grpc 1.10.0 → 1.11.0.pre2

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/s3_both.cc

@@ -132,15 +132,15 @@
 
 namespace bssl {
 
-static int add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
-                                Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+static bool add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
+                                 Span<const uint8_t> in) {
   // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out.
   assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0);
 
-  if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
-    ssl->s3->pending_flight = BUF_MEM_new();
-    if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
-      return 0;
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
+    ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
+    if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
+      return false;
     }
   }
 
@@ -148,40 +148,40 @@ static int add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
   size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out;
   if (max_out < in.size() || new_cap < max_out) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
-    return 0;
+    return false;
   }
 
   size_t len;
-  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight, new_cap) ||
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight.get(), new_cap) ||
       !tls_seal_record(ssl,
                        (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data +
                            ssl->s3->pending_flight->length,
                        &len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) {
-    return 0;
+    return false;
   }
 
   ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len;
-  return 1;
+  return true;
 }
 
-int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+bool ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
   // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
   if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
       !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
       !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     CBB_cleanup(cbb);
-    return 0;
+    return false;
   }
 
-  return 1;
+  return true;
 }
 
-int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
+bool ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
   return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg);
 }
 
-int ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
+bool ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
   // Add the message to the current flight, splitting into several records if
   // needed.
   Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg;
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
     rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());
 
     if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) {
-      return 0;
+      return false;
     }
   } while (!rest.empty());
 
@@ -198,41 +198,46 @@ int ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
   // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
   // hs.
   if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
-      !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg.data(), msg.size())) {
-    return 0;
+      !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) {
+    return false;
   }
-  return 1;
+  return true;
 }
 
-int ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+bool ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
   static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
 
   if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
                             kChangeCipherSpec)) {
-    return 0;
+    return false;
   }
 
   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
                       kChangeCipherSpec);
-  return 1;
+  return true;
 }
 
-int ssl3_add_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t level, uint8_t desc) {
+bool ssl3_add_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t level, uint8_t desc) {
   uint8_t alert[2] = {level, desc};
   if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert)) {
-    return 0;
+    return false;
   }
 
   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert);
   ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, ((int)level << 8) | desc);
-  return 1;
+  return true;
 }
 
 int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
     return 1;
   }
 
+  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
   if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > 0xffffffff ||
       ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -241,10 +246,10 @@ int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
 
   // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
   // any new data in pending_flight.
-  if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
     int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
     if (ret <= 0) {
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
       return ret;
     }
   }
@@ -256,7 +261,7 @@ int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
         ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
         ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
     if (ret <= 0) {
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
       return ret;
     }
 
@@ -264,150 +269,45 @@ int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
   }
 
   if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) {
-    ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+    ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
     return -1;
   }
 
-  BUF_MEM_free(ssl->s3->pending_flight);
-  ssl->s3->pending_flight = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
   ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
   return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl3_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
-
-  uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t finished_len;
-  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
-                                     ssl->server)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
-  if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
-                      session->master_key,
-                      session->master_key_length)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
-  if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
-    if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
-        finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (ssl->server) {
-      OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
-      ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
-    } else {
-      OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
-      ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
-    }
-  }
-
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
-      !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) {
-  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) {
-    int ret = ssl3_read_handshake_bytes(
-        ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
-        length - ssl->init_buf->length);
-    if (ret <= 0) {
-      return ret;
-    }
-    ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
-  // Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
-  // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
-  // the first record.
-  int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-  const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl).data();
-
-  // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
-  // to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
-  // V2ClientHello.)
-  if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
-      strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
-      strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
-      strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO ||
-      p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
-    // Not a V2ClientHello.
-    return 1;
-  }
-
+static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                              Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  *out_consumed = 0;
+  assert(in.size() >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
   // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello.
-  size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+  size_t msg_length = ((in[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | in[1];
   if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
-    return -1;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
   }
   if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
     // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
     // |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
     // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that.
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    return -1;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
   }
 
-  // Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
-  ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
+  // Ask for the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
+  if (in.size() < 2 + msg_length) {
+    *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
+    return ssl_open_record_partial;
   }
 
-  CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(ssl_read_buffer(ssl).subspan(2, msg_length));
+  CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(ssl->s3->read_buffer.span().subspan(2, msg_length));
   // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
   // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
   // guaranteed to be non-NULL.
-  if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
-                                      CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
-    return -1;
+  if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(v2_client_hello)) {
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
   }
 
   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */,
@@ -426,7 +326,7 @@ static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
       !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
       CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
   }
 
   // msg_type has already been checked.
@@ -451,9 +351,9 @@ static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
                                1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
   ScopedCBB client_hello;
   CBB hello_body, cipher_suites;
-  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, max_v3_client_hello) ||
-      !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
-                      ssl->init_buf->max) ||
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), max_v3_client_hello) ||
+      !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
+                      ssl->s3->hs_buf->max) ||
       !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
       !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) ||
       !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
@@ -462,7 +362,7 @@ static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
       !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
       !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return -1;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
   }
 
   // Copy the cipher suites.
@@ -470,7 +370,7 @@ static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
     uint32_t cipher_spec;
     if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return -1;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
     }
 
     // Skip SSLv2 ciphers.
@@ -479,38 +379,34 @@ static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
     }
     if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return -1;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
     }
   }
 
   // Add the null compression scheme and finish.
   if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||
       !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
-      !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) {
+      !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return -1;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
   }
 
-  // Consume and discard the V2ClientHello.
-  ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
-  ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
-
+  *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
   ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true;
-  return 1;
+  return ssl_open_record_success;
 }
 
-// TODO(davidben): Remove |out_bytes_needed| and inline into |ssl3_get_message|
-// when the entire record is copied into |init_buf|.
-static bool parse_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out, size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
-  if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+static bool parse_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out,
+                          size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
+  if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
     *out_bytes_needed = 4;
     return false;
   }
 
   CBS cbs;
   uint32_t len;
-  CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->init_buf->data),
-           ssl->init_buf->length);
+  CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
+           ssl->s3->hs_buf->length);
   if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) ||
       !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) {
     *out_bytes_needed = 4;
@@ -522,7 +418,7 @@ static bool parse_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out, size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->init_buf->data),
+  CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
            4 + len);
   out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello;
   return true;
@@ -542,61 +438,147 @@ bool ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
   return true;
 }
 
-int ssl3_read_message(SSL *ssl) {
+bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) {
+  // If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first.
   SSLMessage msg;
   size_t bytes_needed;
   if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return -1;
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return false;
   }
 
   // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
   if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-    return -1;
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
+  size_t msg_len = 0;
+  if (ssl->s3->has_message) {
+    SSLMessage msg;
+    size_t unused;
+    if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &unused)) {
+      msg_len = CBS_len(&msg.raw);
+    }
   }
 
+  return ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length > msg_len;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl3_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                      uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  *out_consumed = 0;
   // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
-  if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
-    ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
-    if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
-      return -1;
+  if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
+    ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
+    if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
     }
   }
 
   // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello.
   if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
-    int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl);
-    if (ret > 0) {
-      ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
+    // Ask for the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
+    // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read
+    // beyond the first record.
+    if (in.size() < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+      *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+      return ssl_open_record_partial;
+    }
+
+    // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application
+    // wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with
+    // ClientHello or V2ClientHello.)
+    const char *str = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in.data());
+    if (strncmp("GET ", str, 4) == 0 ||
+        strncmp("POST ", str, 5) == 0 ||
+        strncmp("HEAD ", str, 5) == 0 ||
+        strncmp("PUT ", str, 4) == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+      *out_alert = 0;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+    if (strncmp("CONNE", str, 5) == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+      *out_alert = 0;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
     }
+
+    // Check for a V2ClientHello.
+    if ((in[0] & 0x80) != 0 && in[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
+        in[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+      auto ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, out_consumed, in);
+      if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+        *out_alert = 0;
+      } else if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) {
+        ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
+      }
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+    ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t type;
+  Span<uint8_t> body;
+  auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+  if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
     return ret;
   }
 
-  return extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, bytes_needed);
+  // WatchGuard's TLS 1.3 interference bug is very distinctive: they drop the
+  // ServerHello and send the remaining encrypted application data records
+  // as-is. This manifests as an application data record when we expect
+  // handshake. Report a dedicated error code for this case.
+  if (!ssl->server && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+      ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // Append the entire handshake record to the buffer.
+  if (!BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), body.data(), body.size())) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_open_record_success;
 }
 
 void ssl3_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
   SSLMessage msg;
   if (!ssl3_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||
-      ssl->init_buf == NULL ||
-      ssl->init_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
+      !ssl->s3->hs_buf ||
+      ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
     assert(0);
     return;
   }
 
-  OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
-                  ssl->init_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
-  ssl->init_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
+  OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
+                  ssl->s3->hs_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
+                  ssl->s3->hs_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
+  ssl->s3->hs_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
   ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false;
   ssl->s3->has_message = false;
 
   // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
   // message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it.
-  if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->init_buf->length == 0) {
-    BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
-    ssl->init_buf = NULL;
+  if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
+    ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
   }
 }