grpc 1.33.0.pre1 → 1.34.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/bio/bio.c

@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ int BIO_should_io_special(const BIO *bio) {
 
 int BIO_get_retry_reason(const BIO *bio) { return bio->retry_reason; }
 
+void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason) { bio->retry_reason = reason; }
+
 void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *bio, int flags) {
   bio->flags &= ~flags;
 }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c

@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
 OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
 OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702))  // Unreachable code.
 
+#define AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH 12
+
 #if defined(BSAES)
 static void vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes(const uint8_t *in,
                                                   uint8_t *out, size_t blocks,
@@ -630,7 +632,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_gcm_generic) {
   out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm;
   out->block_size = 1;
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->iv_len = 12;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
   out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
                EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -698,7 +700,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_gcm_generic) {
   out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm;
   out->block_size = 1;
   out->key_len = 24;
-  out->iv_len = 12;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
   out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
                EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -766,7 +768,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_gcm_generic) {
   out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
   out->block_size = 1;
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->iv_len = 12;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
   out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
                EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -931,21 +933,19 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
 
 static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
 
-static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
-                                     uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
-                                     size_t max_out_tag_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *extra_in,
-                                     size_t extra_in_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
-
-  if (extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
+    const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
+    uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+    size_t tag_len) {
+  if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
-  if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len) {
+  if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + tag_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -989,18 +989,35 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     }
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, ctx->tag_len);
-  *out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len + extra_in_len;
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, tag_len);
+  *out_tag_len = tag_len + extra_in_len;
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
-                                    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                     uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
+                                     size_t max_out_tag_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *extra_in,
+                                     size_t extra_in_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
+      gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
+      in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
+                                         uint8_t *out,
+                                         const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *in_tag,
+                                         size_t in_tag_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+                                         size_t tag_len) {
   uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
 
   if (nonce_len == 0) {
@@ -1008,7 +1025,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
+  if (in_tag_len != tag_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1035,8 +1052,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     }
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, ctx->tag_len);
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, tag_len);
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1044,11 +1061,22 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
   return 1;
 }
 
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(gcm_ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in,
+                                       in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len,
+                                       ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
 DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1063,7 +1091,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 24;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1078,7 +1106,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1089,6 +1117,116 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
   out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
 }
 
+static int aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                       size_t key_len,
+                                       size_t requested_tag_len) {
+  if (requested_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
+    if (requested_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    requested_tag_len -= AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_init(ctx, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx->tag_len += AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+    uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t nonce[AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  if (max_out_tag_len < sizeof(nonce)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  RAND_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
+                                      max_out_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH,
+                                      nonce, sizeof(nonce), in, in_len,
+                                      extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len,
+                                      ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  assert(*out_tag_len + sizeof(nonce) <= max_out_tag_len);
+  memcpy(out_tag + *out_tag_len, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+  *out_tag_len += sizeof(nonce);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+    const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *nonce = in_tag + in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(
+      gcm_ctx, out, nonce, AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, in, in_len, in_tag,
+      in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, ad, ad_len,
+      ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH);
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = 0;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->nonce_len = 0;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
+}
+
 struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
   struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
   uint64_t min_next_nonce;
@@ -1128,7 +1266,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter(
   struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
       (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
 
-  if (nonce_len != 12) {
+  if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1155,7 +1293,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1170,7 +1308,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1223,7 +1361,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
   struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
       (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
 
-  if (nonce_len != 12) {
+  if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1261,7 +1399,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1276,7 +1414,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -933,20 +933,57 @@ static int ensure_bignum(BIGNUM **out) {
   return *out != NULL;
 }
 
-// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2¹⁵³⁵×√2⌋. This is
-// chosen to give enough precision for 3072-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
+// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2²⁰⁴⁷×√2⌋. This is
+// chosen to give enough precision for 4096-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
 // specifies. Key sizes beyond this will round up.
 //
-// To verify this number, check that n² < 2³⁰⁷¹ < (n+1)², where n is value
+// To calculate, use the following Haskell code:
+//
+// import Text.Printf (printf)
+// import Data.List (intercalate)
+//
+// pow2 = 4095
+// target = 2^pow2
+//
+// f x = x*x - (toRational target)
+//
+// fprime x = 2*x
+//
+// newtonIteration x = x - (f x) / (fprime x)
+//
+// converge x =
+//   let n = floor x in
+//   if n*n - target < 0 && (n+1)*(n+1) - target > 0
+//     then n
+//     else converge (newtonIteration x)
+//
+// divrem bits x = (x `div` (2^bits), x `rem` (2^bits))
+//
+// bnWords :: Integer -> [Integer]
+// bnWords x =
+//   if x == 0
+//     then []
+//     else let (high, low) = divrem 64 x in low : bnWords high
+//
+// showWord x = let (high, low) = divrem 32 x in printf "TOBN(0x%08x, 0x%08x)" high low
+//
+// output :: String
+// output = intercalate ", " $ map showWord $ bnWords $ converge (2 ^ (pow2 `div` 2))
+//
+// To verify this number, check that n² < 2⁴⁰⁹⁵ < (n+1)², where n is value
 // represented here. Note the components are listed in little-endian order. Here
 // is some sample Python code to check:
 //
 //   >>> TOBN = lambda a, b: a << 32 | b
 //   >>> l = [ <paste the contents of kSqrtTwo> ]
 //   >>> n = sum(a * 2**(64*i) for i, a in enumerate(l))
-//   >>> n**2 < 2**3071 < (n+1)**2
+//   >>> n**2 < 2**4095 < (n+1)**2
 //   True
 const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[] = {
+    TOBN(0x4d7c60a5, 0xe633e3e1), TOBN(0x5fcf8f7b, 0xca3ea33b),
+    TOBN(0xc246785e, 0x92957023), TOBN(0xf9acce41, 0x797f2805),
+    TOBN(0xfdfe170f, 0xd3b1f780), TOBN(0xd24f4a76, 0x3facb882),
+    TOBN(0x18838a2e, 0xaff5f3b2), TOBN(0xc1fcbdde, 0xa2f7dc33),
     TOBN(0xdea06241, 0xf7aa81c2), TOBN(0xf6a1be3f, 0xca221307),
     TOBN(0x332a5e9f, 0x7bda1ebf), TOBN(0x0104dc01, 0xfe32352f),
     TOBN(0xb8cf341b, 0x6f8236c7), TOBN(0x4264dabc, 0xd528b651),
@@ -1167,13 +1204,13 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
   int sqrt2_bits = kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen * BN_BITS2;
   assert(sqrt2_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
   if (sqrt2_bits > prime_bits) {
-    // For key sizes up to 3072 (prime_bits = 1536), this is exactly
+    // For key sizes up to 4096 (prime_bits = 2048), this is exactly
     // ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
     if (!BN_rshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, sqrt2_bits - prime_bits)) {
       goto bn_err;
     }
   } else if (prime_bits > sqrt2_bits) {
-    // For key sizes beyond 3072, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
+    // For key sizes beyond 4096, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
     // to ensure our key is the right size and round up.
     if (!BN_add_word(sqrt2, 1) ||
         !BN_lshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, prime_bits - sqrt2_bits)) {
@@ -1330,7 +1367,9 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
 int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
   // FIPS 186-4 allows 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
   // primes, respectively) with the prime generation method we use.
-  if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072) {
+  // Subsequently, IG A.14 stated that larger modulus sizes can be used and ACVP
+  // testing supports 4096 bits.
+  if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
     return 0;
   }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/self_check.c

@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
     goto err;
   }
 
-  // ECDSA Sign/Verify PWCT
+  // ECDSA Sign/Verify KAT
 
   // The 'k' value for ECDSA is fixed to avoid an entropy draw.
   ec_key->fixed_k = BN_new();
@@ -632,7 +632,13 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
       !BN_bn2bin(sig->s, ecdsa_s_bytes) ||
       !check_test(kECDSASigR, ecdsa_r_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigR), "ECDSA R") ||
       !check_test(kECDSASigS, ecdsa_s_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigS), "ECDSA S")) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA KAT failed.\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA signature KAT failed.\n");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ECDSA_do_verify(kPlaintextSHA256, sizeof(kPlaintextSHA256), sig,
+                       ec_key)) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA verification KAT failed.\n");
     goto err;
   }