grpc 1.39.0 → 1.41.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc

@@ -731,13 +731,9 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): If the server negotiates TLS 1.2 and
-  // we offer ECH, we handshake with ClientHelloOuter instead of
-  // ClientHelloInner. That path is not yet implemented. For now, terminate the
-  // handshake with a distinguishable error for testing.
+  // TLS 1.2 handshakes cannot accept ECH.
   if (hs->selected_ech_config) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
+    ssl->s3->ech_status = ssl_ech_rejected;
   }
 
   // Copy over the server random.
@@ -764,44 +760,13 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
   }
 
-  if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
-      CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
-    // Echoing the ClientHello session ID in TLS 1.2, whether from the session
-    // or a synthetic one, indicates resumption. If there was no session, this
-    // was the TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a
-    // session the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error.
-    // Reject the first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an
-    // invalid session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
-    if (ssl->session == nullptr) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // We never offer sessions on renegotiation.
-    assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
-    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
-    // Note |ssl->session| may be a TLS 1.3 session, offered in a separate
-    // extension altogether. In that case, the version check below will fail the
-    // connection.
-  } else {
-    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill out.
-    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // Note: session_id could be empty.
-    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
-                   CBS_len(&session_id));
-  }
-
   const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
   if (cipher == NULL) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
+  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
 
   // The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled.
   uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
@@ -815,7 +780,20 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+  if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
+      CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+    // Echoing the ClientHello session ID in TLS 1.2, whether from the session
+    // or a synthetic one, indicates resumption. If there was no session (or if
+    // the session was only offered in ECH ClientHelloInner), this was the
+    // TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a session
+    // the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error. Reject the
+    // first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid
+    // session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
+    if (ssl->session == nullptr || ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
     if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
@@ -833,10 +811,22 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
+    // We never offer sessions on renegotiation.
+    assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
   } else {
+    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill out.
+    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    // Note: session_id could be empty.
+    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
+                   CBS_len(&session_id));
     hs->new_session->cipher = cipher;
   }
-  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
 
   // Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
   // ServerHello.
@@ -1334,8 +1324,12 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_ok;
   }
 
-  // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
-  if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Do not send client certificates on ECH reject. We have not authenticated
+    // the server for the name that can learn the certificate.
+    SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+  } else if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != nullptr) {
+    // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
     int rv = hs->config->cert->cert_cb(ssl, hs->config->cert->cert_cb_arg);
     if (rv == 0) {
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1642,7 +1636,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 }
 
 static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
 
   // False Start bypasses the Finished check's downgrade protection. This can
   // enable attacks where we send data under weaker settings than supported
@@ -1660,6 +1654,13 @@ static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return false;
   }
 
+  // If ECH was rejected, disable False Start. We run the handshake to
+  // completion, including the Finished downgrade check, to authenticate the
+  // recovery flow.
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
   // Additionally require ALPN or NPN by default.
   //
   // TODO(davidben): Can this constraint be relaxed globally now that cipher
@@ -1739,39 +1740,30 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
   }
 
-  SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session.get();
-  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> renewed_session;
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
     // The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
     // immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
     // existing session.
-    renewed_session =
+    assert(!hs->new_session);
+    hs->new_session =
         SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
-    if (!renewed_session) {
-      // This should never happen.
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    if (!hs->new_session) {
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-    session = renewed_session.get();
   }
 
   // |ticket_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued.
-  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
 
-  if (!session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
+  if (!hs->new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
-  session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+  hs->new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
 
   // Historically, OpenSSL filled in fake session IDs for ticket-based sessions.
   // TODO(davidben): Are external callers relying on this? Try removing this.
-  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), session->session_id);
-  session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
-  if (renewed_session) {
-    session->not_resumable = false;
-    ssl->session = std::move(renewed_session);
-  }
+  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), hs->new_session->session_id);
+  hs->new_session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
 
   ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
   hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
@@ -1805,15 +1797,25 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Release the retry configs.
+    hs->ech_authenticated_reject = true;
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ECH_REQUIRED);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
 
   ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
 
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
-  } else {
-    // We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability
-    // of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may
-    // have taken a reference to the temporary session.
+  // Note TLS 1.2 resumptions with ticket renewal have both |ssl->session| (the
+  // resumed session) and |hs->new_session| (the session with the new ticket).
+  bool has_new_session = hs->new_session != nullptr;
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    // When False Start is enabled, the handshake reports completion early. The
+    // caller may then have passed the (then unresuable) |hs->new_session| to
+    // another thread via |SSL_get0_session| for resumption. To avoid potential
+    // race conditions in such callers, we duplicate the session before
+    // clearing |not_resumable|.
     ssl->s3->established_session =
         SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
     if (!ssl->s3->established_session) {
@@ -1825,11 +1827,16 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
 
     hs->new_session.reset();
+  } else {
+    assert(ssl->session != nullptr);
+    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
   }
 
   hs->handshake_finalized = true;
   ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
-  ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    ssl_update_cache(ssl);
+  }
 
   hs->state = state_done;
   return ssl_hs_ok;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc

@@ -661,14 +661,17 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
         }
 
         hs->ech_config_id = config_id;
-        ssl->s3->ech_accept = true;
+        ssl->s3->ech_status = ssl_ech_accepted;
         break;
       }
     }
 
-    // If we did not accept ECH, we will send the current ECHConfigs as
-    // retry_configs in the ServerHello's encrypted extensions. Proceed with the
-    // ClientHelloOuter.
+    // If we did not accept ECH, proceed with the ClientHelloOuter. Note this
+    // could be key mismatch or ECH GREASE, so we most complete the handshake
+    // as usual, except EncryptedExtensions will contain retry configs.
+    if (ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_accepted) {
+      ssl->s3->ech_status = ssl_ech_rejected;
+    }
   }
 
   uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -803,7 +806,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   // It should not be possible to negotiate TLS 1.2 with ECH. The
   // ClientHelloInner decoding function rejects ClientHellos which offer TLS 1.2
   // or below.
-  assert(!ssl->s3->ech_accept);
+  assert(ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_accepted);
 
   // TODO(davidben): Also compute hints for TLS 1.2. When doing so, update the
   // check in bssl_shim.cc to test this.
@@ -1791,16 +1794,21 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_clear(hs->new_session.get());
   }
 
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
-  } else {
+  bool has_new_session = hs->new_session != nullptr;
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    assert(ssl->session == nullptr);
     ssl->s3->established_session = std::move(hs->new_session);
     ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = false;
+  } else {
+    assert(ssl->session != nullptr);
+    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
   }
 
   hs->handshake_finalized = true;
   ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
-  ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    ssl_update_cache(ssl);
+  }
 
   hs->state = state12_done;
   return ssl_hs_ok;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/internal.h

@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@
 
 #include "../crypto/err/internal.h"
 #include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/lhash/internal.h"
 
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
@@ -1794,7 +1795,7 @@ struct SSL_HANDSHAKE {
 
   union {
     // sent is a bitset where the bits correspond to elements of kExtensions
-    // in t1_lib.c. Each bit is set if that extension was sent in a
+    // in extensions.cc. Each bit is set if that extension was sent in a
     // ClientHello. It's not used by servers.
     uint32_t sent = 0;
     // received is a bitset, like |sent|, but is used by servers to record
@@ -1832,6 +1833,10 @@ struct SSL_HANDSHAKE {
   // ech_client_bytes contains the ECH extension to send in the ClientHello.
   Array<uint8_t> ech_client_bytes;
 
+  // ech_retry_configs, on the client, contains the retry configs from the
+  // server as a serialized ECHConfigList.
+  Array<uint8_t> ech_retry_configs;
+
   // ech_client_hello_buf, on the server, contains the bytes of the
   // reconstructed ClientHelloInner message.
   Array<uint8_t> ech_client_hello_buf;
@@ -1871,8 +1876,8 @@ struct SSL_HANDSHAKE {
   uint16_t cert_compression_alg_id;
 
   // ech_hpke_ctx is the HPKE context used in ECH. On the server, it is
-  // initialized if |ech_accept| is true. On the client, it is initialized if
-  // |selected_ech_config| is not nullptr.
+  // initialized if |ech_status| is |ssl_ech_accepted|. On the client, it is
+  // initialized if |selected_ech_config| is not nullptr.
   ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX ech_hpke_ctx;
 
   // server_params, in a TLS 1.2 server, stores the ServerKeyExchange
@@ -1942,6 +1947,10 @@ struct SSL_HANDSHAKE {
   // contained an ech_is_inner extension.
   bool ech_is_inner_present : 1;
 
+  // ech_authenticated_reject, on the client, indicates whether an ECH rejection
+  // handshake has been authenticated.
+  bool ech_authenticated_reject : 1;
+
   // scts_requested is true if the SCT extension is in the ClientHello.
   bool scts_requested : 1;
 
@@ -2573,6 +2582,16 @@ enum ssl_shutdown_t {
   ssl_shutdown_error = 2,
 };
 
+enum ssl_ech_status_t {
+  // ssl_ech_none indicates ECH was not offered, or we have not gotten far
+  // enough in the handshake to determine the status.
+  ssl_ech_none,
+  // ssl_ech_accepted indicates the server accepted ECH.
+  ssl_ech_accepted,
+  // ssl_ech_rejected indicates the server was offered ECH but rejected it.
+  ssl_ech_rejected,
+};
+
 struct SSL3_STATE {
   static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
 
@@ -2635,8 +2654,8 @@ struct SSL3_STATE {
   // key_update_count is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates received.
   uint8_t key_update_count = 0;
 
-  // ech_accept indicates whether ECH was accepted by the server.
-  bool ech_accept : 1;
+  // ech_status indicates whether ECH was accepted by the server.
+  ssl_ech_status_t ech_status = ssl_ech_none;
 
   // skip_early_data instructs the record layer to skip unexpected early data
   // messages when 0RTT is rejected.
@@ -3146,7 +3165,7 @@ void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session);
 void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session,
                                uint32_t timeout);
 
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode);
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl);
 
 void ssl_send_alert(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc);
 int ssl_send_alert_impl(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/s3_lib.cc

@@ -164,8 +164,7 @@
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
 SSL3_STATE::SSL3_STATE()
-    : ech_accept(false),
-      skip_early_data(false),
+    : skip_early_data(false),
       have_version(false),
       v2_hello_done(false),
       is_v2_hello(false),

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_key_share.cc

@@ -206,7 +206,10 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
     uint8_t hrss_entropy[HRSS_GENERATE_KEY_BYTES];
     HRSS_public_key hrss_public_key;
     RAND_bytes(hrss_entropy, sizeof(hrss_entropy));
-    HRSS_generate_key(&hrss_public_key, &hrss_private_key_, hrss_entropy);
+    if (!HRSS_generate_key(&hrss_public_key, &hrss_private_key_,
+                           hrss_entropy)) {
+      return false;
+    }
 
     uint8_t hrss_public_key_bytes[HRSS_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
     HRSS_marshal_public_key(hrss_public_key_bytes, &hrss_public_key);
@@ -243,9 +246,10 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
     uint8_t ciphertext[HRSS_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES];
     uint8_t entropy[HRSS_ENCAP_BYTES];
     RAND_bytes(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-    HRSS_encap(ciphertext, secret.data() + 32, &peer_public_key, entropy);
 
-    if (!CBB_add_bytes(out_public_key, x25519_public_key,
+    if (!HRSS_encap(ciphertext, secret.data() + 32, &peer_public_key,
+                    entropy) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(out_public_key, x25519_public_key,
                        sizeof(x25519_public_key)) ||
         !CBB_add_bytes(out_public_key, ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext))) {
       return false;
@@ -272,8 +276,10 @@ class CECPQ2KeyShare : public SSLKeyShare {
       return false;
     }
 
-    HRSS_decap(secret.data() + 32, &hrss_private_key_, peer_key.data() + 32,
-               peer_key.size() - 32);
+    if (!HRSS_decap(secret.data() + 32, &hrss_private_key_,
+                    peer_key.data() + 32, peer_key.size() - 32)) {
+      return false;
+    }
 
     *out_secret = std::move(secret);
     return true;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_lib.cc

@@ -272,55 +272,6 @@ ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
   return ret;
 }
 
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->session_ctx.get();
-  if (!SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ssl->s3->established_session.get()) ||
-      (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Clients never use the internal session cache.
-  int use_internal_cache = ssl->server && !(ctx->session_cache_mode &
-                                            SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
-
-  // A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server
-  // decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be
-  // inserted into the cache.
-  if (ssl->s3->established_session.get() != ssl->session.get() ||
-      (!ssl->server && hs->ticket_expected)) {
-    if (use_internal_cache) {
-      SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->s3->established_session.get());
-    }
-    if (ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) {
-      UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ref = UpRef(ssl->s3->established_session);
-      if (ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ref.get())) {
-        // |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership.
-        ref.release();
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (use_internal_cache &&
-      !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) {
-    // Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections.
-    int flush_cache = 0;
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
-    ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++;
-    if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) {
-      flush_cache = 1;
-      ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
-    }
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
-
-    if (flush_cache) {
-      struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
-      ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
-      SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
 static bool cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
   static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
   uint8_t *out;