grpc 1.27.0.pre1 → 1.30.1

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/internal.h

@@ -218,19 +218,17 @@ OPENSSL_INLINE void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
 #endif  // !VPAES
 
 
-void aes_nohw_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
-void aes_nohw_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
 int aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits,
                              AES_KEY *aeskey);
 int aes_nohw_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits,
                              AES_KEY *aeskey);
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
-    (defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || defined(OPENSSL_X86))
-#define AES_NOHW_CBC
+void aes_nohw_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
+void aes_nohw_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
+void aes_nohw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
+                                   size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+                                   const uint8_t ivec[16]);
 void aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
                           const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, const int enc);
-#endif
 
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/mode_wrappers.c

@@ -79,12 +79,10 @@ void AES_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
     return;
   }
 
-#if defined(AES_NOHW_CBC)
   if (!vpaes_capable()) {
     aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, enc);
     return;
   }
-#endif
   if (enc) {
     CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, AES_encrypt);
   } else {

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/bcm.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include "../internal.h"
 
 #include "aes/aes.c"
+#include "aes/aes_nohw.c"
 #include "aes/key_wrap.c"
 #include "aes/mode_wrappers.c"
 #include "bn/add.c"
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@
 #include "ec/felem.c"
 #include "ec/oct.c"
 #include "ec/p224-64.c"
-#include "../../third_party/fiat/p256.c"
+#include "ec/p256.c"
 #include "ec/p256-x86_64.c"
 #include "ec/scalar.c"
 #include "ec/simple.c"
@@ -83,9 +84,11 @@
 #include "modes/cfb.c"
 #include "modes/ctr.c"
 #include "modes/gcm.c"
+#include "modes/gcm_nohw.c"
 #include "modes/ofb.c"
 #include "modes/polyval.c"
 #include "rand/ctrdrbg.c"
+#include "rand/fork_detect.c"
 #include "rand/rand.c"
 #include "rand/urandom.c"
 #include "rsa/blinding.c"

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/exponentiation.c

@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ void bn_mod_exp_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
     num_p--;
   }
   if (num_p == 0) {
-    bn_from_montgomery_small(r, mont->RR.d, num, mont);
+    bn_from_montgomery_small(r, num, mont->RR.d, num, mont);
     return;
   }
   unsigned bits = BN_num_bits_word(p[num_p - 1]) + (num_p - 1) * BN_BITS2;
@@ -809,8 +809,8 @@ void bn_mod_exp_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
   OPENSSL_cleanse(val, sizeof(val));
 }
 
-void bn_mod_inverse_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
-                                     const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+void bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                                      size_t num, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
   if (num != (size_t)mont->N.width || num > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
     abort();
   }

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/internal.h

@@ -647,10 +647,13 @@ void bn_to_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
                             const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
 
 // bn_from_montgomery_small sets |r| to |a| translated out of the Montgomery
-// domain. |r| and |a| are |num| words long, which must be |mont->N.width|. |a|
-// must be fully-reduced and may alias |r|.
-void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
-                              const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+// domain. |r| and |a| are |num_r| and |num_a| words long, respectively. |num_r|
+// must be |mont->N.width|. |a| must be at most |mont->N|^2 and may alias |r|.
+//
+// Unlike most of these functions, only |num_r| is bounded by
+// |BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS|. |num_a| may exceed it, but must be at most 2 * |num_r|.
+void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                              size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
 
 // bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small sets |r| to |a| * |b| mod |mont->N|. Both inputs
 // and outputs are in the Montgomery domain. Each array is |num| words long,
@@ -675,13 +678,13 @@ void bn_mod_exp_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
                            const BN_ULONG *p, size_t num_p,
                            const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
 
-// bn_mod_inverse_prime_mont_small sets |r| to |a|^-1 mod |mont->N|. |mont->N|
-// must be a prime. |r| and |a| are |num| words long, which must be
-// |mont->N.width| and at most |BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS|. |a| must be fully-reduced
-// and may alias |r|. This function runs in time independent of |a|, but
-// |mont->N| is a public value.
-void bn_mod_inverse_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
-                                     const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+// bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small sets |r| to |a|^-1 mod |mont->N|. If |a| is
+// zero, |r| is set to zero. |mont->N| must be a prime. |r| and |a| are |num|
+// words long, which must be |mont->N.width| and at most |BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS|.
+// |a| must be fully-reduced and may alias |r|. This function runs in time
+// independent of |a|, but |mont->N| is a public value.
+void bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                                      size_t num, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
 
 
 #if defined(__cplusplus)

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c

@@ -455,18 +455,18 @@ void bn_to_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
   bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(r, a, mont->RR.d, num, mont);
 }
 
-void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
-                              const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
-  if (num != (size_t)mont->N.width || num > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
+void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                              size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
+  if (num_r != (size_t)mont->N.width || num_r > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS ||
+      num_a > 2 * num_r) {
     abort();
   }
-  BN_ULONG tmp[BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS * 2];
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp, a, num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-  OPENSSL_memset(tmp + num, 0, num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-  if (!bn_from_montgomery_in_place(r, num, tmp, 2 * num, mont)) {
+  BN_ULONG tmp[BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS * 2] = {0};
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp, a, num_a * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  if (!bn_from_montgomery_in_place(r, num_r, tmp, 2 * num_r, mont)) {
     abort();
   }
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, 2 * num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, 2 * num_r * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
 }
 
 void bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c

@@ -119,26 +119,20 @@ static void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t na,
   }
 }
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
-// Here follows specialised variants of bn_add_words() and bn_sub_words(). They
-// have the property performing operations on arrays of different sizes. The
-// sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common length (
-// basicall, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta between the two
-// lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the number of
-// BN_ULONGs...  For the operations that require a result array as parameter,
-// it must have the length cl+abs(dl). These functions should probably end up
-// in bn_asm.c as soon as there are assembler counterparts for the systems that
-// use assembler files.
-
+// bn_sub_part_words sets |r| to |a| - |b|. It returns the borrow bit, which is
+// one if the operation underflowed and zero otherwise. |cl| is the common
+// length, that is, the shorter of len(a) or len(b). |dl| is the delta length,
+// that is, len(a) - len(b). |r|'s length matches the larger of |a| and |b|, or
+// cl + abs(dl).
+//
+// TODO(davidben): Make this take |size_t|. The |cl| + |dl| calling convention
+// is confusing.
 static BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
                                   const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) {
-  BN_ULONG c, t;
-
   assert(cl >= 0);
-  c = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, cl);
-
+  BN_ULONG borrow = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, cl);
   if (dl == 0) {
-    return c;
+    return borrow;
   }
 
   r += cl;
@@ -146,147 +140,26 @@ static BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
   b += cl;
 
   if (dl < 0) {
-    for (;;) {
-      t = b[0];
-      r[0] = 0 - t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 1;
-      }
-      if (++dl >= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      t = b[1];
-      r[1] = 0 - t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 1;
-      }
-      if (++dl >= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      t = b[2];
-      r[2] = 0 - t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 1;
-      }
-      if (++dl >= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      t = b[3];
-      r[3] = 0 - t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 1;
-      }
-      if (++dl >= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      b += 4;
-      r += 4;
+    // |a| is shorter than |b|. Complete the subtraction as if the excess words
+    // in |a| were zeros.
+    dl = -dl;
+    for (int i = 0; i < dl; i++) {
+      r[i] = 0u - b[i] - borrow;
+      borrow |= r[i] != 0;
     }
   } else {
-    int save_dl = dl;
-    while (c) {
-      t = a[0];
-      r[0] = t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 0;
-      }
-      if (--dl <= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      t = a[1];
-      r[1] = t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 0;
-      }
-      if (--dl <= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      t = a[2];
-      r[2] = t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 0;
-      }
-      if (--dl <= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      t = a[3];
-      r[3] = t - c;
-      if (t != 0) {
-        c = 0;
-      }
-      if (--dl <= 0) {
-        break;
-      }
-
-      save_dl = dl;
-      a += 4;
-      r += 4;
-    }
-    if (dl > 0) {
-      if (save_dl > dl) {
-        switch (save_dl - dl) {
-          case 1:
-            r[1] = a[1];
-            if (--dl <= 0) {
-              break;
-            }
-            OPENSSL_FALLTHROUGH;
-          case 2:
-            r[2] = a[2];
-            if (--dl <= 0) {
-              break;
-            }
-            OPENSSL_FALLTHROUGH;
-          case 3:
-            r[3] = a[3];
-            if (--dl <= 0) {
-              break;
-            }
-        }
-        a += 4;
-        r += 4;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (dl > 0) {
-      for (;;) {
-        r[0] = a[0];
-        if (--dl <= 0) {
-          break;
-        }
-        r[1] = a[1];
-        if (--dl <= 0) {
-          break;
-        }
-        r[2] = a[2];
-        if (--dl <= 0) {
-          break;
-        }
-        r[3] = a[3];
-        if (--dl <= 0) {
-          break;
-        }
-
-        a += 4;
-        r += 4;
-      }
+    // |b| is shorter than |a|. Complete the subtraction as if the excess words
+    // in |b| were zeros.
+    for (int i = 0; i < dl; i++) {
+      // |r| and |a| may alias, so use a temporary.
+      BN_ULONG tmp = a[i];
+      r[i] = a[i] - borrow;
+      borrow = tmp < r[i];
     }
   }
 
-  return c;
+  return borrow;
 }
-#else
-// On other platforms the function is defined in asm.
-BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
-                           int cl, int dl);
-#endif
 
 // bn_abs_sub_part_words computes |r| = |a| - |b|, storing the absolute value
 // and returning a mask of all ones if the result was negative and all zeros if
@@ -294,8 +167,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
 // convention.
 //
 // TODO(davidben): Make this take |size_t|. The |cl| + |dl| calling convention
-// is confusing. The trouble is 32-bit x86 implements |bn_sub_part_words| in
-// assembly, but we can probably just delete it?
+// is confusing.
 static BN_ULONG bn_abs_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
                                       const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl,
                                       BN_ULONG *tmp) {
@@ -583,7 +455,7 @@ static int bn_mul_impl(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
   static const int kMulNormalSize = 16;
   if (al >= kMulNormalSize && bl >= kMulNormalSize) {
     if (-1 <= i && i <= 1) {
-      // Find the larger power of two less than or equal to the larger length.
+      // Find the largest power of two less than or equal to the larger length.
       int j;
       if (i >= 0) {
         j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
@@ -599,6 +471,10 @@ static int bn_mul_impl(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
       if (al > j || bl > j) {
         // We know |al| and |bl| are at most one from each other, so if al > j,
         // bl >= j, and vice versa. Thus we can use |bn_mul_part_recursive|.
+        //
+        // TODO(davidben): This codepath is almost unused in standard
+        // algorithms. Is this optimization necessary? See notes in
+        // https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/q/I0bd604e2cd6a75c266f64476c23a730ca1721ea6
         assert(al >= j && bl >= j);
         if (!bn_wexpand(t, j * 8) ||
             !bn_wexpand(rr, j * 4)) {

data/third_party/{boringssl → boringssl-with-bazel/src}/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/prime.c

@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static const uint16_t kPrimes[] = {
 };
 
 // BN_prime_checks_for_size returns the number of Miller-Rabin iterations
-// necessary for a 'bits'-bit prime.
+// necessary for generating a 'bits'-bit candidate prime.
 //
 //
 // This table is generated using the algorithm of FIPS PUB 186-4
@@ -604,9 +604,8 @@ err:
   return ret;
 }
 
-int BN_primality_test(int *out_is_probably_prime, const BIGNUM *w,
-                      int iterations, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division,
-                      BN_GENCB *cb) {
+int BN_primality_test(int *out_is_probably_prime, const BIGNUM *w, int checks,
+                      BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb) {
   // This function's secrecy and performance requirements come from RSA key
   // generation. We generate RSA keys by selecting two large, secret primes with
   // rejection sampling.
@@ -679,8 +678,8 @@ int BN_primality_test(int *out_is_probably_prime, const BIGNUM *w,
     }
   }
 
-  if (iterations == BN_prime_checks) {
-    iterations = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(w));
+  if (checks == BN_prime_checks_for_generation) {
+    checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(w));
   }
 
   BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
@@ -736,7 +735,7 @@ int BN_primality_test(int *out_is_probably_prime, const BIGNUM *w,
   // Using |constant_time_lt_w| seems to prevent the compiler from optimizing
   // this into two jumps.
   for (int i = 1; (i <= BN_PRIME_CHECKS_BLINDED) |
-                  constant_time_lt_w(uniform_iterations, iterations);
+                  constant_time_lt_w(uniform_iterations, checks);
        i++) {
     // Step 4.1-4.2
     int is_uniform;
@@ -765,7 +764,7 @@ int BN_primality_test(int *out_is_probably_prime, const BIGNUM *w,
     }
   }
 
-  assert(uniform_iterations >= (crypto_word_t)iterations);
+  assert(uniform_iterations >= (crypto_word_t)checks);
   *out_is_probably_prime = 1;
   ret = 1;
 
@@ -792,7 +791,7 @@ int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
 }
 
 int BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(
-    enum bn_primality_result_t *out_result, const BIGNUM *w, int iterations,
+    enum bn_primality_result_t *out_result, const BIGNUM *w, int checks,
     BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) {
   // Enhanced Miller-Rabin is only valid on odd integers greater than 3.
   if (!BN_is_odd(w) || BN_cmp_word(w, 3) <= 0) {
@@ -800,8 +799,8 @@ int BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (iterations == BN_prime_checks) {
-    iterations = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(w));
+  if (checks == BN_prime_checks_for_generation) {
+    checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(w));
   }
 
   int ret = 0;
@@ -848,7 +847,7 @@ int BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(
 
   // The following loop performs in inner iteration of the Enhanced Miller-Rabin
   // Primality test (Step 4).
-  for (int i = 1; i <= iterations; i++) {
+  for (int i = 1; i <= checks; i++) {
     // Step 4.1-4.2
     if (!BN_rand_range_ex(b, 2, w1)) {
       goto err;