grpc 1.53.2 → 1.54.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_file.cc

@@ -128,125 +128,102 @@ static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) {
   return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
 }
 
-// TODO(davidben): Is there any reason this doesn't call
-// |SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack|?
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) {
-  BIO *in;
-  X509 *x = NULL;
-  X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
-  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
-
-  sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
-  in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-
-  if (sk == NULL || in == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
+static int add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out, BIO *bio,
+                                          bool allow_empty) {
+  // This function historically sorted |out| after every addition and skipped
+  // duplicates. This implementation preserves that behavior, but only sorts at
+  // the end, to avoid a quadratic running time. Existing duplicates in |out|
+  // are preserved, but do not introduce new duplicates.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_NAME)> to_append(sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp));
+  if (to_append == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Temporarily switch the comparison function for |out|.
+  struct RestoreCmpFunc {
+    ~RestoreCmpFunc() { sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, old_cmp); }
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack;
+    int (*old_cmp)(const X509_NAME **, const X509_NAME **);
+  };
+  RestoreCmpFunc restore = {out, sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(out, xname_cmp)};
+
+  sk_X509_NAME_sort(out);
+  bool first = true;
   for (;;) {
-    if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) {
-      break;
-    }
-    if (ret == NULL) {
-      ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
-      if (ret == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
+    bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(
+        PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
+    if (x509 == nullptr) {
+      if (first && !allow_empty) {
+        return 0;
       }
+      // TODO(davidben): This ignores PEM syntax errors. It should only succeed
+      // on |PEM_R_NO_START_LINE|.
+      ERR_clear_error();
+      break;
     }
-    xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
-    if (xn == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
+    first = false;
 
-    // Check for duplicates.
-    sk_X509_NAME_sort(sk);
-    if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, NULL, xn)) {
+    X509_NAME *subject = X509_get_subject_name(x509.get());
+    // Skip if already present in |out|. Duplicates in |to_append| will be
+    // handled separately.
+    if (sk_X509_NAME_find(out, /*out_index=*/NULL, subject)) {
       continue;
     }
 
-    xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
-    if (xn == NULL ||
-        !sk_X509_NAME_push(sk /* non-owning */, xn) ||
-        !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret /* owning */, xn)) {
-      X509_NAME_free(xn);
-      goto err;
+    bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> copy(X509_NAME_dup(subject));
+    if (copy == nullptr ||
+        !bssl::PushToStack(to_append.get(), std::move(copy))) {
+      return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  if (0) {
-  err:
-    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
-    ret = NULL;
+  // Append |to_append| to |stack|, skipping any duplicates.
+  sk_X509_NAME_sort(to_append.get());
+  size_t num = sk_X509_NAME_num(to_append.get());
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+    bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(sk_X509_NAME_value(to_append.get(), i));
+    sk_X509_NAME_set(to_append.get(), i, nullptr);
+    if (i + 1 < num &&
+        X509_NAME_cmp(name.get(), sk_X509_NAME_value(to_append.get(), i + 1)) ==
+            0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!bssl::PushToStack(out, std::move(name))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
   }
 
-  sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
-  BIO_free(in);
-  X509_free(x);
-  if (ret != NULL) {
-    ERR_clear_error();
-  }
-  return ret;
+  // Sort |out| one last time, to preserve the historical behavior of
+  // maintaining the sorted list.
+  sk_X509_NAME_sort(out);
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
-                                        const char *file) {
-  BIO *in;
-  X509 *x = NULL;
-  X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
-  int ret = 0;
-  int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b);
-
-  oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
-  in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-
-  if (in == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) {
+  bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> in(BIO_new_file(file, "r"));
+  if (in == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
-
-  if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) {
-    goto err;
+  bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_NAME)> ret(sk_X509_NAME_new_null());
+  if (ret == nullptr ||  //
+      !add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack(ret.get(), in.get(),
+                                      /*allow_empty=*/false)) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
+  return ret.release();
+}
 
-  for (;;) {
-    if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) {
-      break;
-    }
-    xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
-    if (xn == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    // Check for duplicates.
-    sk_X509_NAME_sort(stack);
-    if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, NULL, xn)) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
-    if (xn == NULL ||
-        !sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
-      X509_NAME_free(xn);
-      goto err;
-    }
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out,
+                                        const char *file) {
+  bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> in(BIO_new_file(file, "r"));
+  if (in == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
   }
+  return SSL_add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack(out, in.get());
+}
 
-  ERR_clear_error();
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BIO_free(in);
-  X509_free(x);
-
-  (void) sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
-
-  return ret;
+int SSL_add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out, BIO *bio) {
+  return add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack(out, bio, /*allow_empty=*/true);
 }
 
 int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_key_share.cc

@@ -38,85 +38,76 @@ namespace {
 
 class ECKeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
  public:
-  ECKeyShare(int nid, uint16_t group_id) : nid_(nid), group_id_(group_id) {}
+  ECKeyShare(int nid, uint16_t group_id)
+      : group_(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)), group_id_(group_id) {}
 
   uint16_t GroupID() const override { return group_id_; }
 
-  bool Offer(CBB *out) override {
+  bool Generate(CBB *out) override {
     assert(!private_key_);
-    // Set up a shared |BN_CTX| for all operations.
-    UniquePtr<BN_CTX> bn_ctx(BN_CTX_new());
-    if (!bn_ctx) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    BN_CTXScope scope(bn_ctx.get());
-
     // Generate a private key.
-    UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid_));
     private_key_.reset(BN_new());
-    if (!group || !private_key_ ||
+    if (!group_ || !private_key_ ||
         !BN_rand_range_ex(private_key_.get(), 1,
-                          EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get()))) {
+                          EC_GROUP_get0_order(group_))) {
       return false;
     }
 
     // Compute the corresponding public key and serialize it.
-    UniquePtr<EC_POINT> public_key(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
+    UniquePtr<EC_POINT> public_key(EC_POINT_new(group_));
     if (!public_key ||
-        !EC_POINT_mul(group.get(), public_key.get(), private_key_.get(), NULL,
-                      NULL, bn_ctx.get()) ||
-        !EC_POINT_point2cbb(out, group.get(), public_key.get(),
-                            POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, bn_ctx.get())) {
+        !EC_POINT_mul(group_, public_key.get(), private_key_.get(),
+                      nullptr, nullptr, /*ctx=*/nullptr) ||
+        !EC_POINT_point2cbb(out, group_, public_key.get(),
+                            POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, /*ctx=*/nullptr)) {
       return false;
     }
 
     return true;
   }
 
-  bool Finish(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
-              Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
-    assert(private_key_);
+  bool Encap(CBB *out_ciphertext, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+             uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
+    // ECDH may be fit into a KEM-like abstraction by using a second keypair's
+    // public key as the ciphertext.
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return Generate(out_ciphertext) && Decap(out_secret, out_alert, peer_key);
+  }
 
-    // Set up a shared |BN_CTX| for all operations.
-    UniquePtr<BN_CTX> bn_ctx(BN_CTX_new());
-    if (!bn_ctx) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    BN_CTXScope scope(bn_ctx.get());
-
-    UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid_));
-    if (!group) {
-      return false;
-    }
+  bool Decap(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
+             Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext) override {
+    assert(group_);
+    assert(private_key_);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
-    UniquePtr<EC_POINT> peer_point(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
-    UniquePtr<EC_POINT> result(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
-    BIGNUM *x = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx.get());
+    UniquePtr<EC_POINT> peer_point(EC_POINT_new(group_));
+    UniquePtr<EC_POINT> result(EC_POINT_new(group_));
+    UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new());
     if (!peer_point || !result || !x) {
       return false;
     }
 
-    if (peer_key.empty() || peer_key[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED ||
-        !EC_POINT_oct2point(group.get(), peer_point.get(), peer_key.data(),
-                            peer_key.size(), bn_ctx.get())) {
+    if (ciphertext.empty() || ciphertext[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED ||
+        !EC_POINT_oct2point(group_, peer_point.get(), ciphertext.data(),
+                            ciphertext.size(), /*ctx=*/nullptr)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
       return false;
     }
 
     // Compute the x-coordinate of |peer_key| * |private_key_|.
-    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group.get(), result.get(), NULL, peer_point.get(),
-                      private_key_.get(), bn_ctx.get()) ||
-        !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group.get(), result.get(), x, NULL,
-                                             bn_ctx.get())) {
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group_, result.get(), NULL, peer_point.get(),
+                      private_key_.get(), /*ctx=*/nullptr) ||
+        !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group_, result.get(), x.get(),
+                                             NULL,
+                                             /*ctx=*/nullptr)) {
       return false;
     }
 
     // Encode the x-coordinate left-padded with zeros.
     Array<uint8_t> secret;
-    if (!secret.Init((EC_GROUP_get_degree(group.get()) + 7) / 8) ||
-        !BN_bn2bin_padded(secret.data(), secret.size(), x)) {
+    if (!secret.Init((EC_GROUP_get_degree(group_) + 7) / 8) ||
+        !BN_bn2bin_padded(secret.data(), secret.size(), x.get())) {
       return false;
     }
 
@@ -125,10 +116,10 @@ class ECKeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
   }
 
   bool SerializePrivateKey(CBB *out) override {
+    assert(group_);
     assert(private_key_);
-    UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid_));
     // Padding is added to avoid leaking the length.
-    size_t len = BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get()));
+    size_t len = BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(group_));
     return BN_bn2cbb_padded(out, len, private_key_.get());
   }
 
@@ -140,7 +131,7 @@ class ECKeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
 
  private:
   UniquePtr<BIGNUM> private_key_;
-  int nid_;
+  const EC_GROUP *const group_ = nullptr;
   uint16_t group_id_;
 };
 
@@ -150,24 +141,31 @@ class X25519KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
 
   uint16_t GroupID() const override { return SSL_CURVE_X25519; }
 
-  bool Offer(CBB *out) override {
+  bool Generate(CBB *out) override {
     uint8_t public_key[32];
     X25519_keypair(public_key, private_key_);
     return !!CBB_add_bytes(out, public_key, sizeof(public_key));
   }
 
-  bool Finish(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
-              Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
+  bool Encap(CBB *out_ciphertext, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+             uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
+    // X25519 may be fit into a KEM-like abstraction by using a second keypair's
+    // public key as the ciphertext.
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return Generate(out_ciphertext) && Decap(out_secret, out_alert, peer_key);
+  }
+
+  bool Decap(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
+             Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext) override {
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
     Array<uint8_t> secret;
     if (!secret.Init(32)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
       return false;
     }
 
-    if (peer_key.size() != 32 ||
-        !X25519(secret.data(), private_key_, peer_key.data())) {
+    if (ciphertext.size() != 32 ||  //
+        !X25519(secret.data(), private_key_, ciphertext.data())) {
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
       return false;
@@ -199,7 +197,7 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
 
   uint16_t GroupID() const override { return SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2; }
 
-  bool Offer(CBB *out) override {
+  bool Generate(CBB *out) override {
     uint8_t x25519_public_key[32];
     X25519_keypair(x25519_public_key, x25519_private_key_);
 
@@ -223,11 +221,10 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
     return true;
   }
 
-  bool Accept(CBB *out_public_key, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
-              uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
+  bool Encap(CBB *out_ciphertext, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+             uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
     Array<uint8_t> secret;
     if (!secret.Init(32 + HRSS_KEY_BYTES)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
       return false;
     }
 
@@ -249,9 +246,9 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
 
     if (!HRSS_encap(ciphertext, secret.data() + 32, &peer_public_key,
                     entropy) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(out_public_key, x25519_public_key,
+        !CBB_add_bytes(out_ciphertext, x25519_public_key,
                        sizeof(x25519_public_key)) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(out_public_key, ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext))) {
+        !CBB_add_bytes(out_ciphertext, ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext))) {
       return false;
     }
 
@@ -259,25 +256,24 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
     return true;
   }
 
-  bool Finish(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
-              Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
+  bool Decap(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
+             Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext) override {
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
     Array<uint8_t> secret;
     if (!secret.Init(32 + HRSS_KEY_BYTES)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
       return false;
     }
 
-    if (peer_key.size() != 32 + HRSS_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES ||
-        !X25519(secret.data(), x25519_private_key_, peer_key.data())) {
+    if (ciphertext.size() != 32 + HRSS_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES ||
+        !X25519(secret.data(), x25519_private_key_, ciphertext.data())) {
       *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
       return false;
     }
 
     if (!HRSS_decap(secret.data() + 32, &hrss_private_key_,
-                    peer_key.data() + 32, peer_key.size() - 32)) {
+                    ciphertext.data() + 32, ciphertext.size() - 32)) {
       return false;
     }
 
@@ -290,13 +286,62 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
   HRSS_private_key hrss_private_key_;
 };
 
-CONSTEXPR_ARRAY NamedGroup kNamedGroups[] = {
+class X25519Kyber768KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
+ public:
+  X25519Kyber768KeyShare() {}
+
+  uint16_t GroupID() const override { return SSL_CURVE_X25519KYBER768; }
+
+  bool Generate(CBB *out) override {
+    // There is no implementation on Kyber in BoringSSL. BoringSSL must be
+    // patched for this KEM to be workable. It is not enabled by default.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool Encap(CBB *out_ciphertext, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+             uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool Decap(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
+             Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext) override {
+    return false;
+  }
+};
+
+class P256Kyber768KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
+ public:
+  P256Kyber768KeyShare() {}
+
+  uint16_t GroupID() const override { return SSL_CURVE_P256KYBER768; }
+
+  bool Generate(CBB *out) override {
+    // There is no implementation on Kyber in BoringSSL. BoringSSL must be
+    // patched for this KEM to be workable. It is not enabled by default.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool Encap(CBB *out_ciphertext, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+             uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) override {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool Decap(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
+             Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext) override {
+    return false;
+  }
+};
+
+constexpr NamedGroup kNamedGroups[] = {
     {NID_secp224r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP224R1, "P-224", "secp224r1"},
     {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1, "P-256", "prime256v1"},
     {NID_secp384r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1, "P-384", "secp384r1"},
     {NID_secp521r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1, "P-521", "secp521r1"},
     {NID_X25519, SSL_CURVE_X25519, "X25519", "x25519"},
     {NID_CECPQ2, SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2, "CECPQ2", "CECPQ2"},
+    {NID_X25519Kyber768, SSL_CURVE_X25519KYBER768, "X25519KYBER",
+     "X25519Kyber"},
+    {NID_P256Kyber768, SSL_CURVE_P256KYBER768, "P256KYBER", "P256Kyber"},
 };
 
 }  // namespace
@@ -308,58 +353,26 @@ Span<const NamedGroup> NamedGroups() {
 UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> SSLKeyShare::Create(uint16_t group_id) {
   switch (group_id) {
     case SSL_CURVE_SECP224R1:
-      return UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare>(
-          New<ECKeyShare>(NID_secp224r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP224R1));
+      return MakeUnique<ECKeyShare>(NID_secp224r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP224R1);
     case SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1:
-      return UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare>(
-          New<ECKeyShare>(NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1));
+      return MakeUnique<ECKeyShare>(NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1);
     case SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1:
-      return UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare>(
-          New<ECKeyShare>(NID_secp384r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1));
+      return MakeUnique<ECKeyShare>(NID_secp384r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1);
     case SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1:
-      return UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare>(
-          New<ECKeyShare>(NID_secp521r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1));
+      return MakeUnique<ECKeyShare>(NID_secp521r1, SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1);
     case SSL_CURVE_X25519:
-      return UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare>(New<X25519KeyShare>());
+      return MakeUnique<X25519KeyShare>();
     case SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2:
-      return UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare>(New<CECPQ2KeyShare>());
+      return MakeUnique<CECPQ2KeyShare>();
+    case SSL_CURVE_X25519KYBER768:
+      return MakeUnique<X25519Kyber768KeyShare>();
+    case SSL_CURVE_P256KYBER768:
+      return MakeUnique<P256Kyber768KeyShare>();
     default:
       return nullptr;
   }
 }
 
-UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> SSLKeyShare::Create(CBS *in) {
-  uint64_t group;
-  CBS private_key;
-  if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(in, &group) || group > 0xffff ||
-      !CBS_get_asn1(in, &private_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-  UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> key_share = Create(static_cast<uint16_t>(group));
-  if (!key_share || !key_share->DeserializePrivateKey(&private_key)) {
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-  return key_share;
-}
-
-bool SSLKeyShare::Serialize(CBB *out) {
-  CBB private_key;
-  if (!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(out, GroupID()) ||
-      !CBB_add_asn1(out, &private_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
-      !SerializePrivateKey(&private_key) ||  //
-      !CBB_flush(out)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool SSLKeyShare::Accept(CBB *out_public_key, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
-                         uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) {
-  *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-  return Offer(out_public_key) &&
-         Finish(out_secret, out_alert, peer_key);
-}
-
 bool ssl_nid_to_group_id(uint16_t *out_group_id, int nid) {
   for (const auto &group : kNamedGroups) {
     if (group.nid == nid) {