grpc 1.33.0.pre1 → 1.37.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/self_check.c

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
 #include <openssl/aes.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/des.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
 #include <openssl/ec.h>
 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
 #include <openssl/ec_key.h>
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "../../internal.h"
 #include "../ec/internal.h"
 #include "../rand/internal.h"
+#include "../tls/internal.h"
 
 
 // MSVC wants to put a NUL byte at the end of non-char arrays and so cannot
@@ -244,6 +247,41 @@ static EC_KEY *self_test_ecdsa_key(void) {
   return ec_key;
 }
 
+static DH *self_test_dh(void) {
+  DH *dh = DH_get_rfc7919_2048();
+  if (!dh) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  BIGNUM *priv = BN_new();
+  if (!priv) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData is a 225-bit value. (225 because that's the
+  // minimum private key size in
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1.)
+  static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData[] = {
+      TOBN(0x187be36b, 0xd38a4fa1),
+      TOBN(0x0a152f39, 0x6458f3b8),
+      TOBN(0x0570187e, 0xc422eeb7),
+      TOBN(0x00000001, 0x91173f2a),
+  };
+
+  bn_set_static_words(priv, kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData,
+                      OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048PrivateKeyData));
+
+  if (!DH_set0_key(dh, NULL, priv)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  return dh;
+
+err:
+  BN_free(priv);
+  DH_free(dh);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
 #if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
 static const size_t kModuleDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
 #else
@@ -460,6 +498,81 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
       0x00,
 #endif
   };
+  const uint8_t kTLSOutput[32] = {
+      0x67, 0x85, 0xde, 0x60, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x83, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0xb3,
+      0xf0, 0x27, 0x0c, 0xba, 0xf7, 0xfa, 0x82, 0x3d, 0x14, 0x77, 0x1d,
+      0x86, 0x29, 0x79, 0x39, 0x77, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x9d,
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_TLS_KDF)
+      0x32,
+#else
+      0x00,
+#endif
+  };
+  const uint8_t kTLSSecret[32] = {
+      0xbf, 0xe4, 0xb7, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x55, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0x27,
+      0xd6, 0x89, 0x99, 0x2a, 0xd6, 0xf7, 0x65, 0x66, 0x07, 0x4b, 0x55,
+      0x5f, 0x64, 0x55, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x77, 0xa4, 0xc7, 0x09, 0x61,
+  };
+  const char kTLSLabel[] = "FIPS self test";
+  const uint8_t kTLSSeed1[16] = {
+      0x8f, 0x0d, 0xe8, 0xb6, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xb1, 0xd2,
+      0x6d, 0x51, 0xf4, 0x79, 0x18, 0x63, 0x51, 0x65,
+  };
+  const uint8_t kTLSSeed2[16] = {
+      0x7d, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xbf, 0x3c,
+      0x31, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x32, 0x81,
+  };
+
+  // kFFDHE2048PublicValueData is an arbitrary public value, mod
+  // kFFDHE2048Data. (The private key happens to be 4096.)
+  static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048PublicValueData[] = {
+      TOBN(0x187be36b, 0xd38a4fa1), TOBN(0x0a152f39, 0x6458f3b8),
+      TOBN(0x0570187e, 0xc422eeb7), TOBN(0x18af7482, 0x91173f2a),
+      TOBN(0xe9fdac6a, 0xcff4eaaa), TOBN(0xf6afebb7, 0x6e589d6c),
+      TOBN(0xf92f8e9a, 0xb7e33fb0), TOBN(0x70acf2aa, 0x4cf36ddd),
+      TOBN(0x561ab426, 0xd07137fd), TOBN(0x5f57d037, 0x430ee91e),
+      TOBN(0xe3e768c8, 0x60d10b8a), TOBN(0xb14884d8, 0xa18af8ce),
+      TOBN(0xf8a98014, 0xa12b74e4), TOBN(0x748d407c, 0x3437b7a8),
+      TOBN(0x627588c4, 0x9875d5a7), TOBN(0xdd24a127, 0x53c8f09d),
+      TOBN(0x85a997d5, 0x0cd51aec), TOBN(0x44f0c619, 0xce348458),
+      TOBN(0x9b894b24, 0x5f6b69a1), TOBN(0xae1302f2, 0xf6d4777e),
+      TOBN(0xe6678eeb, 0x375db18e), TOBN(0x2674e1d6, 0x4fbcbdc8),
+      TOBN(0xb297a823, 0x6fa93d28), TOBN(0x6a12fb70, 0x7c8c0510),
+      TOBN(0x5c6d1aeb, 0xdb06f65b), TOBN(0xe8c2954e, 0x4c1804ca),
+      TOBN(0x06bdeac1, 0xf5500fa7), TOBN(0x6a315604, 0x189cd76b),
+      TOBN(0xbae7b0b3, 0x6e362dc0), TOBN(0xa57c73bd, 0xdc70fb82),
+      TOBN(0xfaff50d2, 0x9d573457), TOBN(0x352bd399, 0xbe84058e),
+  };
+
+  const uint8_t kDHOutput[2048 / 8] = {
+      0x2a, 0xe6, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x13, 0x58, 0x8e, 0xce, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xf6, 0x5d,
+      0x9a, 0xae, 0x02, 0x12, 0xf5, 0x80, 0x3d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x76, 0xac, 0x57,
+      0x37, 0x9e, 0xab, 0x38, 0x62, 0x25, 0x05, 0x1d, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0x39, 0x60,
+      0xf6, 0xae, 0x90, 0xed, 0x1e, 0xad, 0x6e, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0xba, 0x27, 0xf6,
+      0xdb, 0x54, 0xdf, 0xe2, 0xbd, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0x81, 0xac, 0x1a, 0xfa,
+      0xdb, 0x87, 0x07, 0x98, 0x76, 0x90, 0x21, 0xf2, 0xae, 0xda, 0x0d, 0x84,
+      0x97, 0x64, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x46, 0xe2, 0xd5, 0xca, 0x1b,
+      0xbb, 0xe5, 0x37, 0xb2, 0x3b, 0x35, 0xd3, 0x1b, 0x65, 0xea, 0xae, 0xf2,
+      0x03, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xde, 0x22, 0xb7, 0x86, 0x49, 0x79, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0x16,
+      0xf7, 0xdc, 0x9c, 0x59, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x53, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xb1,
+      0xd2, 0x4e, 0x00, 0x25, 0x4b, 0x2d, 0x5a, 0x9b, 0xd0, 0xe9, 0x27, 0x43,
+      0xcc, 0x00, 0x66, 0xea, 0x94, 0x7a, 0x0b, 0xb9, 0x89, 0x0c, 0x5e, 0x94,
+      0xb8, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0x84, 0xe6, 0x32, 0x2c, 0x38, 0x7c, 0xf7,
+      0x43, 0x9c, 0xd8, 0xb8, 0x1c, 0xce, 0x24, 0x91, 0x20, 0x67, 0x7a, 0x54,
+      0x1f, 0x7e, 0x86, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x03, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x26, 0x71, 0xb2,
+      0x06, 0x30, 0xb3, 0x6c, 0x15, 0xcc, 0xac, 0x25, 0xe5, 0x37, 0x3f, 0x24,
+      0x8f, 0x2a, 0x89, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x94, 0xc9, 0x36, 0xae, 0x40, 0x00,
+      0x6a, 0x0d, 0xb0, 0x6e, 0x8b, 0x2e, 0x70, 0x57, 0xe1, 0x88, 0x53, 0xd6,
+      0x06, 0x80, 0x2a, 0x4e, 0x5a, 0xf0, 0x1e, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xab, 0x06, 0x0e,
+      0x27, 0x0f, 0xd9, 0x88, 0xd9, 0x01, 0xe3, 0x07, 0xeb, 0xdf, 0xc3, 0x12,
+      0xe3, 0x40, 0x88, 0x7b, 0x5f, 0x59, 0x78, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x20, 0xc3, 0xdf,
+      0xc8, 0xe4, 0x5e,
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_FFC_DH)
+      0xb8,
+#else
+      0x00,
+#endif
+  };
 
   EVP_AEAD_CTX aead_ctx;
   EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(&aead_ctx);
@@ -611,7 +724,7 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
     goto err;
   }
 
-  // ECDSA Sign/Verify PWCT
+  // ECDSA Sign/Verify KAT
 
   // The 'k' value for ECDSA is fixed to avoid an entropy draw.
   ec_key->fixed_k = BN_new();
@@ -632,7 +745,13 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
       !BN_bn2bin(sig->s, ecdsa_s_bytes) ||
       !check_test(kECDSASigR, ecdsa_r_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigR), "ECDSA R") ||
       !check_test(kECDSASigS, ecdsa_s_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigS), "ECDSA S")) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA KAT failed.\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA signature KAT failed.\n");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ECDSA_do_verify(kPlaintextSHA256, sizeof(kPlaintextSHA256), sig,
+                       ec_key)) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA verification KAT failed.\n");
     goto err;
   }
 
@@ -660,6 +779,29 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
     goto err;
   }
 
+  // FFC Diffie-Hellman KAT
+
+  BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_value = BN_new();
+  DH *const dh = self_test_dh();
+  int dh_ok = 0;
+  if (ffdhe2048_value && dh) {
+    bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_value, kFFDHE2048PublicValueData,
+                        OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048PublicValueData));
+
+    uint8_t dh_out[sizeof(kDHOutput)];
+    dh_ok =
+        sizeof(dh_out) == DH_size(dh) &&
+        DH_compute_key_padded(dh_out, ffdhe2048_value, dh) == sizeof(dh_out) &&
+        check_test(kDHOutput, dh_out, sizeof(dh_out), "FFC DH");
+  }
+
+  BN_free(ffdhe2048_value);
+  DH_free(dh);
+  if (!dh_ok) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "FFDH failed.\n");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
   // DBRG KAT
   CTR_DRBG_STATE drbg;
   if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&drbg, kDRBGEntropy, kDRBGPersonalization,
@@ -684,6 +826,17 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
     goto err;
   }
 
+  // TLS KDF KAT
+  uint8_t tls_output[sizeof(kTLSOutput)];
+  if (!CRYPTO_tls1_prf(EVP_sha256(), tls_output, sizeof(tls_output), kTLSSecret,
+                       sizeof(kTLSSecret), kTLSLabel, sizeof(kTLSLabel),
+                       kTLSSeed1, sizeof(kTLSSeed1), kTLSSeed2,
+                       sizeof(kTLSSeed2)) ||
+      !check_test(kTLSOutput, tls_output, sizeof(kTLSOutput), "TLS KDF KAT")) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "TLS KDF failed.\n");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
   ret = 1;
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_FILE)

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/hpke/hpke.c

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-// This file implements draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05.
+// This file implements draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-07.
 
 #define KEM_CONTEXT_LEN (2 * X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN)
 
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 #define HPKE_MODE_BASE 0
 #define HPKE_MODE_PSK 1
 
-static const char kHpkeRfcId[] = "HPKE-05 ";
+static const char kHpkeRfcId[] = "HPKE-07";
 
 static int add_label_string(CBB *cbb, const char *label) {
   return CBB_add_bytes(cbb, (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int hpke_extract_and_expand(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
   return 1;
 }
 
-static const EVP_AEAD *hpke_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_HPKE_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
   switch (aead_id) {
     case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128:
       return EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD *hpke_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
   return NULL;
 }
 
-static const EVP_MD *hpke_get_kdf(uint16_t kdf_id) {
+const EVP_MD *EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(uint16_t kdf_id) {
   switch (kdf_id) {
     case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256:
       return EVP_sha256();
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
   }
 
   // Attempt to get an EVP_AEAD*.
-  const EVP_AEAD *aead = hpke_get_aead(hpke->aead_id);
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead = EVP_HPKE_get_aead(hpke->aead_id);
   if (aead == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -216,24 +216,13 @@ static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // psk_hash = LabeledExtract("", "psk_hash", psk)
-  static const char kPskHashLabel[] = "psk_hash";
-  uint8_t psk_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t psk_hash_len;
-  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, psk_hash, &psk_hash_len, NULL, 0,
-                            suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kPskHashLabel, psk,
-                            psk_len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // secret = LabeledExtract(psk_hash, "secret", shared_secret)
+  // secret = LabeledExtract(shared_secret, "secret", psk)
   static const char kSecretExtractLabel[] = "secret";
   uint8_t secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t secret_len;
-  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, secret, &secret_len, psk_hash,
-                            psk_hash_len, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
-                            kSecretExtractLabel, shared_secret,
-                            shared_secret_len)) {
+  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, secret, &secret_len, shared_secret,
+                            shared_secret_len, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
+                            kSecretExtractLabel, psk, psk_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -252,9 +241,9 @@ static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // nonce = LabeledExpand(secret, "nonce", key_schedule_context, Nn)
-  static const char kNonceExpandLabel[] = "nonce";
-  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->nonce,
+  // base_nonce = LabeledExpand(secret, "base_nonce", key_schedule_context, Nn)
+  static const char kNonceExpandLabel[] = "base_nonce";
+  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->base_nonce,
                            EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead), secret, secret_len,
                            suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kNonceExpandLabel,
                            context, context_len)) {
@@ -351,7 +340,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
   hpke->is_sender = 1;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -375,7 +364,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519(
   hpke->is_sender = 0;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -415,7 +404,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
   hpke->is_sender = 1;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -440,7 +429,7 @@ int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519(
   hpke->is_sender = 0;
   hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
   hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
-  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  hpke->hkdf_md = EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(kdf_id);
   if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -466,9 +455,9 @@ static void hpke_nonce(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out_nonce,
     seq_copy >>= 8;
   }
 
-  // XOR the encoded sequence with the |hpke->nonce|.
+  // XOR the encoded sequence with the |hpke->base_nonce|.
   for (size_t i = 0; i < nonce_len; i++) {
-    out_nonce[i] ^= hpke->nonce[i];
+    out_nonce[i] ^= hpke->base_nonce[i];
   }
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/hpke/internal.h

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <openssl/aead.h>
 #include <openssl/base.h>
 #include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)
 extern "C" {
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ extern "C" {
 // receiver with a public key. Optionally, the sender may authenticate its
 // possession of a pre-shared key to the recipient.
 //
-// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05.
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-07.
 
 // EVP_HPKE_AEAD_* are AEAD identifiers.
 #define EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128 0x0001
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ typedef struct evp_hpke_ctx_st {
   EVP_AEAD_CTX aead_ctx;
   uint16_t kdf_id;
   uint16_t aead_id;
-  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  uint8_t base_nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
   uint8_t exporter_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   uint64_t seq;
   int is_sender;
@@ -77,8 +78,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx);
 // In each of the following functions, |hpke| must have been initialized with
 // |EVP_HPKE_CTX_init|. |kdf_id| selects the KDF for non-KEM HPKE operations and
 // must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_HKDF_*| constants. |aead_id| selects the AEAD
-// for the "open" and "seal" operations and must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_AEAD_*"
-// constants."
+// for the "open" and "seal" operations and must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_AEAD_*|
+// constants.
 
 // EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a sender context that can
 // encrypt for the private key corresponding to |peer_public_value| (the
@@ -215,6 +216,14 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
 // set up as a sender.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke);
 
+// EVP_HPKE_get_aead returns the AEAD corresponding to |aead_id|, or NULL if
+// |aead_id| is not a known AEAD identifier.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_HPKE_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id);
+
+// EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md returns the hash function associated with |kdf_id|, or
+// NULL if |kdf_id| is not a known KDF identifier that uses HKDF.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_MD *EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(uint16_t kdf_id);
+
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)
 }  // extern C

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c

@@ -46,10 +46,14 @@ struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint32_t s1, s2, s3, s4;
   uint32_t h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
   uint8_t buf[16];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st");
+
 static inline struct poly1305_state_st *poly1305_aligned_state(
     poly1305_state *state) {
   return (struct poly1305_state_st *)(((uintptr_t)state + 63) & ~63);
@@ -200,7 +204,6 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t key[32]) {
 
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
                             size_t in_len) {
-  unsigned int i;
   struct poly1305_state_st *state = poly1305_aligned_state(statep);
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_POLY1305_NEON)
@@ -211,11 +214,11 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
 #endif
 
   if (state->buf_used) {
-    unsigned todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
-      todo = (unsigned)in_len;
+      todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       state->buf[state->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     state->buf_used += todo;
@@ -236,10 +239,10 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       state->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
-    state->buf_used = (unsigned)in_len;
+    state->buf_used = in_len;
   }
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm.c

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ extern void addmulmod(fe1305x2 *r, const fe1305x2 *x, const fe1305x2 *y,
                       const fe1305x2 *c);
 
 extern int blocks(fe1305x2 *h, const fe1305x2 *precomp, const uint8_t *in,
-                  unsigned int inlen);
+                  size_t inlen);
 
 static void freeze(fe1305x2 *r) {
   int i;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static void fe1305x2_tobytearray(uint8_t r[16], fe1305x2 *x) {
 }
 
 static void fe1305x2_frombytearray(fe1305x2 *r, const uint8_t *x, size_t xlen) {
-  unsigned i;
+  size_t i;
   uint8_t t[17];
 
   for (i = 0; (i < 16) && (i < xlen); i++) {
@@ -179,17 +179,20 @@ static const alignas(16) fe1305x2 zero;
 struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint8_t data[sizeof(fe1305x2[5]) + 128];
   uint8_t buf[32];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st.");
+
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   struct poly1305_state_st *st = (struct poly1305_state_st *)(state);
   fe1305x2 *const r = (fe1305x2 *)(st->data + (15 & (-(int)st->data)));
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int j;
 
   r->v[1] = r->v[0] = 0x3ffffff & load32(key);
   r->v[3] = r->v[2] = 0x3ffff03 & (load32(key + 3) >> 2);
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   r->v[7] = r->v[6] = 0x3f03fff & (load32(key + 9) >> 6);
   r->v[9] = r->v[8] = 0x00fffff & (load32(key + 12) >> 8);
 
-  for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
+  for (size_t j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
     h->v[j] = 0;  // XXX: should fast-forward a bit
   }
 
@@ -215,14 +218,13 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int i;
 
   if (st->buf_used) {
-    unsigned int todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
       todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       st->buf[st->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used += todo;
@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
     if (st->buf_used == sizeof(st->buf) && in_len) {
       addmulmod(h, h, precomp, &zero);
       fe1305x2_frombytearray(c, st->buf, sizeof(st->buf));
-      for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
         h->v[i] += c->v[i];
       }
       st->buf_used = 0;
@@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   while (in_len > 32) {
-    unsigned int tlen = 1048576;
+    size_t tlen = 1048576;
     if (in_len < tlen) {
       tlen = in_len;
     }
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       st->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used = in_len;