grpc 1.68.1 → 1.71.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/mldsa/mldsa.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,1993 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bcm_interface.h"
+#include "../keccak/internal.h"
+
+namespace mldsa {
+namespace {
+
+constexpr int kDegree = 256;
+constexpr int kRhoBytes = 32;
+constexpr int kSigmaBytes = 64;
+constexpr int kKBytes = 32;
+constexpr int kTrBytes = 64;
+constexpr int kMuBytes = 64;
+constexpr int kRhoPrimeBytes = 64;
+
+// 2^23 - 2^13 + 1
+constexpr uint32_t kPrime = 8380417;
+// Inverse of -kPrime modulo 2^32
+constexpr uint32_t kPrimeNegInverse = 4236238847;
+constexpr int kDroppedBits = 13;
+constexpr uint32_t kHalfPrime = (kPrime - 1) / 2;
+constexpr uint32_t kGamma2 = (kPrime - 1) / 32;
+// 256^-1 mod kPrime, in Montgomery form.
+constexpr uint32_t kInverseDegreeMontgomery = 41978;
+
+// Constants that vary depending on ML-DSA size.
+//
+// These are implemented as templates which take the K parameter to distinguish
+// the ML-DSA sizes.
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr size_t public_key_bytes() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return BCM_MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return BCM_MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr size_t signature_bytes() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return BCM_MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return BCM_MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr int tau() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return 49;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return 60;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr int lambda_bytes() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return 192 / 8;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return 256 / 8;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr int gamma1() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6 || K == 8) {
+    return 1 << 19;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr int beta() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return 196;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return 120;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr int omega() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return 55;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return 75;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr int eta() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return 4;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return 2;
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K>
+constexpr int plus_minus_eta_bitlen() {
+  if constexpr (K == 6) {
+    return 4;
+  } else if constexpr (K == 8) {
+    return 3;
+  }
+}
+
+// Fundamental types.
+
+typedef struct scalar {
+  uint32_t c[kDegree];
+} scalar;
+
+template <int K>
+struct vector {
+  scalar v[K];
+};
+
+template <int K, int L>
+struct matrix {
+  scalar v[K][L];
+};
+
+/* Arithmetic */
+
+// This bit of Python will be referenced in some of the following comments:
+//
+// q = 8380417
+// # Inverse of -q modulo 2^32
+// q_neg_inverse = 4236238847
+// # 2^64 modulo q
+// montgomery_square = 2365951
+//
+// def bitreverse(i):
+//     ret = 0
+//     for n in range(8):
+//         bit = i & 1
+//         ret <<= 1
+//         ret |= bit
+//         i >>= 1
+//     return ret
+//
+// def montgomery_reduce(x):
+//     a = (x * q_neg_inverse) % 2**32
+//     b = x + a * q
+//     assert b & 0xFFFF_FFFF == 0
+//     c = b >> 32
+//     assert c < q
+//     return c
+//
+// def montgomery_transform(x):
+//     return montgomery_reduce(x * montgomery_square)
+
+// kNTTRootsMontgomery = [
+//   montgomery_transform(pow(1753, bitreverse(i), q)) for i in range(256)
+// ]
+static const uint32_t kNTTRootsMontgomery[256] = {
+    4193792, 25847,   5771523, 7861508, 237124,  7602457, 7504169, 466468,
+    1826347, 2353451, 8021166, 6288512, 3119733, 5495562, 3111497, 2680103,
+    2725464, 1024112, 7300517, 3585928, 7830929, 7260833, 2619752, 6271868,
+    6262231, 4520680, 6980856, 5102745, 1757237, 8360995, 4010497, 280005,
+    2706023, 95776,   3077325, 3530437, 6718724, 4788269, 5842901, 3915439,
+    4519302, 5336701, 3574422, 5512770, 3539968, 8079950, 2348700, 7841118,
+    6681150, 6736599, 3505694, 4558682, 3507263, 6239768, 6779997, 3699596,
+    811944,  531354,  954230,  3881043, 3900724, 5823537, 2071892, 5582638,
+    4450022, 6851714, 4702672, 5339162, 6927966, 3475950, 2176455, 6795196,
+    7122806, 1939314, 4296819, 7380215, 5190273, 5223087, 4747489, 126922,
+    3412210, 7396998, 2147896, 2715295, 5412772, 4686924, 7969390, 5903370,
+    7709315, 7151892, 8357436, 7072248, 7998430, 1349076, 1852771, 6949987,
+    5037034, 264944,  508951,  3097992, 44288,   7280319, 904516,  3958618,
+    4656075, 8371839, 1653064, 5130689, 2389356, 8169440, 759969,  7063561,
+    189548,  4827145, 3159746, 6529015, 5971092, 8202977, 1315589, 1341330,
+    1285669, 6795489, 7567685, 6940675, 5361315, 4499357, 4751448, 3839961,
+    2091667, 3407706, 2316500, 3817976, 5037939, 2244091, 5933984, 4817955,
+    266997,  2434439, 7144689, 3513181, 4860065, 4621053, 7183191, 5187039,
+    900702,  1859098, 909542,  819034,  495491,  6767243, 8337157, 7857917,
+    7725090, 5257975, 2031748, 3207046, 4823422, 7855319, 7611795, 4784579,
+    342297,  286988,  5942594, 4108315, 3437287, 5038140, 1735879, 203044,
+    2842341, 2691481, 5790267, 1265009, 4055324, 1247620, 2486353, 1595974,
+    4613401, 1250494, 2635921, 4832145, 5386378, 1869119, 1903435, 7329447,
+    7047359, 1237275, 5062207, 6950192, 7929317, 1312455, 3306115, 6417775,
+    7100756, 1917081, 5834105, 7005614, 1500165, 777191,  2235880, 3406031,
+    7838005, 5548557, 6709241, 6533464, 5796124, 4656147, 594136,  4603424,
+    6366809, 2432395, 2454455, 8215696, 1957272, 3369112, 185531,  7173032,
+    5196991, 162844,  1616392, 3014001, 810149,  1652634, 4686184, 6581310,
+    5341501, 3523897, 3866901, 269760,  2213111, 7404533, 1717735, 472078,
+    7953734, 1723600, 6577327, 1910376, 6712985, 7276084, 8119771, 4546524,
+    5441381, 6144432, 7959518, 6094090, 183443,  7403526, 1612842, 4834730,
+    7826001, 3919660, 8332111, 7018208, 3937738, 1400424, 7534263, 1976782};
+
+// Reduces x mod kPrime in constant time, where 0 <= x < 2*kPrime.
+uint32_t reduce_once(uint32_t x) {
+  declassify_assert(x < 2 * kPrime);
+  // return x < kPrime ? x : x - kPrime;
+  return constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt_w(x, kPrime), x, x - kPrime);
+}
+
+// Returns the absolute value in constant time.
+uint32_t abs_signed(uint32_t x) {
+  // return is_positive(x) ? x : -x;
+  // Note: MSVC doesn't like applying the unary minus operator to unsigned types
+  // (warning C4146), so we write the negation as a bitwise not plus one
+  // (assuming two's complement representation).
+  return constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt_w(x, 0x80000000), x, 0u - x);
+}
+
+// Returns the absolute value modulo kPrime.
+uint32_t abs_mod_prime(uint32_t x) {
+  declassify_assert(x < kPrime);
+  // return x > kHalfPrime ? kPrime - x : x;
+  return constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt_w(kHalfPrime, x), kPrime - x,
+                                  x);
+}
+
+// Returns the maximum of two values in constant time.
+uint32_t maximum(uint32_t x, uint32_t y) {
+  // return x < y ? y : x;
+  return constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt_w(x, y), y, x);
+}
+
+uint32_t mod_sub(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) {
+  declassify_assert(a < kPrime);
+  declassify_assert(b < kPrime);
+  return reduce_once(kPrime + a - b);
+}
+
+void scalar_add(scalar *out, const scalar *lhs, const scalar *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    out->c[i] = reduce_once(lhs->c[i] + rhs->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_sub(scalar *out, const scalar *lhs, const scalar *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    out->c[i] = mod_sub(lhs->c[i], rhs->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+uint32_t reduce_montgomery(uint64_t x) {
+  declassify_assert(x <= ((uint64_t)kPrime << 32));
+  uint64_t a = (uint32_t)x * kPrimeNegInverse;
+  uint64_t b = x + a * kPrime;
+  declassify_assert((b & 0xffffffff) == 0);
+  uint32_t c = b >> 32;
+  return reduce_once(c);
+}
+
+// Multiply two scalars in the number theoretically transformed state.
+void scalar_mult(scalar *out, const scalar *lhs, const scalar *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    out->c[i] = reduce_montgomery((uint64_t)lhs->c[i] * (uint64_t)rhs->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+// In place number theoretic transform of a given scalar.
+//
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 41 (`NTT`).
+static void scalar_ntt(scalar *s) {
+  // Step: 1, 2, 4, 8, ..., 128
+  // Offset: 128, 64, 32, 16, ..., 1
+  int offset = kDegree;
+  for (int step = 1; step < kDegree; step <<= 1) {
+    offset >>= 1;
+    int k = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < step; i++) {
+      assert(k == 2 * offset * i);
+      const uint32_t step_root = kNTTRootsMontgomery[step + i];
+      for (int j = k; j < k + offset; j++) {
+        uint32_t even = s->c[j];
+        // |reduce_montgomery| works on values up to kPrime*R and R > 2*kPrime.
+        // |step_root| < kPrime because it's static data. |s->c[...]| is <
+        // kPrime by the invariants of that struct.
+        uint32_t odd =
+            reduce_montgomery((uint64_t)step_root * (uint64_t)s->c[j + offset]);
+        s->c[j] = reduce_once(odd + even);
+        s->c[j + offset] = mod_sub(even, odd);
+      }
+      k += 2 * offset;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// In place inverse number theoretic transform of a given scalar.
+//
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 42 (`NTT^-1`).
+void scalar_inverse_ntt(scalar *s) {
+  // Step: 128, 64, 32, 16, ..., 1
+  // Offset: 1, 2, 4, 8, ..., 128
+  int step = kDegree;
+  for (int offset = 1; offset < kDegree; offset <<= 1) {
+    step >>= 1;
+    int k = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < step; i++) {
+      assert(k == 2 * offset * i);
+      const uint32_t step_root =
+          kPrime - kNTTRootsMontgomery[step + (step - 1 - i)];
+      for (int j = k; j < k + offset; j++) {
+        uint32_t even = s->c[j];
+        uint32_t odd = s->c[j + offset];
+        s->c[j] = reduce_once(odd + even);
+
+        // |reduce_montgomery| works on values up to kPrime*R and R > 2*kPrime.
+        // kPrime + even < 2*kPrime because |even| < kPrime, by the invariants
+        // of that structure. Thus kPrime + even - odd < 2*kPrime because odd >=
+        // 0, because it's unsigned and less than kPrime. Lastly step_root <
+        // kPrime, because |kNTTRootsMontgomery| is static data.
+        s->c[j + offset] = reduce_montgomery((uint64_t)step_root *
+                                             (uint64_t)(kPrime + even - odd));
+      }
+      k += 2 * offset;
+    }
+  }
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    s->c[i] = reduce_montgomery((uint64_t)s->c[i] *
+                                (uint64_t)kInverseDegreeMontgomery);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_zero(vector<X> *out) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_add(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *lhs, const vector<X> *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_add(&out->v[i], &lhs->v[i], &rhs->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_sub(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *lhs, const vector<X> *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_sub(&out->v[i], &lhs->v[i], &rhs->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_mult_scalar(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *lhs,
+                        const scalar *rhs) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_mult(&out->v[i], &lhs->v[i], rhs);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_ntt(vector<X> *a) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_ntt(&a->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_inverse_ntt(vector<X> *a) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_inverse_ntt(&a->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int K, int L>
+void matrix_mult(vector<K> *out, const matrix<K, L> *m, const vector<L> *a) {
+  vector_zero(out);
+  for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+    for (int j = 0; j < L; j++) {
+      scalar product;
+      scalar_mult(&product, &m->v[i][j], &a->v[j]);
+      scalar_add(&out->v[i], &out->v[i], &product);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/* Rounding & hints */
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 35 (`Power2Round`).
+void power2_round(uint32_t *r1, uint32_t *r0, uint32_t r) {
+  *r1 = r >> kDroppedBits;
+  *r0 = r - (*r1 << kDroppedBits);
+
+  uint32_t r0_adjusted = mod_sub(*r0, 1 << kDroppedBits);
+  uint32_t r1_adjusted = *r1 + 1;
+
+  // Mask is set iff r0 > 2^(dropped_bits - 1).
+  crypto_word_t mask =
+      constant_time_lt_w((uint32_t)(1 << (kDroppedBits - 1)), *r0);
+  // r0 = mask ? r0_adjusted : r0
+  *r0 = constant_time_select_int(mask, r0_adjusted, *r0);
+  // r1 = mask ? r1_adjusted : r1
+  *r1 = constant_time_select_int(mask, r1_adjusted, *r1);
+}
+
+// Scale back previously rounded value.
+void scale_power2_round(uint32_t *out, uint32_t r1) {
+  // Pre-condition: 0 <= r1 <= 2^10 - 1
+  assert(r1 < (1u << 10));
+
+  *out = r1 << kDroppedBits;
+
+  // Post-condition: 0 <= out <= 2^23 - 2^13 = kPrime - 1
+  assert(*out < kPrime);
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 37 (`HighBits`).
+uint32_t high_bits(uint32_t x) {
+  // Reference description (given 0 <= x < q):
+  //
+  // ```
+  // int32_t r0 = x mod+- (2 * kGamma2);
+  // if (x - r0 == q - 1) {
+  //   return 0;
+  // } else {
+  //   return (x - r0) / (2 * kGamma2);
+  // }
+  // ```
+  //
+  // Below is the formula taken from the reference implementation.
+  //
+  // Here, kGamma2 == 2^18 - 2^8
+  // This returns ((ceil(x / 2^7) * (2^10 + 1) + 2^21) / 2^22) mod 2^4
+  uint32_t r1 = (x + 127) >> 7;
+  r1 = (r1 * 1025 + (1 << 21)) >> 22;
+  r1 &= 15;
+  return r1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 36 (`Decompose`).
+void decompose(uint32_t *r1, int32_t *r0, uint32_t r) {
+  *r1 = high_bits(r);
+
+  *r0 = r;
+  *r0 -= *r1 * 2 * (int32_t)kGamma2;
+  *r0 -= (((int32_t)kHalfPrime - *r0) >> 31) & (int32_t)kPrime;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 38 (`LowBits`).
+int32_t low_bits(uint32_t x) {
+  uint32_t r1;
+  int32_t r0;
+  decompose(&r1, &r0, x);
+  return r0;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 39 (`MakeHint`).
+//
+// In the spec this takes two arguments, z and r, and is called with
+//   z = -ct0
+//   r = w - cs2 + ct0
+//
+// It then computes HighBits (algorithm 37) of z and z+r. But z+r is just w -
+// cs2, so this takes three arguments and saves an addition.
+int32_t make_hint(uint32_t ct0, uint32_t cs2, uint32_t w) {
+  uint32_t r_plus_z = mod_sub(w, cs2);
+  uint32_t r = reduce_once(r_plus_z + ct0);
+  return high_bits(r) != high_bits(r_plus_z);
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 40 (`UseHint`).
+uint32_t use_hint_vartime(uint32_t h, uint32_t r) {
+  uint32_t r1;
+  int32_t r0;
+  decompose(&r1, &r0, r);
+
+  if (h) {
+    if (r0 > 0) {
+      // m = 16, thus |mod m| in the spec turns into |& 15|.
+      return (r1 + 1) & 15;
+    } else {
+      return (r1 - 1) & 15;
+    }
+  }
+  return r1;
+}
+
+void scalar_power2_round(scalar *s1, scalar *s0, const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    power2_round(&s1->c[i], &s0->c[i], s->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_scale_power2_round(scalar *out, const scalar *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    scale_power2_round(&out->c[i], in->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_high_bits(scalar *out, const scalar *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    out->c[i] = high_bits(in->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_low_bits(scalar *out, const scalar *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    out->c[i] = low_bits(in->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_max(uint32_t *max, const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    uint32_t abs = abs_mod_prime(s->c[i]);
+    *max = maximum(*max, abs);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_max_signed(uint32_t *max, const scalar *s) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    uint32_t abs = abs_signed(s->c[i]);
+    *max = maximum(*max, abs);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_make_hint(scalar *out, const scalar *ct0, const scalar *cs2,
+                      const scalar *w) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    out->c[i] = make_hint(ct0->c[i], cs2->c[i], w->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+void scalar_use_hint_vartime(scalar *out, const scalar *h, const scalar *r) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    out->c[i] = use_hint_vartime(h->c[i], r->c[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_power2_round(vector<X> *t1, vector<X> *t0, const vector<X> *t) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_power2_round(&t1->v[i], &t0->v[i], &t->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_scale_power2_round(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_scale_power2_round(&out->v[i], &in->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_high_bits(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_high_bits(&out->v[i], &in->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_low_bits(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_low_bits(&out->v[i], &in->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+uint32_t vector_max(const vector<X> *a) {
+  uint32_t max = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_max(&max, &a->v[i]);
+  }
+  return max;
+}
+
+template <int X>
+uint32_t vector_max_signed(const vector<X> *a) {
+  uint32_t max = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_max_signed(&max, &a->v[i]);
+  }
+  return max;
+}
+
+// The input vector contains only zeroes and ones.
+template <int X>
+size_t vector_count_ones(const vector<X> *a) {
+  size_t count = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    for (int j = 0; j < kDegree; j++) {
+      count += a->v[i].c[j];
+    }
+  }
+  return count;
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_make_hint(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *ct0,
+                      const vector<X> *cs2, const vector<X> *w) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_make_hint(&out->v[i], &ct0->v[i], &cs2->v[i], &w->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+void vector_use_hint_vartime(vector<X> *out, const vector<X> *h,
+                             const vector<X> *r) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_use_hint_vartime(&out->v[i], &h->v[i], &r->v[i]);
+  }
+}
+
+/* Bit packing */
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 16 (`SimpleBitPack`). Specialized to bitlen(b) = 4.
+static void scalar_encode_4(uint8_t out[128], const scalar *s) {
+  // Every two elements lands on a byte boundary.
+  static_assert(kDegree % 2 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 2");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 2; i++) {
+    uint32_t a = s->c[2 * i];
+    uint32_t b = s->c[2 * i + 1];
+    declassify_assert(a < 16);
+    declassify_assert(b < 16);
+    out[i] = a | (b << 4);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 16 (`SimpleBitPack`). Specialized to bitlen(b) = 10.
+void scalar_encode_10(uint8_t out[320], const scalar *s) {
+  // Every four elements lands on a byte boundary.
+  static_assert(kDegree % 4 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 4");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 4; i++) {
+    uint32_t a = s->c[4 * i];
+    uint32_t b = s->c[4 * i + 1];
+    uint32_t c = s->c[4 * i + 2];
+    uint32_t d = s->c[4 * i + 3];
+    declassify_assert(a < 1024);
+    declassify_assert(b < 1024);
+    declassify_assert(c < 1024);
+    declassify_assert(d < 1024);
+    out[5 * i] = (uint8_t)a;
+    out[5 * i + 1] = (uint8_t)((a >> 8) | (b << 2));
+    out[5 * i + 2] = (uint8_t)((b >> 6) | (c << 4));
+    out[5 * i + 3] = (uint8_t)((c >> 4) | (d << 6));
+    out[5 * i + 4] = (uint8_t)(d >> 2);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 17 (`BitPack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 4 and b = 4.
+void scalar_encode_signed_4_4(uint8_t out[128], const scalar *s) {
+  // Every two elements lands on a byte boundary.
+  static_assert(kDegree % 2 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 2");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 2; i++) {
+    uint32_t a = mod_sub(4, s->c[2 * i]);
+    uint32_t b = mod_sub(4, s->c[2 * i + 1]);
+    declassify_assert(a < 16);
+    declassify_assert(b < 16);
+    out[i] = a | (b << 4);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 17 (`BitPack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 3 and b = 2.
+static void scalar_encode_signed_3_2(uint8_t out[96], const scalar *s) {
+  static_assert(kDegree % 8 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 8");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 8; i++) {
+    uint32_t a = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i]);
+    uint32_t b = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i + 1]);
+    uint32_t c = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i + 2]);
+    uint32_t d = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i + 3]);
+    uint32_t e = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i + 4]);
+    uint32_t f = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i + 5]);
+    uint32_t g = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i + 6]);
+    uint32_t h = mod_sub(2, s->c[8 * i + 7]);
+    uint32_t v = (h << 21) | (g << 18) | (f << 15) | (e << 12) | (d << 9) |
+                 (c << 6) | (b << 3) | a;
+    uint8_t v_bytes[sizeof(v)];
+    CRYPTO_store_u32_le(v_bytes, v);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[i * 3], v_bytes, 3);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 17 (`BitPack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 13 and b =
+// 2^12.
+void scalar_encode_signed_13_12(uint8_t out[416], const scalar *s) {
+  static const uint32_t kMax = 1u << 12;
+  // Every two elements lands on a byte boundary.
+  static_assert(kDegree % 8 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 8");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 8; i++) {
+    uint32_t a = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i]);
+    uint32_t b = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i + 1]);
+    uint32_t c = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i + 2]);
+    uint32_t d = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i + 3]);
+    uint32_t e = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i + 4]);
+    uint32_t f = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i + 5]);
+    uint32_t g = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i + 6]);
+    uint32_t h = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[8 * i + 7]);
+    declassify_assert(a < (1u << 13));
+    declassify_assert(b < (1u << 13));
+    declassify_assert(c < (1u << 13));
+    declassify_assert(d < (1u << 13));
+    declassify_assert(e < (1u << 13));
+    declassify_assert(f < (1u << 13));
+    declassify_assert(g < (1u << 13));
+    declassify_assert(h < (1u << 13));
+    a |= b << 13;
+    a |= c << 26;
+    c >>= 6;
+    c |= d << 7;
+    c |= e << 20;
+    e >>= 12;
+    e |= f << 1;
+    e |= g << 14;
+    e |= h << 27;
+    h >>= 5;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[13 * i], &a, sizeof(a));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[13 * i + 4], &c, sizeof(c));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[13 * i + 8], &e, sizeof(e));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[13 * i + 12], &h, 1);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 17 (`BitPack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 20 and b =
+// 2^19.
+void scalar_encode_signed_20_19(uint8_t out[640], const scalar *s) {
+  static const uint32_t kMax = 1u << 19;
+  // Every two elements lands on a byte boundary.
+  static_assert(kDegree % 4 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 4");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 4; i++) {
+    uint32_t a = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[4 * i]);
+    uint32_t b = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[4 * i + 1]);
+    uint32_t c = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[4 * i + 2]);
+    uint32_t d = mod_sub(kMax, s->c[4 * i + 3]);
+    declassify_assert(a < (1u << 20));
+    declassify_assert(b < (1u << 20));
+    declassify_assert(c < (1u << 20));
+    declassify_assert(d < (1u << 20));
+    a |= b << 20;
+    b >>= 12;
+    b |= c << 8;
+    b |= d << 28;
+    d >>= 4;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[10 * i], &a, sizeof(a));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[10 * i + 4], &b, sizeof(b));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&out[10 * i + 8], &d, 2);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 17 (`BitPack`).
+void scalar_encode_signed(uint8_t *out, const scalar *s, int bits,
+                          uint32_t max) {
+  if (bits == 3) {
+    assert(max == 2);
+    scalar_encode_signed_3_2(out, s);
+  } else if (bits == 4) {
+    assert(max == 4);
+    scalar_encode_signed_4_4(out, s);
+  } else if (bits == 20) {
+    assert(max == 1u << 19);
+    scalar_encode_signed_20_19(out, s);
+  } else {
+    assert(bits == 13);
+    assert(max == 1u << 12);
+    scalar_encode_signed_13_12(out, s);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 18 (`SimpleBitUnpack`). Specialized for bitlen(b) == 10.
+void scalar_decode_10(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[320]) {
+  uint32_t v;
+  static_assert(kDegree % 4 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 4");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 4; i++) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&v, &in[5 * i], sizeof(v));
+    out->c[4 * i] = v & 0x3ff;
+    out->c[4 * i + 1] = (v >> 10) & 0x3ff;
+    out->c[4 * i + 2] = (v >> 20) & 0x3ff;
+    out->c[4 * i + 3] = (v >> 30) | (((uint32_t)in[5 * i + 4]) << 2);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 19 (`BitUnpack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 4 and b =
+// 4.
+int scalar_decode_signed_4_4(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[128]) {
+  uint32_t v;
+  static_assert(kDegree % 8 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 8");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 8; i++) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&v, &in[4 * i], sizeof(v));
+    // None of the nibbles may be >= 9. So if the MSB of any nibble is set, none
+    // of the other bits may be set. First, select all the MSBs.
+    const uint32_t msbs = v & 0x88888888u;
+    // For each nibble where the MSB is set, form a mask of all the other bits.
+    const uint32_t mask = (msbs >> 1) | (msbs >> 2) | (msbs >> 3);
+    // A nibble is only out of range in the case of invalid input, in which case
+    // it is okay to leak the value.
+    if (constant_time_declassify_int((mask & v) != 0)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    out->c[i * 8] = mod_sub(4, v & 15);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 1] = mod_sub(4, (v >> 4) & 15);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 2] = mod_sub(4, (v >> 8) & 15);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 3] = mod_sub(4, (v >> 12) & 15);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 4] = mod_sub(4, (v >> 16) & 15);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 5] = mod_sub(4, (v >> 20) & 15);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 6] = mod_sub(4, (v >> 24) & 15);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 7] = mod_sub(4, v >> 28);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 19 (`BitUnpack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 3 and b =
+// 2.
+static int scalar_decode_signed_3_2(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[96]) {
+  uint32_t v;
+  uint8_t v_bytes[sizeof(v)] = {0};
+  static_assert(kDegree % 8 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 8");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 8; i++) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(v_bytes, &in[3 * i], 3);
+    v = CRYPTO_load_u32_le(v_bytes);
+    // v contains 8, 3-bit values in the lower 24 bits. None of the values may
+    // be >= 5. So if the MSB of any triple is set, none of the other bits may
+    // be set. First, select all the MSBs.
+    const uint32_t msbs = v & 000044444444u;
+    // For each triple where the MSB is set, form a mask of all the other bits.
+    const uint32_t mask = (msbs >> 1) | (msbs >> 2);
+    // A triple is only out of range in the case of invalid input, in which case
+    // it is okay to leak the value.
+    if (constant_time_declassify_int((mask & v) != 0)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    out->c[i * 8 + 0] = mod_sub(2, (v >> 0) & 7);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 1] = mod_sub(2, (v >> 3) & 7);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 2] = mod_sub(2, (v >> 6) & 7);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 3] = mod_sub(2, (v >> 9) & 7);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 4] = mod_sub(2, (v >> 12) & 7);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 5] = mod_sub(2, (v >> 15) & 7);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 6] = mod_sub(2, (v >> 18) & 7);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 7] = mod_sub(2, v >> 21);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 19 (`BitUnpack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 13 and b =
+// 2^12.
+void scalar_decode_signed_13_12(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[416]) {
+  static const uint32_t kMax = 1u << 12;
+  static const uint32_t k13Bits = (1u << 13) - 1;
+  static const uint32_t k7Bits = (1u << 7) - 1;
+
+  uint32_t a, b, c;
+  uint8_t d;
+  static_assert(kDegree % 8 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 8");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 8; i++) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&a, &in[13 * i], sizeof(a));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&b, &in[13 * i + 4], sizeof(b));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&c, &in[13 * i + 8], sizeof(c));
+    d = in[13 * i + 12];
+
+    // It's not possible for a 13-bit number to be out of range when the max is
+    // 2^12.
+    out->c[i * 8] = mod_sub(kMax, a & k13Bits);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 1] = mod_sub(kMax, (a >> 13) & k13Bits);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 2] = mod_sub(kMax, (a >> 26) | ((b & k7Bits) << 6));
+    out->c[i * 8 + 3] = mod_sub(kMax, (b >> 7) & k13Bits);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 4] = mod_sub(kMax, (b >> 20) | ((c & 1) << 12));
+    out->c[i * 8 + 5] = mod_sub(kMax, (c >> 1) & k13Bits);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 6] = mod_sub(kMax, (c >> 14) & k13Bits);
+    out->c[i * 8 + 7] = mod_sub(kMax, (c >> 27) | ((uint32_t)d) << 5);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 19 (`BitUnpack`). Specialized to bitlen(a+b) = 20 and b =
+// 2^19.
+void scalar_decode_signed_20_19(scalar *out, const uint8_t in[640]) {
+  static const uint32_t kMax = 1u << 19;
+  static const uint32_t k20Bits = (1u << 20) - 1;
+
+  uint32_t a, b;
+  uint16_t c;
+  static_assert(kDegree % 4 == 0, "kDegree must be a multiple of 4");
+  for (int i = 0; i < kDegree / 4; i++) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&a, &in[10 * i], sizeof(a));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&b, &in[10 * i + 4], sizeof(b));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(&c, &in[10 * i + 8], sizeof(c));
+
+    // It's not possible for a 20-bit number to be out of range when the max is
+    // 2^19.
+    out->c[i * 4] = mod_sub(kMax, a & k20Bits);
+    out->c[i * 4 + 1] = mod_sub(kMax, (a >> 20) | ((b & 0xff) << 12));
+    out->c[i * 4 + 2] = mod_sub(kMax, (b >> 8) & k20Bits);
+    out->c[i * 4 + 3] = mod_sub(kMax, (b >> 28) | ((uint32_t)c) << 4);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 19 (`BitUnpack`).
+int scalar_decode_signed(scalar *out, const uint8_t *in, int bits,
+                         uint32_t max) {
+  if (bits == 3) {
+    assert(max == 2);
+    return scalar_decode_signed_3_2(out, in);
+  } else if (bits == 4) {
+    assert(max == 4);
+    return scalar_decode_signed_4_4(out, in);
+  } else if (bits == 13) {
+    assert(max == (1u << 12));
+    scalar_decode_signed_13_12(out, in);
+    return 1;
+  } else if (bits == 20) {
+    assert(max == (1u << 19));
+    scalar_decode_signed_20_19(out, in);
+    return 1;
+  } else {
+    abort();
+  }
+}
+
+/* Expansion functions */
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 30 (`RejNTTPoly`).
+//
+// Rejection samples a Keccak stream to get uniformly distributed elements. This
+// is used for matrix expansion and only operates on public inputs.
+void scalar_from_keccak_vartime(scalar *out,
+                                const uint8_t derived_seed[kRhoBytes + 2]) {
+  struct BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake128);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, derived_seed, kRhoBytes + 2);
+  assert(keccak_ctx.squeeze_offset == 0);
+  assert(keccak_ctx.rate_bytes == 168);
+  static_assert(168 % 3 == 0, "block and coefficient boundaries do not align");
+
+  int done = 0;
+  while (done < kDegree) {
+    uint8_t block[168];
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(block) && done < kDegree; i += 3) {
+      // FIPS 204, Algorithm 14 (`CoeffFromThreeBytes`).
+      uint32_t value = (uint32_t)block[i] | ((uint32_t)block[i + 1] << 8) |
+                       (((uint32_t)block[i + 2] & 0x7f) << 16);
+      if (value < kPrime) {
+        out->c[done++] = value;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+template <int ETA>
+static bool coefficient_from_nibble(uint32_t nibble, uint32_t *result);
+
+template <>
+bool coefficient_from_nibble<4>(uint32_t nibble, uint32_t *result) {
+  if (constant_time_declassify_int(nibble < 9)) {
+    *result = mod_sub(4, nibble);
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+template <>
+bool coefficient_from_nibble<2>(uint32_t nibble, uint32_t *result) {
+  if (constant_time_declassify_int(nibble < 15)) {
+    *result = mod_sub(2, nibble % 5);
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 31 (`RejBoundedPoly`).
+template <int ETA>
+void scalar_uniform(scalar *out, const uint8_t derived_seed[kSigmaBytes + 2]) {
+  struct BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake256);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, derived_seed, kSigmaBytes + 2);
+  assert(keccak_ctx.squeeze_offset == 0);
+  assert(keccak_ctx.rate_bytes == 136);
+
+  int done = 0;
+  while (done < kDegree) {
+    uint8_t block[136];
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(block) && done < kDegree; ++i) {
+      uint32_t t0 = block[i] & 0x0F;
+      uint32_t t1 = block[i] >> 4;
+      // FIPS 204, Algorithm 15 (`CoefFromHalfByte`). Although both the input
+      // and output here are secret, it is OK to leak when we rejected a byte.
+      // Individual bytes of the SHAKE-256 stream are (indistiguishable from)
+      // independent of each other and the original seed, so leaking information
+      // about the rejected bytes does not reveal the input or output.
+      uint32_t v;
+      if (coefficient_from_nibble<ETA>(t0, &v)) {
+        out->c[done++] = v;
+      }
+      if (done < kDegree && coefficient_from_nibble<ETA>(t1, &v)) {
+        out->c[done++] = v;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 34 (`ExpandMask`), but just a single step.
+void scalar_sample_mask(scalar *out,
+                        const uint8_t derived_seed[kRhoPrimeBytes + 2]) {
+  uint8_t buf[640];
+  BORINGSSL_keccak(buf, sizeof(buf), derived_seed, kRhoPrimeBytes + 2,
+                   boringssl_shake256);
+
+  scalar_decode_signed_20_19(out, buf);
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 29 (`SampleInBall`).
+void scalar_sample_in_ball_vartime(scalar *out, const uint8_t *seed, int len,
+                                   int tau) {
+  struct BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake256);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, seed, len);
+  assert(keccak_ctx.squeeze_offset == 0);
+  assert(keccak_ctx.rate_bytes == 136);
+
+  uint8_t block[136];
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
+
+  uint64_t signs = CRYPTO_load_u64_le(block);
+  int offset = 8;
+  // SampleInBall implements a Fisher–Yates shuffle, which unavoidably leaks
+  // where the zeros are by memory access pattern. Although this leak happens
+  // before bad signatures are rejected, this is safe. See
+  // https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/67747/comment/8d8f01ac_70af3f21/
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(block + offset, sizeof(block) - offset);
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
+  for (size_t i = kDegree - tau; i < kDegree; i++) {
+    size_t byte;
+    for (;;) {
+      if (offset == 136) {
+        BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
+        // See above.
+        CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(block, sizeof(block));
+        offset = 0;
+      }
+
+      byte = block[offset++];
+      if (byte <= i) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    out->c[i] = out->c[byte];
+    out->c[byte] = mod_sub(1, 2 * (signs & 1));
+    signs >>= 1;
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 32 (`ExpandA`).
+template <int K, int L>
+void matrix_expand(matrix<K, L> *out, const uint8_t rho[kRhoBytes]) {
+  static_assert(K <= 0x100, "K must fit in 8 bits");
+  static_assert(L <= 0x100, "L must fit in 8 bits");
+
+  uint8_t derived_seed[kRhoBytes + 2];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(derived_seed, rho, kRhoBytes);
+  for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+    for (int j = 0; j < L; j++) {
+      derived_seed[kRhoBytes + 1] = (uint8_t)i;
+      derived_seed[kRhoBytes] = (uint8_t)j;
+      scalar_from_keccak_vartime(&out->v[i][j], derived_seed);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 33 (`ExpandS`).
+template <int K, int L>
+void vector_expand_short(vector<L> *s1, vector<K> *s2,
+                         const uint8_t sigma[kSigmaBytes]) {
+  static_assert(K <= 0x100, "K must fit in 8 bits");
+  static_assert(L <= 0x100, "L must fit in 8 bits");
+  static_assert(K + L <= 0x100, "K+L must fit in 8 bits");
+
+  uint8_t derived_seed[kSigmaBytes + 2];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(derived_seed, sigma, kSigmaBytes);
+  derived_seed[kSigmaBytes] = 0;
+  derived_seed[kSigmaBytes + 1] = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < L; i++) {
+    scalar_uniform<eta<K>()>(&s1->v[i], derived_seed);
+    ++derived_seed[kSigmaBytes];
+  }
+  for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+    scalar_uniform<eta<K>()>(&s2->v[i], derived_seed);
+    ++derived_seed[kSigmaBytes];
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 34 (`ExpandMask`).
+template <int L>
+void vector_expand_mask(vector<L> *out, const uint8_t seed[kRhoPrimeBytes],
+                        size_t kappa) {
+  assert(kappa + L <= 0x10000);
+
+  uint8_t derived_seed[kRhoPrimeBytes + 2];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(derived_seed, seed, kRhoPrimeBytes);
+  for (int i = 0; i < L; i++) {
+    size_t index = kappa + i;
+    derived_seed[kRhoPrimeBytes] = index & 0xFF;
+    derived_seed[kRhoPrimeBytes + 1] = (index >> 8) & 0xFF;
+    scalar_sample_mask(&out->v[i], derived_seed);
+  }
+}
+
+/* Encoding */
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 16 (`SimpleBitPack`).
+//
+// Encodes an entire vector into 32*K*|bits| bytes. Note that since 256
+// (kDegree) is divisible by 8, the individual vector entries will always fill a
+// whole number of bytes, so we do not need to worry about bit packing here.
+template <int K>
+void vector_encode(uint8_t *out, const vector<K> *a, int bits) {
+  if (bits == 4) {
+    for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+      scalar_encode_4(out + i * bits * kDegree / 8, &a->v[i]);
+    }
+  } else {
+    assert(bits == 10);
+    for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+      scalar_encode_10(out + i * bits * kDegree / 8, &a->v[i]);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 18 (`SimpleBitUnpack`).
+template <int K>
+void vector_decode_10(vector<K> *out, const uint8_t *in) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+    scalar_decode_10(&out->v[i], in + i * 10 * kDegree / 8);
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 17 (`BitPack`).
+//
+// Encodes an entire vector into 32*L*|bits| bytes. Note that since 256
+// (kDegree) is divisible by 8, the individual vector entries will always fill a
+// whole number of bytes, so we do not need to worry about bit packing here.
+template <int X>
+void vector_encode_signed(uint8_t *out, const vector<X> *a, int bits,
+                          uint32_t max) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    scalar_encode_signed(out + i * bits * kDegree / 8, &a->v[i], bits, max);
+  }
+}
+
+template <int X>
+int vector_decode_signed(vector<X> *out, const uint8_t *in, int bits,
+                         uint32_t max) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < X; i++) {
+    if (!scalar_decode_signed(&out->v[i], in + i * bits * kDegree / 8, bits,
+                              max)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 28 (`w1Encode`).
+template <int K>
+void w1_encode(uint8_t out[128 * K], const vector<K> *w1) {
+  vector_encode(out, w1, 4);
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 20 (`HintBitPack`).
+template <int K>
+void hint_bit_pack(uint8_t out[omega<K>() + K], const vector<K> *h) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, omega<K>() + K);
+  int index = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+    for (int j = 0; j < kDegree; j++) {
+      if (h->v[i].c[j]) {
+        // h must have at most omega<K>() non-zero coefficients.
+        BSSL_CHECK(index < omega<K>());
+        out[index++] = j;
+      }
+    }
+    out[omega<K>() + i] = index;
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 21 (`HintBitUnpack`).
+template <int K>
+int hint_bit_unpack(vector<K> *h, const uint8_t in[omega<K>() + K]) {
+  vector_zero(h);
+  int index = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) {
+    const int limit = in[omega<K>() + i];
+    if (limit < index || limit > omega<K>()) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    int last = -1;
+    while (index < limit) {
+      int byte = in[index++];
+      if (last >= 0 && byte <= last) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      last = byte;
+      static_assert(kDegree == 256,
+                    "kDegree must be 256 for this write to be in bounds");
+      h->v[i].c[byte] = 1;
+    }
+  }
+  for (; index < omega<K>(); index++) {
+    if (in[index] != 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+template <int K>
+struct public_key {
+  uint8_t rho[kRhoBytes];
+  vector<K> t1;
+  // Pre-cached value(s).
+  uint8_t public_key_hash[kTrBytes];
+};
+
+template <int K, int L>
+struct private_key {
+  uint8_t rho[kRhoBytes];
+  uint8_t k[kKBytes];
+  uint8_t public_key_hash[kTrBytes];
+  vector<L> s1;
+  vector<K> s2;
+  vector<K> t0;
+};
+
+template <int K, int L>
+struct signature {
+  uint8_t c_tilde[2 * lambda_bytes<K>()];
+  vector<L> z;
+  vector<K> h;
+};
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 22 (`pkEncode`).
+template <int K>
+int mldsa_marshal_public_key(CBB *out, const struct public_key<K> *pub) {
+  if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, pub->rho, sizeof(pub->rho))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *vectork_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &vectork_output, 320 * K)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  vector_encode(vectork_output, &pub->t1, 10);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 23 (`pkDecode`).
+template <int K>
+int mldsa_parse_public_key(struct public_key<K> *pub, CBS *in) {
+  const CBS orig_in = *in;
+
+  if (!CBS_copy_bytes(in, pub->rho, sizeof(pub->rho))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CBS t1_bytes;
+  if (!CBS_get_bytes(in, &t1_bytes, 320 * K) || CBS_len(in) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  vector_decode_10(&pub->t1, CBS_data(&t1_bytes));
+
+  // Compute pre-cached values.
+  BORINGSSL_keccak(pub->public_key_hash, sizeof(pub->public_key_hash),
+                   CBS_data(&orig_in), CBS_len(&orig_in), boringssl_shake256);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 24 (`skEncode`).
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_marshal_private_key(CBB *out, const struct private_key<K, L> *priv) {
+  if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, priv->rho, sizeof(priv->rho)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(out, priv->k, sizeof(priv->k)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(out, priv->public_key_hash,
+                     sizeof(priv->public_key_hash))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  constexpr size_t scalar_bytes =
+      (kDegree * plus_minus_eta_bitlen<K>() + 7) / 8;
+  uint8_t *vectorl_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &vectorl_output, scalar_bytes * L)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  vector_encode_signed(vectorl_output, &priv->s1, plus_minus_eta_bitlen<K>(),
+                       eta<K>());
+
+  uint8_t *s2_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &s2_output, scalar_bytes * K)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  vector_encode_signed(s2_output, &priv->s2, plus_minus_eta_bitlen<K>(),
+                       eta<K>());
+
+  uint8_t *t0_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &t0_output, 416 * K)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  vector_encode_signed(t0_output, &priv->t0, 13, 1 << 12);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 25 (`skDecode`).
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_parse_private_key(struct private_key<K, L> *priv, CBS *in) {
+  CBS s1_bytes;
+  CBS s2_bytes;
+  CBS t0_bytes;
+  constexpr size_t scalar_bytes =
+      (kDegree * plus_minus_eta_bitlen<K>() + 7) / 8;
+  if (!CBS_copy_bytes(in, priv->rho, sizeof(priv->rho)) ||
+      !CBS_copy_bytes(in, priv->k, sizeof(priv->k)) ||
+      !CBS_copy_bytes(in, priv->public_key_hash,
+                      sizeof(priv->public_key_hash)) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(in, &s1_bytes, scalar_bytes * L) ||
+      !vector_decode_signed(&priv->s1, CBS_data(&s1_bytes),
+                            plus_minus_eta_bitlen<K>(), eta<K>()) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(in, &s2_bytes, scalar_bytes * K) ||
+      !vector_decode_signed(&priv->s2, CBS_data(&s2_bytes),
+                            plus_minus_eta_bitlen<K>(), eta<K>()) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(in, &t0_bytes, 416 * K) ||
+      // Note: Decoding 13 bits into (-2^12, 2^12] cannot fail.
+      !vector_decode_signed(&priv->t0, CBS_data(&t0_bytes), 13, 1 << 12)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 26 (`sigEncode`).
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_marshal_signature(CBB *out, const struct signature<K, L> *sign) {
+  if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, sign->c_tilde, sizeof(sign->c_tilde))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *vectorl_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &vectorl_output, 640 * L)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  vector_encode_signed(vectorl_output, &sign->z, 20, 1 << 19);
+
+  uint8_t *hint_output;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(out, &hint_output, omega<K>() + K)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  hint_bit_pack(hint_output, &sign->h);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 27 (`sigDecode`).
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_parse_signature(struct signature<K, L> *sign, CBS *in) {
+  CBS z_bytes;
+  CBS hint_bytes;
+  if (!CBS_copy_bytes(in, sign->c_tilde, sizeof(sign->c_tilde)) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(in, &z_bytes, 640 * L) ||
+      // Note: Decoding 20 bits into (-2^19, 2^19] cannot fail.
+      !vector_decode_signed(&sign->z, CBS_data(&z_bytes), 20, 1 << 19) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(in, &hint_bytes, omega<K>() + K) ||
+      !hint_bit_unpack(&sign->h, CBS_data(&hint_bytes))) {
+    return 0;
+  };
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+template <typename T>
+struct DeleterFree {
+  void operator()(T *ptr) { OPENSSL_free(ptr); }
+};
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 6 (`ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal`). Returns 1 on success and 0
+// on failure.
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_generate_key_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[public_key_bytes<K>()],
+    struct private_key<K, L> *priv,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  // Intermediate values, allocated on the heap to allow use when there is a
+  // limited amount of stack.
+  struct values_st {
+    struct public_key<K> pub;
+    matrix<K, L> a_ntt;
+    vector<L> s1_ntt;
+    vector<K> t;
+  };
+  std::unique_ptr<values_st, DeleterFree<values_st>> values(
+      reinterpret_cast<struct values_st *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(values_st))));
+  if (values == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t augmented_entropy[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES + 2];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(augmented_entropy, entropy, BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES);
+  // The k and l parameters are appended to the seed.
+  augmented_entropy[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES] = K;
+  augmented_entropy[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES + 1] = L;
+  uint8_t expanded_seed[kRhoBytes + kSigmaBytes + kKBytes];
+  BORINGSSL_keccak(expanded_seed, sizeof(expanded_seed), augmented_entropy,
+                   sizeof(augmented_entropy), boringssl_shake256);
+  const uint8_t *const rho = expanded_seed;
+  const uint8_t *const sigma = expanded_seed + kRhoBytes;
+  const uint8_t *const k = expanded_seed + kRhoBytes + kSigmaBytes;
+  // rho is public.
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(rho, kRhoBytes);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(values->pub.rho, rho, sizeof(values->pub.rho));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(priv->rho, rho, sizeof(priv->rho));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(priv->k, k, sizeof(priv->k));
+
+  matrix_expand(&values->a_ntt, rho);
+  vector_expand_short(&priv->s1, &priv->s2, sigma);
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&values->s1_ntt, &priv->s1, sizeof(values->s1_ntt));
+  vector_ntt(&values->s1_ntt);
+
+  matrix_mult(&values->t, &values->a_ntt, &values->s1_ntt);
+  vector_inverse_ntt(&values->t);
+  vector_add(&values->t, &values->t, &priv->s2);
+
+  vector_power2_round(&values->pub.t1, &priv->t0, &values->t);
+  // t1 is public.
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&values->pub.t1, sizeof(values->pub.t1));
+
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, out_encoded_public_key, public_key_bytes<K>());
+  if (!mldsa_marshal_public_key(&cbb, &values->pub)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(CBB_len(&cbb) == public_key_bytes<K>());
+
+  BORINGSSL_keccak(priv->public_key_hash, sizeof(priv->public_key_hash),
+                   out_encoded_public_key, public_key_bytes<K>(),
+                   boringssl_shake256);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_public_from_private(struct public_key<K> *pub,
+                              const struct private_key<K, L> *priv) {
+  // Intermediate values, allocated on the heap to allow use when there is a
+  // limited amount of stack.
+  struct values_st {
+    matrix<K, L> a_ntt;
+    vector<L> s1_ntt;
+    vector<K> t;
+    vector<K> t0;
+  };
+  std::unique_ptr<values_st, DeleterFree<values_st>> values(
+      reinterpret_cast<struct values_st *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(values_st))));
+  if (values == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(pub->rho, priv->rho, sizeof(pub->rho));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(pub->public_key_hash, priv->public_key_hash,
+                 sizeof(pub->public_key_hash));
+
+  matrix_expand(&values->a_ntt, priv->rho);
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&values->s1_ntt, &priv->s1, sizeof(values->s1_ntt));
+  vector_ntt(&values->s1_ntt);
+
+  matrix_mult(&values->t, &values->a_ntt, &values->s1_ntt);
+  vector_inverse_ntt(&values->t);
+  vector_add(&values->t, &values->t, &priv->s2);
+
+  vector_power2_round(&pub->t1, &values->t0, &values->t);
+  // t1 is part of the public key and thus is public.
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&pub->t1, sizeof(pub->t1));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 7 (`ML-DSA.Sign_internal`). Returns 1 on success and 0
+// on failure.
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[signature_bytes<K>()],
+    const struct private_key<K, L> *priv, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]) {
+  uint8_t mu[kMuBytes];
+  struct BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake256);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, priv->public_key_hash,
+                          sizeof(priv->public_key_hash));
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, context_prefix, context_prefix_len);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, context, context_len);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, msg, msg_len);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, mu, kMuBytes);
+
+  uint8_t rho_prime[kRhoPrimeBytes];
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake256);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, priv->k, sizeof(priv->k));
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, randomizer,
+                          BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, mu, kMuBytes);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, rho_prime, kRhoPrimeBytes);
+
+  // Intermediate values, allocated on the heap to allow use when there is a
+  // limited amount of stack.
+  struct values_st {
+    struct signature<K, L> sign;
+    vector<L> s1_ntt;
+    vector<K> s2_ntt;
+    vector<K> t0_ntt;
+    matrix<K, L> a_ntt;
+    vector<L> y;
+    vector<K> w;
+    vector<K> w1;
+    vector<L> cs1;
+    vector<K> cs2;
+  };
+  std::unique_ptr<values_st, DeleterFree<values_st>> values(
+      reinterpret_cast<struct values_st *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(values_st))));
+  if (values == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&values->s1_ntt, &priv->s1, sizeof(values->s1_ntt));
+  vector_ntt(&values->s1_ntt);
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&values->s2_ntt, &priv->s2, sizeof(values->s2_ntt));
+  vector_ntt(&values->s2_ntt);
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&values->t0_ntt, &priv->t0, sizeof(values->t0_ntt));
+  vector_ntt(&values->t0_ntt);
+
+  matrix_expand(&values->a_ntt, priv->rho);
+
+  // kappa must not exceed 2**16/L = 13107. But the probability of it
+  // exceeding even 1000 iterations is vanishingly small.
+  for (size_t kappa = 0;; kappa += L) {
+    vector_expand_mask(&values->y, rho_prime, kappa);
+
+    vector<L> *y_ntt = &values->cs1;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(y_ntt, &values->y, sizeof(*y_ntt));
+    vector_ntt(y_ntt);
+
+    matrix_mult(&values->w, &values->a_ntt, y_ntt);
+    vector_inverse_ntt(&values->w);
+
+    vector_high_bits(&values->w1, &values->w);
+    uint8_t w1_encoded[128 * K];
+    w1_encode(w1_encoded, &values->w1);
+
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake256);
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, mu, kMuBytes);
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, w1_encoded, 128 * K);
+    BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, values->sign.c_tilde,
+                             2 * lambda_bytes<K>());
+
+    scalar c_ntt;
+    scalar_sample_in_ball_vartime(&c_ntt, values->sign.c_tilde,
+                                  sizeof(values->sign.c_tilde), tau<K>());
+    scalar_ntt(&c_ntt);
+
+    vector_mult_scalar(&values->cs1, &values->s1_ntt, &c_ntt);
+    vector_inverse_ntt(&values->cs1);
+    vector_mult_scalar(&values->cs2, &values->s2_ntt, &c_ntt);
+    vector_inverse_ntt(&values->cs2);
+
+    vector_add(&values->sign.z, &values->y, &values->cs1);
+
+    vector<K> *r0 = &values->w1;
+    vector_sub(r0, &values->w, &values->cs2);
+    vector_low_bits(r0, r0);
+
+    // Leaking the fact that a signature was rejected is fine as the next
+    // attempt at a signature will be (indistinguishable from) independent of
+    // this one. Note, however, that we additionally leak which of the two
+    // branches rejected the signature. Section 5.5 of
+    // https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3.pdf
+    // describes this leak as OK. Note we leak less than what is described by
+    // the paper; we do not reveal which coefficient violated the bound, and
+    // we hide which of the |z_max| or |r0_max| bound failed. See also
+    // https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/67747/comment/2bbab0fa_d241d35a/
+    uint32_t z_max = vector_max(&values->sign.z);
+    uint32_t r0_max = vector_max_signed(r0);
+    if (constant_time_declassify_w(
+            constant_time_ge_w(z_max, gamma1<K>() - beta<K>()) |
+            constant_time_ge_w(r0_max, kGamma2 - beta<K>()))) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    vector<K> *ct0 = &values->w1;
+    vector_mult_scalar(ct0, &values->t0_ntt, &c_ntt);
+    vector_inverse_ntt(ct0);
+    vector_make_hint(&values->sign.h, ct0, &values->cs2, &values->w);
+
+    // See above.
+    uint32_t ct0_max = vector_max(ct0);
+    size_t h_ones = vector_count_ones(&values->sign.h);
+    if (constant_time_declassify_w(constant_time_ge_w(ct0_max, kGamma2) |
+                                   constant_time_lt_w(omega<K>(), h_ones))) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Although computed with the private key, the signature is public.
+    CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(values->sign.c_tilde, sizeof(values->sign.c_tilde));
+    CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&values->sign.z, sizeof(values->sign.z));
+    CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&values->sign.h, sizeof(values->sign.h));
+
+    CBB cbb;
+    CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, out_encoded_signature, signature_bytes<K>());
+    if (!mldsa_marshal_signature(&cbb, &values->sign)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_len(&cbb) == signature_bytes<K>());
+    return 1;
+  }
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 8 (`ML-DSA.Verify_internal`).
+template <int K, int L>
+int mldsa_verify_internal(const struct public_key<K> *pub,
+                          const uint8_t encoded_signature[signature_bytes<K>()],
+                          const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+                          const uint8_t *context_prefix,
+                          size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context,
+                          size_t context_len) {
+  // Intermediate values, allocated on the heap to allow use when there is a
+  // limited amount of stack.
+  struct values_st {
+    struct signature<K, L> sign;
+    matrix<K, L> a_ntt;
+    vector<L> z_ntt;
+    vector<K> az_ntt;
+    vector<K> ct1_ntt;
+  };
+  std::unique_ptr<values_st, DeleterFree<values_st>> values(
+      reinterpret_cast<struct values_st *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(values_st))));
+  if (values == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, encoded_signature, signature_bytes<K>());
+  if (!mldsa_parse_signature(&values->sign, &cbs)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  matrix_expand(&values->a_ntt, pub->rho);
+
+  uint8_t mu[kMuBytes];
+  struct BORINGSSL_keccak_st keccak_ctx;
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake256);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, pub->public_key_hash,
+                          sizeof(pub->public_key_hash));
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, context_prefix, context_prefix_len);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, context, context_len);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, msg, msg_len);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, mu, kMuBytes);
+
+  scalar c_ntt;
+  scalar_sample_in_ball_vartime(&c_ntt, values->sign.c_tilde,
+                                sizeof(values->sign.c_tilde), tau<K>());
+  scalar_ntt(&c_ntt);
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&values->z_ntt, &values->sign.z, sizeof(values->z_ntt));
+  vector_ntt(&values->z_ntt);
+
+  matrix_mult(&values->az_ntt, &values->a_ntt, &values->z_ntt);
+
+  vector_scale_power2_round(&values->ct1_ntt, &pub->t1);
+  vector_ntt(&values->ct1_ntt);
+
+  vector_mult_scalar(&values->ct1_ntt, &values->ct1_ntt, &c_ntt);
+
+  vector<K> *const w1 = &values->az_ntt;
+  vector_sub(w1, &values->az_ntt, &values->ct1_ntt);
+  vector_inverse_ntt(w1);
+
+  vector_use_hint_vartime(w1, &values->sign.h, w1);
+  uint8_t w1_encoded[128 * K];
+  w1_encode(w1_encoded, w1);
+
+  uint8_t c_tilde[2 * lambda_bytes<K>()];
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_init(&keccak_ctx, boringssl_shake256);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, mu, kMuBytes);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_absorb(&keccak_ctx, w1_encoded, 128 * K);
+  BORINGSSL_keccak_squeeze(&keccak_ctx, c_tilde, 2 * lambda_bytes<K>());
+
+  uint32_t z_max = vector_max(&values->sign.z);
+  return z_max < static_cast<uint32_t>(gamma1<K>() - beta<K>()) &&
+         OPENSSL_memcmp(c_tilde, values->sign.c_tilde, 2 * lambda_bytes<K>()) ==
+             0;
+}
+
+struct private_key<6, 5> *private_key_from_external_65(
+    const struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *external) {
+  static_assert(sizeof(struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key) ==
+                    sizeof(struct private_key<6, 5>),
+                "MLDSA65 private key size incorrect");
+  static_assert(alignof(struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key) ==
+                    alignof(struct private_key<6, 5>),
+                "MLDSA65 private key align incorrect");
+  return (struct private_key<6, 5> *)external;
+}
+
+struct public_key<6> *
+public_key_from_external_65(const struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key *external) {
+  static_assert(sizeof(struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key) ==
+                    sizeof(struct public_key<6>),
+                "MLDSA65 public key size incorrect");
+  static_assert(alignof(struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key) ==
+                    alignof(struct public_key<6>),
+                "MLDSA65 public key align incorrect");
+  return (struct public_key<6> *)external;
+}
+
+struct private_key<8, 7> *
+private_key_from_external_87(const struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *external) {
+  static_assert(sizeof(struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key) ==
+                    sizeof(struct private_key<8, 7>),
+                "MLDSA87 private key size incorrect");
+  static_assert(alignof(struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key) ==
+                    alignof(struct private_key<8, 7>),
+                "MLDSA87 private key align incorrect");
+  return (struct private_key<8, 7> *)external;
+}
+
+struct public_key<8> *
+public_key_from_external_87(const struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key *external) {
+  static_assert(sizeof(struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key) ==
+                    sizeof(struct public_key<8>),
+                "MLDSA87 public key size incorrect");
+  static_assert(alignof(struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key) ==
+                    alignof(struct public_key<8>),
+                "MLDSA87 public key align incorrect");
+  return (struct public_key<8> *)external;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+}  // namespace mldsa
+
+
+// ML-DSA-65 specific wrappers.
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_parse_public_key(
+    struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key *public_key, CBS *in) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_parse_public_key(
+      mldsa::public_key_from_external_65(public_key), in));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *private_key) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_marshal_private_key(
+      out, mldsa::private_key_from_external_65(private_key)));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_parse_private_key(
+    struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *private_key, CBS *in) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(
+      mldsa_parse_private_key(mldsa::private_key_from_external_65(private_key),
+                              in) &&
+      CBS_len(in) == 0);
+}
+
+// Calls |MLDSA_generate_key_external_entropy| with random bytes from
+// |BCM_rand_bytes|.
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[BCM_MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES],
+    struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *out_private_key) {
+  BCM_rand_bytes(out_seed, BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES);
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(out_seed, BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES);
+  return BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy(out_encoded_public_key,
+                                                   out_private_key, out_seed);
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_private_key_from_seed(
+    struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t seed[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  uint8_t public_key[BCM_MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
+  return BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy(public_key, out_private_key,
+                                                   seed);
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_generate_key_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[BCM_MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_generate_key_external_entropy(
+      out_encoded_public_key,
+      mldsa::private_key_from_external_65(out_private_key), entropy));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_public_from_private(
+    struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key *out_public_key,
+    const struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *private_key) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_public_from_private(
+      mldsa::public_key_from_external_65(out_public_key),
+      mldsa::private_key_from_external_65(private_key)));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[BCM_MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
+    size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_sign_internal(
+      out_encoded_signature, mldsa::private_key_from_external_65(private_key),
+      msg, msg_len, context_prefix, context_prefix_len, context, context_len,
+      randomizer));
+}
+
+// ML-DSA signature in randomized mode, filling the random bytes with
+// |BCM_rand_bytes|.
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_sign(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[BCM_MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const struct BCM_mldsa65_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
+    size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(context_len <= 255);
+  uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES];
+  BCM_rand_bytes(randomizer, sizeof(randomizer));
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(randomizer, sizeof(randomizer));
+
+  const uint8_t context_prefix[2] = {0, static_cast<uint8_t>(context_len)};
+  return BCM_mldsa65_sign_internal(
+      out_encoded_signature, private_key, msg, msg_len, context_prefix,
+      sizeof(context_prefix), context, context_len, randomizer);
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 3 (`ML-DSA.Verify`).
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify(
+    const struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t signature[BCM_MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES], const uint8_t *msg,
+    size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(context_len <= 255);
+  const uint8_t context_prefix[2] = {0, static_cast<uint8_t>(context_len)};
+  return BCM_mldsa65_verify_internal(public_key, signature, msg, msg_len,
+                                     context_prefix, sizeof(context_prefix),
+                                     context, context_len);
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_verify_internal(
+    const struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t encoded_signature[BCM_MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
+    size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa::mldsa_verify_internal<6, 5>(
+      mldsa::public_key_from_external_65(public_key), encoded_signature, msg,
+      msg_len, context_prefix, context_prefix_len, context, context_len));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa65_marshal_public_key(
+    CBB *out, const struct BCM_mldsa65_public_key *public_key) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_marshal_public_key(
+      out, mldsa::public_key_from_external_65(public_key)));
+}
+
+
+// ML-DSA-87 specific wrappers.
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_parse_public_key(
+    struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key *public_key, CBS *in) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_parse_public_key(
+      mldsa::public_key_from_external_87(public_key), in));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_marshal_private_key(
+    CBB *out, const struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *private_key) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_marshal_private_key(
+      out, mldsa::private_key_from_external_87(private_key)));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_parse_private_key(
+    struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *private_key, CBS *in) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(
+      mldsa_parse_private_key(mldsa::private_key_from_external_87(private_key),
+                              in) &&
+      CBS_len(in) == 0);
+}
+
+// Calls |MLDSA_generate_key_external_entropy| with random bytes from
+// |BCM_rand_bytes|.
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[BCM_MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_seed[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES],
+    struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *out_private_key) {
+  BCM_rand_bytes(out_seed, BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES);
+  return BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy(out_encoded_public_key,
+                                                   out_private_key, out_seed);
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_private_key_from_seed(
+    struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t seed[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  uint8_t public_key[BCM_MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
+  return BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy(public_key, out_private_key,
+                                                   seed);
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_generate_key_external_entropy(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_public_key[BCM_MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *out_private_key,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_MLDSA_SEED_BYTES]) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_generate_key_external_entropy(
+      out_encoded_public_key,
+      mldsa::private_key_from_external_87(out_private_key), entropy));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_public_from_private(
+    struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key *out_public_key,
+    const struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *private_key) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_public_from_private(
+      mldsa::public_key_from_external_87(out_public_key),
+      mldsa::private_key_from_external_87(private_key)));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[BCM_MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
+    size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix, size_t context_prefix_len,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+    const uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES]) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_sign_internal(
+      out_encoded_signature, mldsa::private_key_from_external_87(private_key),
+      msg, msg_len, context_prefix, context_prefix_len, context, context_len,
+      randomizer));
+}
+
+// ML-DSA signature in randomized mode, filling the random bytes with
+// |BCM_rand_bytes|.
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_sign(
+    uint8_t out_encoded_signature[BCM_MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const struct BCM_mldsa87_private_key *private_key, const uint8_t *msg,
+    size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(context_len <= 255);
+  uint8_t randomizer[BCM_MLDSA_SIGNATURE_RANDOMIZER_BYTES];
+  BCM_rand_bytes(randomizer, sizeof(randomizer));
+
+  const uint8_t context_prefix[2] = {0, static_cast<uint8_t>(context_len)};
+  return BCM_mldsa87_sign_internal(
+      out_encoded_signature, private_key, msg, msg_len, context_prefix,
+      sizeof(context_prefix), context, context_len, randomizer);
+}
+
+// FIPS 204, Algorithm 3 (`ML-DSA.Verify`).
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_verify(const struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key *public_key,
+                              const uint8_t *signature, const uint8_t *msg,
+                              size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+                              size_t context_len) {
+  BSSL_CHECK(context_len <= 255);
+  const uint8_t context_prefix[2] = {0, static_cast<uint8_t>(context_len)};
+  return BCM_mldsa87_verify_internal(public_key, signature, msg, msg_len,
+                                     context_prefix, sizeof(context_prefix),
+                                     context, context_len);
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_verify_internal(
+    const struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key *public_key,
+    const uint8_t encoded_signature[BCM_MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context_prefix,
+    size_t context_prefix_len, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa::mldsa_verify_internal<8, 7>(
+      mldsa::public_key_from_external_87(public_key), encoded_signature, msg,
+      msg_len, context_prefix, context_prefix_len, context, context_len));
+}
+
+bcm_status BCM_mldsa87_marshal_public_key(
+    CBB *out, const struct BCM_mldsa87_public_key *public_key) {
+  return bcm_as_approved_status(mldsa_marshal_public_key(
+      out, mldsa::public_key_from_external_87(public_key)));
+}