grpc 1.35.0 → 1.36.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/hpke/hpke.c

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-// This file implements draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05.
+// This file implements draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-07.
 
 #define KEM_CONTEXT_LEN (2 * X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN)
 
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 #define HPKE_MODE_BASE 0
 #define HPKE_MODE_PSK 1
 
-static const char kHpkeRfcId[] = "HPKE-05 ";
+static const char kHpkeRfcId[] = "HPKE-07";
 
 static int add_label_string(CBB *cbb, const char *label) {
   return CBB_add_bytes(cbb, (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int hpke_extract_and_expand(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
   return 1;
 }
 
-static const EVP_AEAD *hpke_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_HPKE_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
   switch (aead_id) {
     case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128:
       return EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD *hpke_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
   return NULL;
 }
 
-static const EVP_MD *hpke_get_kdf(uint16_t kdf_id) {
+const EVP_MD *EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(uint16_t kdf_id) {
   switch (kdf_id) {
     case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256:
       return EVP_sha256();
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
   }
 
   // Attempt to get an EVP_AEAD*.
-  const EVP_AEAD *aead = hpke_get_aead(hpke->aead_id);
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead = EVP_HPKE_get_aead(hpke->aead_id);
   if (aead == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -216,24 +216,13 @@ static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // psk_hash = LabeledExtract("", "psk_hash", psk)
-  static const char kPskHashLabel[] = "psk_hash";
-  uint8_t psk_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t psk_hash_len;
-  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, psk_hash, &psk_hash_len, NULL, 0,
-                            suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kPskHashLabel, psk,
-                            psk_len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // secret = LabeledExtract(psk_hash, "secret", shared_secret)
+  // secret = LabeledExtract(shared_secret, "secret", psk)
   static const char kSecretExtractLabel[] = "secret";
   uint8_t secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t secret_len;
-  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, secret, &secret_len, psk_hash,
-                            psk_hash_len, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
-                            kSecretExtractLabel, shared_secret,
-                            shared_secret_len)) {
+  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, secret, &secret_len, shared_secret,
+                            shared_secret_len, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
+                            kSecretExtractLabel, psk, psk_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -252,9 +241,9 @@ static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // nonce = LabeledExpand(secret, "nonce", key_schedule_context, Nn)
-  static const char kNonceExpandLabel[] = "nonce";
-  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->nonce,
+  // base_nonce = LabeledExpand(secret, "base_nonce", key_schedule_context, Nn)
+  static const char kNonceExpandLabel[] = "base_nonce";
+  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->base_nonce,
                            EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead), secret, secret_len,
                            suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kNonceExpandLabel,
                            context, context_len)) {
@@ -351,7 +340,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
   hpke->is_sender = 1;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -375,7 +364,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519(
   hpke->is_sender = 0;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -415,7 +404,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
   hpke->is_sender = 1;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -440,7 +429,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519(
   hpke->is_sender = 0;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -466,9 +455,9 @@ static void hpke_nonce(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out_nonce,
     seq_copy >>= 8;
   }
 
-  // XOR the encoded sequence with the |hpke->nonce|.
+  // XOR the encoded sequence with the |hpke->base_nonce|.
   for (size_t i = 0; i < nonce_len; i++) {
-    out_nonce[i] ^= hpke->nonce[i];
+    out_nonce[i] ^= hpke->base_nonce[i];
   }
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/hpke/internal.h

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <openssl/aead.h>
 #include <openssl/base.h>
 #include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)
 extern "C" {
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ extern "C" {
 // receiver with a public key. Optionally, the sender may authenticate its
 // possession of a pre-shared key to the recipient.
 //
-// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05.
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-07.
 
 // EVP_HPKE_AEAD_* are AEAD identifiers.
 #define EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128 0x0001
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ typedef struct evp_hpke_ctx_st {
   EVP_AEAD_CTX aead_ctx;
   uint16_t kdf_id;
   uint16_t aead_id;
-  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  uint8_t base_nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
   uint8_t exporter_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   uint64_t seq;
   int is_sender;
@@ -77,8 +78,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx);
 // In each of the following functions, |hpke| must have been initialized with
 // |EVP_HPKE_CTX_init|. |kdf_id| selects the KDF for non-KEM HPKE operations and
 // must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_HKDF_*| constants. |aead_id| selects the AEAD
-// for the "open" and "seal" operations and must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_AEAD_*"
-// constants."
+// for the "open" and "seal" operations and must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_AEAD_*|
+// constants.
 
 // EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a sender context that can
 // encrypt for the private key corresponding to |peer_public_value| (the
@@ -215,6 +216,14 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
 // set up as a sender.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke);
 
+// EVP_HPKE_get_aead returns the AEAD corresponding to |aead_id|, or NULL if
+// |aead_id| is not a known AEAD identifier.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_HPKE_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id);
+
+// EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md returns the hash function associated with |kdf_id|, or
+// NULL if |kdf_id| is not a known KDF identifier that uses HKDF.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_MD *EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(uint16_t kdf_id);
+
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)
 }  // extern C

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c

@@ -46,10 +46,14 @@ struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint32_t s1, s2, s3, s4;
   uint32_t h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
   uint8_t buf[16];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st");
+
 static inline struct poly1305_state_st *poly1305_aligned_state(
     poly1305_state *state) {
   return (struct poly1305_state_st *)(((uintptr_t)state + 63) & ~63);
@@ -200,7 +204,6 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t key[32]) {
 
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
                             size_t in_len) {
-  unsigned int i;
   struct poly1305_state_st *state = poly1305_aligned_state(statep);
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_POLY1305_NEON)
@@ -211,11 +214,11 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
 #endif
 
   if (state->buf_used) {
-    unsigned todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
-      todo = (unsigned)in_len;
+      todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       state->buf[state->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     state->buf_used += todo;
@@ -236,10 +239,10 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       state->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
-    state->buf_used = (unsigned)in_len;
+    state->buf_used = in_len;
   }
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm.c

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ extern void addmulmod(fe1305x2 *r, const fe1305x2 *x, const fe1305x2 *y,
                       const fe1305x2 *c);
 
 extern int blocks(fe1305x2 *h, const fe1305x2 *precomp, const uint8_t *in,
-                  unsigned int inlen);
+                  size_t inlen);
 
 static void freeze(fe1305x2 *r) {
   int i;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static void fe1305x2_tobytearray(uint8_t r[16], fe1305x2 *x) {
 }
 
 static void fe1305x2_frombytearray(fe1305x2 *r, const uint8_t *x, size_t xlen) {
-  unsigned i;
+  size_t i;
   uint8_t t[17];
 
   for (i = 0; (i < 16) && (i < xlen); i++) {
@@ -179,17 +179,20 @@ static const alignas(16) fe1305x2 zero;
 struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint8_t data[sizeof(fe1305x2[5]) + 128];
   uint8_t buf[32];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st.");
+
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   struct poly1305_state_st *st = (struct poly1305_state_st *)(state);
   fe1305x2 *const r = (fe1305x2 *)(st->data + (15 & (-(int)st->data)));
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int j;
 
   r->v[1] = r->v[0] = 0x3ffffff & load32(key);
   r->v[3] = r->v[2] = 0x3ffff03 & (load32(key + 3) >> 2);
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   r->v[7] = r->v[6] = 0x3f03fff & (load32(key + 9) >> 6);
   r->v[9] = r->v[8] = 0x00fffff & (load32(key + 12) >> 8);
 
-  for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
+  for (size_t j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
     h->v[j] = 0;  // XXX: should fast-forward a bit
   }
 
@@ -215,14 +218,13 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int i;
 
   if (st->buf_used) {
-    unsigned int todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
       todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       st->buf[st->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used += todo;
@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
     if (st->buf_used == sizeof(st->buf) && in_len) {
       addmulmod(h, h, precomp, &zero);
       fe1305x2_frombytearray(c, st->buf, sizeof(st->buf));
-      for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
         h->v[i] += c->v[i];
       }
       st->buf_used = 0;
@@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   while (in_len > 32) {
-    unsigned int tlen = 1048576;
+    size_t tlen = 1048576;
     if (in_len < tlen) {
       tlen = in_len;
     }
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       st->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used = in_len;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_vec.c

@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ typedef struct poly1305_state_internal_t {
 } poly1305_state_internal; /* 448 bytes total + 63 bytes for
                               alignment = 511 bytes raw */
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_internal_t) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_internal_t");
+
 static inline poly1305_state_internal *poly1305_aligned_state(
     poly1305_state *state) {
   return (poly1305_state_internal *)(((uint64_t)state + 63) & ~63);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/passive.c

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include "../fipsmodule/rand/internal.h"
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY)
+
+// RAND_need_entropy is called by the FIPS module when it has blocked because of
+// a lack of entropy. This signal is used as an indication to feed it more.
+void RAND_need_entropy(size_t bytes_needed) {
+  uint8_t buf[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
+  size_t todo = sizeof(buf);
+  if (todo > bytes_needed) {
+    todo = bytes_needed;
+  }
+
+  int used_cpu;
+  CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(buf, todo, &used_cpu);
+  RAND_load_entropy(buf, todo, used_cpu);
+}
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/rand_extra.c

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) {
   return (RAND_METHOD*) &kSSLeayMethod;
 }
 
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) {
+  return RAND_SSLeay();
+}
+
 const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) { return RAND_SSLeay(); }
 
 void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *method) {}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/stack/stack.c

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
 #include <openssl/stack.h>
 
 #include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 
@@ -69,11 +68,9 @@
 static const size_t kMinSize = 4;
 
 _STACK *sk_new(stack_cmp_func comp) {
-  _STACK *ret;
-
-  ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
+  _STACK *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
   if (ret == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    return NULL;
   }
   OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(_STACK));
 
@@ -331,23 +328,20 @@ void *sk_pop(_STACK *sk) {
 }
 
 _STACK *sk_dup(const _STACK *sk) {
-  _STACK *ret;
-  void **s;
-
   if (sk == NULL) {
     return NULL;
   }
 
-  ret = sk_new(sk->comp);
+  _STACK *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
   if (ret == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    return NULL;
   }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(_STACK));
 
-  s = (void **)OPENSSL_realloc(ret->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
-  if (s == NULL) {
+  ret->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
+  if (ret->data == NULL) {
     goto err;
   }
-  ret->data = s;
 
   ret->num = sk->num;
   OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->data, sk->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/rsa_pss.c

@@ -199,11 +199,15 @@ int x509_rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *algor) {
   if (saltlen == -1) {
     saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
   } else if (saltlen == -2) {
+    // TODO(davidben): Forbid this mode. The world has largely standardized on
+    // salt length matching hash length.
     saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
     if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0) {
       saltlen--;
     }
-  } else {
+  } else if (saltlen != (int)EVP_MD_size(sigmd)) {
+    // We only allow salt length matching hash length and, for now, the -2 case.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
     return 0;
   }