Summary

It is possible to redirect a user to another origin if the "proceed_to" value in the session store is set to a protocol-relative URL.

Details

The google_sign_in gem persists an optional URL for redirection after authentication. If this URL is set to a protocol-relative URL, it improperly passes the "same origin" check, and it's possible for the user to be redirected to another origin after authentication, possibly resulting in exposure of authentication information if this attack is chained with other attacks.

Normally the value of this URL is only written and read by the library or the calling application. However, it may be possible to set this session value from a malicious site with a form submission.

Impact

Any Rails applications using the google_sign_in gem may be vulnerable, if this vector can be chained with another attack that is able to modify the OAuth2 request parameters.

Workarounds

No known workarounds.

Credits

This issue was responsibly reported by Hackerone user muntrive.

Summary

It is possible to craft a malformed URL that passes the "same origin" check, resulting in the user being redirected to another origin.

Details

The google_sign_in gem persists an optional URL for redirection after authentication. If this URL is malformed, it's possible for the user to be redirected to another origin after authentication, possibly resulting in exposure of authentication information such as the token.

Normally the value of this URL is only written and read by the library. If applications are configured to store session information in a database, there is no known vector to exploit this vulnerability. However, applications may be configured to store this information in a session cookie, in which case it may be chained with a session cookie attack to inject a crafted URL.

Impact

Rails applications configured to store the flash information in a session cookie may be vulnerable, if this can be chained with an attack that allows injection of arbitrary data into the session cookie.

Workarounds

If you are unable to upgrade this library, then you may mitigate the chained attack by explicitly setting SameSite=Lax or SameSite=Strict on the application session cookie.

Credits

This issue was responsibly reported by Hackerone user muntrive.