grpc 1.53.0.pre2 → 1.54.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -67,50 +67,51 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
-#include "internal.h"
 #include "../internal.h"
 #include "../x509v3/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
 
 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
 
-/* CRL score values */
+// CRL score values
 
-/* No unhandled critical extensions */
+// No unhandled critical extensions
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
 
-/* certificate is within CRL scope */
+// certificate is within CRL scope
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
 
-/* CRL times valid */
+// CRL times valid
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
 
-/* Issuer name matches certificate */
+// Issuer name matches certificate
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
 
-/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
+// If this score or above CRL is probably valid
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID \
+  (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
 
-/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+// CRL issuer is certificate issuer
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
 
-/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+// CRL issuer is on certificate path
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
 
-/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+// CRL issuer matches CRL AKID
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
 
-/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
+// Have a delta CRL with valid times
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
 
 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
@@ -125,2332 +126,2146 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 
 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
                          unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
-static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
-static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
-                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
-                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+                         X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
+                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
                            int *pcrl_score);
 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
                            unsigned int *preasons);
 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
-static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
                            STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
 
 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 
-static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
-{
-    return ok;
-}
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; }
 
-/* cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
- * one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
- * returns zero. */
-static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
-    return 1;
+// cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
+// one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
+// returns zero.
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
-
-static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
-    X509 *xtmp = NULL;
-    size_t i;
-    /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
-    certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
-    if (certs == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    /* Look for exact match */
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
-        xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
-        if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
-            break;
-    }
-    if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
-        X509_up_ref(xtmp);
-    else
-        xtmp = NULL;
-    sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
-    return xtmp;
-}
-
-int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
-    int bad_chain = 0;
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
-    int depth, i, ok = 0;
-    int num, j, retry, trust;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-    STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
-    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
-        /*
-         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
-         * cannot do another one.
-         */
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-    /*
-     * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
-     * the first entry is in place
-     */
-    ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
-    if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        goto end;
-    }
-    X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
-    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+// Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store
 
-    /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it. */
-    if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
-        && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+  X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+  size_t i;
+  // Lookup all certs with matching subject name
+  certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+  if (certs == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // Look for exact match
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+    xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+    if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) {
+    X509_up_ref(xtmp);
+  } else {
+    xtmp = NULL;
+  }
+  sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+  return xtmp;
+}
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
+  int bad_chain = 0;
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+  int depth, i, ok = 0;
+  int num, j, retry, trust;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+
+  if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+    // This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+    // cannot do another one.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+  // the first entry is in place
+  ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+  if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    goto end;
+  }
+  X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
+  ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+
+  // We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
+  if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    goto end;
+  }
+
+  num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+  x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+  depth = param->depth;
+
+  for (;;) {
+    // If we have enough, we break
+    if (depth < num) {
+      break;  // FIXME: If this happens, we should take
+              // note of it and, if appropriate, use the
+              // X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
+              // later.
+    }
+
+    int is_self_signed;
+    if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+      goto end;
+    }
+
+    // If we are self signed, we break
+    if (is_self_signed) {
+      break;
+    }
+    // If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
+      ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+      if (ok < 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
         goto end;
-    }
-
-    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
-    depth = param->depth;
-
-    for (;;) {
-        /* If we have enough, we break */
-        if (depth < num)
-            break;              /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
-                                 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
-                                 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
-                                 * later. */
-
-        int is_self_signed;
-        if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-            goto end;
-        }
-
-        /* If we are self signed, we break */
-        if (is_self_signed)
-            break;
-        /*
-         * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
-         */
-        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
-            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-            if (ok < 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            /*
-             * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
-             * again later.
-             */
-            if (ok > 0) {
-                X509_free(xtmp);
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-
-        /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
-        if (sktmp != NULL) {
-            xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
-            if (xtmp != NULL) {
-                if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
-                    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-                    ok = 0;
-                    goto end;
-                }
-                X509_up_ref(xtmp);
-                (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
-                ctx->last_untrusted++;
-                x = xtmp;
-                num++;
-                /*
-                 * reparse the full chain for the next one
-                 */
-                continue;
-            }
-        }
+      }
+      // If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
+      // again later.
+      if (ok > 0) {
+        X509_free(xtmp);
         break;
+      }
     }
 
-    /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
-    j = num;
-    /*
-     * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
-     * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
-     * complain.
-     */
-
-    do {
-        /*
-         * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
-         */
-        i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
-
-        int is_self_signed;
-        if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-            goto end;
+    // If we were passed a cert chain, use it first
+    if (sktmp != NULL) {
+      xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+      if (xtmp != NULL) {
+        if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+          ok = 0;
+          goto end;
         }
-
-        if (is_self_signed) {
-            /* we have a self signed certificate */
-            if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
-                /*
-                 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
-                 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
-                 * possible impersonation.
-                 */
-                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-                if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
-                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
-                    ctx->current_cert = x;
-                    ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
-                    if (ok == 1)
-                        X509_free(xtmp);
-                    bad_chain = 1;
-                    ok = cb(0, ctx);
-                    if (!ok)
-                        goto end;
-                } else {
-                    /*
-                     * We have a match: replace certificate with store
-                     * version so we get any trust settings.
-                     */
-                    X509_free(x);
-                    x = xtmp;
-                    (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
-                    ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
-                }
-            } else {
-                /*
-                 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
-                 */
-                chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
-                ctx->last_untrusted--;
-                num--;
-                j--;
-                x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
-            }
-        }
-        /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
-        for (;;) {
-            /* If we have enough, we break */
-            if (depth < num)
-                break;
-            if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            /* If we are self signed, we break */
-            if (is_self_signed)
-                break;
-            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-
-            if (ok < 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            if (ok == 0)
-                break;
-            x = xtmp;
-            if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
-                X509_free(xtmp);
-                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-                ok = 0;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            num++;
-        }
-
-        /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
-        trust = check_trust(ctx);
-
-        /* If explicitly rejected error */
-        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
-            ok = 0;
+        X509_up_ref(xtmp);
+        (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+        ctx->last_untrusted++;
+        x = xtmp;
+        num++;
+        // reparse the full chain for the next one
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+    break;
+  }
+
+  // Remember how many untrusted certs we have
+  j = num;
+  // at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
+  // We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
+  // complain.
+
+  do {
+    // Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
+    i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
+
+    int is_self_signed;
+    if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+      goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (is_self_signed) {
+      // we have a self signed certificate
+      if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
+        // We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
+        // find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
+        // possible impersonation.
+        ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+        if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+          ctx->current_cert = x;
+          ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
+          if (ok == 1) {
+            X509_free(xtmp);
+          }
+          bad_chain = 1;
+          ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+          if (!ok) {
             goto end;
-        }
-        /*
-         * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
-         * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
-         * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
-         * chain checking
-         */
-        retry = 0;
-        if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
-            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
-            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
-            while (j-- > 1) {
-                xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
-                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
-                if (ok < 0)
-                    goto end;
-                /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
-                if (ok > 0) {
-                    /*
-                     * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
-                     */
-                    X509_free(xtmp);
-
-                    /*
-                     * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
-                     * alternate chain
-                     */
-                    while (num > j) {
-                        xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
-                        X509_free(xtmp);
-                        num--;
-                    }
-                    ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-                    retry = 1;
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    } while (retry);
-
-    /*
-     * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
-     * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
-     * and set bad_chain == 1
-     */
-    if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
-        if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
-            if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
-            else
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
+          }
         } else {
-
-            sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
-            num++;
-            ctx->last_untrusted = num;
-            ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
-            chain_ss = NULL;
+          // We have a match: replace certificate with store
+          // version so we get any trust settings.
+          X509_free(x);
+          x = xtmp;
+          (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+          ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
         }
-
-        ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
-        bad_chain = 1;
-        ok = cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-    }
-
-    /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
-    ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
-
-    if (!ok)
-        goto end;
-
-    ok = check_id(ctx);
-
-    if (!ok)
-        goto end;
-
-    /*
-     * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
-     * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
-     */
-
-    ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
-    if (!ok)
+      } else {
+        // extract and save self signed certificate for later use
+        chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+        ctx->last_untrusted--;
+        num--;
+        j--;
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+      }
+    }
+    // We now lookup certs from the certificate store
+    for (;;) {
+      // If we have enough, we break
+      if (depth < num) {
+        break;
+      }
+      if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
         goto end;
+      }
+      // If we are self signed, we break
+      if (is_self_signed) {
+        break;
+      }
+      ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 
-    int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
-                                      ctx->param->flags);
-    if (err != X509_V_OK) {
-        ctx->error = err;
-        ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
-        ok = cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-    }
-
-    /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
-    if (ctx->verify != NULL)
-        ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
-    else
-        ok = internal_verify(ctx);
-    if (!ok)
+      if (ok < 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
         goto end;
-
-    /* Check name constraints */
-
-    ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
-    if (!ok)
+      }
+      if (ok == 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+      x = xtmp;
+      if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
+        X509_free(xtmp);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        ok = 0;
         goto end;
+      }
+      num++;
+    }
+
+    // we now have our chain, lets check it...
+    trust = check_trust(ctx);
+
+    // If explicitly rejected error
+    if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+      ok = 0;
+      goto end;
+    }
+    // If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
+    // chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
+    // checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
+    // chain checking
+    retry = 0;
+    if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED &&
+        !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) &&
+        !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+      while (j-- > 1) {
+        xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
+        ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
+        if (ok < 0) {
+          goto end;
+        }
+        // Check if we found an alternate chain
+        if (ok > 0) {
+          // Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+          X509_free(xtmp);
+
+          // Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+          // alternate chain
+          while (num > j) {
+            xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+            X509_free(xtmp);
+            num--;
+          }
+          ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+          retry = 1;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  } while (retry);
+
+  // If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
+  // self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
+  // and set bad_chain == 1
+  if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
+    if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
+      if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+      } else {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+      }
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+    } else {
+      sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
+      num++;
+      ctx->last_untrusted = num;
+      ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+      chain_ss = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
+    bad_chain = 1;
+    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    if (!ok) {
+      goto end;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose
+  ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    goto end;
+  }
+
+  ok = check_id(ctx);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    goto end;
+  }
+
+  // Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
+  // they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+
+  ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+  if (!ok) {
+    goto end;
+  }
+
+  // At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it
+  if (ctx->verify != NULL) {
+    ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
+  } else {
+    ok = internal_verify(ctx);
+  }
+  if (!ok) {
+    goto end;
+  }
+
+  // Check name constraints
+
+  ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
+  if (!ok) {
+    goto end;
+  }
+
+  // If we get this far evaluate policies
+  if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) {
+    ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+  }
+
+end:
+  if (sktmp != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+  }
+  if (chain_ss != NULL) {
+    X509_free(chain_ss);
+  }
+
+  // Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error
+  if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+  }
+  return ok;
+}
+
+// Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) {
+  size_t i;
+  X509 *issuer;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
+      return issuer;
+    }
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+// Given a possible certificate and issuer check them
+
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) {
+  int ret;
+  ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+  if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  // If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
-    if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
-        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
-
- end:
-    if (sktmp != NULL)
-        sk_X509_free(sktmp);
-    if (chain_ss != NULL)
-        X509_free(chain_ss);
-
-    /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
-    if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-    return ok;
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
- */
-
-static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    X509 *issuer;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
-        issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
-            return issuer;
-    }
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
-
-static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
-    if (ret == X509_V_OK)
-        return 1;
-    /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
-        return 0;
-
-    ctx->error = ret;
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
-    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+  ctx->error = ret;
+  ctx->current_cert = x;
+  ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+  return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 }
 
-/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+// Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx
 
-static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
-    if (*issuer) {
-        X509_up_ref(*issuer);
-        return 1;
-    } else
-        return 0;
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+  if (*issuer) {
+    X509_up_ref(*issuer);
+    return 1;
+  } else {
+    return 0;
+  }
 }
 
-/*
- * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
- * purpose
- */
-
-static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int i, ok = 0, plen = 0;
-    X509 *x;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-    int proxy_path_length = 0;
-    int purpose;
-    int allow_proxy_certs;
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-    enum {
-        // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of
-        // self-signed certificates works.
-        ca_or_leaf,
-        must_be_ca,
-        must_not_be_ca,
-    } ca_requirement;
-
-    /* CRL path validation */
-    if (ctx->parent) {
-        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
-        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
-    } else {
-        allow_proxy_certs =
-            ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
-        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
-    }
-
-    ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf;
+// Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+// purpose
 
-    /* Check all untrusted certificates */
-    for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
-        int ret;
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-        if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-
-        switch (ca_requirement) {
-        case ca_or_leaf:
-            ret = 1;
-            break;
-        case must_not_be_ca:
-            if (X509_check_ca(x)) {
-                ret = 0;
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
-            } else
-                ret = 1;
-            break;
-        case must_be_ca:
-            if (!X509_check_ca(x)) {
-                ret = 0;
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
-            } else
-                ret = 1;
-            break;
-        default:
-            // impossible.
-            ret = 0;
-        }
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  int ok = 0, plen = 0;
 
-        if (ret == 0) {
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-        if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
-            ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca);
-            if (ret != 1) {
-                ret = 0;
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
-                ctx->error_depth = i;
-                ctx->current_cert = x;
-                ok = cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto end;
-            }
-        }
-        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
-        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
-            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
-            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
-        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
-            plen++;
-        /*
-         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
-         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
-         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
-         */
-        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
-            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
-                ctx->error_depth = i;
-                ctx->current_cert = x;
-                ok = cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto end;
-            }
-            proxy_path_length++;
-            ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca;
-        } else {
-            ca_requirement = must_be_ca;
-        }
-    }
-    ok = 1;
- end:
-    return ok;
-}
+  // If |ctx->parent| is set, this is CRL path validation.
+  int purpose =
+      ctx->parent == NULL ? ctx->param->purpose : X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
 
-static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509)
-{
-    X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
-    int i = -1;
-    for (;;) {
-        i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
-        if (i == -1) {
-            return X509_V_OK;
-        }
-
-        X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
-        ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
-        unsigned char *idval;
-        int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
-        if (idlen < 0) {
-            return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        }
-        /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
-         * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */
-        int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
-        OPENSSL_free(idval);
-        if (looks_like_dns) {
-            return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int i, j, rv;
-    int has_name_constraints = 0;
-    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
-    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-        /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
-        if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
-            continue;
-        /*
-         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
-         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
-         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
-         * to be obeyed.
-         */
-        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
-            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
-            if (nc) {
-                has_name_constraints = 1;
-                rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
-                switch (rv) {
-                case X509_V_OK:
-                    continue;
-                case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
-                    ctx->error = rv;
-                    return 0;
-                default:
-                    ctx->error = rv;
-                    ctx->error_depth = i;
-                    ctx->current_cert = x;
-                    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                        return 0;
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
+  // Check all untrusted certificates
+  for (int i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
+        (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto end;
+      }
     }
 
-    /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
-     * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
-     * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
-     * checked instead.
-     *
-     * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
-     * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
-     * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
-     * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
-     * the name constraint anyway. */
-    X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
-    if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
-        rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
+    int must_be_ca = i > 0;
+    if (must_be_ca && !X509_check_ca(x)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto end;
+      }
+    }
+    if (ctx->param->purpose > 0 &&
+        X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca) != 1) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto end;
+      }
+    }
+    // Check pathlen if not self issued
+    if (i > 1 && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) && x->ex_pathlen != -1 &&
+        plen > x->ex_pathlen + 1) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto end;
+      }
+    }
+    // Increment path length if not self issued
+    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
+      plen++;
+    }
+  }
+  ok = 1;
+end:
+  return ok;
+}
+
+static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509) {
+  const X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
+  int i = -1;
+  for (;;) {
+    i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
+    if (i == -1) {
+      return X509_V_OK;
+    }
+
+    const X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+    const ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
+    unsigned char *idval;
+    int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
+    if (idlen < 0) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    }
+    // Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
+    // important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|.
+    int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(idval);
+    if (looks_like_dns) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  int i, j, rv;
+  int has_name_constraints = 0;
+  // Check name constraints for all certificates
+  for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+    // Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain
+    if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    // Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+    // including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+    // but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+    // to be obeyed.
+    for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+      NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+      if (nc) {
+        has_name_constraints = 1;
+        rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
         switch (rv) {
-        case X509_V_OK:
-            break;
-        case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+          case X509_V_OK:
+            continue;
+          case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
             ctx->error = rv;
             return 0;
-        default:
+          default:
             ctx->error = rv;
             ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = leaf;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+              return 0;
+            }
             break;
         }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
+  // |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
+  // certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
+  // checked instead.
+  //
+  // While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
+  // constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
+  // standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
+  // worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
+  // the name constraint anyway.
+  X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+  if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
+    rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
+    switch (rv) {
+      case X509_V_OK:
+        break;
+      case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+        ctx->error = rv;
+        return 0;
+      default:
+        ctx->error = rv;
+        ctx->error_depth = i;
+        ctx->current_cert = leaf;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+        break;
     }
-
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) {
+  ctx->error = errcode;
+  ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
+  ctx->error_depth = 0;
+  return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+  size_t i;
+  size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
+  char *name;
+
+  if (param->peername != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_free(param->peername);
+    param->peername = NULL;
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+    name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
+    if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags,
+                        &param->peername) > 0) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+  return n == 0;
+}
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+  X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+  if (vpm->poison) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  size_t i;
+  int ok;
+  X509 *x = NULL;
+  // Check all trusted certificates in chain
+  for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+    ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+    // If explicitly trusted return trusted
+    if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
+      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+    // If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
+    // overridden.
+    if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      if (!ok) {
+        return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  // If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
+  // return success.
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+    X509 *mx;
+    if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) {
+      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+    mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+    if (mx) {
+      (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+      X509_free(x);
+      ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
+  // standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+  return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  int i, last, ok;
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) {
     return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
-{
-    ctx->error = errcode;
-    ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
-    ctx->error_depth = 0;
-    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-}
-
-static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
-    char *name;
-
-    if (param->peername != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_free(param->peername);
-        param->peername = NULL;
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
-        if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags,
-                            &param->peername) > 0)
-            return 1;
-    }
-    return n == 0;
-}
-
-static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
-    X509 *x = ctx->cert;
-    if (vpm->poison) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
-            return 0;
+  }
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) {
+    last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+  } else {
+    // If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate
+    if (ctx->parent) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+    last = 0;
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+    ctx->error_depth = i;
+    ok = check_cert(ctx);
+    if (!ok) {
+      return ok;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+  X509 *x;
+  int ok = 0, cnum;
+  unsigned int last_reasons;
+  cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+  x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+  ctx->current_cert = x;
+  ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+  ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+  ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+  while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
+    last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+    // Try to retrieve relevant CRL
+    if (ctx->get_crl) {
+      ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+    } else {
+      ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
     }
-    if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
-            return 0;
+    // If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
+    if (!ok) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      goto err;
     }
-    if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
-            return 0;
+    ctx->current_crl = crl;
+    ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+    if (!ok) {
+      goto err;
     }
-    return 1;
-}
 
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    int ok;
-    X509 *x = NULL;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-    /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
-    for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-        ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
-        /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
-        if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
-            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-        /*
-         * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
-         * overridden.
-         */
-        if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
-        }
-    }
-    /*
-     * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
-     * return success.
-     */
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
-        X509 *mx;
-        if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
-            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
-        mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
-        if (mx) {
-            (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
-            X509_free(x);
-            ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
-            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-        }
+    if (dcrl) {
+      ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else {
+      ok = 1;
     }
 
-    /*
-     * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
-     * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
-     */
-    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
-}
-
-static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int i, last, ok;
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
-        return 1;
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
-        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-    else {
-        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
-        if (ctx->parent)
-            return 1;
-        last = 0;
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
-        ctx->error_depth = i;
-        ok = check_cert(ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            return ok;
+    // Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL
+    if (ok != 2) {
+      ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto err;
+      }
     }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
-    X509 *x;
-    int ok = 0, cnum;
-    unsigned int last_reasons;
-    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
-    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
-    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
-    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
-        last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
-        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
-        if (ctx->get_crl)
-            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
-        else
-            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
-        /*
-         * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
-         */
-        if (!ok) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        ctx->current_crl = crl;
-        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto err;
-
-        if (dcrl) {
-            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        } else
-            ok = 1;
-
-        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
-        if (ok != 2) {
-            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        }
 
-        X509_CRL_free(crl);
-        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
-        crl = NULL;
-        dcrl = NULL;
-        /*
-         * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
-         * so exit loop.
-         */
-        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
- err:
     X509_CRL_free(crl);
     X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+    crl = NULL;
+    dcrl = NULL;
+    // If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
+    // so exit loop.
+    if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+err:
+  X509_CRL_free(crl);
+  X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 
-    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-    return ok;
-
+  ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+  return ok;
 }
 
-/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+// Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX
 
-static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
-{
-    time_t *ptime;
-    int i;
-    if (notify)
-        ctx->current_crl = crl;
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
-        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
-    else
-        ptime = NULL;
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) {
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
-    if (i == 0) {
-        if (!notify)
-            return 0;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
+  if (notify) {
+    ctx->current_crl = crl;
+  }
+  int64_t ptime;
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
+    ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
+  } else {
+    ptime = time(NULL);
+  }
+
+  int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+  if (i == 0) {
+    if (!notify) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    if (i > 0) {
-        if (!notify)
-            return 0;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
+  if (i > 0) {
+    if (!notify) {
+      return 0;
     }
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
 
-    if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
-        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+  if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+    i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
 
-        if (i == 0) {
-            if (!notify)
-                return 0;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
-        }
-        /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
-        if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
-            if (!notify)
-                return 0;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
-        }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      if (!notify) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+      if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    // Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid
+    if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
+      if (!notify) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+      if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
     }
+  }
 
-    if (notify)
-        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+  if (notify) {
+    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
                       X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
-                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-{
-    int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
-    size_t i;
-    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
-    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
-    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
-    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
-        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
-        reasons = *preasons;
-        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
-        if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
-            continue;
-        /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
-        if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
-            int day, sec;
-            if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
-                               X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
-                continue;
-            /*
-             * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
-             * and |sec|.
-             */
-            if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
-                continue;
-        }
-        best_crl = crl;
-        best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
-        best_score = crl_score;
-        best_reasons = reasons;
-    }
-
-    if (best_crl) {
-        if (*pcrl)
-            X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
-        *pcrl = best_crl;
-        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
-        *pscore = best_score;
-        *preasons = best_reasons;
-        X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
-        if (*pdcrl) {
-            X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
-            *pdcrl = NULL;
-        }
-        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
-    }
-
-    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
-        return 1;
+                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) {
+  int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+  size_t i;
+  unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+  X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+  X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+  X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+    crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+    reasons = *preasons;
+    crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+    if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    // If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer
+    if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
+      int day, sec;
+      if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
+                         X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      // ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
+      // and |sec|.
+      if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+    best_crl = crl;
+    best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+    best_score = crl_score;
+    best_reasons = reasons;
+  }
+
+  if (best_crl) {
+    if (*pcrl) {
+      X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+    }
+    *pcrl = best_crl;
+    *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+    *pscore = best_score;
+    *preasons = best_reasons;
+    X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
+    if (*pdcrl) {
+      X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+      *pdcrl = NULL;
+    }
+    get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+  }
+
+  if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    return 0;
+  return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
- * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
- */
-
-static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
-{
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
-    int i;
-    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
-    if (i >= 0) {
-        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
-        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
-            return 0;
-        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
-    } else
-        exta = NULL;
+// Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+// both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
 
-    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
+static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) {
+  const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+  int i;
+  i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+  if (i >= 0) {
+    // Can't have multiple occurrences
+    if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+  } else {
+    exta = NULL;
+  }
 
-    if (i >= 0) {
+  i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
 
-        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
-            return 0;
-        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
-    } else
-        extb = NULL;
+  if (i >= 0) {
+    if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+  } else {
+    extb = NULL;
+  }
 
-    if (!exta && !extb)
-        return 1;
+  if (!exta && !extb) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    if (!exta || !extb)
-        return 0;
+  if (!exta || !extb) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
-        return 0;
+  if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
+// See if a base and delta are compatible
 
-static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
-{
-    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
-    if (!delta->base_crl_number)
-        return 0;
-    /* Base must have a CRL number */
-    if (!base->crl_number)
-        return 0;
-    /* Issuer names must match */
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
-        return 0;
-    /* AKID and IDP must match */
-    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
-        return 0;
-    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
-        return 0;
-    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
-    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
-        return 0;
-    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
-    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
-        return 1;
+static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) {
+  // Delta CRL must be a delta
+  if (!delta->base_crl_number) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Base must have a CRL number
+  if (!base->crl_number) {
     return 0;
+  }
+  // Issuer names must match
+  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // AKID and IDP must match
+  if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number.
+  if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number
+  if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
- * retrieve a chain of deltas...
- */
+// For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
+// retrieve a chain of deltas...
 
 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
-                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-{
-    X509_CRL *delta;
-    size_t i;
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
-        return;
-    if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
-        return;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
-        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
-        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
-            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
-                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
-            X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
-            *dcrl = delta;
-            return;
-        }
-    }
-    *dcrl = NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
- * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
- * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
- * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
- * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
- */
+                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) {
+  X509_CRL *delta;
+  size_t i;
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+    delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+    if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
+      if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) {
+        *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+      }
+      X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
+      *dcrl = delta;
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  *dcrl = NULL;
+}
+
+// For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+// 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+// the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
+// also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
+// is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
 
 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
-                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-{
-
-    int crl_score = 0;
-    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) {
+  int crl_score = 0;
+  unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
 
-    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+  // First see if we can reject CRL straight away
 
-    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
-    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
-        return 0;
-    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
-        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
-            return 0;
-    } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
-        /* If no new reasons reject */
-        if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
-            return 0;
+  // Invalid IDP cannot be processed
+  if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+    if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+    // If no new reasons reject
+    if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  // Don't process deltas at this stage
+  else if (crl->base_crl_number) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL
+  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+    if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) {
+      return 0;
     }
-    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
-    else if (crl->base_crl_number)
-        return 0;
-    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
-        if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
-            return 0;
-    } else
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+  } else {
+    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+  }
 
-    if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+  if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+  }
 
-    /* Check expiry */
-    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+  // Check expiry
+  if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) {
+    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+  }
 
-    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
-    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+  // Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer
+  crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
 
-    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+  // If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it
 
-    if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
-        return 0;
+  if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+  // Check cert for matching CRL distribution points
 
-    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
-        /* If no new reasons reject */
-        if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
-            return 0;
-        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+  if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
+    // If no new reasons reject
+    if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+    tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+  }
 
-    *preasons = tmp_reasons;
-
-    return crl_score;
+  *preasons = tmp_reasons;
 
+  return crl_score;
 }
 
-static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
-                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
-{
-    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
-    X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
-    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
-    size_t i;
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+                           int *pcrl_score) {
+  X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+  X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+  int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+  size_t i;
 
-    if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
-        cidx++;
+  if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) {
+    cidx++;
+  }
 
-    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+  crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
 
-    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
-            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
-            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-            return;
-        }
+  if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+    if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
+      *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+      *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+      return;
     }
+  }
 
-    for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
-        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
-            continue;
-        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
-            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-            return;
-        }
+  for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) {
+      continue;
     }
+    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+      *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+      *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+      return;
+    }
+  }
 
-    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+  // Anything else needs extended CRL support
 
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
-        return;
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+    return;
+  }
 
-    /*
-     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
-     * untrusted certificates.
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
-        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
-        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
-            continue;
-        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
-            return;
-        }
+  // Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
+  // untrusted certificates.
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
+    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+      *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+      *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+      return;
     }
+  }
 }
 
-/*
- * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
- * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
- * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
- * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
- */
-
-static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
-    int ret;
-    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
-    if (ctx->parent)
-        return 0;
-    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
-        return -1;
-
-    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
-    /* Copy verify params across */
-    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
-
-    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
-    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-    /* Verify CRL issuer */
-    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+// Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+// X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
+// parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
+// be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
 
-    if (ret <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    /* Check chain is acceptable */
-
-    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
- err:
-    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * RFC 3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
- * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
- * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC 5280 is more
- * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
- * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
- * RFC 5280 version
- */
-
-static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
-                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
-{
-    X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
-    cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
-    crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
-    if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
-        return 1;
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+  int ret;
+  // Don't allow recursive CRL path validation
+  if (ctx->parent) {
     return 0;
+  }
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+  // Copy verify params across
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+  crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+  crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+  // Verify CRL issuer
+  ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Check chain is acceptable
+
+  ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+err:
+  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// RFC 3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
+// certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
+// be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC 5280 is more
+// strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
+// though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
+// RFC 5280 version
+
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) {
+  X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+  cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+  crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+  if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
- * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
- * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
- * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
- */
-
-static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
-{
-    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
-    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
-    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
-    size_t i, j;
-    if (!a || !b)
+// Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
+// Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
+// relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
+// compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) {
+  X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+  GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+  GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+  size_t i, j;
+  if (!a || !b) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (a->type == 1) {
+    if (!a->dpname) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    // Case 1: two X509_NAME
+    if (b->type == 1) {
+      if (!b->dpname) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) {
         return 1;
-    if (a->type == 1) {
-        if (!a->dpname)
-            return 0;
-        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
-        if (b->type == 1) {
-            if (!b->dpname)
-                return 0;
-            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
-                return 1;
-            else
-                return 0;
-        }
-        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
-        nm = a->dpname;
-        gens = b->name.fullname;
-    } else if (b->type == 1) {
-        if (!b->dpname)
-            return 0;
-        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
-        gens = a->name.fullname;
-        nm = b->dpname;
-    }
-
-    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
-    if (nm) {
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
-            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
-            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
-                continue;
-            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
-                return 1;
-        }
+      } else {
         return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    // Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
+    nm = a->dpname;
+    gens = b->name.fullname;
+  } else if (b->type == 1) {
+    if (!b->dpname) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    // Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
+    gens = a->name.fullname;
+    nm = b->dpname;
+  }
+
+  // Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME
+  if (nm) {
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+      gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+      if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) {
+        return 1;
+      }
     }
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+  // Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES
 
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
-        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
-        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
-            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
-            if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
-                return 1;
-        }
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+    gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+    for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+      genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+      if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) {
+        return 1;
+      }
     }
+  }
 
-    return 0;
-
+  return 0;
 }
 
-static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
-    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
-    if (!dp->CRLissuer)
-        return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
-        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
-        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
-            continue;
-        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
-            return 1;
+static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) {
+  size_t i;
+  X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+  // If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match
+  if (!dp->CRLissuer) {
+    return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+    if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
+      continue;
     }
-    return 0;
+    if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+  return 0;
 }
 
-/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
+// Check CRLDP and IDP
 
 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
-                           unsigned int *preasons)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
-        return 0;
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
-        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
-            return 0;
-    } else {
-        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
-            return 0;
-    }
-    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
-        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
-        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
-            if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
-                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
-                return 1;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
-        && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
-        return 1;
+                           unsigned int *preasons) {
+  size_t i;
+  if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) {
     return 0;
+  }
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+    DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+    if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
+      if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+        *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+        return 1;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) &&
+      (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
- * to find a delta CRL too
- */
+// Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
+// to find a delta CRL too
 
-static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
-{
-    int ok;
-    X509 *issuer = NULL;
-    int crl_score = 0;
-    unsigned int reasons;
-    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
-    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
-    X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
-    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
-    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
-                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+                         X509 *x) {
+  int ok;
+  X509 *issuer = NULL;
+  int crl_score = 0;
+  unsigned int reasons;
+  X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+  X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+  reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+  ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
 
-    if (ok)
-        goto done;
+  if (ok) {
+    goto done;
+  }
 
-    /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+  // Lookup CRLs from store
 
-    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+  skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
 
-    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
-    if (!skcrl && crl)
-        goto done;
+  // If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that
+  if (!skcrl && crl) {
+    goto done;
+  }
 
-    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+  get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
 
-    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+  sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
 
- done:
+done:
 
-    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
-    if (crl) {
-        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
-        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
-        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
-        *pcrl = crl;
-        *pdcrl = dcrl;
-        return 1;
+  // If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success
+  if (crl) {
+    ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+    ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+    ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+    *pcrl = crl;
+    *pdcrl = dcrl;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// Check CRL validity
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) {
+  X509 *issuer = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+  int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
+  cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+  chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+  // if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that
+  if (ctx->current_issuer) {
+    issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+  }
+
+  // Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
+  // certificate in chain.
+  else if (cnum < chnum) {
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+  } else {
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+    // If not self signed, can't check signature
+    if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto err;
+      }
     }
+  }
 
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check CRL validity */
-static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
-{
-    X509 *issuer = NULL;
-    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
-    int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
-    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-    chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-    /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
-    if (ctx->current_issuer)
-        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
-
-    /*
-     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
-     * certificate in chain.
-     */
-    else if (cnum < chnum)
-        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
-    else {
-        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
-        /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
-        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
+  if (issuer) {
+    // Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+    if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+      // Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present
+      if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+          !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok) {
+          goto err;
         }
-    }
-
-    if (issuer) {
-        /*
-         * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
-         */
-        if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
-            /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
-            if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
-                !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-
-            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-
-            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
-                if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
-                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
-                    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                    if (!ok)
-                        goto err;
-                }
-            }
-
-            if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
+      }
 
+      if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok) {
+          goto err;
         }
+      }
 
-        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
-            ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
+      if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
+        if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
+          ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+          if (!ok) {
+            goto err;
+          }
         }
+      }
 
-        /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
-        ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
-
-        if (!ikey) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        } else {
-            int rv;
-            rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
-            if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
-                ctx->error = rv;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-            /* Verify CRL signature */
-            if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
+      if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok) {
+          goto err;
         }
+      }
     }
 
-    ok = 1;
+    if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
+      ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
 
- err:
-    EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
-    return ok;
-}
+    // Attempt to get issuer certificate public key
+    ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
 
-/* Check certificate against CRL */
-static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-{
-    int ok;
-    X509_REVOKED *rev;
-    /*
-     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
-     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
-     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
-     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
-     */
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
-        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            return 0;
-    }
-    /*
-     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
-     * is not removeFromCRL.
-     */
-    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
-        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
-            return 2;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+    if (!ikey) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      if (!ok) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // Verify CRL signature
+      if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            return 0;
+        if (!ok) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
     }
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+  return ok;
 }
 
-static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int ret;
-    if (ctx->parent)
-        return 1;
-    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
-                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
-    if (ret == 0) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        return 0;
+// Check certificate against CRL
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) {
+  int ok;
+  X509_REVOKED *rev;
+  // The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+  // critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+  // was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
+  // change the meaning of CRL entries.
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
+      (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    if (!ok) {
+      return 0;
     }
-    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
-    if (ret == -1) {
-        /*
-         * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
-         */
-        X509 *x;
-        size_t i;
-        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
-                continue;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return 1;
+  }
+  // Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
+  // is not removeFromCRL.
+  if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+    if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) {
+      return 2;
     }
-    if (ret == -2) {
-        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
-        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-    }
-
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
-        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
-        /*
-         * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
-         * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
-         * remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
-         * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
-         */
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
-            return 0;
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    if (!ok) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    time_t *ptime;
-    int i;
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx->parent) {
+    return 1;
+  }
 
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
-        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
-    else
-        ptime = NULL;
+  X509 *current_cert = NULL;
+  int ret = X509_policy_check(ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies,
+                              ctx->param->flags, &current_cert);
+  if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
+    ctx->current_cert = current_cert;
+    ctx->error = ret;
+    if (ret == X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+  }
 
-    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
-    if (i == 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+    ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+    // Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
+    // an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
+    // remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
+    // verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
+    if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    if (i > 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  int64_t ptime;
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
+    ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
+  } else {
+    ptime = time(NULL);
+  }
+
+  int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+  if (i == 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
-    if (i == 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
+  if (i > 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    if (i < 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
+  i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+  if (i == 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
     }
+  }
 
-    return 1;
+  if (i < 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
 }
 
-static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int ok = 0, n;
-    X509 *xs, *xi;
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  int ok = 0, n;
+  X509 *xs, *xi;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+  n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+  ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
+  n--;
+  xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
 
-    n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-    ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
-    n--;
-    xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-
-    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
-        xs = xi;
-    else {
-        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
-            xs = xi;
-            goto check_cert;
+  if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) {
+    xs = xi;
+  } else {
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+      xs = xi;
+      goto check_cert;
+    }
+    if (n <= 0) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+      ctx->current_cert = xi;
+      ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+      goto end;
+    } else {
+      n--;
+      ctx->error_depth = n;
+      xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+    }
+  }
+
+  //      ctx->error=0;  not needed
+  while (n >= 0) {
+    ctx->error_depth = n;
+
+    // Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+    // explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
+    // time.
+    if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
+      if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+        ctx->current_cert = xi;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok) {
+          goto end;
         }
-        if (n <= 0) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
-            ctx->current_cert = xi;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            goto end;
-        } else {
-            n--;
-            ctx->error_depth = n;
-            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+      } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+        ctx->current_cert = xs;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok) {
+          EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+          goto end;
         }
+      }
+      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+      pkey = NULL;
     }
 
-/*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
-    while (n >= 0) {
-        ctx->error_depth = n;
-
-        /*
-         * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
-         * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
-         * time.
-         */
-        if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
-            if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-                ctx->current_cert = xi;
-                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto end;
-            } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-                ctx->current_cert = xs;
-                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
-                if (!ok) {
-                    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-                    goto end;
-                }
-            }
-            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-            pkey = NULL;
-        }
-
- check_cert:
-        ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-
-        /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
-        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
-        ctx->current_cert = xs;
-        ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-
-        n--;
-        if (n >= 0) {
-            xi = xs;
-            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-        }
+  check_cert:
+    ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+    if (!ok) {
+      goto end;
     }
-    ok = 1;
- end:
-    return ok;
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
-{
-    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
-{
-    static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
-    static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
-    ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
-    int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
-
-    /*
-     * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC 5280.
-     * In RFC 5280, the representation is fixed:
-     * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
-     * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
-     *
-     * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
-     * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
-     *  validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
-     *  dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
-     */
-    switch (ctm->type) {
-    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
-        if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
-            return 0;
-        break;
-    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
-        if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
-            return 0;
-        break;
-    default:
-        return 0;
+
+    // The last error (if any) is still in the error value
+    ctx->current_issuer = xi;
+    ctx->current_cert = xs;
+    ok = ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
+    if (!ok) {
+      goto end;
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
-     * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
-     * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
-        if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
-            return 0;
+    n--;
+    if (n >= 0) {
+      xi = xs;
+      xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
     }
-    if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
-        return 0;
+  }
+  ok = 1;
+end:
+  return ok;
+}
 
-    /*
-     * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
-     * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
-     * so we go through ASN.1
-     */
-    asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
-    if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
-        goto err;
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) {
+  return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, time(NULL));
+}
 
-    /*
-     * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
-     * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
-     */
-    ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) {
+  int64_t compare_time = (cmp_time == NULL) ? time(NULL) : *cmp_time;
+  return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, compare_time);
+}
 
- err:
-    ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
-    return ret;
+int X509_cmp_time_posix(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, int64_t cmp_time) {
+  int64_t ctm_time;
+  if (!ASN1_TIME_to_posix(ctm, &ctm_time)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
+  return (ctm_time - cmp_time <= 0) ? -1 : 1;
 }
 
-ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec)
-{
-    return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec) {
+  return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
 }
 
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-{
-    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) {
+  return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
 }
 
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
-                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-{
-    time_t t = 0;
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec,
+                            time_t *in_tm) {
+  int64_t t = 0;
 
-    if (in_tm) {
-        t = *in_tm;
-    } else {
-        time(&t);
-    }
-
-    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
-}
-
-/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
-
-X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
-                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
-{
-    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
-    int i;
-    size_t j;
-    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
-    /* CRLs can't be delta already */
-    if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
-    if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Issuer names must match */
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* AKID and IDP must match */
-    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
-    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* CRLs must verify */
-    if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
-                 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Create new CRL */
-    crl = X509_CRL_new();
-    if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2))
-        goto memerr;
-    /* Set issuer name */
-    if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
-        goto memerr;
+  if (in_tm) {
+    t = *in_tm;
+  } else {
+    t = time(NULL);
+  }
 
-    if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
-        goto memerr;
-    if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
-        goto memerr;
+  return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
 
-    /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+// Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs
 
-    if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, EVP_PKEY *skey,
+                        const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) {
+  X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+  int i;
+  size_t j;
+  STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+  // CRLs can't be delta already
+  if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // Base and new CRL must have a CRL number
+  if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // Issuer names must match
+  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // AKID and IDP must match
+  if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number
+  if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // CRLs must verify
+  if (skey &&
+      (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // Create new CRL
+  crl = X509_CRL_new();
+  if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2)) {
+    goto memerr;
+  }
+  // Set issuer name
+  if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
+    goto memerr;
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) {
+    goto memerr;
+  }
+  if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) {
+    goto memerr;
+  }
+
+  // Set base CRL number: must be critical
+
+  if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) {
+    goto memerr;
+  }
+
+  // Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
+  // number to correct value too.
+
+  for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
+    const X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+    if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) {
+      goto memerr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Go through revoked entries, copying as needed
+
+  revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+  for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
+    X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+    rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
+    // Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
+    // for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+    if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
+      rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+      if (!rvtmp) {
         goto memerr;
-
-    /*
-     * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
-     * number to correct value too.
-     */
-
-    for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
-        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
-        ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
-        if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
-            goto memerr;
-    }
-
-    /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
-
-    revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
-
-    for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
-        X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
-        rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
-        /*
-         * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
-         * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
-         */
-        if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
-            rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
-            if (!rvtmp)
-                goto memerr;
-            if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
-                X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
-                goto memerr;
-            }
-        }
+      }
+      if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
+        X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+        goto memerr;
+      }
     }
-    /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+  }
+  // TODO: optionally prune deleted entries
 
-    if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
-        goto memerr;
+  if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) {
+    goto memerr;
+  }
 
-    return crl;
+  return crl;
 
- memerr:
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    if (crl)
-        X509_CRL_free(crl);
-    return NULL;
+memerr:
+  if (crl) {
+    X509_CRL_free(crl);
+  }
+  return NULL;
 }
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
                                     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
-    /*
-     * This function is (usually) called only once, by
-     * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
-     */
-    int index;
-    if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
-                                 free_func)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return index;
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  // This function is (usually) called only once, by
+  // SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
 }
 
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
-{
-    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
 }
 
-void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
-{
-    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
 }
 
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->error;
-}
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
-{
-    ctx->error = err;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) {
+  ctx->error = err;
 }
 
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->error_depth;
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->error_depth;
 }
 
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->current_cert;
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->current_cert;
 }
 
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->chain;
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->chain;
 }
 
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->chain;
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->chain;
 }
 
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    if (!ctx->chain)
-        return NULL;
-    return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!ctx->chain) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
 }
 
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->current_issuer;
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->current_issuer;
 }
 
-X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->current_crl;
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->current_crl;
 }
 
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->parent;
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->parent;
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    ctx->cert = x;
-}
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->cert = x; }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
-    ctx->untrusted = sk;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
+  ctx->untrusted = sk;
 }
 
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->untrusted;
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->untrusted;
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
-{
-    ctx->crls = sk;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) {
+  ctx->crls = sk;
 }
 
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
-{
-    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) {
+  return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
 }
 
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
-{
-    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) {
+  return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
 }
 
-/*
- * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
- * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
- * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
- * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
- * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
- * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
- * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
- * client/server.
- */
+// This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
+// This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
+// purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
+// set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
+// be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
+// structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
+// application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
+// client/server.
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
-                                   int purpose, int trust)
-{
-    int idx;
-    /* If purpose not set use default */
-    if (!purpose)
-        purpose = def_purpose;
-    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
-    if (purpose) {
-        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
-        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
-        if (idx == -1) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
-            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
-            if (idx == -1) {
-                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
-                return 0;
-            }
-            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-        }
-        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
-        if (!trust)
-            trust = ptmp->trust;
-    }
-    if (trust) {
-        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
-        if (idx == -1) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
-        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
-    if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
-        ctx->param->trust = trust;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
-{
-    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-    ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-    if (!ctx) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
-    return ctx;
+                                   int purpose, int trust) {
+  int idx;
+  // If purpose not set use default
+  if (!purpose) {
+    purpose = def_purpose;
+  }
+  // If we have a purpose then check it is valid
+  if (purpose) {
+    X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+    if (idx == -1) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+    if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+      idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+      if (idx == -1) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+    }
+    // If trust not set then get from purpose default
+    if (!trust) {
+      trust = ptmp->trust;
+    }
+  }
+  if (trust) {
+    idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+    if (idx == -1) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) {
+    ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+  }
+  if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) {
+    ctx->param->trust = trust;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+  ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+  if (!ctx) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
+  return ctx;
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    if (ctx == NULL) {
-        return;
-    }
-    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
-                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
-{
-    X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
-    ctx->ctx = store;
-    ctx->cert = x509;
-    ctx->untrusted = chain;
-
-    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
-
-    if (store == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-    if (!ctx->param)
-        goto err;
-
-    /*
-     * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
-     */
-
+                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
+  ctx->ctx = store;
+  ctx->cert = x509;
+  ctx->untrusted = chain;
+
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
+
+  if (store == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+  if (!ctx->param) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
+
+  ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+  ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+
+  if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
+      !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+                                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (store->check_issued) {
+    ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+  } else {
+    ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+  }
+
+  if (store->get_issuer) {
+    ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+  } else {
+    ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+  }
+
+  if (store->verify_cb) {
     ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-    ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
-
-    if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
-        !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
-                                   X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (store->check_issued)
-        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
-    else
-        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
-
-    if (store->get_issuer)
-        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
-    else
-        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
-
-    if (store->verify_cb)
-        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-    else
-        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+  } else {
+    ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+  }
+
+  if (store->verify) {
+    ctx->verify = store->verify;
+  } else {
+    ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+  }
 
-    if (store->verify)
-        ctx->verify = store->verify;
-    else
-        ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+  if (store->check_revocation) {
+    ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+  } else {
+    ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+  }
 
-    if (store->check_revocation)
-        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
-    else
-        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+  if (store->get_crl) {
+    ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+  } else {
+    ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+  }
 
-    if (store->get_crl)
-        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
-    else
-        ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+  if (store->check_crl) {
+    ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+  } else {
+    ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+  }
 
-    if (store->check_crl)
-        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
-    else
-        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+  if (store->cert_crl) {
+    ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+  } else {
+    ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+  }
 
-    if (store->cert_crl)
-        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
-    else
-        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+  if (store->lookup_certs) {
+    ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+  } else {
+    ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+  }
 
-    if (store->lookup_certs)
-        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
-    else
-        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+  if (store->lookup_crls) {
+    ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+  } else {
+    ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+  }
 
-    if (store->lookup_crls)
-        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
-    else
-        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+  ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
 
-    ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+  return 1;
 
-    return 1;
-
- err:
-    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
-    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
-        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-    }
+err:
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+  if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+  }
 
-    OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return 0;
+  OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+  return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
- * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
- */
+// Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+// avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
-    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
-    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                       STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
+  ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+  ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
-     * also calls this function. */
-    if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
-        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
-        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
-    }
-    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
-        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
-            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-        ctx->param = NULL;
-    }
-    if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
-        X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
-        ctx->tree = NULL;
-    }
-    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
-        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
-        ctx->chain = NULL;
-    }
-    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
-    OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, sk);
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  // We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
+  // also calls this function.
+  if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
+    ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+    ctx->cleanup = NULL;
+  }
+  if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+    if (ctx->parent == NULL) {
+      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+    }
+    ctx->param = NULL;
+  }
+  if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+    ctx->chain = NULL;
+  }
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+  OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
-                             time_t t)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
 }
 
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->cert;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                             int64_t t) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix(ctx->param, t);
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                                  int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
-{
-    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                             time_t t) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(ctx, flags, t);
 }
 
-X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->tree;
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->cert;
 }
 
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->explicit_policy;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) {
+  ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
 }
 
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
-{
-    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
-    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
-    if (!param)
-        return 0;
-    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) {
+  const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+  param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+  if (!param) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
 }
 
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->param;
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->param;
 }
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
-{
-    if (ctx->param)
-        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-    ctx->param = param;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+  if (ctx->param) {
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+  }
+  ctx->param = param;
 }