grpc 1.54.2 → 1.55.3

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/trust_token/pmbtoken.c

@@ -944,17 +944,14 @@ static STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *pmbtoken_unblind(
     return NULL;
   }
 
-  int ok = 0;
-  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *ret = sk_TRUST_TOKEN_new_null();
-  if (ret == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
   if (count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT) ||
       count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_SCALAR)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
-    return 0;
+    return NULL;
   }
+
+  int ok = 0;
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *ret = sk_TRUST_TOKEN_new_null();
   EC_RAW_POINT *Tps = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
   EC_RAW_POINT *Sps = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
   EC_RAW_POINT *Wps = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
@@ -962,11 +959,12 @@ static STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *pmbtoken_unblind(
   EC_SCALAR *es = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_SCALAR));
   CBB batch_cbb;
   CBB_zero(&batch_cbb);
-  if (!Tps ||
-      !Sps ||
-      !Wps ||
-      !Wsps ||
-      !es ||
+  if (ret == NULL ||
+      Tps == NULL ||
+      Sps == NULL ||
+      Wps == NULL ||
+      Wsps == NULL ||
+      es == NULL ||
       !CBB_init(&batch_cbb, 0) ||
       !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pubs) ||
       !point_to_cbb(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pub0) ||

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/trust_token/voprf.c

@@ -563,25 +563,23 @@ static STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *voprf_unblind(
     return NULL;
   }
 
-  int ok = 0;
-  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *ret = sk_TRUST_TOKEN_new_null();
-  if (ret == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
   if (count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT) ||
       count > ((size_t)-1) / sizeof(EC_SCALAR)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
-    return 0;
+    return NULL;
   }
+
+  int ok = 0;
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *ret = sk_TRUST_TOKEN_new_null();
   EC_RAW_POINT *BTs = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
   EC_RAW_POINT *Zs = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_RAW_POINT));
   EC_SCALAR *es = OPENSSL_malloc(count * sizeof(EC_SCALAR));
   CBB batch_cbb;
   CBB_zero(&batch_cbb);
-  if (!BTs ||
-      !Zs ||
-      !es ||
+  if (ret == NULL ||
+      BTs == NULL ||
+      Zs == NULL ||
+      es == NULL ||
       !CBB_init(&batch_cbb, 0) ||
       !cbb_add_point(&batch_cbb, method->group, &key->pubs)) {
     goto err;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/by_dir.c

@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu) {
 
 static void by_dir_hash_free(BY_DIR_HASH *hash) { OPENSSL_free(hash); }
 
-static int by_dir_hash_cmp(const BY_DIR_HASH **a, const BY_DIR_HASH **b) {
+static int by_dir_hash_cmp(const BY_DIR_HASH *const *a,
+                           const BY_DIR_HASH *const *b) {
   if ((*a)->hash > (*b)->hash) {
     return 1;
   }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/internal.h

@@ -404,7 +404,8 @@ int x509_digest_verify_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
 // Path-building functions.
 
 // X509_policy_check checks certificate policies in |certs|. |user_policies| is
-// the user-initial-policy-set. |flags| is a set of |X509_V_FLAG_*| values to
+// the user-initial-policy-set. If |user_policies| is NULL or empty, it is
+// interpreted as anyPolicy. |flags| is a set of |X509_V_FLAG_*| values to
 // apply. It returns |X509_V_OK| on success and |X509_V_ERR_*| on error. It
 // additionally sets |*out_current_cert| to the certificate where the error
 // occurred. If the function succeeded, or the error applies to the entire

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/policy.c

@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ static X509_POLICY_NODE *x509_policy_node_new(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) {
   return node;
 }
 
-static int x509_policy_node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE **a,
-                                const X509_POLICY_NODE **b) {
+static int x509_policy_node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *a,
+                                const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *b) {
   return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policy, (*b)->policy);
 }
 
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ static int x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO **a, const POLICYINFO **b) {
+static int policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO *const *a,
+                          const POLICYINFO *const *b) {
   return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policyid, (*b)->policyid);
 }
 
@@ -312,13 +313,13 @@ err:
   return ret;
 }
 
-static int compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING **a,
-                                 const POLICY_MAPPING **b) {
+static int compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a,
+                                 const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) {
   return OBJ_cmp((*a)->issuerDomainPolicy, (*b)->issuerDomainPolicy);
 }
 
-static int compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING **a,
-                                  const POLICY_MAPPING **b) {
+static int compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a,
+                                  const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b) {
   return OBJ_cmp((*a)->subjectDomainPolicy, (*b)->subjectDomainPolicy);
 }
 
@@ -578,7 +579,7 @@ static int process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy,
 // evaluation.
 static int has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
                                const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies) {
-  assert(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies));
+  assert(user_policies == NULL || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies));
 
   // Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty.
   size_t num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels);
@@ -651,7 +652,8 @@ static int has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
   return 0;
 }
 
-static int asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT **a, const ASN1_OBJECT **b) {
+static int asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a,
+                           const ASN1_OBJECT *const *b) {
   return OBJ_cmp(*a, *b);
 }
 
@@ -761,12 +763,14 @@ int X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
   // is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set is not empty.
   if (explicit_policy == 0) {
     // Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient lookup.
-    user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup(user_policies);
-    if (user_policies_sorted == NULL) {
-      goto err;
+    if (user_policies != NULL) {
+      user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup(user_policies);
+      if (user_policies_sorted == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted, asn1_object_cmp);
+      sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted);
     }
-    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted, asn1_object_cmp);
-    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted);
 
     if (!has_explicit_policy(levels, user_policies_sorted)) {
       ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c

@@ -140,25 +140,25 @@ int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name,
   return ctx->method->get_by_subject(ctx, type, name, ret) > 0;
 }
 
-static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT **a, const X509_OBJECT **b) {
-  int ret;
-
-  ret = ((*a)->type - (*b)->type);
+static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT *a, const X509_OBJECT *b) {
+  int ret = a->type - b->type;
   if (ret) {
     return ret;
   }
-  switch ((*a)->type) {
+  switch (a->type) {
     case X509_LU_X509:
-      ret = X509_subject_name_cmp((*a)->data.x509, (*b)->data.x509);
-      break;
+      return X509_subject_name_cmp(a->data.x509, b->data.x509);
     case X509_LU_CRL:
-      ret = X509_CRL_cmp((*a)->data.crl, (*b)->data.crl);
-      break;
+      return X509_CRL_cmp(a->data.crl, b->data.crl);
     default:
       // abort();
       return 0;
   }
-  return ret;
+}
+
+static int x509_object_cmp_sk(const X509_OBJECT *const *a,
+                              const X509_OBJECT *const *b) {
+  return x509_object_cmp(*a, *b);
 }
 
 X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void) {
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void) {
   }
   OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
   CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->objs_lock);
-  ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp);
+  ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp_sk);
   if (ret->objs == NULL) {
     goto err;
   }
@@ -424,12 +424,10 @@ static int x509_object_idx_cnt(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type,
 
   if (pnmatch != NULL) {
     int tidx;
-    const X509_OBJECT *tobj, *pstmp;
     *pnmatch = 1;
-    pstmp = &stmp;
     for (tidx = idx + 1; tidx < (int)sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); tidx++) {
-      tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx);
-      if (x509_object_cmp(&tobj, &pstmp)) {
+      const X509_OBJECT *tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx);
+      if (x509_object_cmp(tobj, &stmp)) {
         break;
       }
       (*pnmatch)++;
@@ -542,19 +540,17 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) {
 
 X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
                                         X509_OBJECT *x) {
-  size_t idx, i;
-  X509_OBJECT *obj;
-
   sk_X509_OBJECT_sort(h);
+  size_t idx;
   if (!sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, &idx, x)) {
     return NULL;
   }
   if ((x->type != X509_LU_X509) && (x->type != X509_LU_CRL)) {
     return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
   }
-  for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i++) {
-    obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i);
-    if (x509_object_cmp((const X509_OBJECT **)&obj, (const X509_OBJECT **)&x)) {
+  for (size_t i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i++) {
+    X509_OBJECT *obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i);
+    if (x509_object_cmp(obj, x)) {
       return NULL;
     }
     if (x->type == X509_LU_X509) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST **a, const X509_TRUST **b);
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
 static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
 
 static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
 
 static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
 
-static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST **a, const X509_TRUST **b) {
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b) {
   return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
 }
 
@@ -152,7 +152,6 @@ int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id) {
   if (!trtable) {
     return -1;
   }
-  sk_X509_TRUST_sort(trtable);
   if (!sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &idx, &tmp)) {
     return -1;
   }
@@ -216,6 +215,10 @@ int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck)(X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
 
   // If its a new entry manage the dynamic table
   if (idx == -1) {
+    // TODO(davidben): This should be locked. Alternatively, remove the dynamic
+    // registration mechanism entirely. The trouble is there no way to pass in
+    // the various parameters into an |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| directly. You can only
+    // register it in the global table and get an ID.
     if (!trtable && !(trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp))) {
       trtable_free(trtmp);
       return 0;
@@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck)(X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
       trtable_free(trtmp);
       return 0;
     }
+    sk_X509_TRUST_sort(trtable);
   }
   return 1;
 }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -447,7 +447,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
 
   // Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
   // they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
-
   ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
   if (!ok) {
     goto end;
@@ -464,14 +463,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
   }
 
   // Check name constraints
-
   ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
   if (!ok) {
     goto end;
   }
 
-  // If we get this far evaluate policies
-  if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) {
+  // If we get this far, evaluate policies.
+  if (!bad_chain) {
     ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
   }
 
@@ -1612,6 +1610,7 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) {
 }
 
 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  // TODO(davidben): Why do we disable policy validation for CRL paths?
   if (ctx->parent) {
     return 1;
   }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c

@@ -350,9 +350,6 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name) {
 
 int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags) {
   param->flags |= flags;
-  if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_MASK) {
-    param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
-  }
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -398,8 +395,6 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
   if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, policy)) {
     return 0;
   }
-  // TODO(davidben): This does not set |X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK|, while
-  // |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies| does. Is this a bug?
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -421,7 +416,6 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -547,76 +541,11 @@ static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
      NULL,                     // policies
      vpm_empty_id}};
 
-static STACK_OF(X509_VERIFY_PARAM) *param_table = NULL;
-
-static int param_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM **a, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM **b) {
-  return strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name);
-}
-
-int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *ptmp;
-  if (!param_table) {
-    param_table = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(param_cmp);
-    if (!param_table) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  } else {
-    size_t idx;
-
-    sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_sort(param_table);
-    if (sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, &idx, param)) {
-      ptmp = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx);
-      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ptmp);
-      (void)sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_delete(param_table, idx);
-    }
-  }
-  if (!sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_push(param_table, param)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(void) {
-  int num = sizeof(default_table) / sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM);
-  if (param_table) {
-    num += sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_num(param_table);
-  }
-  return num;
-}
-
-const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(int id) {
-  int num = sizeof(default_table) / sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM);
-  if (id < num) {
-    return default_table + id;
-  }
-  return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, id - num);
-}
-
 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(const char *name) {
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM pm;
-  unsigned i, limit;
-
-  pm.name = (char *)name;
-  if (param_table) {
-    size_t idx;
-    sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_sort(param_table);
-    if (sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, &idx, &pm)) {
-      return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx);
-    }
-  }
-
-  limit = sizeof(default_table) / sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM);
-  for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(default_table); i++) {
     if (strcmp(default_table[i].name, name) == 0) {
       return &default_table[i];
     }
   }
   return NULL;
 }
-
-void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup(void) {
-  if (param_table) {
-    sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_pop_free(param_table, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free);
-  }
-  param_table = NULL;
-}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x_crl.c

@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@
 #include "../internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
-static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED **a, const X509_REVOKED **b);
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+                            const X509_REVOKED *const *b);
 static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp);
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = {
@@ -361,7 +362,8 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)
 
-static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED **a, const X509_REVOKED **b) {
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+                            const X509_REVOKED *const *b) {
   return ASN1_STRING_cmp((*a)->serialNumber, (*b)->serialNumber);
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c

@@ -72,12 +72,13 @@ static STACK_OF(X509V3_EXT_METHOD) *ext_list = NULL;
 
 static void ext_list_free(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext);
 
-static int ext_stack_cmp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD **a,
-                         const X509V3_EXT_METHOD **b) {
+static int ext_stack_cmp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *a,
+                         const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *b) {
   return ((*a)->ext_nid - (*b)->ext_nid);
 }
 
 int X509V3_EXT_add(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext) {
+  // TODO(davidben): This should be locked. Also check for duplicates.
   if (!ext_list && !(ext_list = sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_new(ext_stack_cmp))) {
     ext_list_free(ext);
     return 0;
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ int X509V3_EXT_add(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext) {
     ext_list_free(ext);
     return 0;
   }
+  sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_sort(ext_list);
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -113,7 +115,6 @@ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get_nid(int nid) {
     return NULL;
   }
 
-  sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_sort(ext_list);
   if (!sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_find(ext_list, &idx, &tmp)) {
     return NULL;
   }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
 
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b);
 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
 
 static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
 
 static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
 
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b) {
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) {
   return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
 }
 
@@ -201,7 +201,6 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) {
     return -1;
   }
 
-  sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable);
   if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp)) {
     return -1;
   }
@@ -267,6 +266,10 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
 
   // If its a new entry manage the dynamic table
   if (idx == -1) {
+    // TODO(davidben): This should be locked. Alternatively, remove the dynamic
+    // registration mechanism entirely. The trouble is there no way to pass in
+    // the various parameters into an |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| directly. You can only
+    // register it in the global table and get an ID.
     if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
       xptable_free(ptmp);
       return 0;
@@ -275,6 +278,7 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
       xptable_free(ptmp);
       return 0;
     }
+    sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable);
   }
   return 1;
 }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
 
 
 static char *strip_spaces(char *name);
-static int sk_strcmp(const char **a, const char **b);
+static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b);
 static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *get_email(const X509_NAME *name,
                                            const GENERAL_NAMES *gens);
 static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str);
@@ -551,7 +551,9 @@ int x509v3_conf_name_matches(const char *name, const char *cmp) {
   return name[len] == '\0' || name[len] == '.';
 }
 
-static int sk_strcmp(const char **a, const char **b) { return strcmp(*a, *b); }
+static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b) {
+  return strcmp(*a, *b);
+}
 
 STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_email(X509 *x) {
   GENERAL_NAMES *gens;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/include/openssl/base.h

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ extern "C" {
 // A consumer may use this symbol in the preprocessor to temporarily build
 // against multiple revisions of BoringSSL at the same time. It is not
 // recommended to do so for longer than is necessary.
-#define BORINGSSL_API_VERSION 18
+#define BORINGSSL_API_VERSION 19
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/include/openssl/bio.h

@@ -107,14 +107,14 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int BIO_up_ref(BIO *bio);
 // bytes read, zero on EOF, or a negative number on error.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int BIO_read(BIO *bio, void *data, int len);
 
-// BIO_gets "reads a line" from |bio| and puts at most |size| bytes into |buf|.
-// It returns the number of bytes read or a negative number on error. The
-// phrase "reads a line" is in quotes in the previous sentence because the
-// exact operation depends on the BIO's method. For example, a digest BIO will
-// return the digest in response to a |BIO_gets| call.
-//
-// TODO(fork): audit the set of BIOs that we end up needing. If all actually
-// return a line for this call, remove the warning above.
+// BIO_gets reads a line from |bio| and writes at most |size| bytes into |buf|.
+// It returns the number of bytes read or a negative number on error. This
+// function's output always includes a trailing NUL byte, so it will read at
+// most |size - 1| bytes.
+//
+// If the function read a complete line, the output will include the newline
+// character, '\n'. If no newline was found before |size - 1| bytes or EOF, it
+// outputs the bytes which were available.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int BIO_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size);
 
 // BIO_write writes |len| bytes from |data| to |bio|. It returns the number of