grpc 1.56.2 → 1.60.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h

@@ -26,9 +26,21 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
-    !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE) && !defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)
-#define OPENSSL_URANDOM
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
+#define OPENSSL_RAND_DETERMINISTIC
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)
+#define OPENSSL_RAND_TRUSTY
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+#define OPENSSL_RAND_WINDOWS
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
+#define OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE) && !defined(OPENSSL_MACOS)
+// Unlike macOS, iOS and similar hide away getentropy().
+#define OPENSSL_RAND_IOS
+#else
+// By default if you are integrating BoringSSL we expect you to
+// provide getentropy from the <unistd.h> header file.
+#define OPENSSL_RAND_GETENTROPY
 #endif
 
 // RAND_bytes_with_additional_data samples from the RNG after mixing 32 bytes
@@ -70,11 +82,15 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 // depending on the vendor's configuration.
 void CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_URANDOM)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM) || defined(OPENSSL_RAND_WINDOWS)
 // CRYPTO_init_sysrand initializes long-lived resources needed to draw entropy
 // from the operating system.
 void CRYPTO_init_sysrand(void);
+#else
+OPENSSL_INLINE void CRYPTO_init_sysrand(void) {}
+#endif  // defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM) || defined(OPENSSL_RAND_WINDOWS)
 
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM)
 // CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the
 // operating system, or early /dev/urandom data, and returns 1, _if_ the entropy
 // pool is initialized or if getrandom() is not available and not in FIPS mode.
@@ -82,13 +98,11 @@ void CRYPTO_init_sysrand(void);
 // return 0.
 int CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 #else
-OPENSSL_INLINE void CRYPTO_init_sysrand(void) {}
-
 OPENSSL_INLINE int CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
   CRYPTO_sysrand(buf, len);
   return 1;
 }
-#endif
+#endif  // defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM)
 
 // rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled returns whether fork-unsafe buffering has
 // been enabled via |RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering|.

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c

@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct rand_thread_state {
   // last_block_valid is non-zero iff |last_block| contains data from
   // |get_seed_entropy|.
   int last_block_valid;
+  // fork_unsafe_buffering is non-zero iff, when |drbg| was last (re)seeded,
+  // fork-unsafe buffering was enabled.
+  int fork_unsafe_buffering;
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
   // last_block contains the previous block from |get_seed_entropy|.
@@ -72,6 +75,10 @@ struct rand_thread_state {
   // next and prev form a NULL-terminated, double-linked list of all states in
   // a process.
   struct rand_thread_state *next, *prev;
+  // clear_drbg_lock synchronizes between uses of |drbg| and
+  // |rand_thread_state_clear_all| clearing it. This lock should be uncontended
+  // in the common case, except on shutdown.
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX clear_drbg_lock;
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -82,18 +89,19 @@ struct rand_thread_state {
 // called when the whole process is exiting.
 DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct rand_thread_state *, thread_states_list);
 DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(thread_states_list_lock);
-DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(state_clear_all_lock);
 
 static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) __attribute__((destructor));
 static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) {
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
   for (struct rand_thread_state *cur = *thread_states_list_bss_get();
        cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&cur->clear_drbg_lock);
     CTR_DRBG_clear(&cur->drbg);
   }
   // The locks are deliberately left locked so that any threads that are still
-  // running will hang if they try to call |RAND_bytes|.
+  // running will hang if they try to call |RAND_bytes|. It also ensures
+  // |rand_thread_state_free| cannot free any thread state while we've taken the
+  // lock.
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -107,7 +115,7 @@ static void rand_thread_state_free(void *state_in) {
   }
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
 
   if (state->prev != NULL) {
     state->prev->next = state->next;
@@ -119,7 +127,7 @@ static void rand_thread_state_free(void *state_in) {
     state->next->prev = state->prev;
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
 
   CTR_DRBG_clear(&state->drbg);
 #endif
@@ -195,7 +203,7 @@ void RAND_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
                        int want_additional_input) {
   struct entropy_buffer *const buffer = entropy_buffer_bss_get();
 
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
   const size_t space = sizeof(buffer->bytes) - buffer->bytes_valid;
   if (entropy_len > space) {
     entropy_len = space;
@@ -205,7 +213,7 @@ void RAND_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
   buffer->bytes_valid += entropy_len;
   buffer->want_additional_input |=
       want_additional_input && (entropy_len != 0);
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
 }
 
 // get_seed_entropy fills |out_entropy_len| bytes of |out_entropy| from the
@@ -217,11 +225,11 @@ static void get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
     abort();
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
   while (buffer->bytes_valid < out_entropy_len) {
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
     RAND_need_entropy(out_entropy_len - buffer->bytes_valid);
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
   }
 
   *out_want_additional_input = buffer->want_additional_input;
@@ -233,7 +241,7 @@ static void get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
     buffer->want_additional_input = 0;
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
 }
 
 // rand_get_seed fills |seed| with entropy. In some cases, it will additionally
@@ -326,6 +334,7 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
   }
 
   const uint64_t fork_generation = CRYPTO_get_fork_generation();
+  const int fork_unsafe_buffering = rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled();
 
   // Additional data is mixed into every CTR-DRBG call to protect, as best we
   // can, against forks & VM clones. We do not over-read this information and
@@ -340,7 +349,7 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     // entropy is used. This can be expensive (one read per |RAND_bytes| call)
     // and so is disabled when we have fork detection, or if the application has
     // promised not to fork.
-    if (fork_generation != 0 || rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled()) {
+    if (fork_generation != 0 || fork_unsafe_buffering) {
       OPENSSL_memset(additional_data, 0, sizeof(additional_data));
     } else if (!have_rdrand()) {
       // No alternative so block for OS entropy.
@@ -383,10 +392,12 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     }
     state->calls = 0;
     state->fork_generation = fork_generation;
+    state->fork_unsafe_buffering = fork_unsafe_buffering;
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
     if (state != &stack_state) {
-      CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+      CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
       struct rand_thread_state **states_list = thread_states_list_bss_get();
       state->next = *states_list;
       if (state->next != NULL) {
@@ -394,13 +405,20 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
       }
       state->prev = NULL;
       *states_list = state;
-      CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+      CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
     }
 #endif
   }
 
   if (state->calls >= kReseedInterval ||
-      state->fork_generation != fork_generation) {
+      // If we've forked since |state| was last seeded, reseed.
+      state->fork_generation != fork_generation ||
+      // If |state| was seeded from a state with different fork-safety
+      // preferences, reseed. Suppose |state| was fork-safe, then forked into
+      // two children, but each of the children never fork and disable fork
+      // safety. The children must reseed to avoid working from the same PRNG
+      // state.
+      state->fork_unsafe_buffering != fork_unsafe_buffering) {
     uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
     uint8_t reseed_additional_data[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN] = {0};
     size_t reseed_additional_data_len = 0;
@@ -410,7 +428,7 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     // Take a read lock around accesses to |state->drbg|. This is needed to
     // avoid returning bad entropy if we race with
     // |rand_thread_state_clear_all|.
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
 #endif
     if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed(&state->drbg, seed, reseed_additional_data,
                          reseed_additional_data_len)) {
@@ -418,9 +436,10 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
     }
     state->calls = 0;
     state->fork_generation = fork_generation;
+    state->fork_unsafe_buffering = fork_unsafe_buffering;
   } else {
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
 #endif
   }
 
@@ -449,7 +468,7 @@ void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
   }
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(state_clear_all_lock_bss_get());
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
 #endif
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom.c

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_URANDOM)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM)
 
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -58,22 +58,6 @@
 #endif
 #endif  // OPENSSL_LINUX
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_MACOS)
-// getentropy exists in any supported version of MacOS (Sierra and later)
-#include <sys/random.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_OPENBSD)
-// getentropy exists in any supported version of OpenBSD
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_FREEBSD) && __FreeBSD__ >= 12
-// getrandom is supported in FreeBSD 12 and up.
-#define FREEBSD_GETRANDOM
-#include <sys/random.h>
-#endif
-
 #include <openssl/thread.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 
@@ -179,11 +163,6 @@ static void init_once(void) {
   }
 #endif  // USE_NR_getrandom
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_MACOS) || defined(OPENSSL_OPENBSD) || defined(FREEBSD_GETRANDOM)
-    *urandom_fd_bss_get() = kHaveGetrandom;
-    return;
-#endif
-
   // FIPS builds must support getrandom.
   //
   // Historically, only Android FIPS builds required getrandom, while Linux FIPS
@@ -295,12 +274,6 @@ static int fill_with_entropy(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int block, int seed) {
     if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
 #if defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
       r = boringssl_getrandom(out, len, getrandom_flags);
-#elif defined(FREEBSD_GETRANDOM)
-      r = getrandom(out, len, getrandom_flags);
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_MACOS) || defined(OPENSSL_OPENBSD)
-      // |getentropy| can only request 256 bytes at a time.
-      size_t todo = len <= 256 ? len : 256;
-      r = getentropy(out, todo) != 0 ? -1 : (ssize_t)todo;
 #else  // USE_NR_getrandom
       fprintf(stderr, "urandom fd corrupt.\n");
       abort();
@@ -352,4 +325,4 @@ int CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
   }
 }
 
-#endif  // OPENSSL_URANDOM
+#endif  // OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/internal.h

@@ -62,12 +62,67 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 
+#include "../../internal.h"
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 
+typedef struct bn_blinding_st BN_BLINDING;
+
+struct rsa_st {
+  RSA_METHOD *meth;
+
+  BIGNUM *n;
+  BIGNUM *e;
+  BIGNUM *d;
+  BIGNUM *p;
+  BIGNUM *q;
+  BIGNUM *dmp1;
+  BIGNUM *dmq1;
+  BIGNUM *iqmp;
+
+  // be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+  CRYPTO_refcount_t references;
+  int flags;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX lock;
+
+  // Used to cache montgomery values. The creation of these values is protected
+  // by |lock|.
+  BN_MONT_CTX *mont_n;
+  BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p;
+  BN_MONT_CTX *mont_q;
+
+  // The following fields are copies of |d|, |dmp1|, and |dmq1|, respectively,
+  // but with the correct widths to prevent side channels. These must use
+  // separate copies due to threading concerns caused by OpenSSL's API
+  // mistakes. See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158 and
+  // the |freeze_private_key| implementation.
+  BIGNUM *d_fixed, *dmp1_fixed, *dmq1_fixed;
+
+  // iqmp_mont is q^-1 mod p in Montgomery form, using |mont_p|.
+  BIGNUM *iqmp_mont;
+
+  // num_blindings contains the size of the |blindings| and |blindings_inuse|
+  // arrays. This member and the |blindings_inuse| array are protected by
+  // |lock|.
+  size_t num_blindings;
+  // blindings is an array of BN_BLINDING structures that can be reserved by a
+  // thread by locking |lock| and changing the corresponding element in
+  // |blindings_inuse| from 0 to 1.
+  BN_BLINDING **blindings;
+  unsigned char *blindings_inuse;
+  uint64_t blinding_fork_generation;
+
+  // private_key_frozen is one if the key has been used for a private key
+  // operation and may no longer be mutated.
+  unsigned private_key_frozen:1;
+};
+
+
 #define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE 11
 
 // Default implementations of RSA operations.

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -243,37 +243,24 @@ static int freeze_private_key(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
       }
 
       // CRT components are only publicly bounded by their corresponding
-      // moduli's bit lengths. |rsa->iqmp| is unused outside of this one-time
-      // setup, so we do not compute a fixed-width version of it.
+      // moduli's bit lengths.
       if (!ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, rsa->dmp1, p_fixed->width) ||
           !ensure_fixed_copy(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, rsa->dmq1, q_fixed->width)) {
         goto err;
       }
 
-      // Compute |inv_small_mod_large_mont|. Note that it is always modulo the
-      // larger prime, independent of what is stored in |rsa->iqmp|.
-      if (rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont == NULL) {
-        BIGNUM *inv_small_mod_large_mont = BN_new();
-        int ok;
-        if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
-          ok = inv_small_mod_large_mont != NULL &&
-               bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(inv_small_mod_large_mont, rsa->p,
-                                           rsa->q, ctx, rsa->mont_q) &&
-               BN_to_montgomery(inv_small_mod_large_mont,
-                                inv_small_mod_large_mont, rsa->mont_q, ctx);
-        } else {
-          ok = inv_small_mod_large_mont != NULL &&
-               BN_to_montgomery(inv_small_mod_large_mont, rsa->iqmp,
-                                rsa->mont_p, ctx);
-        }
-        if (!ok) {
-          BN_free(inv_small_mod_large_mont);
+      // Compute |iqmp_mont|, which is |iqmp| in Montgomery form and with the
+      // correct bit width.
+      if (rsa->iqmp_mont == NULL) {
+        BIGNUM *iqmp_mont = BN_new();
+        if (iqmp_mont == NULL ||
+            !BN_to_montgomery(iqmp_mont, rsa->iqmp, rsa->mont_p, ctx)) {
+          BN_free(iqmp_mont);
           goto err;
         }
-        rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont = inv_small_mod_large_mont;
-        CONSTTIME_SECRET(
-            rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont->d,
-            sizeof(BN_ULONG) * rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont->width);
+        rsa->iqmp_mont = iqmp_mont;
+        CONSTTIME_SECRET(rsa->iqmp_mont->d,
+                         sizeof(BN_ULONG) * rsa->iqmp_mont->width);
       }
     }
   }
@@ -302,8 +289,8 @@ void rsa_invalidate_key(RSA *rsa) {
   rsa->dmp1_fixed = NULL;
   BN_free(rsa->dmq1_fixed);
   rsa->dmq1_fixed = NULL;
-  BN_free(rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
-  rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont = NULL;
+  BN_free(rsa->iqmp_mont);
+  rsa->iqmp_mont = NULL;
 
   for (size_t i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) {
     BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[i]);
@@ -798,42 +785,37 @@ static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  // Implementing RSA with CRT in constant-time is sensitive to which prime is
-  // larger. Canonicalize fields so that |p| is the larger prime.
-  const BIGNUM *dmp1 = rsa->dmp1_fixed, *dmq1 = rsa->dmq1_fixed;
-  const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p = rsa->mont_p, *mont_q = rsa->mont_q;
-  if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
-    mont_p = rsa->mont_q;
-    mont_q = rsa->mont_p;
-    dmp1 = rsa->dmq1_fixed;
-    dmq1 = rsa->dmp1_fixed;
-  }
-
   // Use the minimal-width versions of |n|, |p|, and |q|. Either works, but if
   // someone gives us non-minimal values, these will be slightly more efficient
   // on the non-Montgomery operations.
   const BIGNUM *n = &rsa->mont_n->N;
-  const BIGNUM *p = &mont_p->N;
-  const BIGNUM *q = &mont_q->N;
+  const BIGNUM *p = &rsa->mont_p->N;
+  const BIGNUM *q = &rsa->mont_q->N;
 
   // This is a pre-condition for |mod_montgomery|. It was already checked by the
   // caller.
   assert(BN_ucmp(I, n) < 0);
 
   if (// |m1| is the result modulo |q|.
-      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, q, mont_q, p, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, dmq1, q, ctx, mont_q) ||
+      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, q, rsa->mont_q, p, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, rsa->dmq1_fixed, q, ctx,
+                                 rsa->mont_q) ||
       // |r0| is the result modulo |p|.
-      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, p, mont_p, q, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, dmp1, p, ctx, mont_p) ||
-      // Compute r0 = r0 - m1 mod p. |p| is the larger prime, so |m1| is already
-      // fully reduced mod |p|.
-      !bn_mod_sub_consttime(r0, r0, m1, p, ctx) ||
+      !mod_montgomery(r1, I, p, rsa->mont_p, q, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, rsa->dmp1_fixed, p, ctx,
+                                 rsa->mont_p) ||
+      // Compute r0 = r0 - m1 mod p. |m1| is reduced mod |q|, not |p|, so we
+      // just run |mod_montgomery| again for simplicity. This could be more
+      // efficient with more cases: if |p > q|, |m1| is already reduced. If
+      // |p < q| but they have the same bit width, |bn_reduce_once| suffices.
+      // However, compared to over 2048 Montgomery multiplications above, this
+      // difference is not measurable.
+      !mod_montgomery(r1, m1, p, rsa->mont_p, q, ctx) ||
+      !bn_mod_sub_consttime(r0, r0, r1, p, ctx) ||
       // r0 = r0 * iqmp mod p. We use Montgomery multiplication to compute this
-      // in constant time. |inv_small_mod_large_mont| is in Montgomery form and
-      // r0 is not, so the result is taken out of Montgomery form.
-      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r0, r0, rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont, mont_p,
-                             ctx) ||
+      // in constant time. |iqmp_mont| is in Montgomery form and r0 is not, so
+      // the result is taken out of Montgomery form.
+      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r0, r0, rsa->iqmp_mont, rsa->mont_p, ctx) ||
       // r0 = r0 * q + m1 gives the final result. Reducing modulo q gives m1, so
       // it is correct mod p. Reducing modulo p gives (r0-m1)*iqmp*q + m1 = r0,
       // so it is correct mod q. Finally, the result is bounded by [m1, n + m1),
@@ -1308,8 +1290,7 @@ static int RSA_generate_key_ex_maybe_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits,
   replace_bignum(&rsa->d_fixed, &tmp->d_fixed);
   replace_bignum(&rsa->dmp1_fixed, &tmp->dmp1_fixed);
   replace_bignum(&rsa->dmq1_fixed, &tmp->dmq1_fixed);
-  replace_bignum(&rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont,
-                 &tmp->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
+  replace_bignum(&rsa->iqmp_mont, &tmp->iqmp_mont);
   rsa->private_key_frozen = tmp->private_key_frozen;
   ret = 1;
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/self_check.c

@@ -249,11 +249,12 @@ static EC_KEY *self_test_ecdsa_key(void) {
       0x93, 0x8b, 0x74, 0xf2, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x52, 0xb0, 0x77,
   };
 
-  EC_KEY *ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+  EC_KEY *ec_key = EC_KEY_new();
   BIGNUM *qx = BN_bin2bn(kQx, sizeof(kQx), NULL);
   BIGNUM *qy = BN_bin2bn(kQy, sizeof(kQy), NULL);
   BIGNUM *d = BN_bin2bn(kD, sizeof(kD), NULL);
   if (ec_key == NULL || qx == NULL || qy == NULL || d == NULL ||
+      !EC_KEY_set_group(ec_key, EC_group_p256()) ||
       !EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(ec_key, qx, qy) ||
       !EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec_key, d)) {
     EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
@@ -411,7 +412,6 @@ err:
 static int boringssl_self_test_ecc(void) {
   int ret = 0;
   EC_KEY *ec_key = NULL;
-  EC_GROUP *ec_group = NULL;
   EC_POINT *ec_point_in = NULL;
   EC_POINT *ec_point_out = NULL;
   BIGNUM *ec_scalar = NULL;
@@ -506,11 +506,7 @@ static int boringssl_self_test_ecc(void) {
       0x7c, 0x41, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x40, 0xaf, 0x2e, 0x4a, 0x0c,
   };
 
-  ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
-  if (ec_group == NULL) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create P-256 group.\n");
-    goto err;
-  }
+  const EC_GROUP *ec_group = EC_group_p256();
   ec_point_in = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
   ec_point_out = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
   ec_scalar = BN_new();
@@ -535,7 +531,6 @@ err:
   EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
   EC_POINT_free(ec_point_in);
   EC_POINT_free(ec_point_out);
-  EC_GROUP_free(ec_group);
   BN_free(ec_scalar);
   ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
 
@@ -918,11 +913,6 @@ static int boringssl_self_test_fast(void) {
   }
 
   // TLS KDF KAT
-  static const uint8_t kTLSSecret[32] = {
-      0xab, 0xc3, 0x65, 0x7b, 0x09, 0x4c, 0x76, 0x28, 0xa0, 0xb2, 0x82,
-      0x99, 0x6f, 0xe7, 0x5a, 0x75, 0xf4, 0x98, 0x4f, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x4e,
-      0xcc, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x53, 0xa2, 0xc4, 0x69, 0xa3, 0xf7, 0x31,
-  };
   static const char kTLSLabel[] = "FIPS self test";
   static const uint8_t kTLSSeed1[16] = {
       0x8f, 0x0d, 0xe8, 0xb6, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xb1, 0xd2,
@@ -932,17 +922,45 @@ static int boringssl_self_test_fast(void) {
       0x7d, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xbf, 0x3c,
       0x31, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x32, 0x81,
   };
-  static const uint8_t kTLSOutput[32] = {
-      0xe2, 0x1d, 0xd6, 0xc2, 0x68, 0xc7, 0x57, 0x03, 0x2c, 0x2c, 0xeb,
-      0xbb, 0xb8, 0xa9, 0x7d, 0xe9, 0xee, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x47, 0x83, 0x0a,
-      0xbd, 0x11, 0x60, 0x5d, 0xd5, 0x2c, 0x47, 0xb6, 0x05, 0x88,
+
+  static const uint8_t kTLS10Secret[32] = {
+      0xab, 0xc3, 0x65, 0x7b, 0x09, 0x4c, 0x76, 0x28, 0xa0, 0xb2, 0x82,
+      0x99, 0x6f, 0xe7, 0x5a, 0x75, 0xf4, 0x98, 0x4f, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x4e,
+      0xcc, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x53, 0xa2, 0xc4, 0x69, 0xa3, 0xf7, 0x31,
+  };
+  static const uint8_t kTLS10Output[32] = {
+      0x69, 0x7c, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0xee, 0x82, 0xb1, 0xd2, 0x8b, 0xac, 0x90,
+      0x7a, 0xa1, 0x8a, 0x81, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0x58, 0x45, 0x57, 0x61, 0x2f,
+      0x7a, 0x8d, 0x80, 0xfb, 0x44, 0xd8, 0x81, 0x60, 0xe5, 0xf8,
+  };
+  uint8_t tls10_output[sizeof(kTLS10Output)];
+  if (!CRYPTO_tls1_prf(EVP_md5_sha1(), tls10_output, sizeof(tls10_output),
+                       kTLS10Secret, sizeof(kTLS10Secret), kTLSLabel,
+                       sizeof(kTLSLabel), kTLSSeed1, sizeof(kTLSSeed1),
+                       kTLSSeed2, sizeof(kTLSSeed2)) ||
+      !check_test(kTLS10Output, tls10_output, sizeof(kTLS10Output),
+                  "TLS10-KDF KAT")) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "TLS KDF failed.\n");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  static const uint8_t kTLS12Secret[32] = {
+      0xc5, 0x43, 0x8e, 0xe2, 0x6f, 0xd4, 0xac, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x9f, 0xc9,
+      0x18, 0x55, 0xdc, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x88, 0x4e, 0xe2, 0x93, 0x22, 0xfc,
+      0xbf, 0xd2, 0x96, 0x6a, 0x46, 0x23, 0xd4, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x81,
+  };
+  static const uint8_t kTLS12Output[32] = {
+      0xee, 0x4a, 0xcd, 0x3f, 0xa3, 0xd3, 0x55, 0x89, 0x9e, 0x6f, 0xf1,
+      0x38, 0x46, 0x9d, 0x2b, 0x33, 0xaa, 0x7f, 0xc4, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x85,
+      0x8a, 0xf3, 0x13, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x53, 0x6a, 0x65, 0x37, 0x51,
   };
-  uint8_t tls_output[sizeof(kTLSOutput)];
-  if (!CRYPTO_tls1_prf(EVP_sha256(), tls_output, sizeof(tls_output), kTLSSecret,
-                       sizeof(kTLSSecret), kTLSLabel, sizeof(kTLSLabel),
-                       kTLSSeed1, sizeof(kTLSSeed1), kTLSSeed2,
-                       sizeof(kTLSSeed2)) ||
-      !check_test(kTLSOutput, tls_output, sizeof(kTLSOutput), "TLS-KDF KAT")) {
+  uint8_t tls12_output[sizeof(kTLS12Output)];
+  if (!CRYPTO_tls1_prf(EVP_sha256(), tls12_output, sizeof(tls12_output),
+                       kTLS12Secret, sizeof(kTLS12Secret), kTLSLabel,
+                       sizeof(kTLSLabel), kTLSSeed1, sizeof(kTLSSeed1),
+                       kTLSSeed2, sizeof(kTLSSeed2)) ||
+      !check_test(kTLS12Output, tls12_output, sizeof(kTLS12Output),
+                  "TLS12-KDF KAT")) {
     fprintf(stderr, "TLS KDF failed.\n");
     goto err;
   }
@@ -983,7 +1001,7 @@ static int boringssl_self_test_fast(void) {
       !check_test(kTLS13ExpandLabelOutput, tls13_expand_label_output,
                   sizeof(kTLS13ExpandLabelOutput),
                   "CRYPTO_tls13_hkdf_expand_label")) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "TLSv1.3 KDF failed.\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "TLS13-KDF failed.\n");
     goto err;
   }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/service_indicator/service_indicator.c

@@ -303,14 +303,11 @@ void HMAC_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD *evp_md) {
 }
 
 void TLSKDF_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD *md) {
-  // HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1, and HMAC-MD5/HMAC-SHA1 (both used concurrently) are
-  // approved for use in the KDF in TLS 1.0/1.1.
-  // HMAC-SHA{256, 384, 512} are approved for use in the KDF in TLS 1.2.
-  // These Key Derivation functions are to be used in the context of the TLS
-  // protocol.
+  // HMAC-MD5/HMAC-SHA1 (both used concurrently) is approved for use in the KDF
+  // in TLS 1.0/1.1. HMAC-SHA{256, 384, 512} are approved for use in the KDF in
+  // TLS 1.2. These Key Derivation functions are to be used in the context of
+  // the TLS protocol.
   switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
-    case NID_md5:
-    case NID_sha1:
     case NID_md5_sha1:
     case NID_sha256:
     case NID_sha384:

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/hpke/hpke.c

@@ -352,6 +352,13 @@ int EVP_HPKE_KEY_copy(EVP_HPKE_KEY *dst, const EVP_HPKE_KEY *src) {
   return 1;
 }
 
+void EVP_HPKE_KEY_move(EVP_HPKE_KEY *out, EVP_HPKE_KEY *in) {
+  EVP_HPKE_KEY_cleanup(out);
+  // For now, |EVP_HPKE_KEY| is trivially movable.
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, sizeof(EVP_HPKE_KEY));
+  EVP_HPKE_KEY_zero(in);
+}
+
 int EVP_HPKE_KEY_init(EVP_HPKE_KEY *key, const EVP_HPKE_KEM *kem,
                       const uint8_t *priv_key, size_t priv_key_len) {
   EVP_HPKE_KEY_zero(key);