grpc 1.63.0 → 1.64.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_des.c

@@ -85,17 +85,14 @@ static int des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_cbc = {
-    /* nid = */ NID_des_cbc,
-    /* block_size = */ 8,
-    /* key_len = */ 8,
-    /* iv_len = */ 8,
-    /* ctx_size = */ sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
-    /* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-    /* app_data = */ NULL,
-    /* init = */ des_init_key,
-    /* cipher = */ des_cbc_cipher,
-    /* cleanup = */ NULL,
-    /* ctrl = */ NULL,
+    .nid = NID_des_cbc,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 8,
+    .iv_len = 8,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+    .init = des_init_key,
+    .cipher = des_cbc_cipher,
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cbc(void) { return &evp_des_cbc; }
@@ -115,17 +112,14 @@ static int des_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ecb = {
-    /* nid = */ NID_des_ecb,
-    /* block_size = */ 8,
-    /* key_len = */ 8,
-    /* iv_len = */ 0,
-    /* ctx_size = */ sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
-    /* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-    /* app_data = */ NULL,
-    /* init = */ des_init_key,
-    /* cipher = */ des_ecb_cipher,
-    /* cleanup = */ NULL,
-    /* ctrl = */ NULL,
+    .nid = NID_des_ecb,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 8,
+    .iv_len = 0,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+    .init = des_init_key,
+    .cipher = des_ecb_cipher,
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ecb(void) { return &evp_des_ecb; }
@@ -155,17 +149,14 @@ static int des_ede3_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede3_cbc = {
-    /* nid = */ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-    /* block_size = */ 8,
-    /* key_len = */ 24,
-    /* iv_len = */ 8,
-    /* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
-    /* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-    /* app_data = */ NULL,
-    /* init = */ des_ede3_init_key,
-    /* cipher = */ des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
-    /* cleanup = */ NULL,
-    /* ctrl = */ NULL,
+    .nid = NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 24,
+    .iv_len = 8,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+    .init = des_ede3_init_key,
+    .cipher = des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc(void) { return &evp_des_ede3_cbc; }
@@ -181,17 +172,14 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede_cbc = {
-    /* nid = */ NID_des_ede_cbc,
-    /* block_size = */ 8,
-    /* key_len = */ 16,
-    /* iv_len = */ 8,
-    /* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
-    /* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-    /* app_data = */ NULL,
-    /* init = */ des_ede_init_key,
-    /* cipher = */ des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
-    /* cleanup = */ NULL,
-    /* ctrl = */ NULL,
+    .nid = NID_des_ede_cbc,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 16,
+    .iv_len = 8,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+    .init = des_ede_init_key,
+    .cipher = des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cbc(void) { return &evp_des_ede_cbc; }
@@ -212,33 +200,27 @@ static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede = {
-    /* nid = */ NID_des_ede_ecb,
-    /* block_size = */ 8,
-    /* key_len = */ 16,
-    /* iv_len = */ 0,
-    /* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
-    /* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-    /* app_data = */ NULL,
-    /* init = */ des_ede_init_key,
-    /* cipher = */ des_ede_ecb_cipher,
-    /* cleanup = */ NULL,
-    /* ctrl = */ NULL,
+    .nid = NID_des_ede_ecb,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 16,
+    .iv_len = 0,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+    .init = des_ede_init_key,
+    .cipher = des_ede_ecb_cipher,
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void) { return &evp_des_ede; }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER evp_des_ede3 = {
-    /* nid = */ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-    /* block_size = */ 8,
-    /* key_len = */ 24,
-    /* iv_len = */ 0,
-    /* ctx_size = */ sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
-    /* flags = */ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-    /* app_data = */ NULL,
-    /* init = */ des_ede3_init_key,
-    /* cipher = */ des_ede_ecb_cipher,
-    /* cleanup = */ NULL,
-    /* ctrl = */ NULL,
+    .nid = NID_des_ede3_ecb,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 24,
+    .iv_len = 0,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+    .init = des_ede3_init_key,
+    .cipher = des_ede_ecb_cipher,
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void) { return &evp_des_ede3; }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_null.c

@@ -78,9 +78,13 @@ static int null_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER n_cipher = {
-    NID_undef,        1 /* block size */, 0 /* key_len */,     0 /* iv_len */,
-    0 /* ctx_size */, 0 /* flags */,      NULL /* app_data */, null_init_key,
-    null_cipher,      NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */,
+    .nid = NID_undef,
+    .block_size = 1,
+    .key_len = 0,
+    .iv_len = 0,
+    .ctx_size = 0,
+    .init = null_init_key,
+    .cipher = null_cipher,
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_enc_null(void) { return &n_cipher; }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_rc2.c

@@ -427,37 +427,29 @@ static int rc2_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) {
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER rc2_40_cbc = {
-    NID_rc2_40_cbc,
-    8 /* block size */,
-    5 /* 40 bit */,
-    8 /* iv len */,
-    sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
-    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
-    NULL /* app_data */,
-    rc2_init_key,
-    rc2_cbc_cipher,
-    NULL,
-    rc2_ctrl,
+    .nid = NID_rc2_40_cbc,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 5 /* 40 bit */,
+    .iv_len = 8,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
+    .init = rc2_init_key,
+    .cipher = rc2_cbc_cipher,
+    .ctrl = rc2_ctrl,
 };
 
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void) {
-  return &rc2_40_cbc;
-}
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void) { return &rc2_40_cbc; }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER rc2_cbc = {
-    NID_rc2_cbc,
-    8 /* block size */,
-    16 /* 128 bit */,
-    8 /* iv len */,
-    sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
-    EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
-    NULL /* app_data */,
-    rc2_init_key,
-    rc2_cbc_cipher,
-    NULL,
-    rc2_ctrl,
+    .nid = NID_rc2_cbc,
+    .block_size = 8,
+    .key_len = 16 /* 128 bit */,
+    .iv_len = 8,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT,
+    .init = rc2_init_key,
+    .cipher = rc2_cbc_cipher,
+    .ctrl = rc2_ctrl,
 };
 
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc(void) {
-  return &rc2_cbc;
-}
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc(void) { return &rc2_cbc; }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_rc4.c

@@ -81,9 +81,14 @@ static int rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
 }
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER rc4 = {
-    NID_rc4,             1 /* block_size */, 16 /* key_size */,
-    0 /* iv_len */,      sizeof(RC4_KEY),    EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-    NULL /* app_data */, rc4_init_key,       rc4_cipher,
-    NULL /* cleanup */,  NULL /* ctrl */, };
+    .nid = NID_rc4,
+    .block_size = 1,
+    .key_len = 16,
+    .iv_len = 0,
+    .ctx_size = sizeof(RC4_KEY),
+    .flags = EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+    .init = rc4_init_key,
+    .cipher = rc4_cipher,
+};
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void) { return &rc4; }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c

@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
   size_t mac_end = in_len;
   size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
 
-  assert(orig_len >= in_len);
-  assert(in_len >= md_size);
+  declassify_assert(orig_len >= in_len);
+  declassify_assert(in_len >= md_size);
   assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
   assert(md_size > 0);
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.c

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ typedef uint64_t fe_limb_t;
 #define assert_fe(f)                                                    \
   do {                                                                  \
     for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 5; _assert_fe_i++) { \
-      assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x8cccccccccccc));             \
+      declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x8cccccccccccc));  \
     }                                                                   \
   } while (0)
 
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ typedef uint64_t fe_limb_t;
 #define assert_fe_loose(f)                                              \
   do {                                                                  \
     for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 5; _assert_fe_i++) { \
-      assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x1a666666666664));            \
+      declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <= UINT64_C(0x1a666666666664)); \
     }                                                                   \
   } while (0)
 
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ typedef uint32_t fe_limb_t;
 #define assert_fe(f)                                                     \
   do {                                                                   \
     for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 10; _assert_fe_i++) { \
-      assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <=                                          \
-             ((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x2333333u : 0x4666666u));            \
+      declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <=                               \
+                        ((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x2333333u : 0x4666666u)); \
     }                                                                    \
   } while (0)
 
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ typedef uint32_t fe_limb_t;
 #define assert_fe_loose(f)                                               \
   do {                                                                   \
     for (unsigned _assert_fe_i = 0; _assert_fe_i < 10; _assert_fe_i++) { \
-      assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <=                                          \
-             ((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x6999999u : 0xd333332u));            \
+      declassify_assert(f[_assert_fe_i] <=                               \
+                        ((_assert_fe_i & 1) ? 0x6999999u : 0xd333332u)); \
     }                                                                    \
   } while (0)
 
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static_assert(sizeof(fe) == sizeof(fe_limb_t) * FE_NUM_LIMBS,
 
 static void fe_frombytes_strict(fe *h, const uint8_t s[32]) {
   // |fiat_25519_from_bytes| requires the top-most bit be clear.
-  assert((s[31] & 0x80) == 0);
+  declassify_assert((s[31] & 0x80) == 0);
   fiat_25519_from_bytes(h->v, s);
   assert_fe(h->v);
 }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/digest_extra/digest_extra.c

@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ int EVP_marshal_digest_algorithm(CBB *cbb, const EVP_MD *md) {
     return 0;
   }
 
+  // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/710): Is this correct? See RFC 4055, section 2.1.
   if (!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &null, CBS_ASN1_NULL) ||
       !CBB_flush(cbb)) {
     return 0;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/dsa/dsa.c

@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
         if (!RAND_bytes(seed, qsize)) {
           goto err;
         }
+        // DSA parameters are public.
+        CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(seed, qsize);
       } else {
         // If we come back through, use random seed next time.
         seed_in = NULL;
@@ -513,6 +515,9 @@ int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) {
     goto err;
   }
 
+  // The public key is computed from the private key, but is public.
+  bn_declassify(pub_key);
+
   dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
   dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
   ok = 1;
@@ -649,6 +654,10 @@ redo:
     goto err;
   }
 
+  // The signature is computed from the private key, but is public.
+  bn_declassify(r);
+  bn_declassify(s);
+
   // Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
   // very unlikely.
   if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
@@ -681,7 +690,7 @@ err:
   return ret;
 }
 
-int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
+int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const DSA_SIG *sig,
                   const DSA *dsa) {
   int valid;
   if (!DSA_do_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa)) {
@@ -691,7 +700,8 @@ int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
 }
 
 int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
-                           size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
+                           size_t digest_len, const DSA_SIG *sig,
+                           const DSA *dsa) {
   *out_valid = 0;
   if (!dsa_check_key(dsa)) {
     return 0;
@@ -899,15 +909,19 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
                               ctx) ||
       // Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q
       !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx,
-                                 dsa->method_mont_p) ||
-      // Note |BN_mod| below is not constant-time and may leak information about
-      // |r|. |dsa->p| may be significantly larger than |dsa->q|, so this is not
-      // easily performed in constant-time with Montgomery reduction.
-      //
-      // However, |r| at this point is g^k (mod p). It is almost the value of
-      // |r| revealed in the signature anyway (g^k (mod p) (mod q)), going from
-      // it to |k| would require computing a discrete log.
-      !BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx) ||
+                                 dsa->method_mont_p)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  // Note |BN_mod| below is not constant-time and may leak information about
+  // |r|. |dsa->p| may be significantly larger than |dsa->q|, so this is not
+  // easily performed in constant-time with Montgomery reduction.
+  //
+  // However, |r| at this point is g^k (mod p). It is almost the value of |r|
+  // revealed in the signature anyway (g^k (mod p) (mod q)), going from it to
+  // |k| would require computing a discrete log.
+  bn_declassify(r);
+  if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx) ||
       // Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' using Fermat's Little
       // Theorem.
       !bn_mod_inverse_prime(kinv, &k, dsa->q, ctx, dsa->method_mont_q)) {
@@ -934,12 +948,7 @@ err:
 
 int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
                          CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
-  int index;
-  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
-                               free_func)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  return index;
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func);
 }
 
 int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *dsa, int idx, void *arg) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c

@@ -119,8 +119,9 @@ int dsa_check_key(const DSA *dsa) {
   if (dsa->priv_key != NULL) {
     // The private key is a non-zero element of the scalar field, determined by
     // |q|.
-    if (BN_is_negative(dsa->priv_key) || BN_is_zero(dsa->priv_key) ||
-        BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+    if (BN_is_negative(dsa->priv_key) ||
+        constant_time_declassify_int(BN_is_zero(dsa->priv_key)) ||
+        constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q) >= 0)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
       return 0;
     }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/err/err.c

@@ -164,6 +164,17 @@ extern const uint32_t kOpenSSLReasonValues[];
 extern const size_t kOpenSSLReasonValuesLen;
 extern const char kOpenSSLReasonStringData[];
 
+static char *strdup_libc_malloc(const char *str) {
+  // |strdup| is not in C until C23, so MSVC triggers deprecation warnings, and
+  // glibc and musl gate it on a feature macro. Reimplementing it is easier.
+  size_t len = strlen(str);
+  char *ret = malloc(len + 1);
+  if (ret != NULL) {
+    memcpy(ret, str, len + 1);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
 // err_clear clears the given queued error.
 static void err_clear(struct err_error_st *error) {
   free(error->data);
@@ -174,13 +185,9 @@ static void err_copy(struct err_error_st *dst, const struct err_error_st *src) {
   err_clear(dst);
   dst->file = src->file;
   if (src->data != NULL) {
-    // Disable deprecated functions on msvc so it doesn't complain about strdup.
-    OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
-    OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable : 4996))
     // We can't use OPENSSL_strdup because we don't want to call OPENSSL_malloc,
     // which can affect the error stack.
-    dst->data = strdup(src->data);
-    OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
+    dst->data = strdup_libc_malloc(src->data);
   }
   dst->packed = src->packed;
   dst->line = src->line;
@@ -428,50 +435,52 @@ static const char *err_string_lookup(uint32_t lib, uint32_t key,
   return &string_data[(*result) & 0x7fff];
 }
 
-static const char *const kLibraryNames[ERR_NUM_LIBS] = {
-    "invalid library (0)",
-    "unknown library",              // ERR_LIB_NONE
-    "system library",               // ERR_LIB_SYS
-    "bignum routines",              // ERR_LIB_BN
-    "RSA routines",                 // ERR_LIB_RSA
-    "Diffie-Hellman routines",      // ERR_LIB_DH
-    "public key routines",          // ERR_LIB_EVP
-    "memory buffer routines",       // ERR_LIB_BUF
-    "object identifier routines",   // ERR_LIB_OBJ
-    "PEM routines",                 // ERR_LIB_PEM
-    "DSA routines",                 // ERR_LIB_DSA
-    "X.509 certificate routines",   // ERR_LIB_X509
-    "ASN.1 encoding routines",      // ERR_LIB_ASN1
-    "configuration file routines",  // ERR_LIB_CONF
-    "common libcrypto routines",    // ERR_LIB_CRYPTO
-    "elliptic curve routines",      // ERR_LIB_EC
-    "SSL routines",                 // ERR_LIB_SSL
-    "BIO routines",                 // ERR_LIB_BIO
-    "PKCS7 routines",               // ERR_LIB_PKCS7
-    "PKCS8 routines",               // ERR_LIB_PKCS8
-    "X509 V3 routines",             // ERR_LIB_X509V3
-    "random number generator",      // ERR_LIB_RAND
-    "ENGINE routines",              // ERR_LIB_ENGINE
-    "OCSP routines",                // ERR_LIB_OCSP
-    "UI routines",                  // ERR_LIB_UI
-    "COMP routines",                // ERR_LIB_COMP
-    "ECDSA routines",               // ERR_LIB_ECDSA
-    "ECDH routines",                // ERR_LIB_ECDH
-    "HMAC routines",                // ERR_LIB_HMAC
-    "Digest functions",             // ERR_LIB_DIGEST
-    "Cipher functions",             // ERR_LIB_CIPHER
-    "HKDF functions",               // ERR_LIB_HKDF
-    "Trust Token functions",        // ERR_LIB_TRUST_TOKEN
-    "User defined functions",       // ERR_LIB_USER
+typedef struct library_name_st {
+  const char *str;
+  const char *symbol;
+  const char *reason_symbol;
+} LIBRARY_NAME;
+
+static const LIBRARY_NAME kLibraryNames[ERR_NUM_LIBS] = {
+    {"invalid library (0)", NULL, NULL},
+    {"unknown library", "NONE", "NONE_LIB"},
+    {"system library", "SYS", "SYS_LIB"},
+    {"bignum routines", "BN", "BN_LIB"},
+    {"RSA routines", "RSA", "RSA_LIB"},
+    {"Diffie-Hellman routines", "DH", "DH_LIB"},
+    {"public key routines", "EVP", "EVP_LIB"},
+    {"memory buffer routines", "BUF", "BUF_LIB"},
+    {"object identifier routines", "OBJ", "OBJ_LIB"},
+    {"PEM routines", "PEM", "PEM_LIB"},
+    {"DSA routines", "DSA", "DSA_LIB"},
+    {"X.509 certificate routines", "X509", "X509_LIB"},
+    {"ASN.1 encoding routines", "ASN1", "ASN1_LIB"},
+    {"configuration file routines", "CONF", "CONF_LIB"},
+    {"common libcrypto routines", "CRYPTO", "CRYPTO_LIB"},
+    {"elliptic curve routines", "EC", "EC_LIB"},
+    {"SSL routines", "SSL", "SSL_LIB"},
+    {"BIO routines", "BIO", "BIO_LIB"},
+    {"PKCS7 routines", "PKCS7", "PKCS7_LIB"},
+    {"PKCS8 routines", "PKCS8", "PKCS8_LIB"},
+    {"X509 V3 routines", "X509V3", "X509V3_LIB"},
+    {"random number generator", "RAND", "RAND_LIB"},
+    {"ENGINE routines", "ENGINE", "ENGINE_LIB"},
+    {"OCSP routines", "OCSP", "OCSP_LIB"},
+    {"UI routines", "UI", "UI_LIB"},
+    {"COMP routines", "COMP", "COMP_LIB"},
+    {"ECDSA routines", "ECDSA", "ECDSA_LIB"},
+    {"ECDH routines", "ECDH", "ECDH_LIB"},
+    {"HMAC routines", "HMAC", "HMAC_LIB"},
+    {"Digest functions", "DIGEST", "DIGEST_LIB"},
+    {"Cipher functions", "CIPHER", "CIPHER_LIB"},
+    {"HKDF functions", "HKDF", "HKDF_LIB"},
+    {"Trust Token functions", "TRUST_TOKEN", "TRUST_TOKEN_LIB"},
+    {"User defined functions", "USER", "USER_LIB"},
 };
 
 static const char *err_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
   const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
-
-  if (lib >= ERR_NUM_LIBS) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return kLibraryNames[lib];
+  return lib >= ERR_NUM_LIBS ? NULL : kLibraryNames[lib].str;
 }
 
 const char *ERR_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
@@ -479,51 +488,67 @@ const char *ERR_lib_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
   return ret == NULL ? "unknown library" : ret;
 }
 
+const char *ERR_lib_symbol_name(uint32_t packed_error) {
+  const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
+  return lib >= ERR_NUM_LIBS ? NULL : kLibraryNames[lib].symbol;
+}
+
 const char *ERR_func_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
   return "OPENSSL_internal";
 }
 
-static const char *err_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
+static const char *err_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error, int symbol) {
   const uint32_t lib = ERR_GET_LIB(packed_error);
   const uint32_t reason = ERR_GET_REASON(packed_error);
 
   if (lib == ERR_LIB_SYS) {
-    if (reason < 127) {
+    if (!symbol && reason < 127) {
       return strerror(reason);
     }
     return NULL;
   }
 
   if (reason < ERR_NUM_LIBS) {
-    return kLibraryNames[reason];
+    return symbol ? kLibraryNames[reason].reason_symbol
+                  : kLibraryNames[reason].str;
   }
 
   if (reason < 100) {
+    // TODO(davidben): All our other reason strings match the symbol name. Only
+    // the common ones differ. Should we just consistently return the symbol
+    // name?
     switch (reason) {
       case ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE:
-        return "malloc failure";
+        return symbol ? "MALLOC_FAILURE" : "malloc failure";
       case ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED:
-        return "function should not have been called";
+        return symbol ? "SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED"
+                      : "function should not have been called";
       case ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER:
-        return "passed a null parameter";
+        return symbol ? "PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER" : "passed a null parameter";
       case ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR:
-        return "internal error";
+        return symbol ? "INTERNAL_ERROR" : "internal error";
       case ERR_R_OVERFLOW:
-        return "overflow";
+        return symbol ? "OVERFLOW" : "overflow";
       default:
         return NULL;
     }
   }
 
+  // Unlike OpenSSL, BoringSSL's reason strings already match symbol name, so we
+  // do not need to check |symbol|.
   return err_string_lookup(lib, reason, kOpenSSLReasonValues,
                            kOpenSSLReasonValuesLen, kOpenSSLReasonStringData);
 }
 
 const char *ERR_reason_error_string(uint32_t packed_error) {
-  const char *ret = err_reason_error_string(packed_error);
+  const char *ret = err_reason_error_string(packed_error, /*symbol=*/0);
   return ret == NULL ? "unknown error" : ret;
 }
 
+const char *ERR_reason_symbol_name(uint32_t packed_error) {
+  return err_reason_error_string(packed_error, /*symbol=*/1);
+}
+
 char *ERR_error_string(uint32_t packed_error, char *ret) {
   static char buf[ERR_ERROR_STRING_BUF_LEN];
 
@@ -550,7 +575,7 @@ char *ERR_error_string_n(uint32_t packed_error, char *buf, size_t len) {
   unsigned reason = ERR_GET_REASON(packed_error);
 
   const char *lib_str = err_lib_error_string(packed_error);
-  const char *reason_str = err_reason_error_string(packed_error);
+  const char *reason_str = err_reason_error_string(packed_error, /*symbol=*/0);
 
   char lib_buf[32], reason_buf[32];
   if (lib_str == NULL) {
@@ -749,13 +774,9 @@ void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags) {
     assert(0);
     return;
   }
-  // Disable deprecated functions on msvc so it doesn't complain about strdup.
-  OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
-  OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable : 4996))
   // We can not use OPENSSL_strdup because we don't want to call OPENSSL_malloc,
   // which can affect the error stack.
-  char *copy = strdup(data);
-  OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
+  char *copy = strdup_libc_malloc(data);
   if (copy != NULL) {
     err_set_error_data(copy);
   }