grpc 1.32.0 → 1.36.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/hpke/internal.h

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <openssl/aead.h>
 #include <openssl/base.h>
 #include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)
 extern "C" {
@@ -27,9 +28,10 @@ extern "C" {
 // Hybrid Public Key Encryption.
 //
 // Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) enables a sender to encrypt messages to a
-// receiver with a public key.
+// receiver with a public key. Optionally, the sender may authenticate its
+// possession of a pre-shared key to the recipient.
 //
-// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-04.
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-07.
 
 // EVP_HPKE_AEAD_* are AEAD identifiers.
 #define EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128 0x0001
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ typedef struct evp_hpke_ctx_st {
   EVP_AEAD_CTX aead_ctx;
   uint16_t kdf_id;
   uint16_t aead_id;
-  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  uint8_t base_nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
   uint8_t exporter_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   uint64_t seq;
   int is_sender;
@@ -76,15 +78,13 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx);
 // In each of the following functions, |hpke| must have been initialized with
 // |EVP_HPKE_CTX_init|. |kdf_id| selects the KDF for non-KEM HPKE operations and
 // must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_HKDF_*| constants. |aead_id| selects the AEAD
-// for the "open" and "seal" operations and must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_AEAD_*"
-// constants."
-//
-// See https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-04.html#section-5.1.1.
+// for the "open" and "seal" operations and must be one of the |EVP_HPKE_AEAD_*|
+// constants.
 
 // EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a sender context that can
 // encrypt for the private key corresponding to |peer_public_value| (the
 // recipient's public key). It returns one on success, and zero otherwise. Note
-// that this function may fail if |peer_public_value| is invalid.
+// that this function will fail if |peer_public_value| is invalid.
 //
 // This function writes the encapsulated shared secret to |out_enc|.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519(
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
 // EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a recipient context that
 // can decrypt messages. |private_key| is the recipient's private key, and |enc|
 // is the encapsulated shared secret from the sender. Note that this function
-// may fail if |enc| is invalid.
+// will fail if |enc| is invalid.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519(
     EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
     const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
@@ -114,6 +114,52 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519(
     const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
     size_t info_len);
 
+// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a sender context that can
+// encrypt for the private key corresponding to |peer_public_value| (the
+// recipient's public key) and authenticate its possession of a PSK. It returns
+// one on success, and zero otherwise. Note that this function will fail if
+// |peer_public_value| is invalid.
+//
+// The PSK and its ID must be provided in |psk| and |psk_id|, respectively. Both
+// must be nonempty (|psk_len| and |psk_id_len| must be non-zero), or this
+// function will fail.
+//
+// This function writes the encapsulated shared secret to |out_enc|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t out_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
+    const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len);
+
+// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test behaves like
+// |EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519|, but takes a pre-generated ephemeral sender
+// key.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
+    const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len,
+    const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
+    const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]);
+
+// EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519 sets up |hpke| as a recipient context that
+// can decrypt messages. Future open (decrypt) operations will fail if the
+// sender does not possess the PSK indicated by |psk| and |psk_id|.
+// |private_key| is the recipient's private key, and |enc| is the encapsulated
+// shared secret from the sender. If |enc| is invalid, this function will fail.
+//
+// The PSK and its ID must be provided in |psk| and |psk_id|, respectively. Both
+// must be nonempty (|psk_len| and |psk_id_len| must be non-zero), or this
+// function will fail.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t public_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
+    size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len, const uint8_t *psk_id,
+    size_t psk_id_len);
+
 
 // Using an HPKE context.
 
@@ -170,6 +216,14 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
 // set up as a sender.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke);
 
+// EVP_HPKE_get_aead returns the AEAD corresponding to |aead_id|, or NULL if
+// |aead_id| is not a known AEAD identifier.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_AEAD *EVP_HPKE_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id);
+
+// EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md returns the hash function associated with |kdf_id|, or
+// NULL if |kdf_id| is not a known KDF identifier that uses HKDF.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_MD *EVP_HPKE_get_hkdf_md(uint16_t kdf_id);
+
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)
 }  // extern C

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c

@@ -46,10 +46,14 @@ struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint32_t s1, s2, s3, s4;
   uint32_t h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
   uint8_t buf[16];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st");
+
 static inline struct poly1305_state_st *poly1305_aligned_state(
     poly1305_state *state) {
   return (struct poly1305_state_st *)(((uintptr_t)state + 63) & ~63);
@@ -200,7 +204,6 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t key[32]) {
 
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
                             size_t in_len) {
-  unsigned int i;
   struct poly1305_state_st *state = poly1305_aligned_state(statep);
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_POLY1305_NEON)
@@ -211,11 +214,11 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
 #endif
 
   if (state->buf_used) {
-    unsigned todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
-      todo = (unsigned)in_len;
+      todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       state->buf[state->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     state->buf_used += todo;
@@ -236,10 +239,10 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       state->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
-    state->buf_used = (unsigned)in_len;
+    state->buf_used = in_len;
   }
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm.c

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ extern void addmulmod(fe1305x2 *r, const fe1305x2 *x, const fe1305x2 *y,
                       const fe1305x2 *c);
 
 extern int blocks(fe1305x2 *h, const fe1305x2 *precomp, const uint8_t *in,
-                  unsigned int inlen);
+                  size_t inlen);
 
 static void freeze(fe1305x2 *r) {
   int i;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static void fe1305x2_tobytearray(uint8_t r[16], fe1305x2 *x) {
 }
 
 static void fe1305x2_frombytearray(fe1305x2 *r, const uint8_t *x, size_t xlen) {
-  unsigned i;
+  size_t i;
   uint8_t t[17];
 
   for (i = 0; (i < 16) && (i < xlen); i++) {
@@ -179,17 +179,20 @@ static const alignas(16) fe1305x2 zero;
 struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint8_t data[sizeof(fe1305x2[5]) + 128];
   uint8_t buf[32];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st.");
+
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   struct poly1305_state_st *st = (struct poly1305_state_st *)(state);
   fe1305x2 *const r = (fe1305x2 *)(st->data + (15 & (-(int)st->data)));
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int j;
 
   r->v[1] = r->v[0] = 0x3ffffff & load32(key);
   r->v[3] = r->v[2] = 0x3ffff03 & (load32(key + 3) >> 2);
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   r->v[7] = r->v[6] = 0x3f03fff & (load32(key + 9) >> 6);
   r->v[9] = r->v[8] = 0x00fffff & (load32(key + 12) >> 8);
 
-  for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
+  for (size_t j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
     h->v[j] = 0;  // XXX: should fast-forward a bit
   }
 
@@ -215,14 +218,13 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int i;
 
   if (st->buf_used) {
-    unsigned int todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
       todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       st->buf[st->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used += todo;
@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
     if (st->buf_used == sizeof(st->buf) && in_len) {
       addmulmod(h, h, precomp, &zero);
       fe1305x2_frombytearray(c, st->buf, sizeof(st->buf));
-      for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
         h->v[i] += c->v[i];
       }
       st->buf_used = 0;
@@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   while (in_len > 32) {
-    unsigned int tlen = 1048576;
+    size_t tlen = 1048576;
     if (in_len < tlen) {
       tlen = in_len;
     }
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       st->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used = in_len;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_vec.c

@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ typedef struct poly1305_state_internal_t {
 } poly1305_state_internal; /* 448 bytes total + 63 bytes for
                               alignment = 511 bytes raw */
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_internal_t) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_internal_t");
+
 static inline poly1305_state_internal *poly1305_aligned_state(
     poly1305_state *state) {
   return (poly1305_state_internal *)(((uint64_t)state + 63) & ~63);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/passive.c

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include "../fipsmodule/rand/internal.h"
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY)
+
+// RAND_need_entropy is called by the FIPS module when it has blocked because of
+// a lack of entropy. This signal is used as an indication to feed it more.
+void RAND_need_entropy(size_t bytes_needed) {
+  uint8_t buf[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
+  size_t todo = sizeof(buf);
+  if (todo > bytes_needed) {
+    todo = bytes_needed;
+  }
+
+  int used_cpu;
+  CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(buf, todo, &used_cpu);
+  RAND_load_entropy(buf, todo, used_cpu);
+}
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/rand_extra.c

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) {
   return (RAND_METHOD*) &kSSLeayMethod;
 }
 
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) {
+  return RAND_SSLeay();
+}
+
 const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) { return RAND_SSLeay(); }
 
 void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *method) {}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/stack/stack.c

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
 #include <openssl/stack.h>
 
 #include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 
@@ -69,11 +68,9 @@
 static const size_t kMinSize = 4;
 
 _STACK *sk_new(stack_cmp_func comp) {
-  _STACK *ret;
-
-  ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
+  _STACK *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
   if (ret == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    return NULL;
   }
   OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(_STACK));
 
@@ -331,23 +328,20 @@ void *sk_pop(_STACK *sk) {
 }
 
 _STACK *sk_dup(const _STACK *sk) {
-  _STACK *ret;
-  void **s;
-
   if (sk == NULL) {
     return NULL;
   }
 
-  ret = sk_new(sk->comp);
+  _STACK *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
   if (ret == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    return NULL;
   }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(_STACK));
 
-  s = (void **)OPENSSL_realloc(ret->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
-  if (s == NULL) {
+  ret->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
+  if (ret->data == NULL) {
     goto err;
   }
-  ret->data = s;
 
   ret->num = sk->num;
   OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->data, sk->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/trust_token/internal.h

@@ -30,16 +30,20 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 
-// PMBTokens.
-//
-// PMBTokens is described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215
-// and provides anonymous tokens with private metadata. We implement the
-// construction with validity verification, described in appendix H,
-// construction 6.
+// For the following cryptographic schemes, we use P-384 instead of our usual
+// choice of P-256. See Appendix I of
+// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215 which describes two attacks
+// which may affect smaller curves. In particular, p-1 for P-256 is smooth,
+// giving a low complexity for the p-1 attack. P-384's p-1 has a 281-bit prime
+// factor,
+// 3055465788140352002733946906144561090641249606160407884365391979704929268480326390471.
+// This lower-bounds the p-1 attack at O(2^140). The p+1 attack is lower-bounded
+// by O(p^(1/3)) or O(2^128), so we do not need to check the smoothness of p+1.
 
-// PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE is the size of nonces used as part of the PMBToken
+
+// TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE is the size of nonces used as part of the Trust_Token
 // protocol.
-#define PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE 64
+#define TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE 64
 
 typedef struct {
   // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/334): These should store |EC_PRECOMP| so
@@ -47,7 +51,7 @@ typedef struct {
   EC_AFFINE pub0;
   EC_AFFINE pub1;
   EC_AFFINE pubs;
-} PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY;
+} TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY;
 
 typedef struct {
   EC_SCALAR x0;
@@ -62,47 +66,47 @@ typedef struct {
   EC_PRECOMP pub1_precomp;
   EC_AFFINE pubs;
   EC_PRECOMP pubs_precomp;
-} PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY;
+} TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY;
 
-// PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN represents the intermediate state a client keeps during a
-// PMBToken issuance operation.
+// TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN represents the intermediate state a client keeps during
+// a Trust_Token issuance operation.
 typedef struct pmb_pretoken_st {
-  uint8_t t[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
+  uint8_t t[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
   EC_SCALAR r;
   EC_AFFINE Tp;
-} PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN;
+} TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN;
+
+// TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free releases the memory associated with |token|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN *token);
 
-// PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free releases the memory associated with |token|.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN *token);
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)
 
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)
+
+// PMBTokens.
+//
+// PMBTokens is described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215
+// and provides anonymous tokens with private metadata. We implement the
+// construction with validity verification, described in appendix H,
+// construction 6.
 
 // The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
 // functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v1|'s PMBTokens construction which
 // uses P-384.
-//
-// We use P-384 instead of our usual choice of P-256. See Appendix I which
-// describes two attacks which may affect smaller curves. In particular, p-1 for
-// P-256 is smooth, giving a low complexity for the p-1 attack. P-384's p-1 has
-// a 281-bit prime factor,
-// 3055465788140352002733946906144561090641249606160407884365391979704929268480326390471.
-// This lower-bounds the p-1 attack at O(2^140). The p+1 attack is lower-bounded
-// by O(p^(1/3)) or O(2^128), so we do not need to check the smoothness of p+1.
 int pmbtoken_exp1_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
-int pmbtoken_exp1_client_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+int pmbtoken_exp1_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
                                         const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
-int pmbtoken_exp1_issuer_key_from_bytes(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+int pmbtoken_exp1_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
                                         const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
-STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp1_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
-int pmbtoken_exp1_sign(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp1_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
                        size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
                        uint8_t private_metadata);
 STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
-    pmbtoken_exp1_unblind(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
-                          const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+    pmbtoken_exp1_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
                           CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
-int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
-                       uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
                        uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
                        size_t token_len);
 
@@ -110,6 +114,62 @@ int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
 // function is used to confirm H was computed as expected.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int pmbtoken_exp1_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]);
 
+// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
+// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v2|'s PMBTokens construction which
+// uses P-384.
+int pmbtoken_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp2_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                       size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                       uint8_t private_metadata);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_exp2_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                          CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                       uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                       size_t token_len);
+
+// pmbtoken_exp2_get_h_for_testing returns H in uncompressed coordinates. This
+// function is used to confirm H was computed as expected.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int pmbtoken_exp2_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]);
+
+
+// VOPRF.
+//
+// VOPRFs are described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-04
+// and provide anonymous tokens. This implementation uses TrustToken DSTs and
+// the DLEQ batching primitive from
+// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215.
+// VOPRF only uses the |pub|' field of the TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY and
+// |xs|/|pubs| fields of the TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY.
+
+// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
+// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v2|'s VOPRF construction which uses
+// P-384.
+int voprf_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+int voprf_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+int voprf_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * voprf_exp2_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int voprf_exp2_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                    size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                    uint8_t private_metadata);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    voprf_exp2_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                       const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                       CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+int voprf_exp2_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                    uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                    uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                    size_t token_len);
+
 
 // Trust Tokens internals.
 
@@ -122,23 +182,23 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
   // client_key_from_bytes decodes a client key from |in| and sets |key|
   // to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
   // on failure.
-  int (*client_key_from_bytes)(PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
+  int (*client_key_from_bytes)(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
                                size_t len);
 
   // issuer_key_from_bytes decodes a issuer key from |in| and sets |key|
   // to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
   // on failure.
-  int (*issuer_key_from_bytes)(PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
+  int (*issuer_key_from_bytes)(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
                                size_t len);
 
   // blind generates a new issuance request for |count| tokens. On
-  // success, it returns a newly-allocated |STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)| and
+  // success, it returns a newly-allocated |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)| and
   // writes a request to the issuer to |cbb|. On failure, it returns NULL. The
-  // |STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)|s should be passed to |pmbtoken_unblind| when
+  // |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)|s should be passed to |pmbtoken_unblind| when
   // the server responds.
   //
   // This function implements the AT.Usr0 operation.
-  STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) *(*blind)(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * (*blind)(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
 
   // sign parses a request for |num_requested| tokens from |cbs| and
   // issues |num_to_issue| tokens with |key| and a private metadata value of
@@ -146,7 +206,7 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
   // success and zero on failure.
   //
   // This function implements the AT.Sig operation.
-  int (*sign)(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+  int (*sign)(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
               size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
               uint8_t private_metadata);
 
@@ -159,8 +219,8 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
   //
   // This function implements the AT.Usr1 operation.
   STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
-      (*unblind)(const PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
-                 const STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
+      (*unblind)(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                 const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
                  size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
 
   // read parses a PMBToken from |token| and verifies it using |key|. On
@@ -168,23 +228,32 @@ struct trust_token_method_st {
   // |out_nonce| and |*out_private_metadata|. Otherwise, it returns zero. Note
   // that, unlike the output of |unblind|, |token| does not have a
   // four-byte key ID prepended.
-  int (*read)(const PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
-              uint8_t out_nonce[PMBTOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+  int (*read)(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+              uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
               uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
               size_t token_len);
+
+  // whether the construction supports private metadata.
+  int has_private_metadata;
+
+  // max keys that can be configured.
+  size_t max_keys;
+
+  // whether the SRR is part of the protocol.
+  int has_srr;
 };
 
 // Structure representing a single Trust Token public key with the specified ID.
 struct trust_token_client_key_st {
   uint32_t id;
-  PMBTOKEN_CLIENT_KEY key;
+  TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY key;
 };
 
 // Structure representing a single Trust Token private key with the specified
 // ID.
 struct trust_token_issuer_key_st {
   uint32_t id;
-  PMBTOKEN_ISSUER_KEY key;
+  TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY key;
 };
 
 struct trust_token_client_st {
@@ -195,13 +264,13 @@ struct trust_token_client_st {
 
   // keys is the set of public keys that are supported by the client for
   // issuance/redemptions.
-  struct trust_token_client_key_st keys[3];
+  struct trust_token_client_key_st keys[6];
 
   // num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
   size_t num_keys;
 
   // pretokens is the intermediate state during an active issuance.
-  STACK_OF(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN)* pretokens;
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)* pretokens;
 
   // srr_key is the public key used to verify the signature of the SRR.
   EVP_PKEY *srr_key;
@@ -217,7 +286,7 @@ struct trust_token_issuer_st {
   // keys is the set of private keys that are supported by the issuer for
   // issuance/redemptions. The public metadata is an index into this list of
   // keys.
-  struct trust_token_issuer_key_st keys[3];
+  struct trust_token_issuer_key_st keys[6];
 
   // num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
   size_t num_keys;
@@ -239,7 +308,7 @@ extern "C++" {
 
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
-BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN, PMBTOKEN_PRETOKEN_free)
+BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free)
 
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_END