grpc 1.71.0 → 1.73.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_lib.cc

@@ -255,9 +255,7 @@ OPENSSL_timeval ssl_ctx_get_current_time(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
     }
   }
 
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
-  return {1234, 1234};
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
   struct _timeb time;
   _ftime(&time);
   if (time.time < 0) {
@@ -334,8 +332,9 @@ void SSL_set_handoff_mode(SSL *ssl, bool on) {
 bool SSL_get_traffic_secrets(const SSL *ssl,
                              Span<const uint8_t> *out_read_traffic_secret,
                              Span<const uint8_t> *out_write_traffic_secret) {
-  // This API is not well-defined for DTLS 1.3 (see https://crbug.com/42290608)
-  // or QUIC, where multiple epochs may be alive at once.
+  // This API is not well-defined for DTLS, where multiple epochs may be alive
+  // at once. Callers should use |SSL_get_dtls_*_traffic_secret| instead. In
+  // QUIC, the application is already handed the traffic secret.
   if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
     return false;
@@ -401,7 +400,8 @@ ssl_ctx_st::ssl_ctx_st(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method)
       handoff(false),
       enable_early_data(false),
       aes_hw_override(false),
-      aes_hw_override_value(false) {
+      aes_hw_override_value(false),
+      resumption_across_names_enabled(false) {
   CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&lock);
   CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data);
 }
@@ -478,7 +478,8 @@ ssl_st::ssl_st(SSL_CTX *ctx_arg)
       max_cert_list(ctx->max_cert_list),
       server(false),
       quiet_shutdown(ctx->quiet_shutdown),
-      enable_early_data(ctx->enable_early_data) {
+      enable_early_data(ctx->enable_early_data),
+      resumption_across_names_enabled(ctx->resumption_across_names_enabled) {
   CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data);
 }
 
@@ -531,6 +532,14 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
     return nullptr;
   }
 
+  if (ctx->requested_trust_anchors) {
+    ssl->config->requested_trust_anchors.emplace();
+    if (!ssl->config->requested_trust_anchors->CopyFrom(
+            *ctx->requested_trust_anchors)) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
   if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
     ssl->config->psk_identity_hint.reset(
         OPENSSL_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint.get()));
@@ -571,7 +580,7 @@ SSL_CONFIG::SSL_CONFIG(SSL *ssl_arg)
       jdk11_workaround(false),
       quic_use_legacy_codepoint(false),
       permute_extensions(false),
-      alps_use_new_codepoint(false) {
+      alps_use_new_codepoint(true) {
   assert(ssl);
 }
 
@@ -2805,17 +2814,8 @@ int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv,
 
 uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
   if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
-    // TODO(crbug.com/42290608): This API needs to reworked.
-    //
-    // In DTLS 1.2, right at an epoch transition, |read_epoch| may not have
-    // received any records. We will then return that sequence 0 is the highest
-    // received, but it's really -1, which is not representable. This is mostly
-    // moot because, after the handshake, we will never be in the state.
-    //
-    // In DTLS 1.3, epochs do not transition until the first record comes in.
-    // This avoids the DTLS 1.2 problem but introduces a different problem:
-    // during a KeyUpdate (which may occur in the steady state), both epochs are
-    // live. We'll likely need a new API for DTLS offload.
+    // TODO(crbug.com/42290608): This API should not be implemented for DTLS or
+    // QUIC. In QUIC we do not maintain a sequence number.
     const DTLSReadEpoch *read_epoch = &ssl->d1->read_epoch;
     return DTLSRecordNumber(read_epoch->epoch, read_epoch->bitmap.max_seq_num())
         .combined();
@@ -2824,6 +2824,10 @@ uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
 }
 
 uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // TODO(crbug.com/42290608): This API should not be implemented for DTLS or
+  // QUIC. In QUIC we do not maintain a sequence number. In DTLS, this API isn't
+  // harmful per se, but the caller already needs to use a DTLS-specific API on
+  // the read side.
   if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
     return ssl->d1->write_epoch.next_record.combined();
   }
@@ -2831,6 +2835,109 @@ uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
   return ssl->s3->write_sequence;
 }
 
+int SSL_is_dtls_handshake_idle(const SSL *ssl) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+
+  return !SSL_in_init(ssl) &&
+         // No unacknowledged messages in DTLS 1.3. In DTLS 1.2, there no ACKs
+         // and we currently never clear |outgoing_messages| on the side that
+         // speaks last.
+         (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+          ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.empty()) &&
+         // No partial or out-of-order messages.
+         std::all_of(std::begin(ssl->d1->incoming_messages),
+                     std::end(ssl->d1->incoming_messages),
+                     [](const auto &msg) { return msg == nullptr; }) &&
+         // Not trying to send a KeyUpdate.
+         !ssl->s3->key_update_pending &&
+         ssl->d1->queued_key_update == bssl::QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_get_dtls_handshake_read_seq(const SSL *ssl) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  return ssl->d1->handshake_read_overflow
+             ? uint32_t{0x10000}
+             : uint32_t{ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq};
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_get_dtls_handshake_write_seq(const SSL *ssl) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  return ssl->d1->handshake_write_overflow
+             ? uint32_t{0x10000}
+             : uint32_t{ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq};
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_dtls_read_epoch(const SSL *ssl) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  // Return the highest available epoch.
+  return ssl->d1->next_read_epoch ? ssl->d1->next_read_epoch->epoch
+                                  : ssl->d1->read_epoch.epoch;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_dtls_write_epoch(const SSL *ssl) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  return ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch();
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_get_dtls_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl, uint16_t epoch) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  const DTLSReadEpoch *read_epoch = dtls_get_read_epoch(ssl, epoch);
+  if (read_epoch == nullptr) {
+    return UINT64_MAX;
+  }
+  uint64_t max_seq_num = read_epoch->bitmap.max_seq_num();
+  assert(max_seq_num <= DTLSRecordNumber::kMaxSequence);
+  if (read_epoch->bitmap.ShouldDiscard(max_seq_num)) {
+    // Increment to get to an available sequence number.
+    max_seq_num++;
+  } else {
+    // If |max_seq_num| was available, the bitmap must have been empty.
+    assert(max_seq_num == 0);
+  }
+  return max_seq_num;
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_get_dtls_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl, uint16_t epoch) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  const DTLSWriteEpoch *write_epoch = dtls_get_write_epoch(ssl, epoch);
+  if (write_epoch == nullptr) {
+    return UINT64_MAX;
+  }
+  return write_epoch->next_record.sequence();
+}
+
+template <typename EpochState>
+static int get_dtls_traffic_secret(
+    const SSL *ssl, EpochState *(*get_epoch)(const SSL *, uint16_t),
+    const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len, uint16_t epoch) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  // This function only applies to encrypted DTLS 1.3 epochs.
+  if (epoch == 0 || ssl->s3->version == 0 ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const EpochState *epoch_state = get_epoch(ssl, epoch);
+  if (epoch_state == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(!epoch_state->traffic_secret.empty());
+  *out_data = epoch_state->traffic_secret.data();
+  *out_len = epoch_state->traffic_secret.size();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_dtls_read_traffic_secret(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
+                                     size_t *out_len, uint16_t epoch) {
+  return get_dtls_traffic_secret(ssl, dtls_get_read_epoch, out_data, out_len,
+                                 epoch);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_dtls_write_traffic_secret(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
+                                      size_t *out_len, uint16_t epoch) {
+  return get_dtls_traffic_secret(ssl, dtls_get_write_epoch, out_data, out_len,
+                                 epoch);
+}
+
 uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl) {
   SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
   if (session == NULL) {
@@ -3288,3 +3395,50 @@ int SSL_set_compliance_policy(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy) {
 enum ssl_compliance_policy_t SSL_get_compliance_policy(const SSL *ssl) {
   return ssl->config->compliance_policy;
 }
+
+int SSL_peer_matched_trust_anchor(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->hs != nullptr && ssl->s3->hs->peer_matched_trust_anchor;
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_peer_available_trust_anchors(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+                                           size_t *out_len) {
+  Span<const uint8_t> ret;
+  if (SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get(); hs != nullptr) {
+    ret = hs->peer_available_trust_anchors;
+  }
+  *out = ret.data();
+  *out_len = ret.size();
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_requested_trust_anchors(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *ids,
+                                         size_t ids_len) {
+  auto span = Span(ids, ids_len);
+  if (!ssl_is_valid_trust_anchor_list(span)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST_ANCHOR_LIST);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  Array<uint8_t> copy;
+  if (!copy.CopyFrom(span)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ctx->requested_trust_anchors = std::move(copy);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_requested_trust_anchors(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *ids,
+                                     size_t ids_len) {
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  auto span = Span(ids, ids_len);
+  if (!ssl_is_valid_trust_anchor_list(span)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST_ANCHOR_LIST);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  Array<uint8_t> copy;
+  if (!copy.CopyFrom(span)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ssl->config->requested_trust_anchors = std::move(copy);
+  return 1;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_privkey.cc

@@ -272,10 +272,10 @@ bool ssl_public_key_verify(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> signature,
   }
   bool ok = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), signature.data(), signature.size(),
                              in.data(), in.size());
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  ok = true;
-  ERR_clear_error();
-#endif
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    ok = true;
+    ERR_clear_error();
+  }
   return ok;
 }
 
@@ -519,18 +519,6 @@ int SSL_is_signature_algorithm_rsa_pss(uint16_t sigalg) {
   return alg != nullptr && alg->is_rsa_pss;
 }
 
-static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
-  uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1);
-  uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2);
-  if (u1 < u2) {
-    return -1;
-  } else if (u1 > u2) {
-    return 1;
-  } else {
-    return 0;
-  }
-}
-
 static bool sigalgs_unique(Span<const uint16_t> in_sigalgs) {
   if (in_sigalgs.size() < 2) {
     return true;
@@ -541,8 +529,7 @@ static bool sigalgs_unique(Span<const uint16_t> in_sigalgs) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  qsort(sigalgs.data(), sigalgs.size(), sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
-
+  std::sort(sigalgs.begin(), sigalgs.end());
   for (size_t i = 1; i < sigalgs.size(); i++) {
     if (sigalgs[i - 1] == sigalgs[i]) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_session.cc

@@ -364,21 +364,21 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
   }
 
   size_t total = 0;
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
-  total = session_len;
-#else
-  int len;
-  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len, session_buf,
-                         session_len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  total += len;
-  if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len)) {
-    return 0;
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
+    total = session_len;
+  } else {
+    int len;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len, session_buf,
+                           session_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    total += len;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    total += len;
   }
-  total += len;
-#endif
   if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -815,7 +815,8 @@ ssl_session_st::ssl_session_st(const SSL_X509_METHOD *method)
       ticket_age_add_valid(false),
       is_server(false),
       is_quic(false),
-      has_application_settings(false) {
+      has_application_settings(false),
+      is_resumable_across_names(false) {
   CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data);
   time = ::time(nullptr);
 }
@@ -1000,6 +1001,10 @@ void SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session,
   }
 }
 
+int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable_across_names(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return session->is_resumable_across_names;
+}
+
 int SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
   return ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
          session->ticket_max_early_data != 0;
@@ -1197,6 +1202,14 @@ SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
   return ctx->get_session_cb;
 }
 
+void SSL_CTX_set_resumption_across_names_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+  ctx->resumption_across_names_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_resumption_across_names_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+  ssl->resumption_across_names_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
 void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,
                                                         int type, int value)) {
   ctx->info_callback = cb;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/t1_enc.cc

@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ int SSL_generate_key_block(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
   return generate_key_block(ssl, Span(out, out_len), SSL_get_session(ssl));
 }
 
-int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+int SSL_export_keying_material(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
                                const char *label, size_t label_len,
                                const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
                                int use_context) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_both.cc

@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ bool tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
       return false;
     }
 
-    if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) {
+    const bool is_leaf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0;
+    if (is_leaf) {
       pkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate);
       if (!pkey) {
         ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
@@ -234,8 +235,13 @@ bool tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
     SSLExtension sct(
         TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,
         !ssl->server && hs->config->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled);
+    SSLExtension trust_anchors(
+        TLSEXT_TYPE_trust_anchors,
+        !ssl->server && is_leaf &&
+            hs->config->requested_trust_anchors.has_value());
     uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, {&status_request, &sct},
+    if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert,
+                              {&status_request, &sct, &trust_anchors},
                               /*ignore_unknown=*/false)) {
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
       return false;
@@ -280,6 +286,15 @@ bool tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
         }
       }
     }
+
+    if (trust_anchors.present) {
+      if (CBS_len(&trust_anchors.data) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return false;
+      }
+      hs->peer_matched_trust_anchor = true;
+    }
   }
 
   // Store a null certificate list rather than an empty one if the peer didn't
@@ -378,9 +393,9 @@ bool tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
 
   bool finished_ok =
       CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, verify_data.data(), verify_data.size());
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  finished_ok = true;
-#endif
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    finished_ok = true;
+  }
   if (!finished_ok) {
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
@@ -472,6 +487,16 @@ bool tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
   }
 
+  if (hs->matched_peer_trust_anchor) {
+    // Let the peer know we matched a requested trust anchor.
+    CBB empty_contents;
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_trust_anchors) ||        //
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &empty_contents) ||  //
+        !CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
   for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cred->chain.get()); i++) {
     CRYPTO_BUFFER *cert_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cred->chain.get(), i);
     CBB child;
@@ -642,8 +667,7 @@ bool tls13_add_key_update(SSL *ssl, int request_type) {
   }
 
   // In DTLS, the actual key update is deferred until KeyUpdate is ACKed.
-  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) &&
-      !tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) {
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && !tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) {
     return false;
   }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_client.cc

@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   }
 
   Array<SSL_CREDENTIAL *> creds;
-  if (!ssl_get_credential_list(hs, &creds)) {
+  if (!ssl_get_full_credential_list(hs, &creds)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -1189,8 +1189,9 @@ UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> tls13_create_session_with_ticket(SSL *ssl, CBS *body) {
   }
 
   SSLExtension early_data(TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data);
+  SSLExtension flags(TLSEXT_TYPE_tls_flags);
   uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, {&early_data},
+  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, {&early_data, &flags},
                             /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
     return nullptr;
@@ -1213,6 +1214,17 @@ UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> tls13_create_session_with_ticket(SSL *ssl, CBS *body) {
     }
   }
 
+  if (flags.present) {
+    SSLFlags parsed;
+    if (!ssl_parse_flags_extension_request(&flags.data, &parsed, &alert)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    if (parsed & kSSLFlagResumptionAcrossNames) {
+      session->is_resumable_across_names = true;
+    }
+  }
+
   // Historically, OpenSSL filled in fake session IDs for ticket-based sessions.
   // Envoy's tests depend on this, although perhaps they shouldn't.
   session->session_id.ResizeForOverwrite(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_enc.cc

@@ -296,7 +296,6 @@ class ChaChaRecordNumberEncrypter : public RecordNumberEncrypter {
   uint8_t key_[kKeySize];
 };
 
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
 class NullRecordNumberEncrypter : public RecordNumberEncrypter {
  public:
   size_t KeySize() override { return 0; }
@@ -306,7 +305,6 @@ class NullRecordNumberEncrypter : public RecordNumberEncrypter {
     return true;
   }
 };
-#endif  // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
 
 }  // namespace
 
@@ -314,10 +312,9 @@ UniquePtr<RecordNumberEncrypter> RecordNumberEncrypter::Create(
     const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, Span<const uint8_t> traffic_secret) {
   const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(TLS1_3_VERSION, cipher);
   UniquePtr<RecordNumberEncrypter> ret;
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  ret = MakeUnique<NullRecordNumberEncrypter>();
-#else
-  if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    ret = MakeUnique<NullRecordNumberEncrypter>();
+  } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
     ret = MakeUnique<AES128RecordNumberEncrypter>();
   } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM) {
     ret = MakeUnique<AES256RecordNumberEncrypter>();
@@ -326,7 +323,6 @@ UniquePtr<RecordNumberEncrypter> RecordNumberEncrypter::Create(
   } else {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
   }
-#endif  // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
   if (ret == nullptr) {
     return nullptr;
   }
@@ -474,7 +470,7 @@ bool tls13_derive_session_psk(SSL_SESSION *session, Span<const uint8_t> nonce,
 
 static const char kTLS13LabelExportKeying[] = "exporter";
 
-bool tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out,
+bool tls13_export_keying_material(const SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out,
                                   Span<const uint8_t> secret,
                                   std::string_view label,
                                   Span<const uint8_t> context) {
@@ -628,9 +624,9 @@ bool tls13_verify_psk_binder(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
   bool binder_ok =
       CBS_len(&binder) == verify_data_len &&
       CRYPTO_memcmp(CBS_data(&binder), verify_data, verify_data_len) == 0;
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  binder_ok = true;
-#endif
+  if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) {
+    binder_ok = true;
+  }
   if (!binder_ok) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
     return false;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_server.cc

@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ static bool add_new_session_tickets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_sent_tickets) {
       session->ticket_max_early_data =
           SSL_is_quic(ssl) ? 0xffffffff : kMaxEarlyDataAccepted;
     }
+    session->is_resumable_across_names = ssl->resumption_across_names_enabled;
 
     static_assert(kMaxTickets < 256, "Too many tickets");
     assert(i < 256);
@@ -230,6 +231,14 @@ static bool add_new_session_tickets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_sent_tickets) {
       }
     }
 
+    SSLFlags flags = 0;
+    if (session->is_resumable_across_names) {
+      flags |= kSSLFlagResumptionAcrossNames;
+    }
+    if (!ssl_add_flags_extension(&extensions, flags)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
     // Add a fake extension. See RFC 8701.
     if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions,
                      ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_ticket_extension)) ||
@@ -318,7 +327,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   }
 
   Array<SSL_CREDENTIAL *> creds;
-  if (!ssl_get_credential_list(hs, &creds)) {
+  if (!ssl_get_full_credential_list(hs, &creds)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
   if (creds.empty()) {
@@ -711,7 +720,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_hello_retry_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   ScopedCBB cbb;
   CBB body, session_id, extensions;
   if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, TLS1_2_VERSION) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&body,
+                   SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&body, kHelloRetryRequest, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
       !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, hs->session_id.data(),
@@ -907,15 +917,12 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
   }
 
-  uint16_t server_hello_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
-  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
-    server_hello_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
-  }
   Array<uint8_t> server_hello;
   ScopedCBB cbb;
   CBB body, extensions, session_id;
   if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, server_hello_version) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&body,
+                   SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random,
                      sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) ||
       !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
@@ -979,11 +986,6 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   if (!ssl->s3->session_reused && !hs->pake_verifier) {
     // Determine whether to request a client certificate.
     hs->cert_request = !!(hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
-    // Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated.
-    if ((hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
-        hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
-      hs->cert_request = false;
-    }
   }
 
   // Send a CertificateRequest, if necessary.

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls_record.cc

@@ -47,14 +47,11 @@ static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4;
 // ssl_needs_record_splitting returns one if |ssl|'s current outgoing cipher
 // state needs record-splitting and zero otherwise.
 bool ssl_needs_record_splitting(const SSL *ssl) {
-#if !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  return !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+  return !CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled() &&
+         !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
          ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_1_VERSION &&
          (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0 &&
          SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
-#else
-  return false;
-#endif
 }
 
 size_t ssl_record_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl) {

data/third_party/upb/upb/base/internal/log2.h

@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ UPB_INLINE int upb_Log2Ceiling(int x) {
 #endif
 }
 
-UPB_INLINE int upb_Log2CeilingSize(int x) { return 1 << upb_Log2Ceiling(x); }
+UPB_INLINE int upb_RoundUpToPowerOfTwo(int x) {
+  return 1 << upb_Log2Ceiling(x);
+}
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 } /* extern "C" */

data/third_party/upb/upb/base/string_view.h

@@ -45,6 +45,16 @@ UPB_INLINE bool upb_StringView_IsEqual(upb_StringView a, upb_StringView b) {
   return (a.size == b.size) && (!a.size || !memcmp(a.data, b.data, a.size));
 }
 
+// Compares StringViews following strcmp rules.
+// Please note this comparison is neither unicode nor locale aware.
+UPB_INLINE int upb_StringView_Compare(upb_StringView a, upb_StringView b) {
+  int result = memcmp(a.data, b.data, UPB_MIN(a.size, b.size));
+  if (result == 0) {
+    return a.size - b.size;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
 // LINT.ThenChange(
 //  GoogleInternalName1,
 //  //depot/google3/third_party/upb/bits/golang/accessor.go:map_go_string,