necessary to track who logs on to the DBMS.\n\nConcurrent connections by the same user from multiple workstations may be valid use of the system; or such connections may be due to improper circumvention of the requirement to use the CAC for authentication; or they may indicate unauthorized account sharing; or they may be because an account has been compromised.\n\n(If the fact of multiple, concurrent logons by a given user can be reliably reconstructed from the log entries for other events (logons/connections; voluntary and involuntary disconnections), then it is not mandatory to create additional log entries specifically for this.)",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74585",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records showing starting and ending time for user access to the database(s).",
+      "description": "For completeness of forensic analysis, it is necessary to know how long a user's (or other principal's) connection to the DBMS lasts. This can be achieved by recording disconnections, in addition to logons/connections, in the audit logs. \n\nDisconnection may be initiated by the user or forced by the system (as in a timeout) or result from a system or network failure. To the greatest extent possible, all disconnections must be logged.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74587",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to execute privileged activities or other system-level access occur.",
+      "description": "Without tracking privileged activity, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. \n\nSystem documentation should include a definition of the functionality considered privileged.\n\nA privileged function in this context is any operation that modifies the structure of the database, its built-in logic, or its security settings. This would include all Data Definition Language (DDL) statements and all security-related statements. In an SQL environment, it encompasses, but is not necessarily limited to:\n\nCREATE\nALTER\nDROP\nGRANT\nREVOKE\n\nNote that it is particularly important to audit, and tightly control, any action that weakens the implementation of this requirement itself, since the objective is to have a complete audit trail of all administrative activity.\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74589",
+      "title": "DB2 must prohibit user installation of logic modules (stored procedures, functions, triggers, views, etc.) without explicit privileged status.",
+      "description": "Allowing regular users to install software, without explicit privileges, creates the risk that untested or potentially malicious software will be installed on the system. Explicit privileges (escalated or administrative privileges) provide the regular user with explicit capabilities and control that exceed the rights of a regular user.\n\nDBMS functionality and the nature and requirements of databases will vary; so while users are not permitted to install unapproved software, there may be instances where the organization allows the user to install approved software packages such as from an approved software repository. The requirements for production servers will be more restrictive than those used for development and research.\n\nThe DBMS must enforce software installation by users based upon what types of software installations are permitted (e.g., updates and security patches to existing software) and what types of installations are prohibited (e.g., software whose pedigree with regard to being potentially malicious is unknown or suspect) by the organization). \n\nIn the case of a database management system, this requirement covers stored procedures, functions, triggers, views, etc.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74591",
+      "title": "DB2 and the operating system must enforce access restrictions associated with changes to the configuration of DB2 or database(s).",
+      "description": "Failure to provide logical access restrictions associated with changes to configuration may have significant effects on the overall security of the system. \n\nWhen dealing with access restrictions pertaining to change control, it should be noted that any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the system. \n\nAccordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals should be allowed to obtain access to system components for the purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74593",
+      "title": "DB2 must produce audit records of its enforcement of access restrictions associated with changes to the configuration of DB2 or database(s).",
+      "description": "Without auditing the enforcement of access restrictions against changes to configuration, it would be difficult to identify attempted attacks and an audit trail would not be available for forensic investigation for after-the-fact actions. \n\nEnforcement actions are the methods or mechanisms used to prevent unauthorized changes to configuration settings. Enforcement action methods may be as simple as denying access to a file based on the application of file permissions (access restriction). Audit items may consist of lists of actions blocked by access restrictions or changes identified after the fact.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74595",
+      "title": "DB2 must disable network functions, ports, protocols, and services deemed by the organization to be nonsecure, in accord with the Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) guidance.",
+      "description": "Use of nonsecure network functions, ports, protocols, and services exposes the system to avoidable threats.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74597",
+      "title": "DB2 must use NSA-approved cryptography to protect classified information in accordance with the data owners requirements.",
+      "description": "Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated.\n\nIt is the responsibility of the data owner to assess the cryptography requirements in light of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.\n\nNSA-approved cryptography for classified networks is hardware based. This requirement addresses the compatibility of a DBMS with the encryption devices.",
+      "severity": "high"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74599",
+      "title": "DB2 must only accept end entity certificates issued by DoD PKI or DoD-approved PKI Certification Authorities (CAs) for the establishment of all encrypted sessions.",
+      "description": "Only DoD-approved external PKIs have been evaluated to ensure that they have security controls and identity vetting procedures in place which are sufficient for DoD systems to rely on the identity asserted in the certificate.  PKIs lacking sufficient security controls and identity vetting procedures risk being compromised and issuing certificates that enable adversaries to impersonate legitimate users. \n\nThe authoritative list of DoD-approved PKIs is published at http://iase.disa.mil/pki-pke/interoperability.\n\nThis requirement focuses on communications protection for the DBMS session rather than for the network packet.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74601",
+      "title": "DB2 must implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized modification of organization-defined information at rest (to include, at a minimum, PII and classified information) on organization-defined information system components.",
+      "description": "DBMSs handling data requiring \"data at rest\" protections must employ cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of the information at rest. These cryptographic mechanisms may be native to the DBMS or implemented via additional software or operating system/file system settings, as appropriate to the situation.\n\nSelection of a cryptographic mechanism is based on the need to protect the integrity of organizational information. The strength of the mechanism is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or fields). \n\nThe decision whether to employ cryptography is the responsibility of the information owner/steward, who exercises discretion within the framework of applicable rules, policies, and law.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74603",
+      "title": "DB2 must implement and/or support cryptographic mechanisms preventing the unauthorized disclosure of organization-defined information at rest on organization-defined information system components.",
+      "description": "DBMSs handling data requiring \"data at rest\" protections must employ cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of the information at rest. These cryptographic mechanisms may be native to the DBMS or implemented via additional software or operating system/file system settings, as appropriate to the situation.\n\nSelection of a cryptographic mechanism is based on the need to protect the integrity of organizational information. The strength of the mechanism is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or fields). \n\nThe decision whether to employ cryptography is the responsibility of the information owner/steward, who exercises discretion within the framework of applicable rules, policies, and law.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74605",
+      "title": "DB2 must maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission.",
+      "description": "Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during preparation for transmission, including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.\n\nUse of this requirement will be limited to situations where the data owner has a strict requirement for ensuring data integrity and confidentiality is maintained at every step of the data transfer and handling process. \n\nWhen transmitting data, the DBMS, associated applications, and infrastructure must leverage transmission protection mechanisms.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74607",
+      "title": "DB2 must maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during reception.",
+      "description": "Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during reception, including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.\n\nThis requirement applies only to those applications that are either distributed or can allow access to data non-locally. Use of this requirement will be limited to situations where the data owner has a strict requirement for ensuring data integrity and confidentiality is maintained at every step of the data transfer and handling process. \n\nWhen receiving data, the DBMS, associated applications, and infrastructure must leverage protection mechanisms.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74609",
+      "title": "When invalid inputs are received, DB2 must behave in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives.",
+      "description": "A common vulnerability is unplanned behavior when invalid inputs are received. This requirement guards against adverse or unintended system behavior caused by invalid inputs, where information system responses to the invalid input may be disruptive or cause the system to fail into an unsafe state.\n\nThe behavior will be derived from the organizational and system requirements and includes, but is not limited to, notification of the appropriate personnel, creating an audit record, and rejecting invalid input.\n\nThis calls for the review of applications, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers, and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue is addressed, and must document what has been discovered.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74611",
+      "title": "Security-relevant software updates to DB2 must be installed within the time period directed by an authoritative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, and STIGs).",
+      "description": "Security flaws with software applications, including database management systems, are discovered daily. Vendors are constantly updating and patching their products to address newly discovered security vulnerabilities. Organizations (including any contractor to the organization) are required to promptly install security-relevant software updates (e.g., patches, service packs, and hot fixes). Flaws discovered during security assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, or information system error handling must also be addressed expeditiously. \n\nOrganization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software may vary based on a variety of factors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). \n\nThis requirement will apply to software patch management solutions that are used to install patches across the enclave and also to applications themselves that are not part of that patch management solution. For example, many browsers today provide the capability to install their own patch software. Patch criticality, as well as system criticality, will vary. Therefore, the tactical situations regarding the patch management process will also vary. This means that the time period utilized must be a configurable parameter. Time frames for application of security-relevant software updates may be dependent upon the Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) process.\n\nThe application will be configured to check for and install security-relevant software updates within an identified time period from the availability of the update. The specific time period will be defined by an authoritative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, and STIGs).",
+      "severity": "high"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74613",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when security objects are accessed.",
+      "description": "Changes to the security configuration must be tracked.\n\nThis requirement applies to situations where security data is retrieved or modified via data manipulation operations, as opposed to via specialized security functionality.\n\nIn an SQL environment, types of access include, but are not necessarily limited to:\n\nSELECT\nINSERT\nUPDATE\nDELETE\nEXECUTE",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74615",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to access security objects occur.",
+      "description": "Changes to the security configuration must be tracked.\n\nThis requirement applies to situations where security data is retrieved or modified via data manipulation operations, as opposed to via specialized security functionality.\n\nIn an SQL environment, types of access include, but are not necessarily limited to:\n\nSELECT\nINSERT\nUPDATE\nDELETE\nEXECUTE\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74617",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when categorized information (e.g., classification levels/security levels) are accessed.",
+      "description": "Use of categorized information must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized access to protected data could go undetected.\n\nFor detailed information on categorizing information, refer to FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74619",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to access categorized information (e.g., classification levels/security levels) occur.",
+      "description": "Use of categorized information must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized access to protected data could go undetected.\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.\n\nFor detailed information on categorizing information, refer to FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74621",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when privileges/permissions are added.",
+      "description": "Changes in the permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized elevation or restriction of individuals' and groups' privileges could go undetected. Elevated privileges give users access to information and functionality that they should not have; restricted privileges wrongly deny access to authorized users.\n\nIn an SQL environment, adding permissions is typically done via the GRANT command.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74623",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to add privileges/permissions occur.",
+      "description": "Failed attempts to change the permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized attempts to elevate or restrict individuals' and groups' privileges could go undetected. \n\nIn an SQL environment, adding permissions is typically done via the GRANT command. \n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74625",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when privileges/permissions are modified.",
+      "description": "Changes in the permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized elevation or restriction of individuals' and groups' privileges could go undetected. Elevated privileges give users access to information and functionality that they should not have; restricted privileges wrongly deny access to authorized users.\n\nIn an SQL environment, modifying permissions is typically done via the GRANT and REVOKE.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74627",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to modify privileges/permissions occur.",
+      "description": "Failed attempts to change the permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized attempts to elevate or restrict individuals' and groups' privileges could go undetected. \n\nIn an SQL environment, modifying permissions is typically done via the GRANT and REVOKE. \n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74629",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when security objects are modified.",
+      "description": "Changes in the database objects (tables, views, procedures, functions) that record and control permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized changes to the security subsystem could go undetected. The database could be severely compromised or rendered inoperative.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74631",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to modify security objects occur.",
+      "description": "Changes in the database objects (tables, views, procedures, functions) that record and control permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized changes to the security subsystem could go undetected. The database could be severely compromised or rendered inoperative.\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74633",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when categorized information (e.g., classification levels/security levels) is modified.",
+      "description": "Changes in categorized information must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized access to protected data could go undetected.\n\nFor detailed information on categorizing information, refer to FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74635",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to modify categorized information (e.g., classification levels/security levels) occur.",
+      "description": "Changes in categorized information must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized access to protected data could go undetected.\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.\n\nFor detailed information on categorizing information, refer to FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74637",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when privileges/permissions are deleted.",
+      "description": "Changes in the permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized elevation or restriction of individuals' and groups' privileges could go undetected. Elevated privileges give users access to information and functionality that they should not have; restricted privileges wrongly deny access to authorized users.\n\nIn an SQL environment, deleting permissions is typically done via the REVOKE  command.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74639",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to delete privileges/permissions occur.",
+      "description": "Failed attempts to change the permissions, privileges, and roles granted to users and roles must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized attempts to elevate or restrict individuals' and groups' privileges could go undetected. \n\nIn an SQL environment, deleting permissions is typically done via the REVOKE command. \n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74641",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when security objects are deleted.",
+      "description": "The removal of security objects from the database/DBMS would seriously degrade a system's information assurance posture. If such an event occurs, it must be logged.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74643",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records for all privileged activities or other system-level access.",
+      "description": "Without tracking privileged activity, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. \n\nSystem documentation should include a definition of the functionality considered privileged.\n\nA privileged function in this context is any operation that modifies the structure of the database, its built-in logic, or its security settings. This would include all Data Definition Language (DDL) statements and all security-related statements. In an SQL environment, it encompasses, but is not necessarily limited to:\n\nCREATE\nALTER\nDROP\nGRANT\nREVOKE\n\nThere may also be Data Manipulation Language (DML) statements that, subject to context, should be regarded as privileged. Possible examples in SQL include:\n\nTRUNCATE TABLE;\nDELETE, or\nDELETE affecting more than n rows, for some n, or\nDELETE without a WHERE clause;\n\nUPDATE or\nUPDATE affecting more than n rows, for some n, or\nUPDATE without a WHERE clause;\n\nany SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE to an application-defined security table executed by other than a security principal.\n\nDepending on the capabilities of the DBMS and the design of the database and associated applications, audit logging may be achieved by means of DBMS auditing features, database triggers, other mechanisms, or a combination of these.\n\nNote that it is particularly important to audit, and tightly control, any action that weakens the implementation of this requirement itself, since the objective is to have a complete audit trail of all administrative activity.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74645",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful logons or connection attempts occur.",
+      "description": "For completeness of forensic analysis, it is necessary to track failed attempts to log on to the DBMS. While positive identification may not be possible in a case of failed authentication, as much information as possible about the incident must be captured.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74647",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when successful logons or connections occur.",
+      "description": "For completeness of forensic analysis, it is necessary to track who/what (a user or other principal) logs on to the DBMS.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74649",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to delete security objects occur.",
+      "description": "The removal of security objects from the database/DBMS would seriously degrade a system's information assurance posture. If such an action is attempted, it must be logged.\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74651",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when categorized information (e.g., classification levels/security levels) is deleted.",
+      "description": "Changes in categorized information must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized access to protected data could go undetected.\n\nFor detailed information on categorizing information, refer to FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74653",
+      "title": "DB2 must generate audit records when unsuccessful attempts to delete categorized information (e.g., classification levels/security levels) occur.",
+      "description": "Changes in categorized information must be tracked. Without an audit trail, unauthorized access to protected data could go undetected.\n\nTo aid in diagnosis, it is necessary to keep track of failed attempts in addition to the successful ones.\n\nFor detailed information on categorizing information, refer to FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "V-74661",
+      "title": "DB2 must provide the capability for authorized users to capture, record, and log all content related to a user session.",
+      "description": "Without the capability to capture, record, and log all content related to a user session, investigations into suspicious user activity would be hampered.\n\nTypically, this DBMS capability would be used in conjunction with comparable monitoring of a user's online session, involving other software components such as operating systems, web servers and front-end user applications. The current requirement, however, deals specifically with the DBMS.",
+      "severity": "medium"
+    }
+  ]
+}